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Foreword by the Commissioner
Industrial relations are at the core of Member States’ economic and social
organisation. At the European level, the European social dialogue acts as a
complement to national industrial relations systems and has developed in tan-
dem with European integration and the efforts to build the European internal
market in order to ensure that it develops in a consensual manner. Social dia-
logue is recognised at the European level as a force for innovation, the con-
sensual anticipation and management of change and as making a key contri-
bution to better governance.
This, the third report on Industrial Relations in Europe, comes at an interest-
ing time, just as the European Union (EU) has embarked on its largest
enlargement which will increase the diversity of industrial relations traditions and the need for social
cohesion. Against this background, understanding better the different industrial relations systems in
Europe — including how they are evolving and how they contribute to economic and social prosper-
ity — is more important than ever.
The 2004 report also comes in the run-up to the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy, the EU’s
response to the challenges presented by globalisation.The spring 2004 European Council stressed the
need to step up efforts to achieve the Lisbon objectives, including the need for the social partners to
make a concrete contribution.This report shows that activities at the European level have been strong-
ly influenced by the need to achieve the Lisbon objectives, and the link between European industrial
relations and the Lisbon strategy is therefore a recurring theme throughout this publication.
In a context of Europeanisation, occurring as a result of globalisation and economic and monetary inte-
gration, the interaction between the European, national, sectoral and company levels of industrial rela-
tions is becoming of central importance.This increases the need for coordination and the European
level provides a good interface for benchmarking, sharing best practice and mutual learning.This report
seeks to make an active contribution to this process and illustrates the growing coordination practices
among a wide range of actors at the European level. I trust it will provide meaningful information and
stimulating food for thought to all its readers.
Vladimír Spidla 
Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities
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The evolution of the idea and practice
of social partnership is a key element
in the construction of the European
Union (EU). Also described as ‘social
dialogue’, its central message is that
employers and workers, and their
organised representatives, have an
important role to play in the gover-
nance of the EU’s economy and
labour market, and in the develop-
ment of appropriate policies of social
and economic reform. The potential
role of the social partners in times of
much needed reform — in order to
respond to the challenges set out at
the European Council of Lisbon in
2000 — was highlighted in the report
of the High Level Group on Industrial
Relations and Change and the
Commission’s communication on the
European social dialogue, both pub-
lished in 2002 (1).
The European social dialogue is
recognised at the highest level by the
European Council as being at the
heart of Europe’s economic and social
model, enabling parallel progress to
be made on the economic and social
fronts. In order to underpin the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon agenda, the
spring 2004 European Council called
on Member States to build partner-
ships for change involving the social
partners, civil society and public
authorities in accordance with nation-
al traditions.The importance of strong
commitment from the European
social partners to delivering reforms
was also stressed by the Employment
Taskforce in its November 2003
report (2).
In adopting the partnership approach,
the EU and its Member States recog-
nise that they have a joint responsibil-
ity in providing support for a coordi-
nated approach to industrial relations
and labour markets at a time when
that is being increasingly challenged
— by processes of internationalisa-
tion, decentralisation and individuali-
sation that tend to make collective
solutions less attractive and harder to
enforce.
Like its two predecessors (3), this third
report, Industrial Relations in Europe
2004, intends to provide an overview
of the current state and recent devel-
opment of industrial relations and
social partnership — the organisation
of its key actors, the relationships
between them, the agreements they
negotiate and the policies they con-
duct. Social partnership structures
apply at various levels — within com-
panies, in local and regional labour
markets and in branches or sectors of
economic activity, within single
Member States and beyond them to
embrace the EU as a whole. How
these structures and the resulting
processes and policies are connected
across levels — mutually reinforcing
or obstructing each other, or being
merely irrelevant — is a critical issue
for coordination. In the first report,
Industrial relations in Europe 2000, the
focus was on the role and value of
European-level structures and poli-
cies.The 2002 report devoted a chap-
ter to industrial relations in the candi-
date countries. This 2004 report
makes an attempt to compare all 25
current Member States of the EU,
although data is still lacking in some
areas.
The starting point for any overview of
European industrial relations and
labour market institutions must be
the recognition that although consid-
erable change is occurring and there
are some convergent trends in
European industrial relations, diversity
is also a persistent feature, both
between and within Member States.
This diversity, already a feature of the
EU before May 2004, will further
increase with the EU’s enlargement.
The fact that diversity persists in spite
of common pressures and challenges
and the fact that countries respond in
different ways to these, demonstrates
the important role played by rules and
institutions and the way in which they
are designed.
In a context of economic integration
such as that occurring in the EU,
while diversity may often increase
the need for harmonisation, conver-
gence or coordination, it also makes
it more difficult. It therefore pres-
ents a challenge to policy-makers in
designing policies to address com-
mon problems.The EU is responding
to this challenge in innovative ways,
both through legislation, horizontal
coordination and the European
social dialogue.
With regard to EU legislation, its
role is evolving. Although the tradi-
tional objective of classical EU
labour law instruments, namely cre-
ating a level-playing field through
setting minimum standards, remains
Editorial
(1) Report of the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the European Union, Employment and Social Affairs DG,
Brussels, January 2002; Communication from the Commission, ‘The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change’,
COM(2002) 341 final, 26 June 2002.
(2) Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, Jobs, jobs, jobs — Creating more employment in Europe, November
2003.
(3) European Commission, Industrial relations in Europe 2000, Employment and Social Affairs DG, Brussels, March 2000; and European
Commission, Industrial relations in Europe 2002, Employment and Social Affairs DG, Brussels, May 2002.
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important, European legally-binding
provisions increasingly pursue other
European policy goals, such as mod-
ernising the regulatory framework,
developing social dialogue at all levels,
finding new balances between flexibil-
ity and security, and increasing the
adaptability of workers. Examples of
horizontal coordination are the open
method of coordination (OMC), the
exchange of views and practices
within and between multinational
corporations, among others with
European works councils, and the
coordination of bargaining agendas
and activities by trade unions from
different Member States.
With regard to the European social
dialogue, it makes an important con-
tribution to policy coordination in
the industrial relations field. In recent
years this role has been stepped up
by the evolution of the social dialogue
in the direction of greater autonomy,
with the increasing adoption by the
European social partners of ‘new gen-
eration’ texts which make recom-
mendations to their members and
which they undertake to follow up
themselves at the national level. This
contrasts with their earlier joint
opinions which tended to be directed
solely at the European institutions
and national public authorities.
The developments described in the
report indicate that it is becoming
increasingly clear that Europea-
nisation in the field of industrial rela-
tions does not refer to ‘harmonisa-
tion’, or a vertical or upward transfer
of authority to the European level, as
was often assumed in the past. It
refers instead to a process of bringing
the European level closer to national
and local discussions and practices,
and European, national and local
actors closer to each other, while
respecting national and cultural differ-
ences. It refers to the convergent evo-
lution of institutions, practices, values
and outcomes such as democracy,
growth, employment and social cohe-
sion, as well as a growing awareness
among industrial relations actors at all
levels of what happens outside one’s
own national borders and cultures.
This understanding of a more ‘hori-
zontal’ Europeanisation, with its impli-
cations of more meaningful exchange
and coordination across national bor-
ders, can be more easily reconciled
with the overall decentralisation
trend in industrial relations. It
acknowledges the emergence of a
European pattern of orientations and
social relations among all participants
(e.g. unions, workers, managers,
employers’ organisations and govern-
ments) amidst a persistent diversity of
nationally defined interests, identities
and practices.
Against this background, although
diversity presents a challenge, it is
also an asset which Europe should
learn from and make to work to its
advantage. Indeed the European level
offers a rich context for benchmark-
ing, sharing best practice and mutual
learning. For example, one of the
main contributions of the European
social dialogue is that by bringing
together social partners from differ-
ent countries, it helps to promote
mutual learning among the actors,
both with regard to understanding
better the perspectives of their coun-
terparts on the other side of indus-
try, but also by increasing their under-
standing of different national tradi-
tions and cultures and what happens
beyond their borders.
Chapter 1 begins by examining pat-
terns and variations in European
industrial relations.The focus is main-
ly on the national level, although the
interaction with the European level is
also explored. The chapter describes
European industrial relations as a
‘mosaic of diversity’, but with interest-
ing efforts at coordination occurring,
both at national and European level.
Chapter 2 complements the first
chapter by exploring the notion of
‘quality in industrial relations’. At a
time when national industrial rela-
tions systems are having to adapt to
the pressures of globalisation and the
EU has enlarged to new Member
States with rather new industrial rela-
tions systems, there is an important
need to better understand what con-
stitutes good quality industrial rela-
tions, in other words, what works in
terms of delivering good economic
and social outcomes.This was an ele-
ment emphasised in the European
Commission’s ‘Social policy agenda’
for the years 2000–05(4). The chapter
provides examples of good industrial
relations at both the national and
European levels.Although the subject
is in need of further research, what is
clear at this stage is that a wide vari-
ety of approaches are being pursued
and that diverse solutions can deliver
beneficial outcomes.
Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on
European level responses. Chapter 3
examines developments in the
European social dialogue over the last
couple of years, which can be sum-
marised as a response to the Lisbon
objectives and preparation for
enlargement. In view of the contribu-
tion of the European social dialogue
to better governance, the chapter also
examines the qualitative evolution of
the European social dialogue towards
greater autonomy, including the
increasing adoption by the social part-
ners of new generation texts.Chapter
4 outlines the main legislative devel-
opments over the past two years and
the important role of legislation — in
spite of diverse national situations —
(4) COM(2000) 379 final, 28 June 2000.
for establishing a minimum degree of
convergence in certain areas in order
to create a level playing field for eco-
nomic actors.
In view of the growing importance of
the company level of industrial rela-
tions, Chapter 5 examines national
trends with regard to the interaction
between corporate ownership pat-
terns and industrial relations in the
EU, as well as initiatives taken at the
European level in the field of company
level industrial relations. Finally,
Chapter 6 examines employment and
working conditions in the new
Member States in relation to the
Lisbon objectives. It examines some
of the main trends occurring, including
the similarities and differences within
EU-15 or groups of Member States
within EU-15. Indeed, the trends with-
in EU-15 are not themselves uniform,
with considerable differences, most
notably between the northern and
southern Member States. EU mem-
bership and the need to implement
the EU’s social acquis, should over
time contribute to raising standards in
these countries, and there are indica-
tions that this is already occurring, for
example,with regard to working time.
EU health and safety and employee
information and consultation rules
should also help to bring about con-
siderable improvements.
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n 1. Introduction
The evolution of the idea and practice
of social partnership is a key ele-
ment in the construction of the EU.
Also described as ‘social dialogue’, its
central message is that employers and
workers, and their organised repre-
sentatives, have an important role to
play in the governance of the EU’s
economy and labour market, and in
the development of appropriate poli-
cies of social and economic reform.
The potential role of the social part-
ners as ‘change masters’ in times of
much needed reform — in order to
respond to the challenges set out at
the European Council of Lisbon in
2000 — was highlighted in the report
of the High Level Group on Industrial
Relations and Change (6). In adopting
the partnership approach, the EU and
its Member States recognise that they
have a joint responsibility in providing
support for a coordinated approach
to industrial relations and labour mar-
kets at a time when that is being
increasingly challenged — by process-
es of internationalisation, decentrali-
sation and individualisation that tend
to make collective solutions less
attractive and harder to enforce.
Like its two predecessors (7), this third
report, Industrial Relations in Europe
2004, intends to provide an overview
of the current state and recent devel-
opment of industrial relations and
social partnership — the organisation
of its key actors, the relationships
between them, the agreements they
negotiate and the policies they con-
duct. Social partnership structures
apply at various levels — within com-
panies, in local and regional labour
markets and in branches or sectors of
economic activity, within single
Member States and beyond them to
embrace the EU as a whole. How
these structures and the resulting
processes and policies are connected
across levels — mutually reinforcing
or obstructing each other, or being
merely irrelevant — is a critical issue
for coordination. In the first report,
Industrial Relations in Europe 2000, the
focus was on the role and value of
European-level structures and poli-
cies. The 2002 report devoted a
chapter to industrial relations in the
so-called ‘candidate countries’. This
2004 report makes an attempt to
compare all 25 current Member
States of the EU.
The starting point for any overview
of European industrial relations and
labour market institutions must be
the massive diversity across
European countries, and possibly
increasing diversity within them,
both between sectors and firms.This
diversity, already a feature of the EU
before May 2004, will further
increase with the EU’s enlargement.
Besides differences in social and eco-
nomic position and interests, this
cross-national diversity in industrial
relations institutions and practices is
a challenge to those who want to
adapt institutions and design policies
in order to address common prob-
lems. Increased heterogeneity within
countries, not only between compa-
nies and across sectors, but also in
social, regional and ethnic terms,
complicates the task of national law-
makers and makes centralised solu-
tions within national borders more
difficult. Across Europe, institutional
diversity and different national inter-
ests in a politically sensitive area
have made harmonisation in the field
of labour law and social policy in the
EU more difficult, even if national
diversity might in fact increase its
importance. Steps towards greater
unity and coordination have better
chances of realisation and contribut-
ing to the solution of common prob-
lems, when diversity is recognised
and understood.
To identify and understand the main
patterns and master trends in this
changing mosaic of diversity is
the key descriptive and analytical
task of this chapter. How different
are Europe’s trade unions in struc-
ture and policy? What do Europe’s
employers, as represented by their
associations, have in common? How
much deep variation in partnership
relations and in policies can be
observed? Which way do trends go?
What alternatives are there to cen-
tralisation? What patterns of govern-
ment assistance and intervention
can be witnessed? How much con-
vergence is there, and where, and
why? Does it include the industrial
relations institutions and practices in
Chapter 1
Patterns and variations in European 
industrial relations (5)
(5) This chapter was drafted by Professor Jelle Visser of the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, University of
Amsterdam.
(6) Report of the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the European Union, Employment and Social Affairs DG,
Brussels, January 2002.
(7) European Commission, Industrial relations in Europe 2000, Employment and Social Affairs DG, Brussels, March 2000; and European
Commission, Industrial relations in Europe 2002, Employment and Social Affairs DG, Brussels, May 2002.
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the 10 new Member States that have
recently joined the EU? Are there par-
ticular shortcomings in the institu-
tions and practices of European indus-
trial relations seen from the social
partnership perspective? These ques-
tions guide the survey of actors and
institutions in this chapter, as their
answers are the backdrop for the dis-
cussion of European-level structures,
initiatives and policies. In order to see
order in diversity, facilitate compari-
son and improve the analytical value
of the chapter, considerable impor-
tance has been placed on the develop-
ment of comparative indicators on
industrial relations institutions:
unions, employers’ organisations,
organisation rates, bargaining cover-
age, centralisation, coordination, and
government intervention.
One of the master trends in industri-
al relations in the past two decades
has been the gradual decentralisa-
tion of multi-employer and firm bar-
gaining structures. In Europe, this
process first became noticeable in
bargaining over reduced working
hours in the 1980s, but has since been
extended to matters of pay.
Internationalisation, technological and
organisational change, multi-tasking,
teamwork and client-related work
processes have made standardised
solutions, negotiated for entire sec-
tors, less feasible and less efficient.
Reflecting growing diversity among
their affiliates and within the member-
ship, this decentralisation trend has
also affected trade union movements,
in particular in relation to working
hours and work-family issues.
It needs to be repeated that Member
States, and sectors of economic activ-
ity within them,often set out from dif-
ferent starting points before being
subject to common pressures
towards decentralisation. In EU-15 (8),
multi-employer bargaining, in some
countries nationwide though more
often at the level of sectors, has been
common during the first three or four
decades since 1945. Decentralisation
in these countries often means offer-
ing more space for company or enter-
prise bargaining. Such a development
towards multi-level bargaining
requires institutional learning and
experimenting, and adaptations both
within unions and employers’ associa-
tions. The key issue, now, is to seek
new ways and methods of coor-
dination, within and across policy
fields, adapted to an environment
characterised by more international
pressure and internal diversity. In EU-
10,multi-employer bargaining and col-
lective bargaining of any kind is much
less common. Here the institutions of
social partnership are obviously much
younger, less settled, fragile and in
need of political support most of the
time. The search for new forms of
partnership and coordination, within
and across countries, but without the
obvious drawbacks of overly cen-
tralised decision-making and uniform
solutions that insufficiently recognise
the diversity in problems, preferences
and capabilities, is a common theme in
Europe, in industrial relations and in
this report.
Moving away from the old economy,
based on standardisation, mass pro-
duction, assimilation of existing tech-
nologies and long-term employment,
a new phase is being entered, where
the institutions of industrial relations
must facilitate, reward and address a
different set of conditions: choice,
commitment, inventiveness, mobility
and retraining. Classic industrial rela-
tions institutions — social partnership
and collective bargaining — can play a
facilitating role, creating the condi-
tions of fairness and shared rules that
allow investment and risk-taking
among both firms and workers. For
this to happen, existing collective
agreements are under constant revi-
sion, opening up to new reward sys-
tems, allowing new trade-offs
between security and flexibility, and
seeking better coverage of part-time
work and temporary employment.
The degree of openness to proce-
dural and substantive reform is
one of the strong points of collective
bargaining and part of its adaptive
flexibility.
European industrial relations offer a
rich context for benchmarking and
best practice learning. Such learn-
ing occurs in the various European
organisations and forums, in the
boardrooms and works councils of
international firms, in the context of
the European social dialogue and
through the involvement of social
partners in the open method of
coordination (OMC), for instance in
the field of employment and labour
market reform.The involvement and
participation of the social partners, at
various levels and alongside other
societal actors, is a critical resource
in such learning experiences.
Learning is part of a process of
Europeanisation — bringing the
European level closer to national and
local discussions and practices, and
European, national and local actors
closer to each other, while respecting
national and cultural differences.
Various examples of Europeanisation
will be highlighted, not just in the lim-
ited sense of a vertical or upward
transfer of authority, but also in the
sense of a convergent evolution of
institutions, practices, values and out-
comes such as democracy, growth,
employment and social cohesion, as
well as a growing awareness among
industrial relations actors at all levels
of what happens outside one’s own
national borders and cultures (‘less
parochialism’). This understanding of
(horizontal) Europeanisation, with its
implications of more meaningful
exchange and coordination across
national borders, can be reconciled
with the overall decentralisation
(8) The chapter will sometimes refer to EU-15 (the Member States until 30 April 2004) and EU-10 (those that joined on 1 May 2004). 
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trend in industrial relations. It
acknowledges the emergence of a
European pattern of orientation and
social relations among all participants
(e.g. unions, workers, managers,
employers associations, and govern-
ments) amidst a persistent diversity of
nationally defined interests, identities
and practices.
n 2. The actors
In this first part, the two main agents
in industrial relations are discussed:
firstly, the employees, trade unions and
employee representation in the enter-
prise, and secondly, the employers,
firms and employers’ associations. In
the second part, institutional varia-
tions and developments are examined,
especially with regard to collective
bargaining and wage-setting (9).
Although the State as the ‘third actor’
in industrial relations is always there
— as a legislator laying down the con-
ditions under which unions and
employers can organise and are grant-
ed particular rights and freedoms —
its role will be discussed in the second
part.With the exception of the United
Kingdom (UK) where union and bar-
gaining recognition procedures were
reintroduced under the 1999
Employment Relations Act, most of
the EU-15 countries have been char-
acterised by relative legislative stability
on regulatory issues concerning union
recognition, procedures of industrial
conflict and the administrative exten-
sion of collective agreements. In con-
trast, during the past decade there
have been fundamental overhauls of
relevant labour legislation in the new
EU Member States, especially in cen-
tral and eastern Europe. In the transi-
tion to a market economy and to
democratic conditions, and in prepar-
ing for meeting the acquis of the EU,
many laws were revised or introduced
for the first time in order to create the
conditions for free union and employ-
er organisation, the right to strike and
dispute settlement, effective collective
bargaining, employee representation
and consultation, social dialogue and
concertation.
2.1. Employees, trade unions
and representation
2.1.1. Affiliation, organisation and
reform patterns in the Member
States
In response to external social and
economic changes as well as internal
financial and membership problems,
trade unions across Europe have over
the past few years restructured
through numerous mergers (10). The
current wave of mergers reflects a
long-term decline in the number of
affiliates within the major union con-
federations, especially in western and
northern Europe. So-called ‘super-
unions’, creating large-scale organisa-
tions spreading across major parts of
the economy, have emerged in the
Netherlands (1998), Finland (2000),
Germany (2001) and the UK (2002).
Similar ‘conglomerate unions’ had
already developed in Ireland (general
workers), Denmark (unskilled work-
ers),Austria and Belgium (white-collar
employees). 2002–03 saw major
union mergers initiated or completed
in countries such as Austria,
Denmark, Sweden and the UK, while
the two main Greek trade union con-
federations are planning a merger in
the near future. In Austria, the sepa-
rate organisation of blue- and white-
collar workers will end with the
planned merger of five unions in 2005.
In Germany, the separate general
union of white-collar employees
joined the four member-unions of the
German Confederation of Trade
Unions (DGB) in 2001. Mergers
between three (Ireland) and six
(Finland) public sector unions have
been announced for 2006.
The trend towards union concentra-
tion is less pronounced in southern
Europe and in the central and eastern
Europe (CEE) Member States, where
the process of economic and political
transition was in many cases marked
by the emergence of numerous com-
peting union centres and breakaways
from existing centres. There have
recently been some moves towards a
greater rationalisation of union struc-
tures in a number of countries, such
as Hungary, though conversely a new
national union confederation was set
up in Poland in 2002, alongside the
two existing ones.
Amalgamations and mergers are not
new phenomenon in union history.
What is new,however, is the scale and
spread of the resulting conglomerate
unions, which straddle the boundaries
of sectors and occupational groups.
This often entails a shift in the balance
of power within confederations and
may necessitate a rethinking of the
role of the confederation itself, espe-
cially with regard to service provision
and representation in national 
and European politics and social dia-
logue (11). In some countries the new
super-unions have now conquered a
place in national concertation bodies
alongside the peak federations, a
development that may be interpreted
as a move from centralisation (as one
form of vertical coordination) to hor-
izontal coordination.
There are several driving forces
behind the current concentration
trend: structural changes (shrinking
domains in industry, decline of manual
occupations); membership decline;
corporate restructuring and privatisa-
tion of public services; decentralisa-
tion of collective bargaining; pooling
resources and economies of scale in
(9) Extensive use will be made throughout of the data and reports of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions and its European Industrial Relations Observatory Online (Euronline), http:/www.eiro.eurofound. 
(10) For an overview, see B. Ebbinghaus (2003), ‘Ever larger unions: organisational restructuring and its impact on union confedera-
tions’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 34.
(11) W. Streeck and J. Visser (1997), ‘The rise of the conglomerate union’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 3.
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service provision and representation,
both in the national and European
arena.Another benefit would lie in the
reduction of inter-union competition.
In theory, union mergers should free
resources for recruitment and make
for more effective representation and
servicing of members. However,
mergers are also costly — as the
organisation has to be restructured
and officials and staff may have to be
retired.
Thus far, union mergers have respect-
ed political and religious demarca-
tions. Nearly all merger activities take
place within confederations and not
between them.There is also no exam-
ple of a cross-national merger
between unions — evidence that
trade unions are deeply embedded in
the history of the national welfare
state, democracy and industrial rela-
tions systems. Between unions and
confederations defined by occupa-
tional status (white collar staff, public
servants, managerial staff) there are
some examples of closer cooperation
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden), though in general the struc-
ture of trade unions in EU-15, as
defined fifty to hundred years ago,
resembles a frozen landscape. In con-
trast, the fragmented trade union
structure in central and eastern
Europe is still young and further
changes are quite likely.
In view of the varied pattern of trade
union organisation in the EU it is hard
to discern any typical EU model of
trade unionism. Table 1.1 shows that
the number of confederations or cen-
tral organisations of trade unions
varies from one to six, the member-
ship share of the largest confedera-
tion from 100 % in Austria to 28 % in
France, and the number of affiliated
unions in the main union confedera-
tion from 8 in Germany to over 100
in Portugal or Poland. In most
Member States there are independent
unions outside the confederal main-
stream of ‘representative’ and recog-
nised unions, though the size of inde-
pendent unionism varies a great deal.
In most cases, independent or
‘autonomous’ unionism is mostly
found among professionals, managers
and high ranking civil servants, some
of whom may be without bargaining
and striking rights. In some Member
States (Denmark, Germany, Spain),
religious organisation outside the
mainstream is another source of inde-
pendent unionism. In others, especially
in Italy and France, independent
unionism has strong political elements
and is concentrated above all in pub-
lic (or subsidised) services. In Spain,
the Czech Republic and of course in
Cyprus independent unionism has
also a regional (and sometime linguis-
tic) signature. In the new Member
States from central and eastern
Europe, for instance in Hungary and
Poland, additional divisions emerged
between the new unions, sometimes
with strong ties to the democratic
opposition against the old regime and
the State-dominated unions, and
those of the old unions and union
centres that succeeded in reforming
themselves.
Table 1.1 presents the structural char-
acteristics of EU trade unions: the
number of divisions between the main
union confederations or centres; the
membership share of the largest cen-
tre; the number of affiliates or mem-
ber unions of those confederations;
the main divisions between these affil-
iates; the (membership) size; and the
nature of independent unionism out-
side the mainstream. With regard to
the main divisions, three main groups
of Member States can be detected:
• Member States with one domi-
nant union confederation. This
group includes Ireland, the UK,
Austria, Germany and Greece
among EU-15, and Latvia, Slovakia,
the Czech Republic and Slovenia
among EU-10. The average mem-
bership share represented by the
largest union centre in this group
is 84 %. Outside the ICTU and
TUC, the main confederations in
Ireland and the UK, there are var-
ious occupational and professional
unions, usually small, though
numerous in the case of the UK.
The Austrian Confederation of
Trade Unions (ÖGB) is unique in
so far as it represents all union-
ised labour in the country and
bridges different political affilia-
tions of union members and offi-
cials. (The Freedom Party’s recent
attempts to establish its own
unions have stalled.) The German
confederation (DGB) has since
1949 followed a similar approach,
but in its case a large organisation
of civil servants (without bargain-
ing rights), some occupational
groups, and a small confederation
of Christian trade unions (CGB)
have remained independent. In
Greece, alongside the dominant
union confederation (GSEE) for
the private sector, there is a sepa-
rate organisation (ADEDY) for
public sector unions.The two are
planning a merger in the near
future. In Latvia, the Slovak and
Czech Republics and Slovenia, the
reformed union confederations,
often with historical roots that
stretch back to the beginnings of
the 20th century, have remained in
a position of dominance during
and since the transition process. In
the case of Slovenia, one or more
rival centres have emerged.
• Member States with union centres
demarcated by occupation. Den-
mark, Sweden and Finland (and out-
side the EU, Norway) belong to this
group, together with Malta and per-
haps also Estonia.The average mem-
bership share of the largest union
centre is much lower than in the
 
first group: around 55 %. In these
countries there are sometimes two
(Estonia, Malta, Norway) and usually
three union confederations: one for
skilled and unskilled manual work-
ers, though often stretching to cler-
ical employees and lower-grade
public servants; one for white-col-
lar employees; and one for academ-
ic professionals. In Malta, the divid-
ing line coincides with employment
in the public or private sector, oth-
erwise Maltese trade unions follow
the British tradition of occupation-
al unions (as is the case in Ireland
and Cyprus) and — rare on the
European continent — in Denmark.
In Scandinavia, cooperation bet-
ween the three union centres has
been the common pattern, though
the historical dominance of the
main confederation representing
blue-collar workers has waned.
There is hardly a basis for inde-
pendent unionism outside this
mainstream — a small syndicalist
centre in Sweden, a Christian feder-
ation and some occupational
unions in Denmark, managerial and
professional unions in Finland and
Estonia (and in Norway).
• Member States with union centres
divided on mainly political grounds.
In Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and
Cyprus, and in some of the new
Member States, these divisions are
within the broad left; in the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Malta, and to some extent also in
Italy, France, and Lithuania (as well
as in Switzerland) they relate to the
split between Christian and Social
Democratic orientations and poli-
tics; in Belgium and in some of the
new Member States (Poland,
Hungary) there are also links with
Liberal or Democratic parties fur-
ther to the right of the political
spectrum. Finally, additional frag-
mentation can occur as a conse-
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Main union confederations (1) Affiliates (2) Independent unions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ireland 1 97 48(3) occup.&sector 3 occup&mngt.
UK 1 84 71 occup.&sector 16 occup&mngt.
Austria 1 100 13 sector&status - -
Germany 1 (2) private&public 83 8 sector 17 public&mngt&relig.
Slovenia 1 (2) private&public 68 20 sector 32 polit&occup.
Greece 1 (2) private&public 70 65 occup.&sector ?
Latvia 1 90 25 sector 10 ?
Slovakia 1 95 37 sector 5 occup&religion
Czech Rep. 1 73 34 sector 27 occup&region
Denmark 3 occupation 66 19 occup.&sector 6 occup&mngt&relig.
Sweden 3 occupation 52 16 sector 1 syndic&mngt.
Finland 3 occupation 49 24 sector 1 occup&mngt.
Estonia 2 occupation 58 18 sector 9 occup.
Malta 2 private/public 55 11 occup.&sector 15 occup.&public
Portugal 2 political 65 100+ occup.&sector 10 occup.
Spain 2 (3) political 41 12 sector 19 regional&polit.
Italy 3 political-religious 41 15 sector 15 polit&mngt.
Belgium 3 political-religious 50 17 sector&status 2 mngt.
Luxembourg 2 (3) polit-relig&occup. 50 15 sector&status 7 occup&mngt.
Netherlands 3 polit-relig&occup. 66 11 sector 6 occup.
Lithuania 3 political-religious 61 24 sector ? ?
Poland 3 political 43 110 sector&company ? ?
Cyprus(4) 4 polit-relig&occup. 43 8 sector 24 occup&public 
France 6 (7) polit-relig&occup. 28 20 sector 12 polit&occup.
Hungary 6 political 31 42 sector 1 mngt.
(1) Only confederations that organise in several sectors and organise 5 % or more of total membership. (2) Affiliates or member unions
belonging to the largest confederation, only national unions (without local organisations). (3) Without 36 affiliated unions in Northern
Ireland; (4) including Turkish Cypriot organisations in northern Cyprus.
Sources: B. Ebbinghaus and J.Visser (2000), The societies of Europe.Trade unions in western Europe since 1945, Palgrave for the main divisions
and demarcations in EU-15, updated with information from union websites (number of unions) and AIAS union file. For EU-10 Member
States, information is obtained from Commission research (UCL).
TABLE 1.1: UNION STRUCTURE AND AFFILIATION PATTERNS IN THE EU
Main divisions
between con-
federations
Share 
of largest
(%)
Main divisions
between 
affiliates
Share 
of all 
members (%)
SourceNo No
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quence of separate organisation of
occupational unionism (Cyprus);
managerial and white collar staff
unions (Netherlands, France,
emerging also in Luxembourg, and
in Slovenia); regional divisions
(Spain, Cyprus, and outside the EU
in Switzerland); and divisions relat-
ed to the opposition of new and old
unions in the transition economies
of the former communist State
economies in central and eastern
Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Where divisions are moti-
vated by politics, the potential for
inter-union conflict and non-cooper-
ation is large.Yet, in some countries,
for example in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg, but at
particular times also in Spain and
Italy, unions have been able to over-
come their differences and present
common policies of recruitment,
bargaining and representation.
The median number of affiliated unions
per union confederation is just above
20 (17 in EU-15 and 26 in EU-10).Table
1.1 shows that the most fragmented
trade union confederations, with large
numbers of affiliates, many very small,
are found in Greece (65), Portugal
(110), Poland (104), the UK (71),
Ireland (48) and Hungary (42).Typically,
in these countries trade unions tend to
organise on the basis of companies,
occupations and status, rather than on
the basis of sectors.The most concen-
trated union confederations with a
small number of large unions are found
in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Malta and Cyprus. Typically, these
unions have organised on a sectoral
basis (‘one employer = one union’),
while many declining (manufacturing)
sectors have now merged. In the two
island States of Malta and Cyprus,
union concentration is surely related
to the small and selective economy,
with a strong presence of tourism and
services, but with many manufacturing
sectors missing or too small to sustain
separate organisation. The issue of
union division and concentration will
be returned to in the second part of
this chapter in the discussion on bar-
gaining centralisation and coordination.
2.1.2. Affiliation, organisation and
reform patterns at the
European level
Despite the massive diversity and
divisions at the national level, trade
unionism at the European level is
characterised by a high degree of
unity. The European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC) brings toge-
ther all major confederations. Of the
65 confederations identified in Table
1.1, 59 are members of the ETUC. In
addition to these confederations, the
ETUC also serves as the European
umbrella organisation for union con-
federations from Iceland (2), Norway
(2), San Marino (2), Switzerland (2),
Turkey (4), Bulgaria (2), and Romania
(4), and it welcomes confederations
with observer status from Croatia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Serbia and
Switzerland. While coverage in the
new Member States is not yet com-
plete, the ETUC does have affiliates
in all of them, usually including the
largest and most representative con-
federation.
At its foundation, in 1973, the ETUC
replaced previous European organi-
sations which had been divided on
the basis of politics, religion and ide-
ology. During the next 30 years, the
organisation steadily expanded,
overcoming remaining divisions
between Socialist, Christian and
Communist union movements, in
the end also embracing the special
white-collar staff confederations.
Starting with its support for the
Solidarity union in Poland, back in
1980, the ETUC supported the new
union movements from CEE coun-
tries early on. It established a
European Trade Union Forum in
1990 to help ‘cooperation and inte-
gration’ and, at its 1991 Congress,
the ETUC introduced an ‘observer
status’ in order to integrate new or
reformed union centres. In 1995, the
ETUC granted full membership to
nine confederations from six CEE
countries having signed application
agreements with the EU. In the fol-
lowing years, ratified by the ETUC
Congress in Helsinki (1999) and
Prague (2003), this process of
enlargement was further expanded.
Table 1.2 shows this expansion and
can be taken as one indicator of the
Europeanisation of trade unions in
Europe.
Starting with 36 million members in
1973 from 14 countries, all in west-
ern Europe, the ETUC’s combined
membership has increased to nearly
60 million in 35 countries, spanning
the whole European (sub)continent.
Currently, the ETUC represents
around 90 % of all union members
in Europe.The most notable excep-
tions to ETUC membership among
union organisations in the current
EU are: a number of specific organi-
sations for managerial and profes-
sional staff, which belong to the
European Confederation of
Executives and Managerial Staff
(Confédération Européenne des
Cadres or CEC) which organises
some of the independent profes-
sional and managerial unions
referred to in Table 1.1; and a num-
ber of organisations affiliated to the
European Confederation of Inde-
pendent Trade Unions (Confédération
Européenne des Syndicats Indé-
pendants or CESI). CEC was re-
established in 1989 from an older
organisation founded in 1951 and
represents around 1 million union
members from 15 countries.
Although not exactly in the same
categories, ETUC’s ‘Eurocadres’
claims a larger membership of
around 5 or 6 million. Both organisa-
tions are recognised, as representa-
tive for their category by the
Commission.This is not the case for
CESI.This umbrella organisation was
founded in 1990 by seven national
organisations which for various rea-
sons had remained outside the main-
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stream, such as the German civil
service federation, DBB, which is
barred from collective bargaining, or
the federation of autonomous unions
in Italy CISAL, which is politically dis-
tinct. Although attempts to coordi-
nate the non-ETUC affiliated unions
existed before the relaunching of the
social dialogue in the late 1980s, it was
the increased success of the ETUC as
a European social partner that insti-
gated the remaining unions to seek
coordination and representation at
the European level. However, since
most minority organisations are now
in the ETUC, staying outside the
ETUC has become less attractive.
Also affiliated to the ETUC are 11
European industry federations, group-
ing almost all major EU trade unions
in their respective sectors, along with
many from the 10 new Member
States and from countries not (yet)
members of the EU. A process of
regrouping and concentration, similar
to the merger process among nation-
al unions, has reduced their number
from 15 to the current 11. This
process of regrouping was more or
less completed in 2000.The activities
of these federations will be discussed
below, in the context of collective
bargaining and coordination.
The important achievement of unity
and the ability to speak with a com-
mon voice in Europe is somewhat
hampered by the national and sec-
toral diversity in union structure,
which together with cultural and lan-
guage differences complicates the
process of cooperation among
Europe’s trade unionists, both at the
strategic level and in their day-to-day
operations. There are now several
forums that promote contacts across
national borders: European works
councils (EWC) in transnational firms;
the sectoral and cross-industry social
dialogue in Brussels; transnational
coordination of bargaining activities in
some industries; and the interregional
trade union councils (ITC) in several
European regions.These forums have
expanded during the 1990s, also into
the new Member States,with the sup-
port of the European Commission
(social dialogue, regional policies).
Interregional Trade Union Councils
are part of the ETUC’s structure and
deal with practical problems of bor-
der workers as well as some strategic
initiatives in regional development.
2.1.3. Membership developments
Well-organised and representative
trade unions are an important part of
the European social or partnership
model. Indeed, union density, meas-
ured as the share of dependent
employed who are members of a
trade union, is higher in Europe than in
the United States, in Japan, or in most
parts of the world (12).As can be seen
from Table 1.3, there are massive dif-
ferences across Europe and, in the late
1990s, the partial trend towards
decline has become rather general,
implicating also countries such as
Sweden, Finland and Denmark. On
average, union density in the EU has
1973 1975 1983 1990 1992 1995 1998 2003
Total membership (Mio.) 36.1 44.0 41.0 40.5 45.3 46.3 50.3 59.0
No of affiliates 17 29 34 38 46 49 68 77
No of countries 14 16 20 22 22 22 29 35
No of European industry federations 6 6 10 14 15 15 15 11
Sources: B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser, The societies of Europe, op.cit., Chapter 19, updated with ETUC reports and website. The total
membership includes pensioners, students, self-employed and unemployed workers, and cannot simply be translated in ‘union density’, i.e.
membership as a fraction of the dependent workforce (wage and salaried employees) in employment (see below).
TABLE 1.2: EUROPEANISATION OF TRADE UNIONS:
AFFILIATION AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE ETUC, 1973-2003
(12) J. Visser (2003), ‘Unions and unionism around the world’, in J. T. Addison and C. Schnabel (eds.), International handbook of trade
unions, Cheltenham, Edgar Elgar, 366–414. See also World labour report 1997–98, Geneva, International Labour Organisation
(ILO), 1998.
Chart 1.1: Trade union density rates, 1990, 1995, 2001–02
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declined from 32.6 in 1995 to 26.4 %
in 2001, a decline of 1 percentage
point per year. (Unfortunately, data for
2002 are incomplete and for 2003 not
yet available.) In EU-15, union density
decreased from 31.0 to 27.3 %; in EU-
10 from 42.7 to 20.4 %.
Union membership is of course not
the only, but it is the most commonly
used indicator of union presence and
influence in labour markets, society
and politics. Membership relative to
the size of the dependent workforce
is one of the key indicators of union
representation and of the support
that unions have among employees
and the public.Other indicators of the
state of unions include recognition
and presence in social dialogue and
concertation at various levels includ-
ing the company (works councils);
coverage of employees by union-
negotiated collective agreements;
union services (sometimes extended
to non-members) and union presence
in administrative social security coun-
cils; and the standing of unions and
union leaders in public opinion. Data
on coverage rates will be returned to
in the second part of the chapter,
union presence in works councils will
be covered in the following paragraph,
and union presence in social security
arrangements in relationship to mem-
bership developments will also be
addressed.
One of the most striking things
demonstrated by Table 1.3 is the
enormous difference in unionisation
levels across Europe — the highest
levels are found in the Nordic coun-
tries, the lowest in France and Spain
and in some of the new Member
States, Poland, the three Baltic States
and Hungary in particular. There is
hardly any other variable showing so
much variation — with unionisation
rates in Sweden around 80 % and
only 10 % in France and 15 % or
lower in Poland. Treated separately,
both EU-15 and EU-10 offer a varied
picture. Of the new Member States,
the two small Mediterranean island
States but also Slovenia and Slovakia
appear to have above-average unioni-
sation levels. Persistent cross-national
differences in unionisation are prima
facie evidence that union organisation
must be seen in the context of insti-
tutions specific to national labour
markets and that the meaning and
importance of union membership
varies across countries.
In econometric analysis of unionisa-
tion trends in the advanced industri-
al countries of western Europe, and
in the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and Japan, it
has been demonstrated that the
downward trend in unionisation is
related to a power shift in present-
day labour markets related to global-
isation, to the rise in unemployment
and to structural changes in labour
market participation and employ-
ment, bringing in groups with a lower
propensity to unionise (service
workers, workers employed in small
firms) and groups that go into non-
standard employment (13). However, it
has also been shown that institutions
matter greatly in terms of how
unions are affected and have been
able to respond to change.
Prominent among such institutional
factors are the unions’ involvement
in unemployment insurance, the
spread and recognition of union
workplace representation, and legally
or nationally established procedures
of union recognition and involve-
ment. However, it should be stressed
that these factors work best in
favour of unionisation where they
are combined (14). Unemployment
insurance without the presence of
local unionism does not attract new
members, as new data from Sweden
and Finland appears to show. And a
high-profile social dialogue and union
recognition, without strong member-
ship representation in firms or com-
petitive member-only services, does
not solve obvious free rider prob-
lems in union organisation, as the
examples from Ireland, Austria or
the Netherlands clearly demonstrate.
The impact of comparatively low
unionisation in many former CEE
countries, but also in France, is aug-
mented by a weak and fragmented
structure of collective bargaining and
inter-union rivalry (15). Initially, follow-
ing the downturn of the communist
State economies in central and east-
ern Europe, the new opposition
unions tended to advance, while the
old, party-led unions were able to
start reforming and keep many of
their members. However, as might
have been expected, the high levels
of unionisation, to a large extent
based on compulsory services and
subscription, could not be main-
tained.The transition to the market
economy and a more voluntary-
based membership went together
with sharply rising unemployment
rates, falling wages, huge losses of
membership and intense inter-union
competition. It has been particularly
difficult to found trade unions and
organise recruitment and services in
the new multinational firms and in
the large small firms sector. These
difficulties are not dissimilar from
the problems faced by unions in EU-
15, for instance in Ireland and the
UK in the case of international firms,
or almost universally (perhaps with
(13) B. Western (1997), Between capital and class: Post-war unionisation in the capitalist democracies, Princeton NJ, Princeton
University Press; and J. Visser (2002), ‘Why fewer European workers join unions. A social customs explanation of membership
trends’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 40.
(14) B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser (1999), ‘When institutions matter: Union growth and decline in western Europe, 1950–95’, European
Sociological Review, Vol. 15.
(15) H. Kohl and H.-W. Platzer (2003), Arbeitsbeziehungen in Mittelosteuropa. Transformationen und Intergration: die acht EU-
Beitrittsländer in Vergleich, Baden-Baden, Nomos.
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the exception of Denmark and
northern Italy) in the case of small
and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). The difference is that in the
transition economies the interna-
tional and SME sectors tend to have
a greater weight and that the shock
from old style enterprise and union
relations is larger.
Another main finding is that unionisa-
tion trends in the private and public
sectors have further diverged.As the
incomplete data of Table 1.3 show, in
France, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Latvia
and Slovakia, more than half, and, in
Sweden, the UK and the Czech
Republic, nearly half of all union mem-
bers are employed in the public sec-
tor. When comparing such composi-
tional figures, we should however be
aware that the public sector is defined
in different ways in different countries.
In the CEE countries, the large share
of public sector unionism, besides
being a heritage of the past, reflects
the difficulties of unions in recruiting
members in the private sector. In
Union density rates Change Share of all members (%)
1990 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 1995–2002 Female Public
Sweden 80.0 83.1 82.2 80.6 78.0 78.0 -0.7 52.7 47.9
Denmark 75.3 77.0 75.6 76.3 73.8 .. -0.5 48.5 ..
Finland 72.2 78.0 76.1 .. 71.2 .. -1.1 50.5 ..
Cyprus (1) .. .. .. .. 70.0 .. ..
Malta (2) 54.4 56.0 59.2 60.9 63.0 62.8 1.3 27.0 ..
Belgium 53.9 55.7 56.0 55.1 55.8 .. 0.0 .. ..
Slovenia .. .. .. .. 41.0 .. 49.4* 76.2*
Ireland 51.0 47.1 44.4 40.5 35.9 .. -1.9 37.9 ..
Austria 46.9 40.7 38.9 37.4 35.7 35.4 -0.8 31.8 39.7
Slovakia 78.7 57.3 .. .. .. 35.4 -3.1 49.6* 70.9*
Italy 38.8 38.1 36.2 36.1 34.8 34.0 -0.6 38.3* 53.1*
Luxembourg 44.8 38.7 38.1 35.7 33.5 .. -0.9 .. ..
UK 39.3 34.1 32.1 31.4 30.7 30.4 -0.5 43.7 47.4
Latvia .. .. .. .. 20.0 .. 57.0 82.1*
Greece 32.4 29.6 28.6 26.7 .. .. -0.7 .. ..
Czech Republic 78.7 46.3 .. .. 27.0 25.1 -3.0 57.9* 44.5*
Portugal 31.7 25.4 24.3 .. .. .. -0.5 .. ..
Germany 31.2 29.2 27.0 25.6 23.5 23.2 -0.9 31.2 39.3
Netherlands 25.5 25.7 25.1 24.6 22.5 22.1 -0.5 34.2* 28.8*
Hungary 63.4 .. 32.8 .. 19.9 -6.2 48.7* 70.3*
Estonia 90.6 31.6 19.3 20.0 16.6 .. -2.5 .. ..
Lithuania .. .. .. .. 16.0 .. .. ..
Spain 14.7 16.3 15.7 14.9 .. .. -0.4 .. 31.2
Poland 32.9 . 24.2 14.7 .. -3.0 55.1* 76.6*
France 10.1 9.8 9.8 .. 9.7 .. 0.0 48.3* 66.3*
Average EU-25 ** .. 32.6 .. 27.9 26.4 .. -1.0 .. ..
Average EU-15 ** 32.8 31.0 29.5 28.5 27.3 .. -0.6 .. ..
Average EU-10 ** .. 42.7 .. 22.5 20.4 .. -3.7 .. ..
United States 16.1 14.3 13.6 13.4 12.9 12.8 -0.2 39.2 ..
Japan 25.4 24.0 22.8 22.2 20.9 20.3 -0.5 27.4 ..
NB: Density rates for EU-15 countries are standardised, i.e. without unemployed and self-employed, retired employees and student mem-
bers, along the model in B. Ebbinghaus and J.Visser (2000), The societies of Europe, op.cit. In the case of the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK
and the United States, figures are calculated from the labour force survey. Elsewhere they are recalculated from administrative sources.
See also OECD, Employment outlook 2004, Chapter 3 (‘Wage-setting outcomes and institutions’), Paris, July 2004.The EU-10 figures are
non-standardised and follow nationally based statistics collected by the Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Université Catholique de
Louvain, Monographs on the Situation of social partners in the candidate countries, Brussels, December 2003, a research project conducted on
behalf of the Employment and Social Affairs DG of the European Commission.
If marked with an asterisk (*), the data on membership composition (share of female members; share of members in the public sector)
are calculated from sample surveys of the International Social Science Programme (ISSP) and relate to 1998. (**) weighted averages. In
the case of missing data, the nearest year is taken into account.
(1) Without the northern (Turkish Cypriot) part.
(2) Non-standardised rates, without pensioners (10 % of the total membership in 2003) the union density rate in 2002 decreases to 
57  %.
.. No data available.
TABLE 1.3: TRADE UNION DENSITY RATES AND MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION, 1995–2002
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many EU-15 countries, union decline
in recent times has been most severe
in the private sector and, on average,
union density in the public sector is
now two to three times higher than in
the private sector (16).
The higher unionisation rate in public
and subsidised services has con-
tributed to the advance of women in
unions, since women make up a dis-
proportionate share of employment
in public administration, local govern-
ment, social services, health and edu-
cation. It appears that in Sweden,
Finland, Latvia, the Czech Republic
and Poland women represent more
than half of all union members, while
in Denmark and, according to survey
data, also in Slovakia, Slovenia,
Hungary and France, women make up
almost half of union membership.
Women in the UK, Ireland, Italy and
the Netherlands, though still under-
represented, have made considerable
progress in unions. In a number of
countries the female density rate has
now equalled or risen above the male
density rate (this is the case in the
Nordic countries but probably also in
Poland, Latvia, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia), but this is clearly related to
the size and the higher unionisation
rate of the public sector. The lowest
density rate in all countries of both
men and women are found in com-
mercial services, in particular in com-
merce and retailing, hotels and restau-
rants, cleaning, personal and business
services, among workers in non-stan-
dard, temporary and part-time jobs,
and in small firms. Generally, these are
the sectors where less protection of
standards and rights is provided by
the law or by collective agreements,
and where unions have less access.
Small firms, for instance,or temporary
workers, are in many countries
exempted from statutory norms
regarding working time and consulta-
tion of employees (works councils).
2.1.4. Trade union and employee
representation in enterprises
A key feature of European industrial
relations is the existence of forms of
employee representation in enterpris-
es for the purpose of information and
consultation. Provisions for works
councils or similar bodies for informa-
tion and consultation in enterprises of
staff representatives, elected by and
from the firm’s employees, and based
on law or central agreement, exist in
nearly all EU Member States. In
Belgium, Luxembourg and France,
management is also represented and
an executive company director chairs
the council. In Denmark, joint bodies
for representation and consultation in
enterprises are established on the
basis of a central agreement, whereas
in Finland, the law provides for
exchange of information and cooper-
ation negotiations between manage-
ment and employees or their repre-
sentatives. In Sweden, legislation con-
fers information, consultation and
codetermination rights on the (local)
unions. Such statutory rights have
been absent in the UK and Ireland,
with the exception of specific rights of
information and consultation in the
case of collective dismissals and the
transfer of undertakings, as provided
under EU law. In the UK there has
been, and still are, joint consultative
councils, or similar structures in some
companies, though these are entirely
Chart 1.2: Share of union membership in the public sector, 1998
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(16) J. Visser (2003), ‘Unions and unionism around the world’, op. cit.
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framed by voluntary agreement
between management and unions.
Recent central agreements in Ireland
have urged management to extend
partnership to the local and compa-
ny level, but this has not been fol-
lowed up to a large extent.This situ-
ation is set to change owing to the
implementation of EU directive
2002/14/EC which establishes a gen-
eral framework for informing and
consulting employees in enterprises
(see also Chapter 4). This directive
establishes a general framework for
informing and consulting employees
in the EU, providing for minimum
requirements regarding information
and consultation of employees in
decisions that affect their interests,
targeting enterprises with over 50
employees or establishments with at
least 20 employees.According to the
directive, Member States must make
appropriate provisions to deal with
non-compliance on the part of
either employers or employees’ rep-
resentatives.
Table 1.4 offers an overview of the
characteristics of employee represen-
tation in firms in the EU.
The main division that matters is
between single and dual channel
systems.
• In single channel systems, cur-
rently in Finland, Sweden, Denmark,
Poland, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta,
the rights or workplace representa-
tion for the purpose of information,
consultation and in some cases co-
determination are expressed
through workplace unions. These
rights can be established by law or
by (central) agreement with
employers, or both. The advantage
of single channel systems is their
simplicity, as union and council func-
tions are merged.The disadvantages
are that non-union members, and
employees in firms in which unions
are not recognised, may be exclud-
ed from representation. This prob-
lem is relatively small in countries
such as Sweden, Finland and
Denmark, and also in Malta and
Cyprus, where unionisation rates
are high, but it is a problem where
the basis of union membership is
small, as in Poland and Lithuania.
Ireland and the UK present ‘single
channel’ cases, but on a voluntary
and fairly limited basis.
• In mixed or extended channel
systems, employee rights are in
principle expressed through the
union, but non-union members are
included,directly (Italy) or through a
supplementary channel in non-
union enterprises (Czech Republic,
Latvia, Estonia). Thus, Italian works
councils, based on agreements with
employers and the statutory rights
bestowed on all employees (in firms
above a certain size) are a mixed
case in so far as no distinction is
made between union and non-
union members, and the unions vol-
untarily extend union rights and
benefits to non-union members(17).
In the Czech Republic, Latvia and
Estonia, the law provides for mech-
anisms of employee representation
in non-union firms, additional to the
rights bestowed on unions in enter-
prises where they are present.
Under the 2001 law, Czech employ-
ees have the right to establish a
works council in non-union firms.
The council must however be dis-
solved if a workplace union is estab-
lished. In anticipation of EU legisla-
tion, Lithuania will move towards a
mixed or even dual model. In Poland
and Estonia, government attempts
to establish works councils, inde-
pendent of the unions, have stalled
because of the opposition of (some
of) the unions, partly in alliance with
employers.
• In dual channel systems the law
provides for a separate channel of
employee representation in firms,
which is additional to the trade
union(s). This system is found in
Germany, Austria, France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
has also been adopted, following the
return to democracy, by Spain, and
with less success, in Portugal and
Greece, and during the transition in
Hungary, Poland (public enterprises
only), Slovakia and Slovenia (where
the works council system was
embedded in the ‘Yugoslav’ model
of worker self-determination). In
this model the rights to representa-
tion, information and consultation
are conferred on individual workers
(in firms above a certain threshold),
irrespective of the trade unions.
Consequently, there may be compe-
tition between the works council
and the unions, though in reality lay
union officials and representatives
tend to play a leading role in the
councils and councils may be a
recruitment ground for trade
unions. Works councils tend to be
highly unionised and in council elec-
tions the trade union candidates
tend to attract votes from mem-
bers and non-members alike.
Another encouraging sign is that
voter turnout in workplace election
tends to be high, between 65 and
85% (18).
(17) I. Regalia (1995), ‘Italy: the costs and benefits of informality’, in Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Works councils.
Consultation, representation and cooperation in industrial relations, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 217–42.
(18) Data presented in L. Calmfors, A. Booth, M. Burda, D. Checchi, R. Naylor and J. Visser (2001), ‘The future of collective bargaining
in Europe’, in T. Boeri, A. Brugiavini and L. Calmfors (eds.), The role of the unions in the 21st century, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1-155, Table 4.1.
A general problem is implementation
of agreements and legislation on the
ground. In general, works councils are
a phenomenon of large firms. Even
where the law provides for works
council structures and employee rep-
resentation in SMEs and firms with
less than 100 employees, usually only
a minority of these firms establish
councils, or they make do with infor-
mal consultation mechanisms. In
Germany, for example, the law pro-
vides statutory rights in firms with five
or more employees. The establish-
ment of a works council is not
mandatory and according to survey
figures from 2002, works councils
cover just 11 % of all firms and 50 %
of all employees within the law’s
scope. Coverage is related to the size
and the age of the firm, with smaller
and newer firms much less likely to
have established a works council.
(They are also less likely to join an
employers’ organisation or have a col-
lective agreement. Around one third
of German employees is neither cov-
ered by an agreement nor by a coun-
cil.) In the Netherlands, councils are
mandatory in all firms of 50 or more
employees. There are councils in
about half of all firms between 50 and
99 employees, whereas implementa-
tion approaches 100 % in larger
firms. In France, the Ministry of
Labour estimates that of small firms
(10–19 employees) less than 20 %
have a form of workplace representa-
tion for employees. This percentage
increases to 56 % for firms with
20–49 employees and to 90 % in
firms with more than 50 employees. In
Greece, it appears that less than 5 %
of the firms covered by the law have
actually established a works council.
These figures strongly suggest that
where union members are absent (in
small firms) there will also be less
activity and pressure to set up a
works council and implement whatev-
er firms are required to do by law or
by agreement.
Besides the lack of adequate informa-
tion and monitoring,non-implementa-
tion is still a problem in EU-10.
According to a study of the European
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Basis Single Mixed Dual Union Separate union Council Infor- Consul- Codeter-
competition workplace bargains mation tation mination
representation wages?
Sweden C&L Y Some N.A. N Y Y Y
Denmark C&L Y Some N.A. N Y Y Y
Finland L&C Y Some N.A. N Y Y Y
Poland L Y Very strong N.A. N Y Y N
Lithuania L Y Considerable N.A. N Y Y N
Cyprus A Y Very strong N.A. Possible Y Y N
Malta A Y Very strong N.A. N Y Y N
Ireland A Some - N.A. N - - -
UK A Some - - - N.A. N - - -
Italy L&C Y Very strong N.A. Frequently Y Y N
Czech Rep. L Y Marginal N.A. N Y Y N
Estonia L Y Some N.A. N Y Y N
Latvia L Y No N.A. N Y Y N
Germany L Y Marginal Sometimes N Y Y Y
Netherlands L Y Considerable Rarely Possible Y Y Y
Austria L Y No Sometimes N Y Y Y
Slovenia L Y Considerable Sometimes N Y Y Y
Hungary L Y Very strong Frequently N Y Y Y
Slovakia L Y Marginal Sometimes Possible Y Y Y
Spain L Y Very strong Normally Y Y Y N
France L Y Very strong Frequently N Y Y N
Belgium L&C Y Considerable Normally N Y Y N
Luxembourg L Y Considerable Normally N Y Y N
Greece L Y ? ? ? Y Y N
Portugal L Y Very strong Frequently N Y Y N
NB: Basis for employee representation rights: central agreement = C; agreement (sector/company) = A; law = L.
Sources: J. Rogers and W.Streeck (eds.),Works councils, op. cit.; J.Visser (1992),‘La representación de los trabajadores en los centros de trabajo
en Europe occidental: Estructura, escala, alcance y estrategia’, in Sociologia del Trabajo, Vol. 14; A. Toth and Y. Ghellab, ‘The challenge of
representation at the workplace in EU accession countries: Does the creation of works councils offer a solution alongside trade unions?’,
Geneva, ILO, report prepared for the Tripartite Conference:The right to information and consultation in practice in an enlarged European Union,
Warsaw, 12–13 December 2003; G. Gradev and M. Stajonevic (2003), ‘Workers’ representation at company level in CEE countries’, in
Transfer, Vol. 9, and national overviews in EIRO, Thematic feature – works councils and other workplace employee representation and
participation structures.
TABLE 1.4: WORKS COUNCILS, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN (LARGE) FIRMS
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Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions, there
is a general lack of institutionalisation
and councils are virtually non-exis-
tent in any of the new Member
States (including Cyprus and Malta),
with the partial exception of
Slovenia, Poland (public sector), and
perhaps Slovakia, and only in
Hungary and Slovenia are councils
comparable with the fully-fledged
types in EU-15 (19).There seem to be
virtually no works councils in the
Czech Republic.The law establishes a
right, not an obligation, that works
councils be established in enterprises
where no unions are present; howev-
er, the council must be disbanded if a
trade union is established. In Slovakia
the law was changed in 2003 making
works councils a secondary channel
for information and consultation
even in enterprises where unions are
present. Previous legislation had pro-
vided for employee representation
only in non-unionised workplaces,
but few works councils had been
established. As noted by the report,
Industrial relations in Europe 2002, on
the state of industrial relations in the
accession and candidate countries,
there is a clear lack of workers’ rep-
resentation especially in companies
without trade unions, the number of
which is growing rapidly.This is lead-
ing to a situation in which many of
the new Member States, and some of
the old, face the impossibility of
ensuring workers’ information and
consultation, despite the fact that it is
enshrined in their national legislation
and represents an important element
of the Community acquis (20).
Where they exist, works councils or
similar (union-based) structures of
employee representation exercise
consultation and information rights,
especially with regard to social and
personnel policies. Sometimes,
employees or their representatives
are represented on the company
board. This relationship between
employee representation and corpo-
rate governance is further explored in
Chapter 5 of the report. In addition to
consultation with management, many
works councils have a monitoring task
with regard to collective agreements
or statutory rights and legal pre-
scripts, for instance concerning equal
opportunity, or health and safety. In
most EU-15 and in three of the EU-10
Member States, works councils or
union-based representation bodies in
enterprises have co-determination
rights, mostly with regard to social
and human resource management
policies, sometimes extending to mat-
ters of economic policy, mergers,
takeovers, work organisation and
investment.
Usually, when councils have co-deter-
mination rights, they must be consult-
ed over the implementation of pay
systems and working-time schedules.
In addition, in some Member States,
the law permits elected employees’
representative bodies to negotiate so-
called plant agreements regulating
issues not covered by collective
agreement with management.This is a
rather sensitive issue from the trade
unions’ point of view. Unions tend to
consider such legislative entitlements
as infringements of their bargaining
rights. Trade unions have nearly
always,by law or by agreement,prima-
cy in negotiating and signing collective
agreements.Yet works councils, even
when established as a second channel,
often play a supplementary role.This
role has become more important in
recent times, especially with increased
attention to negotiating change and
variation in working time, perform-
ance-related pay systems, secondary
benefits, and the application of ‘open-
ing’ or ‘hardship clauses’ which allow
firms to suspend parts of (sectoral)
collective agreements in case they
face financial and business difficulties.
These clauses have become more
important in recent years, as will be
seen below, but the application of
such clauses requires the exchange of
credible information and representa-
tive structures for consultation at the
level of firms. Where such practices
and structures are missing, or not
trusted by employees, decentralisa-
tion of bargaining, with a view to cre-
ating more flexibility in response to
the challenges facing firms, is often
stalled.
In single channel systems, the division
of bargaining tasks and responsibilities
between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’
union is a matter of internal union
decision and discipline. In dual channel
systems, it involves the law. Usually,
councils are legally barred from col-
lective bargaining and calling a strike.
Only in Spain, for historical reasons
connected with the transition to
democracy in the 1970s, do works
councils have a recognised role in col-
lective bargaining. But also in
Germany, in spite of legal provisions,
many works councils engage in collec-
tive bargaining over working hours
and even pay, with or without the
prior consent and knowledge of the
union. In Hungary, the law that had
given councils the right to negotiate
an agreement if no union is present,
was repealed in 2002. In the
Netherlands and in Austria, councils
may negotiate wages and working
hours, in firms where no union is
present or when the industry agree-
ment permits such negotiations.
Company bargaining in the
Netherlands usually takes place with
trade unions, since management
prefers the professionalism and legal
responsibility of ‘external’ and ‘inde-
pendent’ unions. But in some non-
union sectors, for instance in informa-
tion technology and in business serv-
ices, works councils step in. However,
(19) European Foundation (2004), Social dialogue and conflict resolution in the acceding countries, Luxembourg, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, p. 11. 
(20) European Commission, Industrial relations in Europe 2002, op. cit.
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under Dutch law, while collective
agreements are legally binding, it is not
the case when the agreement is
signed by the works council.The pre-
sumption is that councils are not
independent and that employees have
no choice. They can voluntarily join
and leave the union, and union nego-
tiators are not on the firm’s payroll.
These conditions do not apply to
works councils.
Table 1.4 also presents information
regarding the presence of union
workplace organisations in enterpris-
es. In single channel systems, union
workplace organisation is given for
unionised firms. In dual channel sys-
tems, union workplace organisation
may be absent, for instance in the
Netherlands. In France, legislation
introduced in 1969 provides for sepa-
rate union representation in enter-
prises. In Belgium and Luxembourg
this is guaranteed by central agree-
ment. In Germany and elsewhere this
may be subject to sectoral agree-
ments and hence it may vary consid-
erably across the economy (usually
stronger in manufacturing and public
services, and absent in commercial
services). The effectiveness of work-
place representation and also of
works councils will be influenced by
inter-union competition.Where com-
petition is strong, the works council
has a stronger raison d’etre, since it
provides for unitary representation.
Council elections have the important
secondary function of providing some
measure of the popularity and repre-
sentation claims of rival unions in,
for instance, Belgium, Luxembourg,
France, Spain and Italy, in the latter
case also against the excessive repre-
sentation claims of the independent
unions.
2.1.5. Europeanisation of employee
representation
The role of the EU’s legislative acquis
and its body of rules concerning
employee and union rights, and the
directives concerning consultation
and information in multinational and
national companies and establish-
ments have already been mentioned.
These are examples not only of verti-
cal intervention and legal harmonisa-
tion, but also occasions for increased
cross-border contacts and mutual
learning in trade unions and compa-
nies. In addition, the particular form of
legal intervention, with room for
locally negotiated solutions that satis-
fy certain conditions, also foster a cli-
mate and experience of social dia-
logue and autonomous contractual
arrangements (see also Chapters 4
and 5).
The European Works Councils
(EWCS) Directive 94/45/EC applies
to undertakings or groups with at
least 1 000 employees and at least
150 employees in each of two
Member States. It allows for the
establishment of a EWC, representa-
tive of employees in the Member
States where the group has opera-
tions, to be informed and consulted
on the progress of the business and
any significant changes envisaged.
While not really comparable with
national works councils, and general-
ly much weaker, the importance of
EWCs lies in the fact that they
involve over 10 000 employee rep-
resentatives directly in intercultural
exchanges and practices. In a recent
opinion (21), the European Economic
and Social Committee (EESC)
observes that various studies point
to internal growth of EWCs and
recognition of their positive role
played in promoting social dialogue
within companies. As many of the
original pre-1996 EWC agreements
have been renegotiated, their con-
tent has becomes richer and pro-
vides more and better facilities for
transnational exchange.The develop-
ing scope of these agreements would
also seem evident from the exten-
sion of the range of issues being dealt
with by EWCs. Issues with a strong
European dimension such as health
and safety, equal opportunities policy,
training and mobility and environ-
mental policy are often included.This
process of dynamic development
within EWCs has probably reached
its fullest expression in consultation
over company restructuring in the
case of relocations, mergers and clo-
sures. This issue is returned to in
Chapter 5.
2.2. Employers and their
organisations
2.2.1. Affiliation, organisation and
reform patterns in the Member
States
Cross-national differences in the
organisation and roles of employers’
organisations significantly affect nation-
al industrial relations practices (22).
Usually, multi-employer bargaining can
be institutionalised only when
employers’ organisations exist and
engage in bargaining. For similar rea-
sons, statutory provisions for the
extension of collective agreements to
non-organised firms can be used only
when the signatory party on behalf of
the employer side is an employers’
organisation. In other words, the
prevalence of multi- or single-employ-
er bargaining as well as the coverage
(21) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the practical application of the European Works Councils Directive
94/45/EC, 24 September 2003, EESC 1164/2003.
(22) This section has benefited greatly from the research by F. Traxler and his associates, as presented in the report on Employers asso-
ciations in Europe, covering EU-15, Hungary, Slovenia and Norway, published by the European Foundation, and from the study by
F. Traxler, S. Blaschke and B. Kittel (2001), National labour relations in internationalised markets. A comparative study of institu-
tions, change and performance, Oxford University Press. For this section we have also used the database established by the
Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Université Catholique de Louvain, Monographs on the situation of social partners in the can-
didate countries, Brussels, December 2003, a research project conducted on behalf of the Employment and Social Affairs DG of the
European Commission.
of agreements is strongly influenced
by the existence and activities of
employers’ organisations.
The organisation of employers varies
considerably across Member States.
At the cross-industry level, in coun-
tries like Denmark, Sweden, Ireland,
the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Italy
and Spain, as well as in Cyprus, the
three Baltic States and Slovakia, there
is essentially a single umbrella organi-
sation, representing employers’ and
trade interests in the private sector.
Alongside these organisations we
often find specialist organisations rep-
resenting the small and medium-sized
firm sector, in agriculture, among
cooperatives and sometimes in the
banking sector.Often, the State sector
and public interest enterprises are
excluded from mainstream business
and employers’ associations.They may
organise separately.
In Finland, Portugal, Greece and Malta
the main federation organises indus-
trial businesses and employers only
and separate organisations exist in
(commercial) services. In Finland,
there are now moves towards a
merger, to be completed in 2005.
Slovenia, like Austria, is unusual in that
it has a chamber of commerce and
industry, of which membership is
obligatory. Alongside these, separate
chambers of crafts and small enter-
prises, also with obligatory member-
ship, exist. It now seems that the com-
pulsory-membership chambers in
Slovenia will cease representing
NB: (1) General associations, without organisations specialising in representing agriculture, horticulture and fishery; cooperatives; SMEs,
financial enterprises, and nationalised firms or local government; public sector, organisations representing public firms or special sectors,
such as finance and banking. (2) Only sectoral affiliates or companies, without regional affiliates. (3) Expressed as a percentage of wage
and salaried employees working in organised firms. Members with observer status between brackets. (4) Benelux. * Compulsory mem-
bership (in Austria in WKÖ, not in IV; in Slovenia in GSD, not in ZDS. Between brackets: members with observer status.
Sources: Reports and websites of UNICE, CEEP and UEAPME; supplemented with information from F.Traxler, S. Blaschke and B. Kittel
(2001), National labour relations in internationalised markets, op.cit., and the Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Université Catholique de
Louvain, Monographs on the situation of social partners in the candidate countries, Brussels, December 2003, a research project conducted on
behalf of the Employment and Social Affairs DG of the European Commission.
(1)
No
Member
UNICE
Affiliates
(2)
No
Organisation 
rate (3)
% 
Participation  
in social dialogue
UEAPME CEEP 
member?
Bipartite Tripartite
Austria 2 IV 9 100 (=WKÖ) * Y Y WKÖ* Y
Slovenia 2 (ZDS) 26 100 (=GZS) * Y Y (OZS) N
Netherlands 1 VNO-NCW 149 85 Y Y MKB Y(4)
Luxembourg 1 FEDIL 24 80 N Y CDM, FDA Y(4)
France 1 MEDEF 87 74 N Y APCM, UPA, CGPME Y
Belgium 1 VBO-FEB 33 72 Y Y UNIZO, UCM, CC, PME-SDI, KAN Y(4)
Spain 1 CEOE 148 72 Y Y CEPYME, PIME, PIMEC SEFES Y
Greece 1 ___ 44 70 Y Y GSEVEE Y
Slovakia 1 AZZR SR 37 65 N Y (SZZ) N
Germany 2 BDA, BDI 54 63 N Y ZDH-BFD, BDS-DgeV Y
Cyprus 4 OEB 52 60 Y Y (CCCI) N
Finland 2 TT, PT 29 60 Y Y SY-FEE Y
Ireland 1 IBEC 53 60 Y Y ISME, SFA Y
Portugal 2 AIP, CIP 79,42 58 N Y AIP Y
Sweden 1 SN 25 55 N Y FR, FPB Y
Denmark 1 DA 13 52 Y Y Håndværksrådet Y
Italy 1 Confindustria 110 51 N Y Confartigianato, CONFAPI, CAN,
Confesercenti, CASA
Y
UK 1 CBI 150 40 N (Y) UIC Y
Czech Rep. 2 SP CR 7 35 N Y (AMSP-CR), (SPCR), (EXXR) Y
Estonia 1 ETTK .. 35 Y Y (EVEA) N
Latvia 1 (LDDK) 19 30 Y Y (LAK) N
Hungary 4 (CEHIC) 43 .. N Y (IPOSZ) Y
Poland 2 KPP, (PKPP) .. .. Y Y (ZRP) N
Lithuania 4 (LPK) .. .. Y Y (LVDK) N
Malta 2 FOI .. .. Y Y (IPSE) N
TABLE 1.5: EUROPE’S BUSINESS AND EMPLOYERS’ASSOCIATIONS
AFFILIATION, ORGANISATION RATES AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL DIALOGUE
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employers’ interests in collective bar-
gaining, a role which has been much
criticised but had ensured full bargain-
ing coverage in the past. Germany is
the only remaining case with a divi-
sion — at the national level —
between the representation of
employers and trade interests (in
some regions, for instance Bavaria, the
two structures have been integrated),
although a somewhat similar situation
exists in Denmark and the Czech
Republic at the industry level.As part
of a larger trend of reintegrating
industrial relations, human resource
management and social policy in gen-
eral business practice, this once com-
mon division — especially in northern
Europe — has now disappeared in
Sweden (2000) and Switzerland
(2002), following the early examples
of the British CBI in 1965 and the
Dutch in 1968, later followed by the
Irish, the Finnish, the Norwegian and
the Danish employers. With a less
institutionalised and autonomous
sphere of industrial relations, the
Belgian, French, Italian, Greek, Spanish
and Portuguese organisations of le
Patronat had never separated these
functions. Finally, in a number of coun-
tries there are two or more major
federations, on the basis of a division
between industry and services, or —
more rarely — reflecting political and
regional divisions.
Rationalisation processes have taken
place also at the levels below the peak
associations.This includes mergers of
trade and employers’ organisations in
the same sector, as well as mergers of
employers’ associations representing
neighbouring sectors. Aside from the
Nordic countries, a notable number
of mergers at these lower levels are
reported in Italy, the Netherlands and
the UK. One important reason for
organisational restructuring is that
employers’ associations have been
under pressure from their member
firms to economise on resources. In
response to these pressures, employ-
ers’ associations in countries such as
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Sweden, the UK (and Switzerland)
have launched major reforms aimed
at cutting budgets, membership dues
and/or staff.
On the other hand, during the 1990s
new federations were formed or split
off from existing ones. For instance, in
Ireland, associations representing the
small firm sector left the main confed-
eration in order to form a separate
representative body for SMEs. New
employers’ organisations were creat-
ed in the ICT sector in Italy and
Sweden, and for the temporary 
work agencies in Germany and
Luxembourg. Other Member States
with many recent new organisations
are Spain and Portugal (23). In Portugal,
four new peak associations have been
set up, for SMEs in 1996; tourism in
1996; agriculture in 1995; and fishing
in 2000. In general, there is quite some
overlap in domains of representation,
and intensive competition, between
employers’ associations representing
large firms and those representing
SMEs.
The most thoroughgoing changes,
however, took place in the former
communist countries during the tran-
sition to a market economy. Initially,
so-called employers’ organisations
mainly represented State-owned
enterprises, but privatisation has since
resulted in a proliferation of employer
and industry organisations in some
countries, especially for SMEs. There
are now three organisations in Poland
and six or more in Hungary. Many
organisations have essentially a busi-
ness/trade role, focusing on economic
issues and lobbying, rather than on
employer issues and collective bar-
gaining, though many participate in
various national-level tripartite
forums. The tripartite engagements
may involve quasi-bargaining activities
and have influenced public policies
regarding labour and employment law,
and the direction of social and eco-
nomic policies in the process of tran-
sition and the accession to the EU.
However, the lack of strong and rep-
resentative employers’ organisations
at national and sectoral level is a fre-
quently noted feature of many CEE
countries.
Regular national cross-industry bar-
gaining with trade unions over sub-
stantive pay and conditions issues is
part of the remit of central employ-
ers’ bodies in Belgium, Finland,
Greece, Ireland and Portugal (and
outside the EU in Norway). In
Luxembourg such activities are chan-
nelled through the tripartite commis-
sion deciding on the application of
price indexation to (minimum) wages,
benefits and pensions. Cross-industry
bargaining over specific issues or pro-
cedural matters is part of the role 
of employers’ confederations in
Denmark, France, the Netherlands,
Italy, Spain and, in recent years again,
in Sweden (24). While falling short of
bargaining, employers’ confederations
entertain contacts with trade unions
in various private and public forums in
Austria and Germany. It is probably in
the UK that the main employers’
body has the least ‘bargaining-like’ role
in any area.
In the new Member States, business
and employers’ organisations do not
engage in bipartite national cross-
industry bargaining with trade unions
over pay and conditions — the main
exceptions being Slovenia and Latvia
(on minimum wages). Instead, there is
a high degree of tripartism at the
national level, with employers’ bodies
involved in negotiation and/or consul-
tation processes with trade unions
and governments. This may result in
regular tripartite agreements on min-
imum wages, as in Hungary, or on wi-
der issues, as in Slovenia. Less regular
(23) M. Behrens (2004), ‘New forms of employers’ collective interest representation’, Industrielle Beziehungen, Vol. 11.
(24) See also A. Vatta (2001), Gli imprenditori e la concertazione in Europa. Un analasi comparata, Rome, Ed. Lavoro.
or issue-specific tripartite national
agreements have been concluded in
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta and Poland. Slovenia has tripar-
tite national pay agreements, as well as
bipartite national bargaining.
At the industry level, sectoral employ-
ers’ organisations with a collective
bargaining role are key components
of the industrial relations systems of
most EU-15 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden. Only in Ireland and in the
UK, and in the special (small State)
case of Luxembourg, are there hardly
any sectoral employers’ associations
with a bargaining role. In these coun-
tries, collective bargaining occurs
essentially at company level, though
overlaid with cross-industry bargain-
ing in Ireland (and occasionally also in
Luxembourg with regard to indexa-
tion of wages and benefits to price
developments). In the new Member
States, sectoral bargaining has hardly
developed, with the notable excep-
tions of Slovenia, Cyprus and, to a
lesser extent, Slovakia.This is due to
the fact that in most of these coun-
tries sectoral employers’ organisa-
tions are either weak and lack the
necessary resources to participate, or
that they are denied the authority to
conclude sectoral agreements on
behalf of their members, as is often
the case for instance in Hungary and
in Poland.
2.2.2. Affiliation, organisation and
reform patterns at the
European level
General private business interests
were coordinated soon after the cre-
ation of the common market by the
Union des Industries de la
Communauté Européenne (UNICE).
Reflecting a shift in focus with the
advancement of the dialogue with
trade unions, in 1987 the organisation
accepted the role of ‘Industrial and
Employers’ Association’. By that time,
most national industrial and employ-
ers’ associations had already merged.
Initially, UNICE restricted full mem-
bership to common market countries,
but later also admitted member
organisations from non-Member
States, for instance, Norway,
Switzerland and Turkey. In recent
years, UNICE has conferred observer
status on member associations from
central and eastern Europe and will
accept them as members in the future.
Today, the representation of employ-
ers’ interests at the EU level is rela-
tively comprehensive and united.
UNICE represents almost all the main
national cross-industry confedera-
tions of private sector employers and
business in the EU-15 countries. In
addition, it has member organisations
in 7 of the 10 new Member States
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia)
and observer members in Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.
Currently the organisation has a total
of 35 national member organisations
and four observers. UNICE acts as
both an employers’ organisation,
engaging in social dialogue and, in spe-
cial circumstances, negotiations with
the ETUC, and as a trade or industry
association, promoting its members’
interests in a range of areas and 
seeking to influence EU decision-mak-
ing on a variety of issues.
A separate European-level body rep-
resenting SMEs, the European
Association of Craft and Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME),
also exists. Since 1998, UEAPME and
UNICE have cooperated closely in
EU-level social dialogue and negotia-
tions with the trade unions.
Furthermore, the European Centre of
Enterprises with Public Participation
and of Enterprises of General
Economic Interest (CEEP, Centre
Européen des Entreprises Publique),
which was founded in 1961, repre-
sents enterprises and organisations
with public participation or carrying
out activities of general economic
interest, irrespective of their legal or
ownership status.
UEAPME has 77 national member
organisations in all EU-15 Member
States. The organisation only has
members with observer status in the
10 new Member States. In addition it
includes some European-level branch
organisations. CEEP has both national
federations and firms as its members.
The organisation has not yet much
extended beyond EU-15. Only in
Hungary (and in Romania) has it
admitted a full member.
In recent years, in addition to affilia-
tion to their European peak associa-
tions, national business and employ-
ers’ associations have also chosen to
establish their own offices in Brussels
for the purpose of representation,
information exchange and lobbying.A
similar development has occurred
among national peak federations of
the trade unions. In some cases, there
is regional cooperation, for instance,
in the group of Nordic countries.
Another interesting development is
found among Hungarian business and
employers’ associations. Notwith-
standing their divisions, they decided
in 1999 to create a joint representa-
tion in Europe in the run-up to EU
membership.
At the European sectoral level, there
are hundreds of organisations repre-
senting business interests. However,
only a minority of these are employ-
ers’ organisations, in the sense that
they represent their members on
employment issues or have relations
with the trade unions. The main
exceptions are the organisations in
those sectors where a sectoral social
dialogue has developed. There are
currently 30 sectoral dialogue com-
mittees, in most of which joint texts
(opinions, declarations, codes of con-
duct, etc.) on a range of issues (e.g.
training, employment, fundamental
rights or health and safety) have been
reached. The importance and devel-
opment of the EU sectoral social 
27
Patterns and variations in European industrial relations Chapter 1
dialogue is discussed in Chapter 3.
The sectoral employers’ organisations
involved in the dialogue generally rep-
resent all EU-15 Member States,
though their membership in the new
Member States varies considerably.
Unlike their national counterparts
and unlike the European industry fed-
eration, the sectoral employers’
organisations at the European level
operate autonomously from their
cross-industry peak organisations.
UNICE has not integrated the sec-
toral organisations and remains a fed-
eration of national (cross-industry)
peak associations. However, UNICE
does organise a so-called European
employer network (EEN). This net-
work for information exchange of
some 150 sectoral employers’ organ-
isations (Fédérations européennes de
l’industrie, or FEBIs) was set up in
1989 and works as a joint platform for
information, support and coordination.
2.2.3. Membership developments
Until the 1990s, the raison d’être of
employers’ federations was mainly
linked to the conclusion and adminis-
tration of multi-employer collective
bargaining. However, traditional multi-
employer bargaining, which defined
uniform working conditions, wages
and working hours for entire sectors,
has come under pressure (see below).
Cross-national mergers and
takeovers have produced more ‘dis-
embedded firms’ whose loyalty with
national associations may be lower.All
mergers reduce membership and
most exacerbate the differences
between large and small firms, and
complicate the association’s gover-
nance if it has both small and large
firms among its members. This may
produce tensions in collective bar-
gaining, but also because small firms
depend on collective services provid-
ed by the association that large firms
can produce more easily on their own
if they need them. This is of course
not new, but the differences and ten-
sions have grown larger. Case studies
from various countries and sectors
demonstrate a trend towards cost-cut-
ting, lower staff-member ratios,growing
cost-consciousness among member
firms, a shift to services for payment
(sometimes organised through affiliat-
ed commercial ventures) and a
renewed emphasis on lobbying
instead of mere representation.
The organisation rate or ‘density’ of
employers’ organisations is hard to
assess, due to frequent lack of data
and difficulties of definition, so the fig-
ures available need to be assessed
with caution. In only a minority of
countries is the membership of
employers’ organisations document-
ed in official statistics. Consequently, if
available at all, figures on absolute or
relative membership are mostly based
on self-reported data from the organ-
isations themselves. Unlike trade
union membership, there are no offi-
cial statistics, recorded by national sta-
tistical offices, and there are no mem-
bership surveys, based on labour
force sample surveys (as in the case of
union membership). The European
Commission does, however, carry out
representativeness studies which pro-
vide another important source of
data. Chart 1.4 is therefore based on
the Commission’s data as well as the
research of Franz Traxler and his asso-
ciates, with additional information
from EIRO.
Similar to union density, measuring the
proportion of all employees joining a
union, employer density or the
employer organisation rate can be
defined as the proportion of all
employers (firms) joining an employ-
ers’ association. However, it would
seem appropriate to take account of
differences in firm size, since it would
matter more in terms of influence and
impact on unions, collective bargaining
and on employees, when large, rather
than small firms join. It is therefore
common practice to measure the den-
sity or organisation rate of employers
as the proportion of the national
workforce employed by the member
firms of employers’ associations.
Not counting situations where the
membership of employers’ organisa-
tions is obligatory by law, the average
EU employer rate of organisation is
60 % (no data available for Poland,
Hungary, Lithuania and Malta). In
other words, three out of five
employees work in firms which join
an employers’ organisation.This aver-
age hides huge variations across
Member States. While in Austria and
Slovenia,due to compulsory member-
ship in the chambers, the organisation
rate of employers is (near) complete,
high organisation rates of 70 % and
more are also obtained in the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium,
France, Spain and Greece. Having
slipped in recent times, organisation
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Chart 1.4: The organisation rate of employers, around 2000
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rates in Germany are still above 60
%. In the range between 50 and 60 %
we find Cyprus, Ireland, Finland,
Sweden, Italy and Denmark. With a
slow but continuous decline, the
organisation rate of British employers
is now estimated to be 40 %. Still
lower rates are reported for Estonia,
Latvia and the Czech Republic, while
there is no data available for Poland,
Hungary,Lithuania and Malta. It should
be stressed once more that these fig-
ures are crude estimates — measure-
ment has not achieved the degree of
precision that exists for trade unions,
especially since nationwide (labour
force or enterprise) surveys cannot
be used and employers’ associations
themselves are reluctant to publish
this data.
But even with these caveats it can be
concluded that, with some excep-
tions, employers’ associations are a
well-established phenomenon in EU-
15 and that the organisation rate of
employers is fairly high and stable. In
all but three countries for which we
have data, the organisation rate of
employers is higher than the union
density rate, often by a wide margin.
Only in Sweden, Finland and
Denmark, does union density exceed
the rate of organisation of employers.
We saw earlier that these were the
countries with the highest unionisa-
tion levels, still little effected by the
decline that hit unions elsewhere in
Europe and in the world.
One of the problems of employers’
organisations in the CEE countries is
that like trade unions, they find it hard
to gain a foothold in the newly emerg-
ing private sector, either because
these firms are exceedingly small and
rapidly changing, or employers, espe-
cially in the international large firm
sector, are reluctant to join or form
associations for the purpose of collec-
tive services and representation.
Further constraints are that these
organisations often lack a mandate
from their members and that their
financial position is often too weak to
enable them to provide adequate
services to member firms. Frequently,
this creates obstacles to social dia-
logue, concertation and collective
bargaining, our next subject.
n 3. Collective bargaining,
social  dialogue and 
concertation
ILO Convention No 98 of 1949
defines collective bargaining as ‘volun-
tary negotiations between employers
or employers’ organisations and
workers’ organisations, with a view to
the regulation of terms and condi-
tions by collective agreements’.
Collective bargaining is thus a rule-
making process based on joint deci-
sions between independent organisa-
tions. When successful, it results in
agreements which specify the collec-
tive rules and conditions applying to
employment and employment rela-
tions in firms, i.e. conditions of work
and rules governing the relations
between employees and managers.
Additionally, agreements usually also
define the relationship between the
negotiating organisations, for instance
with regard to the renewal of agree-
ments, dispute procedures, peace
obligations, recognition and facilities.
All this has no counterpart in individ-
ual bargaining between workers and
managers.
Another important distinction is
between collective bargaining and
consultation. Consultation is an advi-
sory process in which one party seeks
the advice of the other,but retains the
power of unilateral decision-making.
Like collective bargaining it may take
place in different contexts and at dif-
ferent levels, within firms, sectors or
regions, and in local, national and
international contexts of law-making
and policy implementation.
Social dialogue, finally, is the broader
process and may encompass both 
collective bargaining and consultation.
It can be organised as an autonomous,
bipartite and self-governed process
between workers and managers, and
their representative organisations.But
it can also take place in a tripartite
setting with the participation of offi-
cials or agencies representing the gov-
ernment or the public realm.
Information exchange through social
dialogue can be combined with and
prepare the ground for joint problem-
solving, collective bargaining or unilat-
eral decision-making. When success-
ful, social dialogue is a process in
which actors inform each other of
their intentions and capacities, elabo-
rate and exchange information pro-
vided to them, and clarify and explain
their assumptions and expectations.
3.1. Collective bargaining
Voluntary collective bargaining, as
defined under ILO Convention No
98, plays a key role in industrial rela-
tions in all EU-15 Member States and
is a defining element in social partner-
ship.Article 4 of the ILO Convention
calls upon States to take measures
appropriate to national conditions
‘where necessary, to encourage and
promote the full development and
machinery for voluntary negotiation
between employers or employers’
organisations and workers’ organisa-
tions, with a view to the regulation of
terms and conditions of employment
by means of collective agreements’.
However, even in EU-15 there are
large differences in the conditions and
influence of collective bargaining, the
level(s) at which bargaining takes
place, the coverage of employees, its
scope or content, and the nature of
the very bargaining process, including
the expression and regulation of con-
flict. Other differences refer to the
degree of differentiation across sec-
tors and firms, the coverage of the
public sector or civil servants, and —
not least — the role of the State and
the law in defining organisational and
bargaining rights, the implementation
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and extension of negotiated agree-
ment, and the definition of lawful
strikes. This bewildering variety has
remained outside the remit of the EU,
but must be understood if unions or
employers want to coordinate and
cooperate across borders. In this first
section we concentrate on bargaining
coverage and the role of public policy.
3.1.1. Bargaining coverage
The coverage rate of collective bar-
gaining is an indicator of the extent to
which the terms of employment in an
economy are regulated by collective
agreement. Operationally, we define
the coverage rate as the number of
employees covered by a collective
agreement as a proportion of all
wage- and salary-earners in employ-
ment. This definition renders the
measurement of bargaining coverage
comparable with union and employer
density.While union density is one of
the indicators of potential bargaining
strength and solidarity among
employees, bargaining coverage meas-
ures the real rather than potential
extent to which employees are sub-
ject to union-negotiated terms and
conditions of employment. It may thus
also be seen as a complementary indi-
cator of union presence (25).
There are a number of reasons why
employees may not be covered, even
if collective bargaining takes place (26).
Firstly, unions and employers may be
too weak to include all employees
belonging to their domain of action.
Secondly, the bargaining parties may
explicitly exclude certain employee
groups. In the past, they often exclud-
ed (part-time) employees working
less than a certain number of hours
per week, thereby excluding large
numbers of women and young peo-
ple.They may also decide to exclude
managers or employees above a 
certain pay threshold. In such cases, the
employment terms are regulated by
individual contract or by none at all.
Thirdly, certain categories of employees
may be legally excluded from the right
to collective bargaining.This sometimes
applies in particular to public sector
employees or particular groups such as
the police and the armed forces,whose
employment terms are regulated unilat-
erally by the State.
As in the case of calculating union
density and employer organisation
rates, there are many data and meas-
urement problems. Comparing across
countries it seems useful to take
account of the fact that some groups
of employees may be excluded from
collective bargaining (and from the
right to strike). In that case it is neces-
sary to calculate an adjusted coverage
rate, i.e. the number of employees
covered by a collective agreement as
a proportion not of all employees but
only of those with the right to bar-
gain.We will see that in most Member
States there is hardly a difference —
since only very few are excluded. In
some Member States, for instance in
Austria, Germany, Hungary,
Luxembourg or Spain, it does, howev-
er, make a difference when public
employees without bargaining rights
are taken out. Besides these adjust-
ment difficulties, a problem of compa-
rability may also arise due to the fact
that, under multi-level bargaining,
many employees are covered by two
(or more) agreements.This may cause
double counting in statistics on cover-
age. Confusion may also derive from
multi-annual agreements and missing
specification of the date when agree-
ments expire. Sometimes collective
agreements are only reported in their
first year of validity, thus excluding still
valid multi-year agreements from an
earlier year. In Chart 1.5 and Table 1.6,
we have tried to include all collective
agreements that are (still) valid during
the year under consideration. Finally,
we refer only to the formal coverage
of collective agreements, as demarcat-
ed by their scope. Hence we do not
consider the informal application of
the terms of the agreement by firms
not formally included by the agree-
ment, though this may give collective
bargaining additional representation
and influence. Formal coverage does,
however, include those employees
covered by extension procedures
(see below).
The aggregate or national rates of
bargaining coverage for the 22 coun-
tries for which data are available are
set out in Chart 1.5 and Table 1.6.
Chart 1.5: Bargaining coverage rates, 1990 and 2001
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( 25) R. J. Flanagan (1999), ‘Macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining: an international perspective’, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 37.
( 26) See F. Traxler and M. Behrens (2002), ‘Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures’, EIRO- Eironline, December.
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From a comparative perspective, the
key finding is that in the EU two thirds
of all employees are covered by col-
lective agreement (27). However, there
is massive variation, from near 100 %
in Slovenia, Austria and France to
lower than 30 % in Estonia and the
Czech Republic, and lower than 20 %
in Latvia and Lithuania.The (weighted)
average for the EU-15 is 78 %, for EU-
10 the average is 35 %.
In comparison with union density,bar-
gaining coverage is at least twice as
high and there appears to be much
more stability. It should be recalled
that in the 1990s union density fell in
all EU Member States and the average
EU rate stood at 26 % in 2001–02.
The apparent stability of coverage
rates hides contrasting developments,
however. During the 1990s bargaining
coverage increased in Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands,
Spain and Portugal, was stable in
Austria and France (where a huge
increase in the 1980s was the
response to new legislation creating a
duty to bargain for management),
while coverage decreased in
Germany, the UK and Luxembourg. In
the UK, continuing the trend of the
1980s, bargaining coverage has shrunk
from 49 % in 1990 to 36 % in 1998.
The demise of multi-employer bar-
gaining and the failure by unions to
secure recognition for collective bar-
gaining from employers has created
the conditions for decline. Data up to
2001 suggest that the decline stopped
after 1998.Whether this is related to
the new recognition procedure is
hard to say. Under the 1999
Employment Relations Act, unions can
be granted recognition as bargaining
agents by the Conciliation and
Arbitration Committee upon request,
with or without a ballot. Until
February 2004 there had been 347
applications and 81 ballots, of which
50 resulted in the union winning
(27) Between the weighted — 66 % — and unweighted — 64 % — average there is little difference. These averages are based on 22
EU Member States. No reliable estimates are available in the case of Ireland, Greece and Malta. It should also be noted that the
available data for Belgium dates from the mid-1990s and assumes that no significant alteration of coverage has occurred. The
Italian figure — 70 % — may be overestimated as it excludes the millions of workers in micro-firms. Most figures for the new
Member States are rough estimates, based on national (non-standardised) data reported by EIRO.   
NB: Cov = bargaining coverage non-standardised; E = employer organisation rate (private sector); U = Union density rate. Between
brackets: estimate of coverage rate based on employers’ organisation rate (Greece, Ireland) or union density rate (Malta).
TABLE 1.6: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE, EMPLOYERS’ ORGANISATIONS AND UNION DENSITY
1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 71–80 81–90 91–100
Austria U Cov, E
Slovenia U Cov, E
France U E Cov
Belgium U E Cov
Sweden E U Cov
Finland E U Cov
Netherlands U E Cov
Spain U E Cov
Denmark E U Cov
Luxembourg U Cov, E
Ireland U (Cov)E
Portugal U E Cov
Germany U Cov, E
Greece U (Cov)E
Cyprus E Cov, U
Malta (Cov)U
Italy U E Cov
Slovakia U Cov E
Poland U Cov
UK U Cov, E
Hungary U Cov
Czech Rep. U, Cov E
Estonia U Cov E
Latvia Cov U E
Lithuania Cov, U
32
Chapter 1 Industrial Relations in Europe 2004
recognition (28). In Germany, the ero-
sion of bargaining coverage was a phe-
nomenon of the second half of the
1990s: the coverage rate fell from 72
to 63 % in the ‘old’ Federal Republic
and from 56 to 44 % in the five new
eastern Länder (29). Most defections
came from small and medium-sized
firms and were related to the difficul-
ty faced by employers’ associations in
binding employers to standardised
collective agreements with the
unions.
The context for bargaining in the new
Member States from central and east-
ern Europe differs from that of EU-15
and Cyprus and Malta. Under the old
regime, bargaining coverage was 
100 %, although collective agree-
ments often had little practical rele-
vance and differed in their narrow
focus on social welfare and health and
safety at work. All countries but
Slovenia saw a decline in bargaining
coverage during the course of the
transformation process. (The stability
of coverage in Slovenia at an unri-
valled level of 100 % is mainly based
on the obligatory membership of
chambers of commerce and industry,
which has survived the transforma-
tion process but is set to change in
the years ahead with voluntary
employer organisation.) In the public
sector there is often no meaningful
collective bargaining, reflecting the old
situation. Only Slovakia recently set
the stage for collective bargaining in
public services and in 2002–03 some
national agreements were reached.
The companies in the emerging pri-
vate sector have been neither keen
on entering single-employer bargain-
ing nor willing and able to set up
strong employers’ associations which
might conduct multi-employer bar-
gaining on their behalf.A recent statis-
tical study of the Ministry of
Employment and Labour in Hungary
reported a further five-point drop in
the coverage rate, from 45 to 40 %
between 2001 and 2002 (adjusted
rates).According to the study, this sug-
gests that private-sector employers
may be withdrawing from wage negoti-
ations and that the current company
bargaining structure provides no stable
framework. In addition,many countries
struggle with the problem of under-
payment or delays  in payment, even
where minimum wages and collective
agreements apply. One government
survey in Poland found two thirds of
audited companies in breach of con-
tract,with a tendency of diffusion from
small to larger firms. These problems
will be further taken up in Chapter 6 of
the report.
3.1.2. Coverage rates, union and
employers’ organisation and
the role of extension
There appears to be only a weak rela-
tionship between union density and
bargaining coverage. As one can see
from Table 1.6, coverage rates exceed
union density rates in all Member
States (Latvia appears to be the only
exception), often by a very wide mar-
gin, for instance in France, Spain,
Portugal,Austria and the Netherlands.
In a cross-national comparison of
union density and coverage rates (22
EU countries), the correlation coeffi-
cient is .41.
There is a much closer relationship
with the employers’ rate of organisa-
tion. The correlation coefficient
between the employer organisation
rate and bargaining coverage (19
countries) is .76 and highly significant.
Unfortunately, we have no time series
on employer organisation coverage
and some of the data may not repre-
sent the actual state of affairs, but in
general the impression is one of much
greater membership stability among
employers’ organisations than in the
case of trade unions.
Both employer organisation and bar-
gaining coverage depend on the same
condition: sectoral organisation.
Simply put, the chances of employees
having access to collective bargaining
increase quite dramatically with multi-
employer bargaining. Sectoral multi-
employer bargaining dominates in all
but 1 of the 10 Member States where
coverage rates are above 70 %. The
exception is France where there is a
legal duty to bargain and the State
plays a very large role in extending
coverage (see below). Company bar-
gaining prevails in seven Member
States — Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and the UK — in which coverage
rates are 40 % or lower. In between
are countries in which sectoral multi-
employer bargaining is less estab-
lished (Slovakia), less relevant
(Luxembourg, Cyprus) or being chal-
lenged (Germany). With a coverage
rate of 63 %, or 68 % if we exclude
the very small firms, Germany is still
above the EU average.
In Europe, it is common for employ-
ers to voluntarily ‘extend’ negotiated
agreements to both unionised and
non-union workers. Voluntary exten-
sion to similar workers in the same
firm is also recommended as good
practice in ILO Recommendation No
91 of 1951. It also makes good sense
from the employers’ point of view,
since union members-only contracts
might be seen as discriminating
against co-workers, who are not
union members, and might uninten-
tionally create an incentive for union-
isation. Erga omnes or non-discrimina-
tory application of agreements to
employees ‘in similar conditions’ is
legally required in Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
(28) S. Overell, ‘Consultants do battle with the brotherhoods’, Financial Times, 26 April 2004.
(29) Data based on a survey of the Institute for Labour Market and Employment Research (IAB). See S. Kohaut and C. Schnabel (2003),
‘Zur Erosion des Flächentarifvertrags’, Industrielle Beziehungen, Vol. 11. 
Austria, Poland, Portugal and Spain. In
Italy the relevant constitutional article
(No 39) has never been enacted, but
as a rule judges take minimum wage
provisions in agreements as bench-
marks for their decisions.
As can be seen from Table 1.6, bar-
gaining coverage nearly always
exceeds the employer organisation
rate. The exceptions are few:
Luxembourg, the three Baltic States
and the Czech Republic. In addition to
weak data, in these countries there
may be a tendency among employers
not to engage in bargaining with
unions. These five countries have in
common that they rely mostly on
company bargaining and that exten-
sion mechanisms, even where they
legally exist, do not therefore apply.
Where bargaining coverage is in
excess of employer organisation
rates, at least some non-organised
employers apply the agreement nego-
tiated by their organised competitors.
They may do so voluntarily, under
pressure of unions or in an attempt to
attract good workers. As has been 
discussed in the report, Industrial rela-
tions in Europe 2002,many countries in
Europe have procedures of legal or
administrative extension of collective
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Denmark No practice of extension of private-sector wage agreements. In Denmark, extension refers mainly to the transposition 
Sweden of EU directives. In Ireland, extension of minimum wage provisions of Joint Labour Committees has become rare since
Ireland adoption of Minimum Wage Act 2000. In the UK, all extension provisions were abolished in the1980s.
UK
Austria Extension can be ordered by Austrian Federal Arbitration Office on application of one or both bargaining parties. In  
Slovenia practice of little importance, because obligatory membership in Austrian Economic Chamber guarantees inclusive 
coverage.The same condition applies in Slovenia (but this may change if employers’ side will be organised on a voluntary
basis- outside the Chamber system).
Belgium Extension is automatic if agreements are signed by all parties in Joint Industry Councils or in the National Labour 
Council. If not, the Ministry can extend multi-employer agreements by royal decree on application of one or more 
bargaining parties.
Finland If agreements already cover 50 % or more employees in the sector, agreements are automatically binding for all 
firms and workers in their domain.The decision is taken by a special government body and can be appealed in the Labour
Court.
France On the request of one or more of the bargaining parties, addressed to the National Commission on Collective 
Bargaining, the Minister can extend agreements to entire sectors and/or enlarge agreements to different geographical 
regions or other economic sectors.
Germany On the application of one or more of the bargaining parties and approved by a special committee for extensions, and if 
more than 50 % of the workforce is already covered, the Ministry can extend agreements to the entire sector.
Since 1998, and only in the construction industry, the Ministry can extend minimum wage provisions at its own initiative.
Greece The Minister can extend agreements at its own initiative, provided the agreement already covers more than 50 %
in the sector or occupation.
Hungary On application of one or more of the bargaining parties and after consultation with the subcommittee of the National 
Interest Reconciliation Committee, the Ministry can extend agreements to the entire sector.Applicants must provide 
proof of their representativity in the sector concerned.
Italy The Constitution declares collective agreements signed by ‘representative trade unions’ generally binding on all 
employee categories covered by the agreement, but the relevant article (39) was never enacted. However, judges 
generally take minimum wage levels set by sectoral agreements as a reference in disputes.
Luxembourg The Ministry can extend multi-employer agreements by decree on the application of one or more of the bargaining 
parties.
Netherlands On the application of one or more bargaining parties, after (non-binding) advice of the (bipartite) Labour Foundation,
and if 55–60 % or more of the workforce is already covered, the Ministry can extend agreements to entire sector.
Poland The Ministry can extend multi-employer agreements to cover unaffiliated employers in a particular sector, if considered 
‘a vital social interest’.
Portugal On its own initiative, the Ministry can extend agreements to the entire economic sector or geographical regions, and/or
enlarge the agreement to different regions. Interested parties can appeal the decision.
Slovakia On the application of one or more of the bargaining parties and recommended by a special tripartite committee for 
extension, the Ministry can extend agreements to employers with similar business activities and economic and social 
conditions.
Spain Extension is automatic throughout the agreement’s domain if signed by a majority of the representatives of each party 
to the agreement. Upon request by unions and/or employers, the Ministry can enlarge the agreement in cases where no
bargaining exists.
Source: F.Traxler and M. Behrens (2002), ‘Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures’; EIRO - Eironline; OECD (2004), ‘Wage-
setting institutions’, in Employment outlook, Paris, 17.
TABLE 1.7: LEGAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
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agreements. Such public law provi-
sions, which make the collective
agreement binding for the entire sec-
tor or occupation, exist in 11 of the
EU-15 countries (all but the UK,
Ireland, Sweden and Denmark) and 4
EU-10 Member States (Slovenia,
Slovakia,Hungary and Poland). In addi-
tion, Denmark has introduced an
extension procedure for the purpose
of implementing EU directives (see
Table 1.7). In two countries — Aus-
tria and Slovenia — obligatory mem-
bership in employers’ organisations is
a functional equivalent to administra-
tive extension and in Italy extension
of contracts to employees in non-
organised firms is based on judges’
rulings — applying the minimum wage
provisions in collective agreements
also to employees working in firms
not bound by them.
Table 1.7, based on the previous
report and additional sources, shows
the main variation in procedures.
Public authorities, such as Ministries
of Labour, play a crucial role in initiat-
ing the extension of an agreement in
France,Greece,Portugal, and, to some
extent, also in Slovakia. In these coun-
tries, and also in Spain, the Minister
may also decide to ‘enlarge’ the agree-
ment and apply its provisions to other
sectors or regions. Several countries
have established minimum require-
ments for extension, most commonly
minimum rates for coverage of the
relevant agreement prior to exten-
sion. Such requirements for represen-
tativeness apply in Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Spain. Usually, the
Minister must ask advice from the
social partners and firms may appeal
decisions. Social partners may advise
on dispensations for small or starting
firms, for instance in the Netherlands.
Other minimum requirements are
that the extension must be in the
‘public interest’ (Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland) or must abolish
disadvantages to employees or
employers (Slovakia). The direct
effect in terms of employees addi-
tionally covered by agreements
varies. It is probably considerable in
France, Spain and Belgium, although
no reliable data are available. For
Finland, the Netherlands, Hungary
and Germany the additional effect on
bargaining coverage is estimated at
19, 7, 4 and 1 percentage points
respectively (30).
One of the main conclusions of the
2002 EIRO study on the extension of
collective agreements was that there
is ‘a high stability of extension provi-
sions — the continuity is striking’ (31).
This is remarkable in view of the tur-
bulence in unionisation and collective
bargaining. In recent years, there have
been fierce debates on collective bar-
gaining and extension in France,
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, and Hungary.
• In France, in the context of several
initiatives to reform the existing col-
lective bargaining system and make
it more autonomous and represen-
tative, employers have proposed to
create more possibilities for opt-
outs, with the possibility of offering
terms and conditions of employ-
ment below agreed, and in some
cases, legally established minima.
This issue has also emerged in
other Member States. In the con-
text of the Agenda 2010 labour
market reform programme of the
German Government, the issue
has arisen whether sectoral agree-
ments should legally be required to
contain ‘opening’, ‘hardship’ or
‘inability to pay’ clauses. Unions,
both in France and Germany, are
strongly opposed. At present, the
reform project of the French
employers confederation, MEDEF,
seems stalled and in Germany the
issue has been left to the social
partners. In Poland, however, after
months of debate, Parliament
responded to employers’ wishes
and adopted a revised labour code
introducing a rather far-reaching
statutory ‘hardship’ clause.
Accordingly, the signatory parties
can agree to suspend a collective
agreement for up to three years, if a
company faces financial problems.
This change presupposes the exis-
tence of worker representatives
who can sign the suspension, but
that there is no statutory work-
place representation in Poland and
there are no representatives in
most firms. In Hungary, as in
Germany, it has been suggested that
more flexibility would make it more
attractive for employers to join
employers’ associations and sign
sectoral agreements, but so far no
action has been taken. In the
Netherlands, the issue of extend-
ing collective agreements resurfaces
during each downward turn in the
business cycle and has increasingly
been associated with the issue of
low representativeness of the
unions, with less than 25 % of all
employees joining a union.
However, a recent study commis-
sioned by the Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment
found that most Dutch employers
are rather satisfied with their
(extended) sector-wide collective
agreement (32). Many appreciate the
fact that extension supports equal
contributions to joint funds, espe-
cially in matters of training and pen-
sions.The survey also showed that a
minority of employers is discon-
tented and that some expect advan-
tages from a shift towards compa-
ny-level agreements. This group is
large enough to make conflicts con-
(30) OECD (2004), ‘Wage-setting institutions’, Employment outlook, Paris, p. 17; The estimate for Hungary is based on 2002 figures
released by the Ministry of Employment and Labour.
(31) F. Traxler and M. Behrens (2002), ‘Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures’, op. cit. 
(32) M. Heijnen and C. van Rij (2003), ‘Ervaringen van werkgevers met CAO en AVV’, Amsterdam, Regioplan.
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cerning extension a rather perma-
nent phenomenon. In recent years,
employers in some branches (e.g.
petrol stations, cleaning, transport,
work agencies) have tried to escape
from the obligations arising from
extended sectoral agreements by
negotiating separate collective
agreements with non-mainstream
trade unions. In one appeal case, the
Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to suggest that
the ‘employee association’ at three
temporary work agencies was not
acting independently from employ-
ers. In Portugal, the discussion is
related to the large role of the gov-
ernment in industrial relations,
inherited from the (non-democrat-
ic) past. In Spain, the previous gov-
ernment had wanted to reform col-
lective bargaining and scrap the
principle of ‘ultra-activity’ (ultraactivi-
dad) which means that a collective
agreement remains valid after its
expiry, if it has not been renewed. If
the end of an agreement would
restore the status quo ante, employ-
ers would have less reason to
speedily negotiate a new agree-
ment. In the face of strong trade
union opposition, the Spanish
employers confederation (CEOE)
backed off and signed in 2002 an
agreement with the trade unions in
which the principle of continued
application of agreements was
retained.
The 1994 OECD jobs study argued
that extension stifles competition in
product and labour markets, and
called upon governments to discon-
tinue this particular instrument for
supporting sectoral bargaining.
However, in a remarkable case, in
1997, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) defended extension on the
grounds that it is a linchpin of the
European social model, as defined in
Treaty Articles 2 and 3.The competi-
tion rules of the internal market do
not in the opinion of the EJC overrule
this principle (33). Careful empirical
studies conducted at different times in
the Netherlands have not been able
to find an upward pushing effect on
wages (34). Supporting sectoral bargain-
ing, it may even lower distributional
conflict and investment losses (of
workers in firms and firms in work-
ers) connected to the ‘hold-up’ prob-
lem in bargaining.The so-called ‘hold-
up’ problem arises from the fact that
workers (employees) will tend to
restrain their specific investments in
the firm if they expect that, after hav-
ing committed themselves, future bar-
gaining over the distribution of the
surplus will put them at a disadvan-
tage. Such future bargaining is neces-
sary, for instance, if the economy is hit
by aggregate shocks such as unex-
pected inflation.Although it would be
possible to write contracts for this
and other contingencies at the micro
level, ‘it is desirable to delegate this
task of adjusting contracts to aggre-
gate shocks to corporatist organisa-
tions, so that this adjustment does not
interfere with the idiosyncratic
shocks’, i.e. shocks that are specific to
each firm or product group. Individual
workers or local managers do not
have much influence on negotiations
which are conducted outside the firm,
hence they cannot create a hold-up
problem. However, in addition to sec-
toral negotiations conducted outside
the firm, managers and workers, or
their local representatives, can decide
to adjust their contracts according to
their specific needs when not doing
so would yield separation (either the
employee decides to quit or man-
agers try to lay off the employee).This
interpretation supports a multi-level
approach to bargaining and predicts
that under conditions of sectoral bar-
gaining there will be fewer separations
and more investment in, for instance,
training (35). Extension and multi-
employer bargaining have therefore
been important instruments in
defending sectoral bargaining and
coordinating wage behaviour in
Europe’s labour markets. This will be
discussed below.
3.1.3. Coverage of European
agreements
Bargaining of a kind also occurs at the
European level. ETUC, UNICE and
CEEP, plus, more recently, UEAPME
and the Eurocadres/CEC liaison com-
mittee, have negotiated a number of
European agreements, primarily to
propose and renew EU legislation in
the employment and social field (see
also Chapters 3 and 4 of this report).
They have reached such agreements
on parental leave, part-time work and
fixed-term work, which have been
given legal force through EU direc-
tives. In July 2002, a framework agree-
ment on telework was concluded,
which is being implemented by the
members of the signatory parties in
accordance with their own national
procedures, rather than by means of
an EU directive and national legisla-
tion. These various agreements have
focused primarily on EU-15.However,
the directives implementing the first
three agreements form part of the
acquis communautaire which is being
adopted and implemented by the new
Member States, while the signatories
to the telework accord invited their
members in the new Member States
to implement the agreement.A similar
European-level ‘bargaining’ process
driven by the prospect of EU legisla-
tion has occurred on some occasions
over specific issues in a number of
(33) EJC-C-219/97 Mij. Drijvende Bokken vs. Stichting Pensoenfonds voor Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven.
(34) R. Freeman, J. Hartog and C. Teulings (1997), ‘AVV, spil in’t spel’, Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 30 July; M. Rojer (2002), ‘De
betekenis van de CAO en het algemeen verbindend verklaren van de CAO’s’, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid,
The Hague, werkdocumenten No 271.
(35) C. Teulings and J. Hartog (1998), Corporatism or competition. Labour contract, institutions and wage structures in international
companies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 5.
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sectors (for example, working time in
civil aviation and maritime transport),
while outside this process numerous
joint texts of varying kinds have been
concluded by the European sectoral
social partners.As with cross-industry
agreements, the primary focus has so
far been on the current Member
States. However, efforts are being
made in the sectoral social dialogue
to involve the new Member States.
Where EU agreements or legal texts
are implemented by means of a
national cross-industry or sectoral
agreement, a problem of incomplete
coverage may arise.While in Belgium
this is solved by the legal status and
full extension of such agreements
when concluded in the National
Labour Council, it has elsewhere
required a specific extension proce-
dure which did not previously exist.
For instance, in early 2004, the Danish
central organisations LO (unions) and
DA (employers) signed an agreement
on the incorporation of EU Directive
2002/14/EC, which establishes a gen-
eral framework for informing and
consulting employees, into the exist-
ing cooperation agreement between
LO and DA. The existing agreement
covered only an estimated 50 % of
the Danish labour force in the private
sector. The new agreement includes
the innovation that employee groups
outside LO may now obtain repre-
sentation in company cooperation
committees as members. This has
until now been reserved for LO
member unions, and LO has had
mixed feelings about possible free
rider effects of this extension of rep-
resentation in response to an EU law.
The implementation of the directive
via the DA–LO cooperation agree-
ment means that company-level joint
cooperation committees will now
have a duty to consult all groups of
employees in the enterprise and not
only those who are covered by a col-
lective agreement between LO and
DA member organisations. It is fur-
ther clarified that it should be possible
for employee groups outside LO to
obtain representation in the coopera-
tion committee if there is consensus
about such representation. In line with
the directive, the cooperation agree-
ment will provide that employees
must be informed and consulted on
the development of the undertaking’s
activities and economic situation; the
situation, structure and probable
development of employment; and
decisions likely to lead to substantial
changes in work organisation or in
working and employment conditions.
LO also sees the new agreement as
an important step in using the
DA–LO cooperation agreement as an
instrument to implement future EU
directives that concern relations be-
tween management and employees.
3.2. Coordination and
centralisation of wage-
bargaining (36)
In recent years, facing increased eco-
nomic uncertainty and the economic
downturn of 2001–03, many Member
States have stepped up their attempts
to improve coordination of wage-bar-
gaining. Membership of the common
currency has added to the urgency to
get it right in wage-setting, as wages
have become more important as an
adjustment variable. One of the chal-
lenges for wage-bargainers as well as
for governments has been to achieve
higher levels of coordination in spite
of current decentralisation trends in
industrial relations and firms, without
stifling the growing demand for flexi-
bility and local variation. Quite differ-
ent patterns can be observed.
Bargaining decentralisation may be
accompanied by increased macroeco-
nomic governance with the help of
central organisations and the involve-
ment of the government. If that is the
case, confederations and central guid-
ance, implicit or explicit via agree-
ments,have not become obsolete.But
their role in collective bargaining has
become a different one — assisting
the process of decentralisation by
creating the conditions for stable
organisation,dialogue and trust.This is
what has been called ‘organised
decentralisation’ and is designed to
combine the need for greater flexibil-
ity and variation with the requirement
of enhanced coordination across
companies and sectors, and some-
times also across policy areas (37).The
opposite trend of ‘unorganised decen-
tralisation’ is seen when the role of
peak associations and sectoral organ-
isations is diminished and individual
contracting replaces collective bar-
gaining and company bargaining sup-
plants sectoral bargaining. Under such
conditions, there is no possibility of
explicit coordination, other than
through the market or by force of law.
3.2.1. The trend towards
decentralised industrial
relations
Decentralisation is often mentioned
as the master trend in industrial rela-
tions. In many countries, this process
first became noticeable in bargaining
over working-time reduction in the
1980s,but has since been extended to
matters of pay. It has been claimed
that internationalisation, technological
and organisational change, multi-task-
ing, teamwork and client-related work
processes have made standardised
solutions, negotiated for entire sec-
tors, less feasible and efficient (38).
Reflecting growing diversity in the
(36) The focus in this section and the remainder of the chapter is on wage-bargaining. Other substantive issues in agreements
between the social partners, e.g. working hours and arrangements, restructuring, social plans, training, equal opportunity, are dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 in relation to the Lisbon objectives of growth, employment and social inclusion. 
(37) F. Traxler (1995), ‘Farewell to labour market associations? Organised versus disorganised decentralisation as a map for industrial
relations’, in C. J. Crouch and F. Traxler (eds.), Organised Industrial Relations in Europe. What future?, Hants, Vermont, pp. 3–19.
(38) A. Lindbeck and D. J. Snower (2001), ‘Centralised bargaining and reorganised work: Are they compatible?, European Economic
Review, Vol. 45.
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workforce, decentralisation has also
changed the trade unions.Yet the main
driving force has come from employ-
ers. Traditionally, the creation of a
level playing field and the prevention
of cut-throat competition based on
low wages has been valued as one of
the benefits of wage and working
hours standards set by sectoral or
national wage agreements. Increased
international competition has made
this less relevant. Instead, it has
become more important for interna-
tionally competing firms to have the
freedom to react speedily to wage
competition from foreign firms. The
introduction of performance related
pay, and payment by results, has also
supported the demand for company
level bargaining.
• In a recent survey of employers and
workers in Finland, the stabilising
effect of collective agreements
through the restriction on wage
competition was praised by
employers and employees, and on
balance, both employers’ organisa-
tions and unions express satisfac-
tion with the Finnish system of
multi-level bargaining, in which com-
pany bargaining is embedded in sec-
toral and national agreements.
However, the study also found that
most employers would like the sys-
tem to become more flexible and
that many wanted more room for
wage incentives. Large internation-
alised firms especially would like to
see movement towards a wage-bar-
gaining system where the company
level has a larger role than at pres-
ent. The employees of these large
firms do not favour such a develop-
ment. Employees and trade union
representatives have emphasised
the position of the low paid.
Centralised collective agreements
might be seen as providing more
bargaining power and greater pro-
tection for those employees and
unions whose position on the
labour market is not very strong
and, indeed, has proved most popu-
lar in sectors and firms where
women and temporary workers
make up a higher share of the work-
force. It is to be noted that per-
formance-related pay is quite wide-
spread in Finland (affecting 50 % of
white collar staff and 34 % of blue
collar workers) and is accepted by a
majority of employees and by the
unions, though only if it affects a
small part (5–6 %) of total earnings.
The study also found that new firms
and those with young workers
showed a stronger preference for
individual and company-level agree-
ments. Professional workers and
their unions, too,preferred stronger
wage differentials in order to
reward training,education and skills.
The German employers’ federa-
tion in engineering (Gesamtmetall)
mentions industrial peace as the
principal advantage of sectoral
bargaining. This is especially
important for companies that are
involved in ‘highly sensitive’ pro-
duction alliances and high value
networks that produce for
export markets. The capacity of
employers to take a strike, and
respond with a lockout, appears
to have decreased in the past two
decades (39). Consequently, strike
prevention has become more
important. Other important advan-
tages of sectoral bargaining men-
tioned by employers are legal and
planning certainty. Yet, support for
industry-wide collective agree-
ments is waning, as is demonstrat-
ed by the increasing importance of
associations of employers that do
not require their members to
comply with the conditions of col-
lective agreements. It is for these
reasons that German employers
want more opening clauses in sec-
toral agreements. In a survey of
500 managing directors in the met-
alworking and electrical industry,
conducted at the end of 2003,
three out of four companies said
that they deviated from the con-
ditions on wages and/or holiday
or Christmas bonuses stipulated
in the collective agreement.
Moreover, more than half of the
companies reportedly applied
their own working-time rules.
Though the survey found no sup-
port for the thesis that German
firms want to abolish industry-
wide collective agreements, most
managers stressed that they
needed more flexibility within
these agreements.
Small firms are less likely to join
employers’ associations. Union mem-
bership and formal rights of employee
information and consultation are also
less common. Employees in SMEs are
usually only covered by collective
agreements if there is a sectoral
agreement, sometimes with the help
of extension. Large firms can more
easily bear the transaction costs asso-
ciated with wage-bargaining, whereas
it may be more efficient for smaller
firms to ‘buy’ negotiating services col-
lectively from employer associations
and be insured against union pressure.
However, these firms may be too
small to attract union attention and
high (perceived) costs may prevent
new and small firms from entering
employer associations, or they may
decide to join employers associations
that allow contractual opt-outs (e.g.
Germany). Sometimes sectoral agree-
ments differentiate between large and
small firms. This happens in metal
engineering in the Netherlands and is
also quite common in Spain and
France (where sectoral agreements
often cover small and medium-sized
firms only).
The level at which collective bargain-
ing takes place can also be seen as the
outcome of a bargaining process,
(39) K. Thelen and I. Kume (2003), ‘The future of nationally embedded capitalism. Industrial relations in Germany and Japan’, in K.
Yamamura and W. Streeck (eds.), The end of diversity. Prospects for German and Japanese capitalism, Ithaca NY, Cornell University
Press, pp. 183–211.
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where employers and employees have
(partly) different interests. Usually,
trade unions prefer sectoral bargaining
and this preference will be stronger
when union representation in the
enterprise is weak or not under the
union’s control. In this sense, the
Scandinavian system of ‘single channel’
representation presents a better ‘fit’ to
multi-level (industry and company)
bargaining than the German or Dutch
system of ‘dual channel’ representa-
tion. While the peace obligation may
apply in both cases, based on agree-
ment in one case and on the law in the
other, German and Dutch unions fear
that their policies might be undercut
by works councils over which they
exercise only limited control.This fear
is stronger when there is competition
between unions in the workplace. It is
for this reason that trade unions have
usually insisted on their prerogative in
matters of bargaining over wages and
working hours. The Italian situation,
though based on single channel repre-
sentation, presents another limitation.
Here the largest union confederation
(CGIL) opposes further decentralisa-
tion of bargaining because, in contrast
with the prescription of the 1993
‘incomes policy’ pact, about half of the
workers in firms above 10 employees,
and nearly all in smaller firms, are
excluded from company bargaining as
they have no adequate representation.
Under company bargaining, employees
can make wage gains above the sec-
toral average determined by the gov-
ernment’s forecasted inflation rates.
Such gains have to be based on pro-
ductivity improvements and can also
include a significant performance-relat-
ed element. Many of Italy’s small firms
and most workers in the south are de
facto excluded and the induced wage
drift in the south is estimated to run
2.5 % below the national average
between 1995 and 2001 (40).
3.2.2. Bargaining levels
The key picture which emerges from
Table 1.8 is that the setting of wages
and employment terms in the EU
involves bargaining activities at differ-
ent levels — the sector or branch of
economic activity, supplemented with
company or enterprise bargaining
and, in nearly half of the EU
economies, also with some form of
national bargaining. After the eclipse
of sectoral bargaining during the
1980s, the UK is the only Member
State where all or nearly all bargaining
takes place at the company level, pre-
senting an industrial relations environ-
ment resembling the US system.
Sectoral bargaining is however also
very weak or marginal in Ireland,
France, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, and Lithuania. (Bargaining in
large companies substitutes for sec-
toral bargaining in Malta and
Luxembourg.) Of these countries,
Ireland is the only one in which cross-
industry agreements guide wage-set-
ting at the company level.
Multi-employer bargaining at the sec-
toral level has remained the dominant
type of wage-setting in EU-15, though
it is rare that all bargaining occurs at
one level. Instead,most bargaining sys-
tems are characterised by multi-level
negotiations. Eight of the EU-15 have
some wage-bargaining, though not
necessarily on all occasions, at the
cross-industry level, covering the
whole economy (Finland, Ireland,
Portugal and the Netherlands), the
private sector (Belgium and Greece),
or the entire industrial sector
(Denmark and Sweden). There are
large differences regarding the impor-
tance of the different bargaining levels
within the various national bargaining
structures. In EU-15, there are three
countries (Belgium, Ireland and
Finland) where, in 2004, the cross-
industry level and two (France and
the UK) where the company level is
dominant. In EU-10, the company-
level nearly always dominates, except
in Slovenia, Slovakia and Cyprus. In
eight Member States (Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden) the sectoral level is the most
important level of wage-bargaining,
while in four countries (Luxembourg,
Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia) there is
either no predominant bargaining
level or the dominant level varies
from bargaining round to bargaining
round between the cross-industry
and the sectoral level (Finland).
There are also significant differences
in the meaning and scope of sectoral
bargaining within the different nation-
al contexts. In Ireland and the UK, and
in most new Member States except
Slovenia, sectoral bargaining is limited
to a very few branches of activity only.
In France sectoral bargaining covers in
particular small and medium-sized
companies, while many of the larger
companies have a company agree-
ment. In the Netherlands and Spain,
large multinational firms usually nego-
tiate a company agreement, even if
there is a sectoral agreement in the
branches in which they operate.There
can also be significant differences
between the various sectors (41). The
public sector, for example, has in most
countries a rather centralised bargain-
ing structure, while in sectors with a
predominance of larger firms, the
company level tends to have a greater
influence on wage determination.
Moreover, there are also variations in
the geographical scope.While in most
countries sectoral agreements are
concluded at national level, in some
countries (e.g. Germany, Spain and
with regard to special low ‘entry’
wages also in Italy) there are sectoral
wage agreements which are valid only
in a certain region or province.
(40) P. Casadio (2002), Wage formation in the Italian private sector after the 1992–93 income policy agreements, revised version of
paper presented at the ECB workshop on wage formation in Europe, Frankfurt, December 2001. 
(41) P. Marginson and K. Sisson (2003), ‘European integration and industrial relations’, in J. H. H. Weiler, I. Begg and J. Peterson (eds.),
Integrating in an expanding Europe: Reassessing the fundamentals, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 169–90.
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• A particularly important recent
development in sectoral bargaining
is the use of opening, hardship,
inability to pay, opt-out or
drop-out clauses, which allow
firms under certain conditions to
negotiate lower pay or longer
working hours with their workforce
than stipulated in the sectoral
agreements. Such opt-out clauses
have become more prominent in
recent years in Austria, France,
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
and Spain, although it is not easy to
establish the degree to which
employers make use of them. In
Spain most collective agreements,
affecting as many as 70 % of all
employees, have a so-called ‘drop-
out’ clause, laying down situations in
which companies may fail to fulfil
wage guarantee clauses. A major
innovation in the 2004 agreements
in Denmark is that the parties at
the local level may now conclude
local agreements that deviate in
either direction, above and beneath
the minimum conditions that are
stipulated in the agreement. They
must however inform the signatory
parties at the higher level. This
means more flexibility for firms, but
at the same time the trade unions
gain a stronger role for employee
representatives, since such devia-
tions can be concluded only in
enterprises which have union-elect-
ed employee representatives and
only by agreement. With regard to
working-time arrangements, the
Danish agreements signed in 2004
stipulate that, within the framework
of a local agreement, the actual
organisation of working hours may
now be subject to direct agreement
with the individual employee or
groups of employees — a similar
provision entered Dutch law and
collective agreements after the
adoption of the Working Time Act
of 1996. For the employers, this is a
step in the direction of ‘individuali-
sation’, while the trade unions are
pleased to have maintained the col-
lectively agreed framework.Danish
employers dropped their demand
for lower bonus payments for unso-
cial hours and inconveniences.
These new provisions can be seen
as an extension of decentralisation
in the bargaining system, with the
sectoral agreements increasingly
acting as a framework for bargaining
at enterprise level.
There are also significant differences
in the relationship between the differ-
ent bargaining levels. In many coun-
tries, such as Denmark and Sweden,
there is a supplementary relationship,
whereby the sectoral agreement
determines a minimum wage and
actual earnings are determined in
company bargaining. By contrast, the
cross-industry wage agreements in
Belgium and Ireland, and the central
agreement for 2004–05 in the
Netherlands, determine a maximum
National Sector Company Duration of contracts (years)
Belgium *** ** * 2
Finland *** ** * 2
Ireland *** * 2
Slovenia ** ** * 2
Greece ** ** * 2
Netherlands * *** * 2
Denmark * *** ** 3–4
Portugal * *** * Variable
Spain * ** ** 2–3
Slovakia * ** ** 2
Hungary * * *** 2
Germany *** * 1–2
Austria *** * 1
Sweden *** * 3
Italy *** ** 2
Cyprus *** * 2–3
Luxembourg ** ** Variable
France * *** 2?
Czech Republic * *** Variable
Estonia * *** Variable
Latvia * *** Variable
Lithuania * *** Variable
Malta * *** Variable
Poland * *** Variable
UK *** Variable
NB: *** =  principle or dominant bargaining level; ** = important but not dominant level; * = existing level of bargaining.
Sources: Adapted from EIRO publications.
TABLE 1.8: LEVELS OF WAGE BARGAINING AND USUAL DURATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, 2003
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wage increase which sets the margin
for wage negotiations at sectoral and
at company level. In Spain, the central
agreements for 2002 and 2003 define
a target rate for wage increases
determined by the government’s infla-
tion forecast and the cost of living
adjustment if the latter exceeds the
forecast. Some countries (for exam-
ple, Denmark and Sweden) report a
significant ‘wage drift’ between sec-
toral-level and company-level wage
increases. In other countries, for
instance Germany, Austria and Italy,
the positive wage drift has become
very small, with increases linked to
productivity and usually limited to
larger and particularly well-perform-
ing companies. Increasingly, there is
negative drift as well, associated with
opening clauses and local social pacts
in which firms extract wage or work-
ing hours concessions from local bar-
gainers in exchange for job or invest-
ment promises (42). In Italy this devel-
opment is related to so-called ‘area
contracts’, in which some provisions
of the nationwide sectoral agree-
ments are suspended, and a lower
wage rate is agreed, in exchange for
regional investment and job creation.
There seems to have been a tendency
towards a longer contract duration,
usually from one to two or even three
years (see Table 1.8). (In Denmark,
current agreements expire after three
years, instead of four in the 2000–04
agreements, moving from two-year
agreements in the 1990s). In Spain,
too, there is some pressure to move
from one to two years.This is consis-
tent with multi-level bargaining, in
which frameworks are set for longer
periods and adjustments can be made
at lower levels. In some countries, for
instance Belgium and Finland, bargain-
ing levels (central and industry) alter-
nate between even and uneven years.
Only in Belgium, Luxembourg and
Malta, adjustments are made on the
basis of an automatic price index. In
Spain, the ‘revision clause’ in collective
agreements in the private sector
serve more or less the same function.
In conclusion,most countries have wit-
nessed tendencies towards a decen-
tralisation of wage determination,
mostly by introducing more space for
company bargaining within sectoral
agreements, sometimes by explicitly
introducing the possibility for ‘opt-
outs’ under specified conditions of
economic adversity.All this is suppos-
edly increasing the flexibility of wage-
setting. Overall, there has been
remarkably little change in the impor-
tance of the principal bargaining levels.
The UK is the only country in which
the most important level of wage-bar-
gaining switched from the sectoral to
the company level, but that happened
long before the 1990s. In France, a
strong decline in sectoral wage-bar-
gaining was observed during the 1990s,
which did not mark a qualitative
change since French sectoral bargain-
ing has been highly fragmented for a
long time. In the Netherlands, the
breakdown of sectoral bargaining has
been limited to some branches (bank-
ing, for example) while other sectors
(such as commerce and catering) have
tended to centralise wage-bargaining.
There had always been an important
market for company bargaining among
multinational firms. In Sweden, cross-
industry wage-bargaining disappeared
in favour of sectoral bargaining at the
beginning of the 1990s. In Denmark,
cross-industry bargaining has not com-
pletely disappeared but may in fact
have become more important in
recent years. Here, decentralisation
took the form of leaving more issues
to be decided at the company level,
above a specified minimum level.Multi-
employer bargaining, even at a very
general (cross-industry) level, has
remained important for the funding of
general purpose goods, some related
to the ‘old’ welfare system (early
retirement, disability and sickness
leave), some to the ‘investment welfare
state’ (training, parental and education-
al leave). A similar development had
characterised the Netherlands until
2002 and 2003 when the government
stepped in with more heavy armour to
phase out collective funding of provi-
sions for the ‘old’ welfare state. In Italy,
a national tripartite agreement con-
cluded in 1993 and reaffirmed in 1998
laid down the rules for the bargaining
system, affirming the primacy of sec-
toral-level bargaining with a supple-
mentary role for productivity bargain-
ing in companies. Finally, in Spain there
has been a slow decrease in the impor-
tance of company agreements and
simultaneously an increase in the
importance of sectoral wage-bargain-
ing, within a renewed cross-industry
framework. In short,despite decentral-
isation and the advance of multi-level
bargaining, most EU-15 countries have
shown a remarkable stability in their
wage-bargaining structure, the same
stability observed in bargaining cover-
age. However, this picture does not
hold for the far more unstable and
decentralised situation prevailing in
many of the new Member States.
3.2.3. The measurement of
decentralisation
For reasons of comparison through
time and across Member States it
would be useful to design a common
yardstick. This paragraph therefore
presents an index of decentralisa-
tion (43). Centralisation of wage-bar-
gaining has a vertical and horizontal
dimension, with centralisation of bar-
gaining authority and organisational
concentration as core variables. The
vertical dimension refers to the level
at which agreements or guidelines are
negotiated and to the authority of the
negotiating unions and employers’
associations.The horizontal dimension
(42) W. Streeck and B. Rehder (2003), ‘Das Flächentarifvertrag: Krise, Stabilität und Wandel’, Industrielle Beziehungen, Vol. 10
(43) This follows the approach in T. Iversen (1999), Contested economic institutions. The politics of macroeconomics and wage-bargain-
ing in advanced democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 48–57. A similar approach was suggested in J. Visser
(1990), ‘In search of inclusive unionism’, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, Vol. 18, Chapters 7 and 8.
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refers to the concentration or frag-
mentation of the negotiating parties at
any given level.Where bargaining takes
places at different levels, the authority
and concentration of the actors at
each of the levels needs to be taken
into account.
The relationship between the confed-
erations or peak associations of trade
unions and employers and their affili-
ates or member organisations in the
field of collective bargaining is deter-
mined to some degree by the formal
provisions of the various organisations’
constitutions, but also by less formal
factors such as power resources,
access to information, long-established
routines and personal networks
between organisational leaders. It has
been argued that power in the union
movement, for instance,gravitates from
the sector unions to the national con-
federations if collective bargaining is
dominated by central agreements dur-
ing a considerable number of years (44).
It cannot be assumed,however, that the
power of the national confederations is
identical with the general degree of
centralisation of collective bargaining,
because this also depends on employ-
ers. One of the social partners can be
much more centralised than the other,
even though some balance is likely to
develop over time.With these caveats
in mind, an attempt has been made in
Box 1.1 to measure the degree of cen-
tralisation of the unions in matters of
collective bargaining over wages.
(44) J. P. Windmuller (1975), ‘The authority of national trade union confederations: a comparative analysis’, in D. B. Lipsky (ed.), Union
power and public policy, New York, New York School of Labor Relations, p. 98; also H. A. Clegg (1976), Trade unionism under col-
lective bargaining. A theory based on comparison of six countries, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 54. 
(45) At this point in time there is no bargaining authority above the national level. Union attempts to establish cross-national coordi-
nation of wage-bargaining will be discussed later in the chapter.
(46) With regard to enforceability the approach followed here is the one suggested by F. Traxler, B. Kittel and S. Blaschke (2001),
National labour relations in internationalised markets. A comparative study of institutions, change and performance, Oxford
University Press, although the number of items has been reduced. 
(47) T. Iversen, Contested economic institutions, op. cit., p. 53; J. Visser, ‘In search of inclusive unionism’, op. cit., p. 172.
(48 ) In order to increase the distances at the low end of the scale (of very decentralised systems), Iversen’s operational definition has
been followed by taking the square root. 
To determine the degree of centralisation in multi-level bargaining,
weights must be attached to each level reflecting the legal or customary
bargaining authority at each level.Thus, if all authority is vested in organ-
isations at the national level, it can be accorded the weight of ‘1’,where-
as if a level has no authority whatsoever it would be given a ‘0’ (45).
Levels with real, but limited authority would be given weights between
zero and one, so that
∑j = 1, where w is the weight accorded to each level j.
The assignment of weights depends on the level at which bargaining takes
place (national, sectoral or company) and the degree of enforceability of
agreements or recommendations at each level (46).At the national level,four
possibilities are acknowledged: the union confederation negotiates a
national wage agreement (0.4); the agreement contains ‘opt out’ clauses
(0.3); it negotiates only minimum rates and/or issues non-binding (in legal
terms) recommendations (0.2), it sets a procedural framework for nego-
tiations (0.1), or it does none of these things (0).The same question,with
the same scores,can be repeated at the sectoral level.Are any of the activ-
ities mentioned above taking place or is all bargaining left to the company
level? In addition,the formal authority of the negotiating confederation (or
union) is measured by answering six simple questions: (i) Are agreements
legally enforceable? (is non-implementation punishable in court?) (yes =
0.1;no = 0); (ii) Do agreements or does the law prescribe a ‘peace obliga-
tion’ on lower-level bargainers (0.1/0)? (iii) Do affiliates (company repre-
sentatives) ask permission from the confederation (union) to commence
negotiations (0.1/0)? (iv) Does the confederation (union) participate in the
preparation and formulation of bargaining on the demand of its affiliates
(local representatives) or otherwise prescribe the bargaining space of
lower level bargainers (0.1/0)? (v) Does the confederation (union) have a
(central) strike fund of significant size, from which strikers, respectively
unions or local organisations, can be reimbursed (0.1/0)? (vi) Does the
confederation or union have the right to veto or end a strike,by withhold-
ing permission, funding or calling for arbitration (0.1/0)? The maximum
score is set at 2 x(0.4 + 6 x 0.1)/2 = 1.
For a complete measure of centralisation, these scores must be com-
bined with information about the number of organisations (confedera-
tions, unions or bargaining units) over which bargaining authority is
divided. If all authority would be vested in one confederation and one
union, it reaches the maximum score 1, but if authority at each level is
fragmented among many organisations, it will be lower.A simple formu-
la is to divide the bargaining authority w at level j by the number of
organisations or units at that level.Our measure of centralisation would
then become:
Cent = ∑∑j / nj, where nj = the number of confederations
(unions) at level j.
As noted by Iversen, the limitation of this index is that it assumes that
all confederations, unions or bargaining units are of equal size and equal
influence. It disregards the possibility that some confederations or
unions dominate or lead the others, because of their larger size and
resources.The counting of union organisations can be approached in a
similar way as the economic concentration of firms or the political con-
centration of political parties with the so-called Herfindahl index, which
weights large unions more than small (47).The ‘effective’ number of union
organisations N, i.e. those that are large enough to influence bargaining
patterns, is defined as:
N = ( ∑ i p i
2
)
- 1
,
where pi is the share of union (confederation) members organised by
union (confederation) i. if N is substituted for n, the formula for central-
isation is the following:
Cent = ∑ ∑ j  / Nj = ∑wij x pi j
2
This index (48) is theoretically well-founded as it measures the control
over enterprise and/or industry bargaining by higher level agreements
and organisations, and is well-adapted to the reality of multi-level bar-
gaining systems, treating industry bargaining as nested in and potentially
controlled by central bargaining, but also as a controlling force in its
own right.
Box 1.1: The degree of centralisation of unions in collective bargaining over wages
 
The results (see Chart 1.6 and Table
1.9) clearly show a group of EU
Member States with a rather cen-
tralised organisation of unions and
wage-bargaining: Austria, Ireland,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland,
Sweden, followed closely by
Denmark, Germany and Slovenia.
Ireland is the only country in this
group without a strong sectoral
framework for bargaining and
Germany the only country without a
cross-industry one. In nearly all coun-
tries, sectoral agreements have been
loosened up, either moving towards
setting minimum rates only
(Denmark) or by creating more space
for local bargaining (Austria,Germany,
the Netherlands), sometimes with
‘opt outs’ that allow firms to set con-
ditions beneath the agreed sectoral
level. At the low end of the centrali-
sation scale we find the UK and
France as well as most new Member
States, with the exception of Slovenia
and Slovakia. Decentralisation is in
these countries the product of the
absence of both national and sectoral
bargaining conditions and union frag-
mentation. Finally, in between, we find
the southern Member States —
Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal —
together with Luxembourg and
Slovakia. One remarkable finding is
that in these countries there has been
an upward movement in centralisa-
tion during the 1990s, especially by
setting a more binding sectoral frame-
work for wage-bargaining (Italy,
Spain), in some cases supplemented
by procedural guidelines or even sub-
stantive targets for wage-bargaining.
The overall picture is therefore not
one of a general tendency towards
decentralisation, at least not if all lev-
els (cross-industry, sectoral and com-
pany) and the enforceability and for-
mal power of the confederation and
its affiliates are taken into account. By
abandoning cross-industry bargaining,
Sweden and Denmark (in the 1980s,
not shown in Table 1.9) are the clear-
est cases of decentralisation — but
coming from very high levels. In con-
trast, Ireland (in the late 1980s, not
shown in Table 1.9), Belgium, Italy,
Spain and Greece have moved in the
other direction. If only the sectoral
level is considered, a tendency
towards more decentralisation is
apparent, to some extent counter-
vailed by the trend towards greater
union concentration.
It should be stressed, again, that this
description of trends is based on con-
sidering the role and organisation of
trade unions and leaves employers
out of the picture. It is possible to
make a few general observations con-
cerning the bargaining role of employ-
ers’ organisations. In most Member
States (Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, the UK, and all new Member
States except Slovenia) affiliated
employers’ organisations enjoy fairly
substantial autonomy and probably
operate more independently of their
national confederations than the
unions do. There may, however, be a
quite significant degree of informal
power sharing, based on personal
relationships, network ties and fre-
quent meetings between industrial
relations/human resource manage-
ment executives of largest firms.This
can contribute to explicit or implicit
coordination which will be consid-
ered in the next section.
The autonomy of sectoral (and
regional) employers’ associations in
matters of collective bargaining mani-
fests itself through a lack of formal
powers of the confederations over
their affiliates. Sometimes the affiliates
are required to inform their peak
association, but usually the latter has
no power of sanction over their (larg-
er) member organisations, nor do
they offer positive sanctions, like a
‘central strike or resistance fund’
comparable to the more powerful
and centralised union confederations.
By contrast, in a number of Member
States (Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, and also in Slovenia) the for-
mal power of the national confedera-
tions over their affiliates is more sub-
stantial. This includes the right either
to negotiate collective agreements
directly or to impose certain bargain-
ing goals on their affiliates (Belgium,
Ireland). In Denmark, the confedera-
tion’s power rests on the appoint-
ment of mediators in the case of con-
flict. (The same is true for the unions.)
In Slovenia, the peak association direct-
ly organises companies and thus does
not have to share power with sectoral
employers’ organisations, while the
Confederation of Greek Industries
signs sectoral collective agreements
which are binding for its member asso-
ciations.Although collective bargaining
is mostly in the domain of its member
organisations, the formal power to sign
contracts is retained by the Austrian
Chamber of Enterprises.
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Chart 1.6: Centralisation of wage bargaining index, 2003
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Weight Weight Effective number Effective number Index of 
national level sectoral level of  confederations of unions centralisation
Austria 1990 0.4 1.0 1.0 8.5 0.72
1995 0.4 1.0 1.0 8.3 0.72
2003 0.4 0.8 1.0 7.9 0.71
Ireland 1990 0.4 0.2 1.1 4.6 0.63
1995 0.4 0.2 1.1 4.8 0.64
2003 0.4 0.2 1.1 5.3 0.64
Belgium 1990 0.4 0.6 2.3 5.6 0.53
1995 0.4 0.6 2.3 5.2 0.54
2003 0.6 0.6 2.4 5.2 0.61
Netherlands 1990 0.4 1.0 2.4 6.2 0.57
1995 0.4 0.9 2.3 6.3 0.57
2003 0.4 0.8 2.1 5.4 0.58
Finland 1990 0.7 0.7 2.8 10.5 0.59
1995 0.5 0.7 2.7 10.1 0.54
2003 0.7 0.7 2.9 8.9 0.57
Sweden 1990 0.9 0.9 2.2 6.3 0.74
1995 0.3 0.9 2.3 5.9 0.53
2003 0.4 0.9 2.6 5.6 0.56
Denmark 1990 0.3 0.9 2.0 7.7 0.52
1995 0.3 0.9 2.0 7.4 0.52
2003 0.4 0.7 2.0 7.1 0.54
Germany 1990 0.1 1.0 1.5 6.0 0.48
1995 0.1 1.0 1.5 6.6 0.47
2003 0.1 0.8 1.5 5.3 0.47
Slovenia 2003 0.3 0.4 2.0 10.0 0.43
Greece 1995 0.2 0.4 2.4 18.0 0.33
2003 0.3 0.4 2.4 14.0 0.39
Spain 1990 0.1 0.3 3.0 9.2 0.26
1995 0.1 0.3 3.0 8.3 0.26
2003 0.3 0.4 3.0 8.3 0.38
Italy 1990 0.1 0.3 3.4 9.5 0.25
1995 0.2 0.6 3.5 9.4 0.35
2003 0.2 0.5 3.5 9.1 0.34
Slovakia 2003 0.1 0.2 1.1 11.0 0.33
Luxembourg 1995 0.1 0.6 2.5 8.3 0.33
2003 0.1 0.6 2.8 8.3 0.33
Portugal 1990 0.5 0.4 1.8(1) 12.5 0.24
1995 0.5 0.4 1.8(1) 11.8 0.26
2003 0.1 0.4 1.9 11.1 0.30
Latvia 2003 0.1 0.1 1.2 15.0 0.30
Czech Rep. 2003 0.1 0.2 1.7 11.0 0.27
Hungary 2003 0.2 0.2 3.9 11.0 0.26
Cyprus 2003 0.1 0.4 2.9 12.0 0.26
Estonia 2003 0.1 0.1 1.9 9.0 0.25
Malta 2003 0.1 0.2 3.3 7.1 0.24
Lithuania 2003 0.1 0.1 2.2 11.0 0.23
Poland 2003 0.1 0.1 3.1 15.0 0.20
France 1990 0.1 0.1 7.1 8.3 0.16
1995 0.1 0.1 6.7 7.7 0.17
2003 0.1 0.1 6.2 8.3 0.17
UK 1990 0.0 0.2 1.5 14.5 0.12
1995 0.0 0.2 1.4 11.1 0.13
2003 0.0 0.2 1.4 11.1 0.13
NB: (1) Only UGT is involved in central pacts, while CGTP is opposed.
Source: Calculations by J.Visser (see text), see also Appendix Table A1.
TABLE 1.9: CENTRALISATION OF WAGE BARGAINING, 1990–2003
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3.2.4. Explicit and implicit
coordination of wage-
bargaining
Coordination based on shared under-
standing and mutual trust may be
more important than centralisation of
wage-setting. This is perhaps the
strongest lesson from the experience
of social pacts — many of which were
fully unexpected and negotiated in
rather fragmented and decentralised
wage-setting structures (49). A shared
understanding of the economic and
social context, and of key mechanisms
driving growth, productivity and
employment, greatly increases the
probability of wage-bargaining being
conducted in a cooperative way, in
which each party has an eye on their
own long-term self-interest and the
common good, and not only to their
short-term interest or purely section-
al concerns. This is for instance the
key principle of the Irish reports of
the National Economic and Social
Council, which preceded each of the
six major national partnership agree-
ments in that country (50).The impor-
tance of independent, valid and reli-
able policy analysis and the ‘joint
observation of (unpleasant) facts and
messages’ in such bipartite and non-
statutory organisations as the
Foundation of Labour in the
Netherlands can be of great help for
the development of shared under-
standing.
Any form of commitment by separate
organisations to undertake joint deci-
sions can be classified as explicit coor-
dination. Centralisation is only one —
extreme — form of coordination, for
instance, when coordination moves in
the direction of a single policy con-
trolled by a single agent or closely
cooperating central organisations. But
there are less ambitious forms of
coordination, for instance, if the social
partners, with or without the govern-
ment,accept joint rules by which deci-
sion-makers must abide or if they
adopt joint targets and norms for
their policy. Such a joint rule, target or
norm can be the result of concerta-
tion and social dialogue, when partici-
pants are persuaded to move towards
a congruent set of shared values and
preferences. Or coordination can be
implicit, based on the dominance or
example of a particular union,
employers’ group or sector and
resulting in setting the trend, norm or
target for others. This can be com-
bined with lower levels of centralisa-
tion and explicit coordination, though
some power and visibility of the
trend-setting union, employers’ group
or sector is needed.Alternatively, the
trend or norm for pay developments
can be determined by the govern-
ment through explicit guidelines, a
legal pay-indexation mechanism
and/or the statutory minimum wage,
though it would seem conceptually
advisable to treat this separately,
together with other possible means
of government intervention (see
below). Probably the weakest form of
coordination occurs when social part-
ners exchange information about
their ambitions and capacity for pun-
ishing or rewarding, without actually
reaching agreement or setting clear
guidelines.
These considerations can be translated
into the following scale for measuring
bipartite coordination in wage-bargain-
ing, distinguishing between explicit and
implicit coordination and coordination
between and within employers’ and
union organisations (51):
5 = explicit coordination between and
within peak association of unions and
employers, through agreements at the
national and sectoral level;
4 = explicit coordination between
peak federations through agreements
only at the national level or implicit
coordination (without agreement)
within confederations (unions or
employers) at the national and sec-
toral level;
3 = implicit coordination through syn-
chronisation of sectoral bargaining
and pattern-setting;
2 = implicit coordination and irregular
or incomplete pattern-setting;
1 = no coordination at the national or
sectoral level.
If any collective bargaining is consid-
ered as a form of market coordina-
tion — against its alternative of indi-
vidual contracting in unorganised
markets — then it makes sense to
consider also the extent of bargaining
coverage.The second (weighed) coor-
dination measure is obtained by mul-
tiplying the score on the coordination
scale by the coverage rate (52). Table
1.10 presents the results.
About half of all EU Member States
have maintained or re-introduced
some form of explicit coordination at
the national level. In Finland, Ireland,
Greece,Portugal (before 2001), and in
2003 also in the Netherlands, national
agreements on wage policy have been
concluded within the framework of
tripartite cross-industry agreements.
The two-year national agreements in
Belgium move within a framework set
by law. In Denmark, the sectoral
agreements have since 2000 been
supplemented by ‘climate agreements’
and other provisions negotiated and
monitored at the central level. In
(49) For an overview, see G. Fajertag and P. Pochet (eds.) (2000), Social pacts in Europe. New dynamics, Brussels, European Trade Union
Institute and Observatoire Social Européenne.
(50) See NESC (2003), An investment in quality: services, inclusion and enterprise, Dublin, National Economic and Social Council, March.
(51) A somewhat similar ranking has been proposed by L. Kenworthy (2001), ‘Wage-setting measures, a survey and assessment’, World
Politics, Vol. 54.
(52) For the purpose of comparison with the centralisation score, and for the same reasons, Table 1.9 presents the square root of the
weighed coordination index.
Spain, central agreements have set
guidelines for wage conduct since
2001. In Slovenia (2002) and
Hungary (2003), and in weaker ver-
sions also in Slovakia and Latvia, tri-
partite negotiations set the frame-
work for minimum wages and some
additional elements of wage-setting.
In Italy, finally, tripartite negotiations
in 2002 and 2003 have mostly con-
centrated on labour law reform, but
also sought to influence the inflation
targets set by the government.
Almost all of these agreements re-
commend a policy of wage modera-
tion in order to sustain non-infla-
tionary economic development and
to improve national competitive-
ness. In order to draw up macroeco-
nomic guidelines and define con-
crete national target figures for wage
increases, many Member States have
tripartite or bipartite economic and
social councils that provide macro-
economic expertise for the social
partners (see Table 1.12, in the sec-
tion on concertation).An attempt to
create such a mechanism in
Germany, modelled on the Dutch
Foundation of Labour, has failed.
In several Member States the peak
organisations of unions and/or
employers engage in implicit coordi-
nation.This is the case, for instance, in
Sweden (unions), the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and Malta (unions and
employers’ groups), Portugal and
France (employers). Pattern-setting is
reported in six Member States:
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
the Netherlands and Sweden. Usually,
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Types of coordination
Finland Explicit coordination through national wage agreements and sectoral coordination 5 0.64
Belgium Explicit coordination in National Labour Council, little sectoral coordination 4 0.61
Slovenia Explicit coordination through bipartite and tripartite national agreements 4 0.63
Denmark Some explicit coordination and broad sectoral agreements and pattern-setting 4 0.58
Netherlands Some explicit, but mostly implicit coordination and some pattern-setting 4 0.57
by large employers and unions
Sweden Implicit coordination within confederations (unions) and pattern-setting, 4 0.57
aided by joint institutions
Austria Implicit coordination through synchronisation of bargaining rounds and 3 0.54
pattern-setting between sectors
Ireland Explicit coordination through national wage agreements, coordination 4 0.49
within sectors absent
Germany Implicit coordination through comprehensive sectoral bargaining and pattern-setting 3 0.43
Spain Some explicit coordination between confederations of unions and employers 3 0.48
in recent years and weak pattern-setting in sectoral bargaining
Italy Implicit coordination between major employers (through strongest regional 2.5 0.42
and sectoral federations) and in principle trade union confederations
Portugal Implicit coordination between major employers, little coordination between unions 2 0.41
Luxembourg Implicit coordination among employees and employers, no sectoral coordination 2.5 0.38
Greece Some explicit coordination, with government assistance, little sectoral coordination 2.5 0.37
France Irregular implicit coordination through pattern-setting in the public sector 1.5 0.37
and nationalised industries
Cyprus Incomplete pattern-setting between sectors 2 0.36
Malta Implicit coordination among unions and employers 2 0.35
Slovakia No national coordination since 2000, some sectoral coordination 2 0.31
Hungary Some national coordination through the tripartite body, no sectoral coordination 2 0.28
Latvia Some national coordination, mainly on minimum wages 1.5 0.26
Poland No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.21
UK No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.19
Estonia No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.17
Czech Rep. No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.16
Lithuania No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.11
NB: 5 = Explicit coordination between and within the peak association of unions and employers, through agreements at the national and
sectoral level; 4 = Explicit coordination between peak federations through agreements at national level only, or implicit coordination in
confederations (unions or employers) at the national and sectoral level; 3 = Implicit coordination through synchronisation of sectoral
bargaining and pattern-setting; 2 = Some coordination through supervision and weak, irregular or incomplete pattern-setting; 1= No
coordination at the national or sectoral level.Weighted with coverage rate (coverage rates in Greece and Ireland are set at the level of
employer organisation rates, in Malta at the level of the union density rate).
TABLE 1.10: COORDINATION OF WAGE BARGAINING, 2003
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the dominant sectors are industrial
sectors such as metalworking or
chemicals, which are exposed to
international competition. Pattern
bargaining also occurs through large
(multinational) firms, as in the
Netherlands, where such companies
set the trend for wage increases.
Sometimes, for instance in Sweden,
the leadership of industry in wage-
bargaining is supported by legal provi-
sions supplying mediation services.
In the new Member States coordina-
tion is generally weak,with the excep-
tion of Slovenia. The tradition of
national wage agreements, existing in
Slovakia, faltered in the late 1990s and
the last such agreement was conclud-
ed in 2000.Attempts to reach agree-
ment in Poland stalled in 2003. In
Hungary, however, there have been
fresh initiatives.Usually the legal status
of a national agreement is a non-bind-
ing recommendation to lower level
bargainers, but there is little coordina-
tion, within or between confedera-
tions, or in sectors, to put pressure
behind such recommendations or
monitor their follow-up.
3.2.5. Recent developments in wage-
bargaining — an overview
Wage-setting is arguably the area in
which industrial relations and collec-
tive bargaining has the greatest direct
effect on broader economic and
social developments, influencing infla-
tion, unemployment and social expen-
diture (53). Its importance as a means of
adapting to economic imbalances has
increased with the progress of eco-
nomic and monetary union (EMU) as
euro-zone countries are no longer
able to use exchange and interest
rates to make such economic adjust-
ments. The introduction of the euro
has also added greater transparency
to pay comparisons within Europe.
Furthermore, the accession of the
new Member States will add a new
dimension to wage-setting. Wages in
these countries are in general consid-
erably lower than the EU-15 average
and there will be considerable inter-
est in the effects of EU membership
on wages and economic development
in the new Member States and of the
addition to the single market of a
group of low-wage economies on
developments in EU-15.
The EU’s 2003–05 broad economic
policy guidelines, adopted by the
Council in June 2003, state that the
maintenance of sound macroeconom-
ic conditions depends on wage devel-
opments as well as on the policies
pursued by the European Central
Bank and national governments. The
Council calls upon wage-bargainers to
seek outcomes that contribute to sta-
ble macroeconomic conditions and
‘employment-friendly’ growth. Gov-
ernments should promote the right
framework conditions for wage nego-
tiations among the social partners.
Above all, nominal wage increases are
consistent with price stability and
productivity gains. In particular, labour
cost developments should remain
moderate in the context of a possible
cyclical recovery in productivity or
temporary increases in inflation (for
instance, related to oil price hikes).
This would allow companies to
increase job-creating investment. The
guidelines also stress a perceived
need to allow wages to better reflect
productivity, taking into account pro-
ductivity differences across skills and
local or regional labour market condi-
tions. Finally, the guidelines advise gov-
ernments to ‘foster the macroeco-
nomic dialogue in a context of pro-
ductivity-oriented wage policies’.
Across the current EU, nominal pay
increases had moderated somewhat
in 2002 following a rise in 2001.This
reflects, with some delay, the world-
wide economic downturn which
began late 2000.The terrorist attacks
on the United States on 11
September 2001, and the Middle East
wars that followed, have added to the
uncertainty facing European
economies. In 2002 and 2003, there
was a marked slowdown in economic
growth. Taking inflation into account,
real pay increases had not risen very
high in 2001, despite worries about
the erosion of wage restraint after
entrance into the EMU had been
secured. On average, wage modera-
tion intensified in 2002, though there
is considerable variation, especially
outside the euro zone (see Chart
1.7). Adding productivity to the equa-
(53) This section is based on Employment in Europe 2003. Recent trends and prospects, published by the European Commission, DG
Employment, and the EIRO overview on pay developments in 2003 (Eironline, 2004).
Chart 1.7: Annual average % change in real wages per employee, 
1994–2001 and 2001–03
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tion, trade unions in most EU-15
Member States were unable to
achieve wage rises equal to the sum of
inflation and productivity increases in
2001 and 2002. It thus seems that the
EU’s key broad economic guidelines
on pay — that increases in nominal
wages should be consistent with price
stability and that increases in real
wages should not exceed growth in
labour productivity — were by and
large observed in most Member
States. 2003 was a year when eco-
nomic growth slowed further, where-
as unemployment rose and inflation
fell.This might be expected to offer a
recipe for further wage moderation,
as called for by the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and many
governments.
The attainment of very low inflation
has resuscitated an old fear, discussed
at length by Keynes: the tendency of
workers to resist cutting money
wages even in the presence of very
high rates of unemployment. When
nominal rate increases are very low,
the room for adjustment would seem
restricted.This is probably the reason
why there has been a tendency to
prolong working hours as an alterna-
tive adjustment variable, leading to
lower hourly wage rates.
The problem of limited nominal wage
adjustment has come up in a number
of euro countries. Excluding a down-
ward adjustment of wages, the
Spanish central agreement for 2003
mentions the intention to make
greater use of shorter working hours
(and reduced overtime) rather than
wages or contracts as an adjustment
variable in case of a downturn. In a
Finnish study, based on a survey of the
social partners and their members in
2003, it was found that adjustment to
a downturn is expected to take place
first of all through job losses and
changes in employment levels, possi-
bly also in working hours. Employees
are not ready to accept downward
flexibility of wages, even if low wages
are compensated by public subsidies.
However, it seems to be gradually
becoming more widely accepted that,
under the conditions of EMU, there is
scope for mechanisms that include
partial nominal wage adjustments.
Using tax reductions as part of collec-
tive wage agreements is considered a
positive and effective measure to
achieve moderate wage settlements.
This is seen as another reason for
national wage agreements and social
pacts, which also involve the govern-
ment.
In late 2002, the central organisations
in Finland reached a new two-year
agreement for 2003 and 2004, with
moderate cost effects of 2.9 % in
2003 and 2.2 % in 2004. Union
demands — improved redundancy
compensation and minimum working
hours — were partly met and the
government helped by offering tax
cuts and employment measures. The
agreement was ratified by the mem-
bership and will be implemented
through sectoral and, in some cases,
company bargaining. It is interesting to
note that this agreement, like its pred-
ecessors, encourages local negotia-
tions over performance related pay,
now quite widespread in Finland.
Wage-bargaining in Belgium follows
a pattern of biennial national agree-
ments, the last of which was conclud-
ed in January 2003, applying to 2003
and 2004. The agreement had to be
within the parameters set by the gov-
ernment, based on the benchmarks 
of Belgium’s three neighbours —
Germany, France and the
Netherlands. The negotiators settled
for an indicative rate of 5.4 % cost
increase over two years. Other issues
related to harmonising conditions for
blue- and white-collar staff, are train-
ing and greater flexibility in the appli-
cation of the government’s quota sys-
tem for employment creation for
young people and trainees in small
and medium-sized firms.
In March 2003, the Irish social part-
ner organisations ratified a new
national partnership agreement, called
‘Sustaining progress’. It is an 18-month
pay deal providing for increases of
7 %,along with measures in areas such
as compliance procedures and statu-
tory redundancy pay. The Irish
Business and Employers’ Confe-
deration (IBEC) had insisted that
‘deliverable mechanisms’ be included
in any new national agreement.With
the help of new benchmarking proce-
dures, the unions were able to secure
public sector wage increases where
they had lagged in past years.
In November 2002, the social part-
ners and the government in the
Netherlands reached an agreement
for 2003, including a recommendation
to lower level bargainers to settle pay
increases within a limit of 2.5 % cost
increases — the first such centrally
agreed wage ceiling for a decade. (The
1993 ‘new course’ agreement, recom-
mending a ‘zero’ increase, had been a
response to the 1991–93 recession
and was negotiated without the gov-
ernment, albeit under a strong ‘shad-
ow of hierarchy’ or threat of interven-
tion.) A year later, it proved much
more difficult to negotiate another
tripartite agreement. Eventually, the
social partners struck a deal, recom-
mending a pay freeze in 2004 and a
small increase, if the economy
improves, in 2005. This compromise
won a yes vote in a unique referen-
dum among the membership of the
Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions
(FNV).As part of the agreement, the
government softened its austerity
measures in social security and health
insurance that had already gained
approval in parliament, and postponed
its plan to phase out early retirement
through punitive tax sanctions.
However, the standstill in wage nego-
tiations in the remainder of 2004 and
2005 was contingent upon reaching a
new tripartite agreement on early
retirement, by May 2004. When this
proved impossible, the unions organ-
ised another referendum to reject the
government’s proposals and declared
that they would break the standstill
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on wages. The government threat-
ened to retaliate by not extending
collective agreements.
In late 2002, on the prompting of the
government, a tripartite agreement
was reached in Hungary’s re-estab-
lished National Interest Reconciliation
Council.The agreement recommend-
ed to sector and company bargainers
a 4.5 % wage increase in real terms,
and a standstill in raising the level of
the statutory minimum wage. In 2003,
fewer than half of the collective agree-
ments reported to the Ministry
included provisions on annual wage
increase, in contrast to 60 % in the
previous year.The negotiated increas-
es, however, were usually higher than
the recommendations.
In June 2002, the government and
social partners in Slovenia conclud-
ed an agreement on private sector
pay for the period 2002–04. Under
the deal,pay rises were to be linked to
consumer price increases, while from
2004 pay would be adjusted in a new
way aimed at helping Slovenia make a
smooth transition to EU membership.
This was taken up by a new tripartite
social agreement for 2003–05, signed
in April 2003 by the Slovenian
Government and the social partners.
This pact set the general direction for
economic and social development and
defines the tasks and responsibilities
of the negotiating parties.The agree-
ment’s main aim is to achieve a bal-
ance between economic efficiency
and social and legal security. It
includes provisions on wage policy,
employment, training, social dialogue,
equal opportunities and taxation.
The central organisations in Spain
concluded a cross-industry agree-
ment in January 2003, laying down
guidelines and criteria for lower-level
collective bargaining in 2003. Like a
similar one in 2002, the agreement
puts pay moderation at the centre of
bargaining, explicitly referring to the
requirements of stability in the EMU.
The agreement also advises lower-
level bargaining to promote increased
employment stability in exchange for
more flexible working time. As in
2002, this was a typical ‘agreement to
agree’, emphasising the value of ‘dia-
logue and social concertation on cri-
teria and content applicable at the dif-
ferent levels of collective bargaining’.
The agreement is valid for one year
with the possibility of renewal or
extension.An innovation is that it pro-
vides for the creation of a Monitoring
Commission (Comisión de Seguimiento)
for the purpose of promoting social
dialogue; gathering and disseminating
good practices related to equal
opportunities; promoting the
European-level social partners’ July
2002 framework agreement on tele-
work; and fostering the promotion of
‘observatories’ at national sectoral
level.The new agreement reflects the
spirit of various EU directives in call-
ing for ‘a suitable balance between
flexibility and security, establishing
frameworks that allow companies to
adapt internally to changing circum-
stances’. Also in line with EU direc-
tives, the 2003 agreement calls for
equal treatment and non-discrimina-
tion on grounds of gender, ethnic
group or race, while promoting the
content of the European declaration
on the employment of people with
disabilities, signed in May 1999 by EU-
level social partners.
Portugal experienced a sharp deteri-
oration in economic performance in
2002 and 2003, with soaring unem-
ployment, a contraction in public
expenditure and low productivity.The
government has proposed a new
‘social contract for competitiveness
and employment’, which is being dis-
cussed in the Standing Committee for
Social Concertation.There appears to
be no consensus,with one of the union
confederations in favour and the other
against, and with employers insisting
that the peace clause issue has to be
resolved first. Under the emergency
conditions of entering the EMU, there
had been a string of social pacts in the
1990s, the last one applying to 2001.
In February 2003, Poland’s Minister
of Labour proposed a ‘pact for labour
and development’ and from May 2003
the Tripartite Commission for Social
Issues has been involved. In
September, employers’ organisations
and some trade unions reached a par-
tial agreement on minimum wages,
public sector pay increases and cuts in
business taxes,which was accepted by
the government. However, the NSZZ
Solidarnoch trade union rejected the
deal and withdrew from further nego-
tiations.The future of the social agree-
ment initiative is uncertain.
Although national-level tripartism is
operational again in Slovakia after a
two-year break in 1997 and 1998, the
social partners and the government
have not been able to reach a new
general agreement since 2000. The
government determined the rise of
minimum wages (currently at 41 % of
the estimated average monthly wage)
unilaterally, setting an increase of over
10 % for 2003.
December 2003, the Greek Confe-
deration of Labour (GSEE) invited the
central employers’ federations to start
negotiations replacing the 2002–03 cen-
tral agreement. That agreement dealt
mainly with wages and working hours,
but for 2004 the GSEE also seeks
improved social insurance rights for tele-
workers,in line with the autonomous EU
agreement of July 2002.
A tripartite agreement on the reform
of the sickness fund deficits was
reached in Luxembourg, but not on
wages. Some coordination is being
achieved through the ‘automatic’
indexation system, adjusting all wages,
pensions and benefits one month
after the cost-of-living index in the
previous six months has gone up by
2.5 %.The decision is taken in the tri-
partite Index Commission
(Commission de l’indice) which meets
every three months.
Malta’s second largest union (UHM,
Union of United Workers) has in
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2004 proposed a social pact in view of
EU accession, taking its example from
Irish and Dutch social partnerships.
In July 2002, the Italian Government,
employers’ organisations and trade
unions — with the notable exception
of the largest union confederation
(CGIL) — signed a major agreement
on incomes policy, labour market
reform, tax concessions, and invest-
ment and employment in the south of
Italy.This ‘pact for Italy’ exempts small
firms from the dismissal protection
law under certain conditions, and
offers a larger window for temporary
contracts and work agencies, follow-
ing the proposals in the ‘Biagi law’, so
called after the labour lawyer Marco
Biagi who was murdered in April
2002.Against the background of eco-
nomic slowdown and rising inflation,
the pact re-affirmed the principle of
earlier agreements that pay rises in
sectoral collective bargaining should
stay within the government’s inflation
forecast. However, the unions have
pressed for a revision since then. In
June 2003, after five months of nego-
tiations, Confindustria, the central
employers’ confederation of Italy and
the three main trade union confeder-
ations, including the CGIL, signed a
new agreement, aimed at relaunching
development, employment and com-
petitiveness, and seeking to influence
the government’s future economic
policy. Both trade unions and employ-
ers’ organisations are opposed to the
government’s reform plan to move
more decision-making in these mat-
ters to the regions.The 2003–04 bar-
gaining round in Italy struggled with
the decline in concertation and there
were sharp disagreements over how
to compensate for the ex post excess
in inflation at the time of a cyclical
downturn. The CGIL and the other
unions want to renegotiate the gov-
ernment’s inflation target, but this is
resisted by the government and by
employers. In view of these differ-
ences, it is remarkable that the three
trade union confederations and the
employers’ organisations in Italy’s
small crafts business sector (around
1.5 million employees divided over
850 000 firms) signed a replica of the
1993 ‘incomes policy’ agreement for
the artisan sector in March 2004, set-
ting the stage for firm-level bargaining
and introducing joint union–employer
bodies in small firms. In December
2003, sectoral employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions signed a
renewal of the national collective
agreements in the chemicals industry,
without resort to any industrial action
and before the old provisions were
due to expire. The key provisions of
the new agreement are the safeguard-
ing of workers’ purchasing power and
the affirmation of the principle of
social dialogue and negotiation with-
out conflict. From January 2004, the
parties will establish a joint commit-
tee to examine technical aspects of
the application of the recent ‘Biagi law’
on the reform of the labour market.
New collective agreements for
hourly-paid and salaried workers in
the industrial sector were concluded
on 1 February 2004 by the
Confederation of Danish Industries
(DI) and the Central Organisation of
Industrial Employees (CO-I), a cartel
of blue-collar and white-collar trade
unions from various sectors in indus-
try.The new agreements succeed the
four-year deal of 2000.The key points
of the new agreements are improve-
ments in social policy, such as occupa-
tional pensions,parental leave and sick
pay. The settlement prioritises the
wish to maintain jobs and its provi-
sions represent an increase in labour
costs of nearly 1 % per year over its
three-year term, leaving room for
subsequent local pay negotiations
which should ensure real wage
increases without jeopardising the
competitiveness of enterprises. An
interesting aspect of industry bargain-
ing in Denmark is that negotiations
are preceded by so-called ‘climate
agreements’ or ‘agreements to agree’
by the central organisations, DA for
the employers, and LO for the unions.
In particular, these agreements stress
the value of social dialogue as a men-
tal framework for efficient collective
bargaining and seek to diminish the
risk of conflict — with unions clearly
concerned about attracting foreign
investment, especially where large
industrial conflicts attract high public-
ity and have strong knock-on effects
in the global network economy. Soon
after these agreements, the two cen-
tral organisations extended the agree-
ment to the entire private sector.
Following difficult negotiations, this
deal was drawn up by the Public
Conciliation Service (Forligsinstitu-
tionen) and was subsequently put to a
membership ballot. The settlement
staved off the threat of industrial
action. The two key issues were the
introduction of a central fund for the
payment of parental leave and benefits
above the statutory level; and pay
compensation in the event of unlawful
strikes. Eventually employers conced-
ed the first point and the trade unions
the second.The overall settlement is
notable for an increased focus on
social issues, but also for the more
central role taken by LO and DA
compared to recent years.
The first sectoral three year collective
agreements in the 2004 bargaining
round in Sweden were signed in
March in four industrial sectors —
paper and pulp, steel and metals,
chemicals and engineering.This result
had become possible thanks to the
conclusion of a central agreement for
nearly one million blue-collar workers
in the private sector between the
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise
(SN) and the Swedish Confederation
of Trade Unions (LO), the first such
agreement in over a decade. In
February 2004, after three years of
negotiations, this ‘adjustment agree-
ment’ provides financial benefits and
other support to workers who are
made redundant. Under the adjust-
ment insurance scheme, workers
(with some seniority) who are cov-
ered by LO-negotiated agreements
for blue-collar workers and are given
notice of a collective or individual
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redundancy in a situation of ‘work
shortage’, will receive monetary sup-
port for training, finding a new job or
starting an enterprise, or, in the case
of older workers, pre-retirement.The
company and the local trade union
must apply together for this support.
Employers will pay a contribution
based on their wage bill to the insur-
ance scheme; a bipartite foundation
will be responsible for the administra-
tion of the new adjustment insurance.
The 2004 agreements in industry pro-
vide for a 6.8 % pay rise in three
years, plus working-time cuts worth
half a percentage point.They followed
the model of the three-year agree-
ments concluded in 1998 and 2001.
The average pay rise in the earlier
agreements was 7.5 % in 1998 and 7 %
in 2002.The new agreements establish
joint funds for the improvement of
skills development, health and safety,
and parental leave. Similar agreements
followed in commerce, banking,
finance, media, and construction.
Bargaining in these sectors had been
held back by the State’s Mediation
Authority (Medlingsinstitutet), which
prefers the industry agreements to be
settled first.The agreements in metal
engineering and other industrial
branches had been prepared by the
‘impartial negotiation leaders’, an
institution that was introduced by the
1997 industry agreement between 12
employers’ organisations and eight
trade unions.These impartial negotia-
tion leaders replace the ‘State media-
tors’ found in other sectors of the
Swedish economy.The industry agree-
ment is widely thought to have pre-
pared Sweden for joining the EMU
and heightened international compe-
tition, which requires lower levels of
conflict (54). Following the ‘no’ vote in a
national referendum, Sweden has,
however, remained outside.
In February 2004, the collective bar-
gaining parties in the metalworking
industry in the German region of
Baden-Württemberg signed new col-
lective agreements. The settlement,
which was subsequently adopted as a
‘pilot agreement’ for other regions,
provides for a pay increase of 2.2 % in
2004 and 2.7 % in 2005. Of each
annual pay increase, 0.7 percentage
points will serve to allow for a ‘cost-
neutral’ adjustment to the introduc-
tion of the new pay framework agree-
ment of 2002,which merges blue- and
white-collar job categories into a sin-
gle grading system. As part of the
compromise, it was agreed that, devi-
ating from the industry’ standard 35-
hours working week, up to 50 % of
the employees in an enterprise can
work up to 40 hours. Originally, the
employers had asked for longer work-
ing hours and a general ‘opening
clause’, with unlimited authority for
local management and works councils
to decide such matters. In the final
settlement, the unions gained the con-
cession that they and the employers’
federation need to be informed and
give their consent. Against the back-
ground of its defeat on the 35-hour
week issue in eastern Germany in
2003, IG Metall regarded the out-
come of the 2004 bargaining round as
a moderate success. The dispute in
the East German steel and metal
industry had ended after four weeks
when the trade union called off the
strike. While employers in the steel
industry conceded a gradual reduc-
tion, in the metalworking industry,
employers conceded no reduction in
the working week. It was IG Metall’s
worst defeat in decades.
3.3. Concertation, social pacts
and the rise of the
government
The overview on wage-bargaining
showed that governments play an
active role in influencing the outcome
of collective bargaining in many EU
Member States.They employ different
instruments, varying from direct par-
ticipation in negotiations (concerta-
tion) which may or may not lead to a
social pact, agreement or contract,
threats to withdraw support or
offering compensation instead, to
minimum wage legislation and index-
ation, or trying to use wage-setting in
the public sector as a benchmark for
private sector wage developments.
Table 1.11 is based on the five-point
scale proposed as follows:
5 = government imposes private sec-
tor wage settlements or suspends
bargaining (involuntary wage freeze);
4 = government participates directly
in private sector wage-bargaining and
provides norms or ceilings, or tax-
based compensation to achieve par-
ticular outcomes (social pacts);
3 = government determines wage-
bargaining outcomes indirectly
through minimum wage-setting,wage-
setting in the public sector,or through
threats of sanction (for instance,with-
holding extension or recognition);
2 = government sets minimum wage
and provides institutional framework
for national or sectoral collective bar-
gaining (legal protection of agree-
ments,extension),consultation or dia-
logue (recognition and consultation).
(1.5 if only one of these applies);
1 = no role of government in wage-
setting.
Table 1.11 shows that there is consid-
erable variation across EU 15 Member
States. In Belgium, Ireland, Portugal,
Finland, Greece, followed by Italy,
France, and Luxembourg the highest
scores are reached, whereas the low-
est scores on ‘government interven-
tion’ are observed in the UK,Austria,
Germany and Spain.The Netherlands,
Denmark and Sweden occupy a medi-
um position. Significantly, the most
‘activist’ governments are not in the
‘neo-corporatist’ Member States, with
highly coordinated bargaining and
(54) N. Elvander (1999), The industrial agreement: An analysis of its ideas and performance, Sandviken, ALMEGAs förlag.
centralised and concentrated social
partners. Intervention is strongest,
and most persistent, in the more
‘peripheral States’,which had to make
the largest adjustment in their wage-
setting system before entering the
euro zone. The results of Table 1.11
also suggest that ‘no or little’ govern-
ment intervention is an option both
in relatively organised ‘neo-corpo-
ratist’ countries (Austria,Germany, to
a lesser extent also in Sweden,
Denmark and the Netherlands), and
in countries that have tended to fol-
low an unorganised free market
course (UK, Spain).
Variation is also found in EU-10
where most Member States have only
limited instruments to influence wages
and wage-bargaining is generally unco-
ordinated. Only in a few Member
States (Slovenia, Hungary) have gov-
ernments been active and successful in
negotiating some kind of cross-indus-
try pact.The national minimum wage is
the most widespread instrument in
seeking to influence wage develop-
ments. All new Member States, with
the exception of Cyprus, have intro-
duced a national minimum wage. (In
Cyprus there are, however, minimum
wages set for particular categories,
including clerks, nurses and school
assistants.) Usually, social partners have
a say through tripartite bodies on shap-
ing minimum wage decisions, but the
government takes the final decision.
Since the adoption of a statutory min-
imum wage in Ireland and the UK,
nine EU-15 countries now have a
statutory minimum wage, which can
also be seen as a form of coordina-
tion, since it functions as a reference
point for the whole wage system.
While in Belgium and Greece the
minimum wage is set by binding
national level collective agreements, in
the other seven countries (France,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the
UK) the minimum wage has its basis
solely in legislation.Therefore, the lat-
ter might be interpreted as a form of
State-imposed coordination, though
only in France is the impact very
large. Finally, there are three countries
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Average
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1990–2004
BE 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1
1E 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
PT 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7
FI 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5
EL 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 3.4
IT 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.3
FR 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1
LU 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.1
NL 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.3
DK 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2
SE 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2
ES 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
DE 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6
AT 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
UK 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2
EU-15 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8
HU 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0
SI 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0
PL 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 2.5
SK 4.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5
CZ 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
EE 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
LV 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
LT 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
MT 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
CY 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
EU-10 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.3
Source: Adapted from A. Hassel, Negotiating wage restraint, Habilitationsschrift Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2003; updates for Greece and
Luxembourg, and for 2001– 04 all EU-10 and EU-15 Member States.
NB:1 = No role of government in wage-setting; 1.5 = government only involved in minimum wage-setting;
2 = Government tries to influence wage-bargaining by providing institutional framework for consultation or dialogue;
3 = Government determines wage-bargaining outcomes indirectly through minimum wage-setting, tax-based incomes policies, or 
threats of sanction (positive or negative);
4 = Government participates directly in wage-bargaining, by providing norms or ceilings (social pacts);
5 = Government imposes private sector wage settlements or suspends bargaining (involuntary wage freeze).
TABLE 1.11: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN WAGE-BARGAINING
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(Belgium,Luxembourg and Malta) that
have a pay-indexation mechanism,
according to which nominal wage
increases are automatically and gener-
ally adjusted to inflation. In all other
countries such ‘centralising mecha-
nisms’ have disappeared, after having
been quite important in the high infla-
tion environment of the 1970s.
However, in the post-EMU context
the issue has not disappeared, espe-
cially in countries where there are sig-
nificant differences between the
national and the EMU inflation rate,or
where government targets and actual
price rises diverge. In Italy, the trade
unions, especially the CGIL, have
demanded an upward revision of the
government’s target rate, which since
1993 has been used as a benchmark
for sectoral wage-bargaining. In Spain,
most employees are covered by col-
lective agreement with wage revision
clauses (cláusulas de revisión salarial),
which provide for additional pay rises
when inflation exceeds certain limits.
Their importance has increased in the
context of wage-bargaining under
EMU, since they make up the differ-
ence between actual consumer price
inflation and the government’s fore-
casted or target rate, which is often
used as a benchmark for initial wage
rises for the purpose of adaptation to
the EMU conditions of stability and
competitiveness.
Public sector wage-setting is another
source of government influence, espe-
cially in the new Member States.The
public sector is important in terms of
relative size and because it employs
the majority of union members.
Although public sector wages are usu-
ally much lower, governments in the
new Member States are not able to
use public sector wage-setting in
order to influence wage develop-
ments in the private sector.The two
seem unrelated. In the private sector,
collective bargaining, coordination and
coverage are weak, and, in the public
sector, the most common approach is
that wage scales and rates for public
employees are set by government
decree, after quasi-negotiations
(Hungary, Estonia) or perfunctory
consultations with the unions. Only in
Cyprus and Malta is there free collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector,
and both in Slovenia and Slovakia
national agreements have set the
stage for public sector wage-bargain-
ing in recent years.
No trend towards less government
intervention in wage-bargaining in EU-
15 can be observed, although the
instrument of a wage freeze, still
employed in the 1970s and 1980s, has
become rare in the 1990s. But gov-
ernments have not been able to
extract themselves from the domain
of industrial relations and wage-set-
ting. This means that governments
must also be interested in the organi-
sation and coordination of labour
markets. The reason is that govern-
ments must worry about unemploy-
ment if they want to be re-elected
and that social dialogue and coordi-
nated wage-bargaining offered suit-
able starting points for negotiations
about adjustments in response to
shocks and turbulence (55). But State
intervention is a double-edged sword.
Governments might achieve a higher
control over the rate of change of
wages, but in exchange they surren-
der control over other policy issues,
especially regarding social protection.
This may explain the increased inter-
dependence between the domains of
industrial relations, social protection
and labour market governance, and
between wage and social policy when
it comes to bargaining.
The new scheme for additional
maternity/paternity benefits in
Denmark is a good example of the
growing interaction between wage
and welfare issues, and of the political
pressure on social partners to assume
a number of ‘social policy’ tasks. The
most discussed aspect of the 2004
agreements in industry is the introduc-
tion of a provision, known as a revi-
sion or mousetrap clause, which
allows the parties to reopen negotia-
tions if parliament adopts legislation
which changes the basis of the agree-
ments — for example, by amending
the rules on unemployment benefits
during temporary lay-offs, the estab-
lishment of a central fund to finance
additional parental benefits, or other
initiatives which increase employers’
costs. Such a clause was seen as neces-
sary to secure the agreements’ rela-
tively long duration of three years. It
was also meant as a warning to the
political actors against intervention in
matters of the traditionally
autonomous sphere of regulating pay
and working conditions. In this connec-
tion, the proposal of a central fund
financed by employers collectively for
additional parental benefits was a hotly
debated issue. A similar approach is
now being pursued in Sweden and the
Netherlands. If the Swedish
Government decides to introduce new
sickness insurance rules or amend
existing working-time legislation, the
signatory parties to the 2004 collective
agreements in Sweden may cancel
them. In the Netherlands, the ‘wage
moderation promises’ in the 2004–05
agreement have been made contingent
on a new agreement on legislation sup-
porting early retirement under some
conditions and were withdrawn when
this agreement could not be reached.
These interdependencies between
wage and social policy are also growing
at the level of firms, for instance in
Germany.
The incentives for social partners and
governments to enter into agreements
or social pacts post-EMU will in part
depend on how future uncertainty is
evaluated against past experience. If an
asymmetric shock were to happen
under monetary union, the ‘one size
fits all’ monetary policy requires more
flexibility through the deployment of
other policy instruments. Fiscal policy
(55) The role of government intervention in wage-bargaining has been analysed in the comparative study of A. Hassel, Negotiating
wage restraint, Habilitationsschrift Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2003.
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is a possible response to divergent
cyclical developments in the euro
zone, but is unlikely to be sufficient in
itself to achieve stabilisation (and may
be used to accentuate cycles).Hence, it
is likely that extra or early wage
restraint through coordinated policies
may come to be seen as a necessary
means of stabilising the economy.
Governments will want to avoid the
risk that occasional wage hikes occur
‘by accident’, because the fiscal and
employment consequences are now
much more difficult to handle. Extra
wage restraint through coordination
with central organisations of unions
and employers is probably preferred
over the longer and less predictable
path towards slowing down wage
growth through a rise in unemploy-
ment.
In sum, the mere uncertainty of the
macroeconomic consequences of
EMU and the perceived risk of large
imbalances at specific occasions may
imply a precautionary motive for this
type of coordination (56).Governments
should be the actors most interested
in finding a substitute for lost policy
instruments (e.g. monetary policy, fis-
cal policy restraints). Employers may
be less interested, as they are likely to
see decentralisation as their first
choice.Yet, they may see the benefits
of achieving wage moderation
through coordination rather than
risking conflict in an economy in
which reliability is at a premium. For
trade unions, the exercise of wage
restraint means a lot of stress, but in
a situation when they are losing
ground they may have an incentive to
demonstrate their ability and legitima-
cy as national actors.
3.3.1. Consultation and
representation on statutory
bodies
Representation on statutory bodies is
usually the prerogative of the national
peak associations of employers and
trade unions. In some cases, for
instance in the Netherlands,Denmark
and Sweden, these tasks are now
shared with sectoral unions and
employer federations, as an expres-
sion of a trend towards decentralisa-
tion.As shown in Table 1.12, employ-
ers and unions enjoy formal represen-
tation on such bodies in almost all EU
countries.While in most cases parti-
cipation in such structures is for-
malised and the national peak associa-
tions are officially recognised as mem-
bers of these bodies, trade union offi-
cials and employer representatives in
the UK are appointed as competent
individuals rather than as official rep-
resentatives of their associations.The
statutory bodies on which union and
employers’ representatives sit may be
bipartite, tripartite or have a wider
membership. They may have an advi-
sory, consultative or negotiating and
standard-setting role.Their remit may
be general — as with the Belgian
CNT/NAR, Greece’s OKE, Hungary’s
OÉT, Ireland’s NESR, Italy’s CNEL or
the Dutch SER — or relate to speci-
fic issues, for instance, with regard to
economic development (Malta), social
security administration (as in France,
Germany,Greece and Italy), aspects of
pay and incomes policy (Finland and
Norway), minimum wage-setting or
the application of labour law and the
extension of collective agreements
(Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg). In
many new Member States, the tripar-
tite body annually negotiates or advis-
es the government regarding the
increase of the national minimum
wage and, in some cases, the index
used to calculate the increase in
remuneration of public service
employees.
In recent times there are two major
EU Member States in which the cen-
tral employers’ associations have
scaled back their involvement in a
number of such representative bod-
ies. In 2001, France’s MEDEF decided
to withdraw from the direct manage-
ment of the country’s jointly run
social security fund-holding bodies. A
little later, the employers’ association
for small and medium firms followed
suit.A decade earlier, together with its
decision to stop central wage negoti-
ations, the Swedish Employers’ con-
federation formally withdrew from
consultation boards and other gov-
ernment bodies in an effort to dis-
tance itself from what it considered to
be excessive corporatism. However,
little has changed in practice since
many employer representatives have
continued to serve on governing bod-
ies, but now in their personal capacity.
In all of the former State socialist
countries, tripartite concertation
came to be institutionalised in the
wake of the democratic transition.
Hungary did so already in 1988.These
bodies are usually anchored in legal
statutes, but the role played by them
in practice fluctuates,partly depending
on the political complexion of the
government. Poland’s Tripartite
Commission for Social and Economic
Issues was established as a forum for
national social dialogue in 1994. The
weakness of employer representation
and conflicts between the unions
obstructed the work of the
Commission for many years.
However, since 2001, the government
has introduced new legal regulations
in order to revitalise the Commission.
There are now also some sectoral tri-
partite bodies. In July 2002, at the ini-
tiative of the Hungarian Government,
an agreement was reached to renew
the national-level tripartite dialogue
within the framework of the National
Interest Reconciliation Council
(OÉT). Employees are represented by
all six national trade union confedera-
tions that had been part of earlier
national-level tripartite forums and
employers are represented by all nine
national organisations. Tripartite dia-
logue between trade unions, employ-
ers and the State has been opera-
tional in Slovakia for more than a
decade, although there was a break in
(56) L. Calmfors et al. (2001), ‘The future of collective bargaining in Europe’, op. cit.
 
1997–98 and a new legal framework
in 1999. At national level, the main
forum for tripartism is the Tripartite
Economic and Social Concertation
Council, whose main activity consists
of issuing opinions on measures pro-
posed by the government in the field
of economic and social policy, and, if
possible,concluding ‘general agreements’
on such issues. There are also some
efforts to support tripartism at the
regional level,while public labour market
bodies have a tripartite structure.
International organisations, in particu-
lar the EU and the ILO,have played an
important role in promoting the set-
ting up of such institutions and have
supported their development.
However, the political stance of
national governments is also decisive
for tripartite bodies to play a signifi-
cant role in setting the agenda for
reform. Despite this political depend-
ence, and in spite of some criticism of
their excessively formal nature (see
Chapter 6), after a decade or so of
experience, it can be concluded that
tripartite consultation has demon-
strated its resilience and become a
constant feature in the new Member
States. (In Cyprus and Malta tripar-
tism has also taken root, informally in
Cyprus and on a legal basis in Malta
since 2000.) The weaknesses of these
structures include the fragmentation
of unions and employers’ organisa-
tions in many countries as well as the
poor state of the autonomous (bipar-
tite) social dialogue at the national
and especially sectoral level, some-
thing which has been stressed by the
Commission in the run-up to enlarge-
ment. The Commission has indeed
sought to actively promote the devel-
opment of bipartite social dialogue in
EU-10, and is continuing these efforts.
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Tripartite bodies
Austria Numerous statutory 'corporatist' boards
Belgium National Labour Council (CNT/NAR); various bodies at sectoral and regional level
Cyprus Labour Advisory Board (ESS); Economic Consultative Committee; Social Insurance Fund Council 
Czech Rep. Council for Economic and Social Agreement
Denmark Official Conciliation Service; several institutions under the auspices of the Ministry of Employment
Estonia National Economic and Social Council (NESC)
Finland Economic Council; Incomes Policy Settlement Commission
France National Commission on Collective Bargaining; Unemployment insurance fund (UNEDIC); various social security 
fund-holding bodies
Germany Parity committee for extension of collective agreements; social security administrative boards; labour courts and 
labour market board
Greece Economic and Social Council (OKE); Mediation and Arbitration Service (OMED); Supreme Labour Council; Labour
Inspectorate; Social Insurance Foundation (IKA)
Hungary National Interest Reconciliation Council (OÉT)
Ireland National Economic and Social Council (NESC); National Economic and Social Forum (NESF); National Centre for 
Partnership and Performance (NCPP); Labour Relations Commission (LRC); Joint Labour Committees (JLC);
Labour Court
Italy National Council for Economic Affairs and Labour (CNEL); social security boards
Luxembourg Economic and Social Council;Tripartite Coordinating Committee;Tripartite Index Commission; National 
Conciliation Office
Latvia National Tripartite Cooperation Council
Lithuania Tripartite Council; Commission of Labour Protection; State Social Insurance Council
Malta Malta Council for Economic and Social Development, MCESD
Netherlands Social and Economic Council (SER)
Poland Commission for Social and Economic Issues
Portugal Economic and Social Council (CES); Standing Committee for Social Concertation (CPCS)
Slovakia Council for Economic and Social Concertation (RHSD);Agreement Extension Committee
Slovenia Economic and Social Council (ESSS); Managing Board of Employment Agency;Agency for Pension and Disability 
Insurance;Agency for Health Insurance
Spain Economic and Social Council (CES); National Institute of Employment (INEM); State Commission for Continuing 
Training (CEFC)
Sweden Labour Court; authorities involved in the mediation process and occupational accidents/illnesses
UK Participation of individual representatives in Low Pay Commission (LPC), Learning and Skills Council (LSC) and 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
Source: Database of the Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Université Catholique de Louvain (1997–2003) on behalf of the Employment
and Social Affairs DG of the European Commission.
TABLE 1. 12: PARTICIPATION OF UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS IN TRIPARTITE BODIES
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n 4. Europeanisation
In addition, there are significant
trends in European industrial rela-
tions that influence national develop-
ments. Already prior to economic
and monetary union (EMU), national
industrial relations generally followed
one of two broad tracks: attempts at
cross-border agreement among trade
unions in continental welfare state
countries to seek wage increases
within specified parameters and
thereby preventing social dumping;
and the adoption of social pacts in
peripheral or ‘catch-up’ countries,
prioritising national competitiveness,
addressing crisis situations and
preparing for EMU membership.
Viewed together, the two responses
look like a dichotomy between
‘Europeanisation’ or ‘nationalisation’
of wage-setting and industrial rela-
tions. The first strategy, although it
had the support of the European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
and some of its most powerful
national members and industry feder-
ations, was always very weak as it had
to be based on coordination among
trade unions. European employers’
organisations and transnational firms
were not able or willing to engage in
bargaining or joint coordination.The
second, national strategy, has its diffi-
culties in the post-entry context,
although it may be a very valuable
strategy for the new Member States,
especially if they are preparing for
EMU membership. Already they are
expected to join the second phase of
the European exchange rate mecha-
nism some time after accession,
which makes exchange rate policies a
matter of common concern, with
procedures for surveillance and
coordination. The preparation for
membership brings the Maastricht
convergence criteria into play.
Although some EU-10 Member
States have a tradition of social pacts
(Poland in the early 1990s; later also
Slovakia and Hungary, and of course
Slovenia) and institutional tripartism
is a feature in all countries, there is
still a way to go.
As EMU and economic coordination
render labour costs and cost of living
comparisons more feasible, there are
obvious competitive and normative
reasons for setting wages in line with
or slightly below settlements reached
in European neighbours. EU Member
States have always been free to set
pay awards compatible with historical
productivity differences and with an
element of ‘catching up’ on other
countries. Convergence in Europe,
apart from the acceptance and imple-
mentation of a common acquis of legal
rules and standards, is in part built
upon such competitive processes.
The social dialogue process and the
European macroeconomic dialogue
notwithstanding, concrete pay and
conditions of employment are not
subject to collective agreements at
the European cross-industry or sec-
toral level. There are also no known
cases of such concrete bargaining at
European level within European com-
panies, though a small but growing
number of European works councils
have reached some form of agree-
ment on specific non-pay issues such
as training or sexual harassment,
while management increasingly
deploys cross-border pay compar-
isons, and some unions are actively
seeking to enhance transnational
coordination of wage-bargaining.
For the European Metalworkers’
Federation (EMF) the turning point
came in the early 1990s,when the union
was confronted with the triple pressure
of the internal market,the recession and
the preparation of EMU (57). Several
national wage-bargaining rounds ran
into difficulties and wage-bargaining
was no longer seen as just a national
issue. In response, the EMF started
restructuring itself and began to dis-
cuss the potential for transnational
coordination.The EMF started with a
system for information exchange, the
so-called European collective bargain-
ing information network, followed by
an exchange of observers and the
adoption of common minimum stan-
dards, for instance on working hours
(1996) and vocational training (2001).
Since 1998, the EMF tries to ensure
that national unions pursue a com-
mon strategy of demanding wage
increases along the formula of pro-
ductivity increases plus the inflation
rate. The main goal of the coordina-
tion of collective bargaining is to avoid
the downward competition between
different national bargaining rounds.
The EMF has no means of enforcing
collective decisions on its individual
national affiliates. However, it has
established what can be described as
a system of very soft sanctions.
National members have the obligation
to report to the Collective Bargaining
Committee on national wage-bargain-
ing rounds.
Other European industry federations,
such as the European Mine, Chemical
and Energy Workers’ Federation
(EMCEF), the European Federation of
Public Service Unions (EPSU), and the
European Transport Worker’s
Federation (ETF), have also stepped
up their transnational coordination
efforts. However, they do not try to
coordinate wages. Only the exchange
of information of the different ways of
bargaining in individual countries,
including the exchange of bargaining
observers, is deemed a realistic possi-
bility. The EPSU, which organises
workers in the civil service from local
to European government as well as in
the health sector and general utilities
such as energy and water, is struggling
to preserve a system of integrated
public services within EU Member
States. Engagement in the European
(57 ) See T. Schulten (2002), ‘Europeanisation of collective bargaining: An overview on trade union initiatives for a transnational coordi-
nation of collective bargaining policy’, WSI Discussion Paper, No 101, Düsseldorf, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut
in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
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social dialogue and lobbying the EU
institutions are important elements of
its work.A third strategy employed by
EPSU is cooperation with other social
movements.The federation took part
in the European day of national action
on the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) organised by the
European Social Forum on 13 March
2003 and the ETUC’s European day of
national action for a social Europe on
21 March 2003. The link with other
social movements is also visible in
relation to public procurement. EPSU
together with several other European
Industry Federations cooperated with
a range of environmental and social
movements such as Greenpeace
Europe and the Social Platform, itself a
network of European NGOs promot-
ing the social dimension of the EU, in
lobbying the EU Council of Ministers
to amend the draft directive on public
procurement towards the inclusion of
social, ecological and fair trade criteria
in the award of public procurement
contracts. Finally, the drafting and
debating of the Convention on the
Future of Europe including a working
group on ‘social Europe’ inspired
EPSU, as part of a broad public serv-
ice coalition, to demand that ‘the
social and economic value of services
of general economic interest are pro-
tected and formally enshrined in any
new constitutional framework in
Europe’ (58).
Other unions are engaged in more
classical union tactics.To mention only
two: the European Federation of
Trade Unions in Food, Agriculture,
Tourism and Allied Branches (EFFAT)
signed in December 2002 an agree-
ment on vocational training with
employers in the agriculture sector, to
be implemented by the social part-
ners at the national level.Additionally,
it negotiated and signed a voluntary
code of conduct in relation to corpo-
rate social responsibility with employ-
ers in the sugar industry in February
2003 (see also Chapter 3). In early
2003, the European Transport
Workers’ Federation (ETF), on the
other hand, organised a European-
wide strike against the EU directive
on the liberalisation of access to
European ports and the market for
dockworkers. Partly because of these
and other national strikes, the direc-
tive was rejected in the European
Parliament in the final reading in
November 2003.
n 5. Conclusion
In a changing international context it
is not easy to derive clear principles
from theory or identify which are the
best examples to learn from. The
debate on the idea that either full cen-
tralisation or full decentralisation pre-
sented the optimal solution to wage-
bargaining – as defended in the
famous Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis (59)
– continues. While a number of
econometric studies confirm the
superiority of a fully centralised or
fully decentralised bargaining model
to intermediate ones (60), other studies
conclude that the hypothesis has not
stood up to facts. For example, in a
recent analysis, reported by the
OECD, the authors find no robust
association between institutional
characteristics of wage bargaining and
economic performance, and much
instability over time (61).There is indeed
now a huge literature on this. In a
meta-analysis, Calmfors et al. (2001)
found that results depended strongly
on the indicators of centralisation and
coordination used and the countries
included in the analysis.A similar point
is made by Flanagan (1999) in his
overview. The analysis in Iversen
(1999) and Traxler,Blaschke and Kittel
(2001) suggests that, if combined with
a strict monetary policy and provided
that there is sufficient coordination
across bargaining domains, wages set
at the intermediate level of sectors
(or large companies) may perform
equally well or better than fully
decentralised wage-bargaining (in
terms of unemployment and inflation)
(62). This suggests that coordination
plays an important role and that it
may work as a substitute for centrali-
sation, thus off-setting the drawbacks
of a purely intermediate bargaining
system.
An important lesson from cross-
national comparative studies seems to
be that coordination, based on shared
understanding and mutual trust, may
be more important than centralisa-
tion of wage-setting. This is perhaps
the strongest lesson emerging from
the experience of social pacts —
many of which were fully unexpected
and negotiated in rather fragmented
and decentralised structures of wage-
setting.A shared understanding of the
economic and social context, and of
key mechanisms driving growth, pro-
ductivity and employment, greatly
increases the probability of wage-bar-
gaining being conducted in a coopera-
tive way, in which each party has an
eye to its own long-term self-interest
and the common good, and not just
to its short-term interest or purely
sectional concerns. But the chance of
(58) EPSU (2002b), ‘Services of general interest and the Convention on the Future of Europe — You can shape the future of Europe!’,
Brussels, EPSU General Circular No 13. 
(59) L. Calmfors and J. Driffill (1988), ‘Bargaining structure, corporatism, and macroeconomic performance’, Economic Policy, Vol. 6. 
(60) See, for example, 'Wage flexibility and wage interdependencies in EMU, EU Economy Review 2003. 
(61) OECD (2004), 'Wage-setting Institutions', op. cit. 
(62) L. Calmfors et al. (2001), ‘The future of collective bargaining in Europe’, op. cit.; R. J. Flanagan (1999), 'Macroeconomic perform-
ance and collective bargaining: an international perspective', op. cit.; T. Iversen (1999), Contested economic institutions, The poli-
tics of  macroeconomics and wage bargaining in advanced democracies, op. cit.; F. Traxler, S. Blaschke and B. Kittel (2001),
National labour relations in internationalised markets, op. cit.
creating and maintaining a coopera-
tive ‘mood of play’ depends as much
on institutions as on the disposition of
wage-bargainers. Without supportive
institutions, even altruistic wage-bar-
gainers can find themselves drawn
into a zero-sum conflict, in which the
attempt of each agent to rationally
advance its interests can lead to a col-
lective outcome that is worse for all.
The relevant institutions range from
the type of joint foundations and
councils for policy preparation and
nationwide bargaining as exist in a
number of countries; independent
research bodies or committees of
experts; the industrial relations
machinery and law; structures of bar-
gaining and coordination above the
level of single firms; and joint invest-
ments in collective institutions for
training, lifelong learning and enter-
prise-level partnership.
The hypothesis that either full central-
isation or full decentralisation pres-
ents the optimal solution to wage-
bargaining, is based on the assumption
that parties adopt a non-cooperative
bargaining approach. If a moderate
degree of altruism is introduced —
motivated by consideration of long-
term, rather than immediate self-
interest and by social responsibility —
then even moderately coordinated
bargaining may yield better outcomes,
i.e. lower rates of unemployment and
inflation.The real difference between
centralised and moderately fragment-
ed bargaining structures may be their
vulnerability to shocks.While a coop-
erative mood of play can produce
good results with any bargaining
structure, in the face of major shocks
the parties may revert to less cooper-
ative forms of behaviour which, in sys-
tems with weak coordination, can
have serious consequences.
There are large built-in tensions in
both national and international coor-
dination of collective bargaining. To
the extent that there is continued
decentralisation of actual bargaining
levels, coordination costs will
increase. Continued decline in union
membership relative to employment,
especially in new and growing parts of
the economy will weaken the legiti-
macy of moderating agreements
struck by unions.A threat to national
coordination is likely to be provided
by the internationalisation of product
and labour markets, which tends to
liberate companies from their histori-
cal national roots.As a consequence,
national governments will have less
leverage to convince companies to
accept a joint policy, for instance hold-
ing back extreme salaries and bonus-
es for top executives.
Increasingly, national frames of refer-
ence — as in a national wage policy
that is developed for the sake of the
national interest or social solidarity
— may lose its economic,political and
moral relevance for the strongest
players in the economy, namely firms
that are already strongly internation-
alised and the managerial and profes-
sional staff in these firms. This puts
greater strains on the central organi-
sations of employers and unions when
they try to define and defend national
guidelines for policy. This discussion
suggests that coordination through
social pacts and consensual norms as
a precautionary wage policy may only
work up to a point. Such coordination
may represent an unstable equilibri-
um, which may easily break down
once the levels of unionisation and
coverage of collective agreements fall
below a critical level.Another way of
phrasing this conclusion is that wage
moderation through coordination
may increasingly come to require
skilled government intervention, a
‘shadow of hierarchy’ and public poli-
cy support.
There is another lesson from com-
parative analysis. When tensions
appear in centralised bargaining, there
can be significant benefits in moving
towards a form of ‘organised decen-
tralisation’ rather than risk an ‘unor-
ganised’ breakdown, withdrawal or
erosion. Learning ahead of failure
means that elements of variation and
flexibility must be introduced before
the framework for centralised bar-
gaining breaks down and one of the
parties, in particular employers,
decides to withdraw, either in one
bang or by slowly investing less and
less trust and resources in coordina-
tion policies among themselves and
with the trade unions.
The final lesson from comparative
experience concerns some of the
ingredients necessary to achieve a
successful system of coordinated
decentralisation — both in the
national and international context.
To achieve successful devolution to
lower bargaining levels and/or an
upward shift to European-level dia-
logue and coordination, one needs
stable and reliable partners, in whom
one places confidence. Institution
building through organisational
reform and information exchange,
together with mechanisms for con-
flict resolution and trust building, are
crucial.
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n 1. Introduction: 
Why quality?
The ‘quality of industrial relations’ is a
topic attracting growing interest at the
European level.This is largely a result of
the growing recognition of the impor-
tance of social dialogue and social part-
nership to achieving the European
Union’s (EU) economic and social
objectives,and as key ingredients of the
good governance of economic change,
labour markets and enterprises. As a
consequence there is considerable
interest in improving understanding of
industrial relations practices, not least
at a time when the EU has recently
enlarged to 10 new Member States,
where there is a need for capacity-
building in the industrial relations field
(see also Chapters 1 and 3).
The importance of social dialogue and
social partnership has been recog-
nised at the highest level in Europe. In
2002, the Barcelona European
Council defined the European social
model as comprising good economic
performance, a high level of social
protection, education, and social dia-
logue. Furthermore, in the communi-
cation, ‘The European social dialogue,
a force for innovation and change’ (63),
the European Commission considers
that social dialogue can be one of the
driving forces behind successful eco-
nomic and social reform.The commu-
nication highlights the role of social
dialogue and partnership in addressing
some of the key challenges facing
Europe, for example, enhancing skills
and qualifications, modernising work
organisation, promoting equal oppor-
tunities and diversity, and developing
active ageing policies (see Chapter 3).
The importance of social dialogue and
social partnership are also recognised
at the global level.The Chair’s conclu-
sions of the G8 Labour and
Employment Ministers Conference in
Stuttgart on 15–16 December 2003
declared that:‘successful economies in
the 21st century will not be possible
without a modern system of labour
relations and efficient strategies to
manage change pro-actively. Effective
cooperation between employers and
workers and their organisations on a
partnership basis and the involvement
of workers in accordance with nation-
al traditions and practices make an
important contribution to promoting
the quality of jobs.The report (64) of the
International Labour Organisation’s
(ILO) World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalisation
published in February 2004 calls for a
‘focus on people’ and stresses that in
the context of a strategy for change,
strong representative organisations of
workers and employers are essential
for a fruitful social dialogue. It also
emphasises that in the context of eco-
nomic restructuring, the early involve-
ment of workers’ representatives can
be beneficial for all and for the good
functioning of companies, particularly
during difficult transition periods.
The social dialogue or partnership
perspective places industrial rela-
tions in the broader perspective of
social and economic development.
Traditional methods and practices of
industrial relations — collective bar-
gaining, the expression and resolu-
tion of conflict, representation, col-
lective insurance and the handling of
grievances — do not lose their
importance, but are placed in a
wider context. According to the
Commission, quality in industrial
relations is determined by the capac-
ity to build consensus on both diag-
nosis and ways and means of taking
forward the adaptation and mod-
ernisation agenda of the Lisbon
strategy, coping successfully with
industrial change and corporate
restructuring (65), and should reflect
the desire not just to defend mini-
mum standards, but also to promote
rising standards and ensure a more
equitable sharing of the benefits of
progress (66).
Although the quality of industrial rela-
tions is not easy to define precisely, it
should show through in practical
terms by improving the quality of the
lives of citizens, for instance, the cre-
ation of more and better jobs, and
higher levels of investment. Taking
these elements together, it can be
concluded that there are four main
dimensions to the ‘quality’ of industri-
al relations:
• the creation of a sense of ‘fairness’
and ‘trust’ based on jointly agreed
rules and partnerships which are
mutually advantageous to em-
ployees and firms;
• the lowering of (transaction) costs
related to the contracting and
rewarding of labour and the resolu-
tion of conflict;
• the investment in institutions that
give adequate flexibility to firms and
Chapter 2
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(63) COM(2002) 341 final.
(64) ILO (2004), A fair globalisation — Creating opportunities for all, report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalisation, Geneva, 24 February 2004. 
(65) ‘Social policy agenda’, COM(2000) 379 final.
(66) Commission communication on ‘Employment and social policies: a framework for investing in quality’, COM(2001) 313 final.
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employees, making it possible to
adjust and seize new opportunities,
and give firms and employees suffi-
cient security for making longer
term investments than otherwise
would be the case;
• the achievement of the overall
objectives of social and economic
policy, for instance, as defined by the
Lisbon strategy.
n 2. Quality and the 
Lisbon strategy
At the Lisbon European Council held
in the Spring of 2000, the EU set itself
the strategic goal ‘to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world,
capable of economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion’. The achievement of
the Lisbon objectives not only
requires a common effort from
Member States; its success also
depends upon the contribution of
‘autonomous’, non-State actors and
sectors in the economy, including
firms, employees and the organisa-
tions that represent them, in other
words, the social partners.As part of
the implementation of the Lisbon
agenda, the spring 2004 European
Council (67) calls on Member States to
build reform partnerships involving
the social partners, civil society and
public authorities in accordance with
national arrangements and traditions.
Such national reform partnerships
should promote complementary
strategies for change, addressing the
broad range of policies — economic,
social and environmental — encom-
passed by the Lisbon strategy. At the
EU level, the social partners are
involved through the Tripartite Social
Summit preceding the annual Spring
Council (see also Chapter 3). At the
2004 Summit, the European social
partners presented their second annu-
al report on the implementation of
their 2002 framework of actions on
lifelong learning and a first report on
social partner initiatives in Member
States that are relevant for implemen-
tation of the European employment
guidelines (68). In spite of many short-
comings, social partnership involve-
ment and consultation over policy ini-
tiatives is a common feature of the
European employment strategy (EES)
(see Box 2.1). The joint decision to
develop a European-wide ‘partnership
for change’ in combination with corre-
sponding national efforts (69) is an
expression of this awareness.
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(67) Presidency conclusions, Brussels European Council, 25/26 March 2004. 
(68) ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP (2004), Framework of actions for the lifelong development of competencies and qualifications,
Second follow-up report, 5 March 2004; ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP (2004), 2004 Report on social partner actions in Member
States to implement employment guidelines, 5 March 2004.
(69) Presidency conclusions, Brussels European Council, 25/26 March 2004. 
(70) ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP (2004), op.cit.
Box 2.1: Good governance and partnership — 
the involvement of the social partners in the EES
The contribution of the social partners to the effective governance of the European
employment strategy (EES) is highly recognised (see also Chapter 3). The European
Commission and Council’s Joint Employment Report 2003/04 indicates that the involvement
of the social partners in developing the national action plans (NAPs) is progressing, and that
their contributions to implementation are better presented and reported, but that their
involvement could nevertheless still be improved.
In their first report on social partner actions in Member States to implement the employ-
ment guidelines, the cross-industry social partners stressed the following elements (70).
The social partners were usually consulted during the preparation of the NAPs. In most
countries, employers and trade union organisations submitted separate comments (Italy,
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK) whereas in some (Belgium, Denmark and
Sweden) joint social partner contributions were included as an integral part of the NAP in
a summarised version and added as annexes. In Germany, Greece and Portugal the involve-
ment of social partners improved compared with previous years.
In terms of quality, the consultation was seen as too superficial in several cases due to the
absence of discussions with government (Austria), the lack of in-depth discussions on poli-
cy content (Denmark) or insufficient time for consultation (Finland, Belgium, the
Netherlands).
Ways of involving the social partners did not change significantly with the synchronisation
and streamlining of the broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) and the EES. No link
could be perceived between social partner involvement in constructing the NAP employ-
ment and drawing up the national reports on implementation of BEPG, with the exception
of Luxembourg where social partners delivered an opinion on the BEPGs. In Belgium, social
partners explicitly asked to be involved, in both the preparation of the BEPGs and the eval-
uation of their implementation.
Bilateral and tripartite initiatives aimed at supporting employment and economic develop-
ment through a comprehensive set of measures, were reported at national level or region-
al level in six countries. Concerning bilateral initiatives at national level, a collective agree-
ment was signed in Finland and Belgium and a ‘pact for development’ concluded in Italy. In
Belgium, a tripartite agreement including measures to create more jobs was prepared at
national level, and bilateral or tripartite pacts for employment at regional level. In Spain,
social partners signed an interconfederal agreement for collective bargaining containing
common criteria for collective bargaining at national, provincial, regional and company lev-
els on a wide range of labour-market-related issues. In the Netherlands, the social partners
and the Dutch Government reached an agreement on measures to support economic
recovery and increase employment. Discussions in view of a tripartite social pact for com-
petitiveness and employment were at an early stage in Portugal.
 
The Lisbon approach is also impor-
tant in another sense. Based on the
benchmarking approach used in the
Treaty-based European employment
strategy, the Lisbon European Council
proposed the open method of coor-
dination (OMC) as a means of
‘spreading best practices and achiev-
ing greater convergence towards the
main EU goals’, whereby convergence
is furthered through setting common
objectives, targets and timetables,
accompanied by a process of peer
review, benchmarking and exchange
of good practices.The OMC is a new
mode of multi-level governance based
on a mutual learning process through
which domestic policy actors learn to
respect each other’s differences while
accepting a common purpose and
agenda for change. It is a way of deal-
ing with the problems resulting from
the integration of European markets
in policy areas which already have
long traditions at the national level,
and where different national prefer-
ences and policy approaches make it
difficult to adopt common European
rules. The field of industrial relations
shares these characteristics and it is
therefore an interesting area in which
to explore the use of some aspects of
the OMC, in particular the process of
benchmarking and best practice
learning, supported by common indi-
cators.While encouraging the auton-
omy of the social partners at the
European level, the High Level Group
on Industrial Relations and Change in
the EU recommended some modest
steps in that direction (71).The view of
the group was that it would raise
awareness of common problems and
provide useful solutions among social
partners across Europe and con-
tribute to mutual learning.The cross-
industry social partners’ framework
of actions on lifelong learning is the
first example of a social partner text
to be implemented by an OMC
adapted to the social partners (see
Chapter 3).
What would be useful criteria for
assessing the quality of industrial rela-
tions? This is a difficult question, large-
ly due to the fact that such criteria
have to be developed and shared by
the industrial relations actors them-
selves if they are to serve as guidance
for their action.The high level group
suggested a list of 14 possible criteria
(see Box 2.2), 10 of which were out-
put-related and more or less derived
from the EES guidelines.Criteria 11 to
15 relate to the quality of the institu-
tions and the process of industrial
relations: Are the negotiating organi-
sations representative? Do the agree-
ments which they negotiate offer
wide-ranging coverage and protec-
tion, including to those with marginal
positions in the labour market? Do
these agreements offer effective low-
cost mechanisms for the resolution of
conflicts, for instance, without too
much delay and undue (or expensive)
recourse to litigation in courts? Do
they encourage the participation and
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(71) Report of the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the European Union, Employment and Social Affairs DG,
European Commission, Brussels, January 2002, pp. 38–39. 
Box 2.2: The criteria for establishing the quality of industrial
relations proposed by the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the EU
• the contribution made to social cohesion, competitiveness and socially sustainable economic growth;
• the extent to which full employment is an overarching objective while ensuring, at the same time, fair and decent terms and conditions
of employment for all workers;
• the creation of quality employment by fostering the employability and the modernisation of the regulatory framework in line with the
changing organisation of work;
• the promotion of active ageing with the aim of enhancing the capacity of and the incentives for older workers to remain in the labour
force;
• the facilitation of better access for all workers, including those with atypical contracts, to lifelong-learning thereby increasing the pro-
portion of the adult working-age population participating at any given time in education and training;
• a contribution to preventing skills shortages, including by promoting occupational and geographical mobility;
• effective preventive and active policy measures to promote the integration into the labour market of groups and individuals at risk or
with a disadvantage, in order to avoid marginalisation, the emergence of ‘working poor’ and a drift into exclusion;
• appropriate measures to integrate into the labour market, workers with disabilities, ethnic minorities  and migrant workers as regards
their integration into the labour market;
• better application at workplace level of health and safety legislation, and more training and promoting measures for the reduction of
occupational accidents and diseases (in traditionally high risks sectors);
• the mainstreaming of gender;
• highly-representative social partners, i.e. partners able to represent most employers and employees, either through direct membership
or via other channels (e.g. support in industrial action);
• a wide coverage of collective bargaining, which includes all forms of atypical employment;
• improving ways of preventing and/or settling labour disputes, via non-judicial mechanisms, such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration
in both collective and individual cases;
• improving the level of participation of employees in decision-making, including financial participation thereby enhancing the productivity
of the workforce.
 
commitment of employees in the
employing organisation and help to
raise productivity? Some of these
institutional questions have been cov-
ered in Chapter 1.
A report prepared for the European
Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions, dis-
cusses the quality of industrial rela-
tions under three different perspec-
tives (72): (a) the general EU policy con-
text, in particular the involvement of
the social partners in the implementa-
tion of the Lisbon agenda; (b) the spe-
cific outcomes, in particular those
relating to the management of change,
comprising the entire range of
employment conditions and reconcili-
ation of work and non-working life;
and (c) the institutional framework, in
particular the relationships between
the various actors and levels in indus-
trial relations. In a follow-up report,
also for the foundation, the feasibility
of developing a reliable set of social
dialogue indicators on the actors,
processes and outcomes has been
explored (73). Indicators and bench-
marking techniques are of course
used for a variety of purposes.As was
emphasised in Chapter 1, the focus in
this report is on their use for the spe-
cific purpose of facilitating interna-
tional comparisons of actual out-
comes — for instance, wage develop-
ments or earnings distributions or
patterns of labour market reforms —
achieved by rather different approach-
es in national industrial relations sys-
tems marked by diversity.Having devel-
oped some common indicators on
union and employer organisation, bar-
gaining strength and coverage, centrali-
sation, coordination, the role of gov-
ernment, etc., in the previous chapter,
the remainder of this chapter will be
used to provide some promising
examples of ‘quality’ outcomes (74).
n 3. Examples of quality 
in industrial relations
Along the lines of the above-men-
tioned quality elements of industrial
relations, various examples illustrating
the issues involved in collective bar-
gaining at European and national levels
show interesting developments testi-
fying to the capacity of the social part-
ners, often supported by labour law,
to enhance their negotiation agenda.
Such examples, which address some
of the most important issues under-
lined by the high level group and by
the Council with regard to quality in
work and the challenges to be met in
the context of the Lisbon strategy, are
summarised below.The examples are
not of course exhaustive, but concen-
trate on the best known areas. New
issues are emerging which it will also
be interesting to explore in the future
– such as the potential impact of
industrial relations on innovation –
however, too little is currently known
about these in order to address them
here.
3.1. Investment in work ability
and training
In a number of Member States impor-
tant actions have been undertaken by
the social partners in order to
enhance participation in the labour
market. In Finland, next to ongoing
improvements concerning vocational
training as agreed by the central
labour market organisations, a com-
prehensive approach has been under-
taken in a number of programmes
carried out on a tripartite basis to
develop a better human resource
management approach to employ-
ment. An important aspect of these
programmes is the improvement of
‘work ability’ and professional skills.
Various elements of this programme
will be taken forward in a new gener-
ation of Finnish tripartite pro-
grammes on employee well-being, the
improvement of productivity and the
quality of working life.Action in edu-
cation and training figures prominent-
ly in the latest 2002 national income
agreement covering 2003 and 2004. In
Denmark and Sweden, the social part-
ners, often together with the public
authorities, are involved in enhancing
existing schemes for competence and
skills development. Especially in the
State and local government sector, the
Danish social partners have taken
major initiatives. In the Netherlands,
collective agreements covering 35 %
of employees include provisions on
employability. In many sectors there
are collective ‘development and train-
ing’ funds. In Germany, the social part-
ners are strongly involved in cam-
paigns to increase apprenticeship
training and a path-breaking agree-
ment on continuous training was
signed in the metalworking industry
of Baden-Württemberg. In 2003,
employers and trade unions in France
and Luxembourg concluded central
agreements on continuous vocational
training. The French central agree-
ment was a significant event in so far
as it was signed by all major trade
union confederations, for the first
time since 1995. The agreement
establishes an individual training right
for employees, based on a 20-hour
‘credit’ per year for training inside or
outside the company after 12 months
of service, with pro rata entitlement
for part-timers. The agreement in
Luxembourg — some provisions of
which require implementation via leg-
islation — includes new schemes for
unpaid and individual training leave.
A year earlier, in 2002, as a result of 
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(72) A. Weiler (2003), Quality of industrial relations: Development of comparative indicators, report for the European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, mimeo, May 2003.
(73) V. Cortebeeck, R. Huys, G. Van Gyes and T. Vandenbrande (2004), Quality of industrial relations: Country profiles, background
paper of a data set commissioned by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin,
mimeo, March 2004. 
(74) A multi-variate quantitative study, intended to discover causal relationships, is beyond the scope of this report, though it certainly
offers material which might facilitate such analysis.
tripartite discussions, Poland inaugu-
rated its first national-scale pro-
gramme for the vocational activation
of young people, seeking to enable
new labour market entrants to
acquire their first work experience. In
Portugal, and more recently in the
UK, the government and social part-
ners joined forces to improve initial
and continuing vocational training.
In Belgium, the social partners took
action with regard to setting aside
training funds for employees and disad-
vantaged groups as well as supporting
employers who seek work for redun-
dant elderly workers through out-
placements. In Greece, funds financed
by the social partners can subsidise the
employment of persons nearing retire-
ment. In Italy, sector-wide funds are
being used to promote the training of
workers who are made redundant. A
special foundation, set up by the social
partners in Austria together with the
public employment service, seeks to
qualify the unemployed for targeted
local labour demand. In Portugal, the
new labour code negotiated between
the government and social partners
contains important provisions relating
to training based on the employment
and vocational training agreement con-
cluded in February 2001. The Irish
social partners are strongly involved in
enhancing continuing training activities
in enterprises. In May 2002, Irish
employers launched a new initiative
on upgrading the skills of employees
in order to meet the requirements of
a more knowledge-based economy. In
Spain, following consultation of the
social partners, a new funding scheme
for continuous training has been set
up, which gives greater responsibility
to the regions and to individual
employers.
Participation in continuing vocational
training is more substantial in enter-
prises that have collective agreements
or agreements between management
and the workforce than in other com-
panies of all sizes without such agree-
ments (75). This finding clearly under-
lines the important role of social part-
nership in this policy area.Vocational
training and lifelong learning have also
been important topics for the
European social partners (see
Chapter 3). In March 2002 the cross-
industry social partners adopted a
framework of actions on the lifelong
development of qualifications and
competencies in the EU and two fol-
low-up reports have been produced
on implementation of the priorities
identified. The European sectoral
social partners have also addressed
the topic through the adoption of
joint texts (agriculture, banking, elec-
tricity) and developing practical tools
such as manuals on training and tutor-
ship (private security, cleaning indus-
try, construction). In many other sec-
tors it is an important priority in their
work.
3.2. New forms of work
organisation and adapted
working-time arrangements
The growth in ‘atypical’, ‘non-regular’
and other non-standard forms of
employment — such as temporary
work (mainly fixed-term contracts
and temporary agency work), part-
time work, telework, ‘economically
dependent’ work but without an
employment contract, on-call work
— is a common long-term trend
across the EU. However, the new
forms of work are not growing equal-
ly across Member States (see Charts
2.1 and 2.2).
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Chart 2.2: Share of persons working less than 30 hours per 
week as % of total employment, 2003
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Chart 2.1: Share of temporary employment by contract duration, 2003
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On average, some 13 % of all employ-
ees in the EU were employed on tem-
porary contracts in 2003.As shown in
Chart 2.1, there is a huge variation
across Member States, with very high
rates in Spain, followed by Portugal,
Poland, Finland, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Slovenia and France, all
with an above-average share of tem-
porary employment, and a very low
incidence of temporary contracts in
the UK and in most of the new
Member States. In most new Member
States, this type of contract was virtu-
ally non-existent until the early 1990s
(see Chapter 6). The opposite posi-
tion of Spain (a high incidence of tem-
porary work) and the UK (a low inci-
dence) suggests that temporary work
is being used by employers as a way of
recruiting new labour market
entrants to escape from highly pro-
tected standard jobs.The issue is then
how ‘security and flexibility’ could be
better redistributed between secure
and insecure jobs. Chart 2.1 also
brings out the variation in the use of
very short temporary contracts —
again, quite widespread in Spain but
also in Poland. If employees end up
having several short temporary jobs,
incentives for investment in skills are
likely to be poor. Part-time work (if
defined as persons working less than
30 hours per week) accounts for 30 %
of all female employment and 6 % of
male employment in EU-15 (see
Chart 2.2). There are massive varia-
tions across countries, with very high
rates for the Netherlands, followed by
the UK, Denmark and Ireland, and
rather low rates in Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Finland. The incidence
of part-time employment in EU-10 is
considerably lower, at under half the
current EU figure. A common factor
is that part-time work is predomi-
nantly a female phenomenon, as 33.5
% of all female employees work part-
time (2002, Eurostat figure). At 10.3
% in 2002, the proportion in EU-10 is
much lower and part-time employ-
ment would seem to be also associ-
ated with disabilities and other con-
ditions that constrain both men and
women to work full-time. It would
also seem that a larger proportion of
part-time work is involuntary (see
Chapter 6).Telework/telecommuting
is also increasing, but differences in
definition make comparisons difficult.
According to the Commission, there
are about 4.5 million employed tele-
workers in EU-15, amounting to
around 2.8 % of total employment.
Telework is not yet, however,
thought to have developed signifi-
cantly in EU-10.
A number of reasons are often cited
for the overall growth of these non-
standard types of employment con-
tracts (temporary work, on-call
employment, self-employment con-
tracts) such as employers’ wish to
achieve greater flexibility in order to
help cover periods of varying work-
load and to access expertise and spe-
cialists, and the desire by employees
to balance their work and meet other
(family, study, social) responsibilities.
The situation varies between coun-
tries and forms of work in terms of
the extent to which employees posi-
tively choose new forms of work or
accept them because they cannot find
‘regular’ work (see also Chapter 6).
A framework regulating a number of
new forms of work is being created at
EU level, seeking to promote new
forms of work, prevent discrimination
against the workers involved and pro-
mote quality and flexibility in such
forms of work. Directives, based on
social partner agreements, have regu-
lated some aspects of part-time work
(1997) and fixed-term work (1999). In
July 2002, the European-level social
partners concluded an agreement on
telework, which is to be implemented
by the national member organisations
of the signatory parties within three
years (see also Chapter 3.) The over-
all thrust of EU regulation is to pro-
mote equal treatment between
employees on different types of
employment contracts where possi-
ble and to make it easier for employ-
ees to accept non-standard forms of
employment contracts.
At the national level, all EU-15 and
some of the EU-10 regulate various
aspects of new forms of work, with
implementation of the above-men-
tioned EU directives leading to legisla-
tion even in countries which formerly
had no regulation in this area. For
instance, in Greece and Italy tempor-
ary agency work has only been for-
mally permitted in recent years. In July
2003, new legislation regulating fixed-
term and part-time employment
came into force in Hungary.The new
provisions of the labour code seek to
transpose the EU directives on these
issues, and also address the issue of
telework. In Slovenia, as of January
2003, new legislation has been intro-
duced which seeks to regulate tem-
porary agency work, increase the flex-
ibility of the Slovenian labour market
and provide adequate protection for
temporary agency workers. New leg-
islation has been adopted on tempo-
rary agency work and fixed-term con-
tracts in Poland.
While there has been a widespread
tendency to promote and permit var-
ious new forms of work, this has gen-
erally been accompanied by the estab-
lishment of a number of rules for
their operation, often with the possi-
bility of deviating from the rules by
collective agreement, as is the case in
Germany, the Netherlands and
Denmark, and is now under discus-
sion in France. New regulations on
temporary agency work in Germany,
introduced in 2002, specify that tem-
porary agency workers must be paid
the same wages as ‘permanent’
employees, but that this rule can be
deviated from by collective agree-
ment.At present, the remuneration of
workers hired out by commercial
temporary work agencies in Germany
is on average 30 % below the level
paid in the user company. The new
acts on part-time work and fixed-
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term employment relationships,
which came into force on 1 January
2001, are proving to be fairly effective
in encouraging part-time work.
Changes have occurred in some
Member States with a high level of
regulation in areas such as fixed-term
contracts, especially by relaxing the
grounds on which such contracts are
allowed, their length and renewal.
Deregulation has usually been accom-
panied by re-regulation. In EU-10, the
regulation of various new forms of
work has been subject to rapid
change in many cases in preparation
for EU accession, including the imple-
mentation of the relevant EU direc-
tives.This has involved both new reg-
ulation and relaxation of previous
restrictions.
Collective bargaining also plays a
role in regulating new forms of
work. As seen above, the issue has
been an important one in negotia-
tions between the European-level
social partners.At national level, col-
lective agreements have varying
roles in this area. Aspects of part-
time work are covered by agree-
ments at various levels in countries
such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and
Spain. These include: assisting con-
version into full-time contracts;
maximum and minimum working
times and overtime; part-time work
for older workers; rights to reduce
working time; and training provi-
sions. Some collective agreements
(mainly sectoral) include provisions
on fixed-term contracts in countries
such as Denmark, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden,
dealing with matters such as the
maximum proportion of such con-
tracts, limits on their duration and
rules on circumstances in which they
may be used.
While collectively agreed provisions
on part-time and fixed-term work are
often relatively well established, a
more recent trend is towards collec-
tive bargaining relating to temporary
agency work. Specific sectoral collec-
tive agreements for the temporary
agency work sector have been con-
cluded in recent years in Austria,
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden. These agreements tend to
cover issues such as pay and condi-
tions, benefits, representation rights
and training. There are also some
company-level agreements between
individual temporary work agencies
and trade unions, as in Germany at
Randstad Deutschland and Adecco.
Another approach to temporary
agency work is to include provisions
in the collective agreements of sec-
tors and companies that use agency
work.This is the case, for example, in
many Italian sectoral agreements,
specifying the conditions under which
the use of temporary agency work is
allowed or not allowed; the maximum
number of agency workers permitted;
and the conditions of pay and working
hours.
Telework is another issue, which is
increasingly subject to bargaining in
some countries.Agreements providing
for equal treatment with other
employees and regulating matters
such as the voluntary nature of tele-
work, training, equipment, monitoring
and health and safety have been signed
in Austria (e.g. in electricity supply,
telecommunications, information
technology services, mineral oil pro-
duction and information consulting);
Denmark (in finance and commerce);
Germany (in railways and at Deutsche
Telekom); Italy (in commerce, public
administration and for SMEs); Sweden
(trade, commerce and services); and
the UK (British Telecom). The imple-
mentation of the EU-level social part-
ners’ agreement on telework is stimu-
lating further joint approaches on this
theme (see Chapter 3).
Finally, in many Member States individ-
ual choices concerning working time,
the annualisation of working hour 
calculations and, often, also family-
friendly working-time regimes are a
matter of collective bargaining. In
Finland, working life will be studied
taking account of the long-range fea-
tures of working-time development.
Reference can also be made to e-
work and telework, notably in Ireland
and Finland, or to certain new forms
of work such as on-call work, project
work and combined work/training
contracts in Italy. However, a Finnish
tripartite working group failed to
agree on the conditions to apply to a
permanent sabbatical leave scheme, to
succeed the current experimental
system.The main issue of contention
was the length of prior employment
required for employees to be entitled
to a sabbatical. In German collective
agreements, a number of long-term
working-time savings accounts have
been developed which can help to
better organise the work/life-balance.
Also in Sweden, Finland and
Luxembourg, this approach has been
taken further. The three-year collec-
tive agreements concluded in
Denmark in 2004, offer greater scope
for negotiated flexibility at the local
level and for individual choice in
working-time arrangements.A similar
choice approach already exists in
many Dutch agreements. While in
Sweden the government financially
supports efforts to reduce involun-
tary part-time work, in Greece cer-
tain efforts are being undertaken in
the public sector to create jobs on
the basis of part-time work, which so
far is not widely used. In Germany
part-time work may also have
increased as a result of the right to
work part-time, already existing in the
Netherlands since 1999 and now also
under discussion in Austria. In Austria,
Germany and Italy, nationwide collec-
tive agreements have recently been
signed for temporary agency workers.
The new labour code in Portugal,
foresees, inter alia, the extension of
fixed-term contracts to six years and
a reduction of the period defined as
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night work. Incentives also exist to
encourage companies to convert
fixed-term contracts into permanent
ones. In Spain, within the most recent
national framework agreement on
collective bargaining, efforts to
reduce recourse to temporary work
are continuing.
3.3. Health and safety at work
In response to the Council resolution
of 3 June 2002 on a new Community
strategy on health and safety at work
(2002–06) (76), which calls on the
Member States to ‘develop and imple-
ment coordinated coherent preven-
tion policies, geared to national condi-
tions, with measurable targets set in
this context for reducing accidents at
work and occupational diseases, espe-
cially in those sectors of activity in
which rates are above average’, some
Member States, especially the UK,
Denmark, France, Greece and, to a
minor extent, Portugal have set
national targets for the reduction of
occupational accidents and diseases.
In Denmark, in 2001, the government
took the initiative of regulating the
‘psychological work environment’,
including sexual harassment and bully-
ing.This provoked protests against the
infringement of the bargaining auto-
nomy believed to be typical of ‘the
Danish model’.The subsequent agree-
ment on these matters covering
industrial sectors opened the usual
channel for settling industrial disputes
for dealing with these matters. In
Finland, on the other hand, a legal
approach was taken and in 2003 a
new Act on occupational safety and
health, extending the existing protec-
tion to issues such as the burden of
work, working alone and harassment,
was adopted.
Other countries have adopted a tri-
partite approach, for instance, in
Luxembourg, in June 2001, tripartite
discussions resulted in agreement on
a partial disability pension in addition
to the existing full disability pension.
Employers will be responsible for
offering internal redeployment to
employees in receipt of the partial dis-
ability pension. In the event of non-
compliance, the employer will be
liable to pay a compensatory tax of
50 % of the minimum wage for up to
24 months. In Sweden also the gov-
ernment launched tripartite talks with
the social partners on the issue of
‘increased health in working life’ in
November 2001, against the back-
ground of increasing levels of sickness
absence.The intention was to put into
effect an 11-point programme drawn
up by the government. Earlier in the
year, unions and employers in the pri-
vate sector had signed an agreement
improving the terms of the collective
work injury insurance scheme.
Changes have also been made in two
other insurance schemes based on
collective agreements, those covering
sickness and redundancy. In February
2001, the Portuguese Government
and social partners signed an agree-
ment aimed at improving working
conditions and health and safety at
the workplace and combating acci-
dents at work. The agreement pro-
vides for measures aimed at prevent-
ing and combating workplace acci-
dents, and improving services
designed to ensure health, safety and
hygiene at the workplace. It also cre-
ates a number of joint bodies to
implement its provisions. Policies in
the field of health and safety are often
combined with more and better train-
ing such as in Denmark and Sweden,
modernisation of notifications of acci-
dents (Spain), better supervision of
health and safety matters (Finland),
targeted information measures for
small and medium-sized enterprises
(the Netherlands) and upgrading safe-
ty management, training and consulta-
tion (Ireland,Austria).
In recent years some agreements
addressing the issue of stress and
excessive workloads have been
reached (Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Sweden). Increase of
individual choices with regard to the
elements laid down in collective
agreements, e.g. less cash pay against
better non-monetary working condi-
tions and/or payments into pension
funds, are aspects which are likely to
be interesting for many workers.
Inspiration could be provided by the
1999 agreement in the Dutch
Foundation of Labour on a ‘multiple-
choice model of employment condi-
tions’ and hence could be developed
further to increase the attractiveness
of work and working environments.
In May 2004, the European social 
partners concluded an agreement on
work-related stress which was, once
formally adopted in October 2004. It
will be implemented at the national
level by their national affiliates. Such
approaches are premised on the idea
that good social policy, in this case
adequate policies on health and safety,
but extending to other matters affect-
ing the ‘well-being’ of employees, con-
tribute to sound economic policy. In
simple terms, companies should be
better off if their employees are
happy.
3.4. Active ageing
To develop a sustainable employment
culture, the short-term concerns of
flexibility of companies and workers
have to be balanced against medium-
and long-term (lifetime) capacity
empowerment in the context of a
competitive environment and the
continuous need to manage change.
Attention to issues of training, health
and safety, the work-family balance,
and variation of working hours over
the life cycle are all inter-related,
even though they are often treated 
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(76) Communication from the Commission, ‘Adapting to change and work in society: a new Community strategy on health and safety
at work 2002–06’, COM(2002) 118 final. 
separately. Demographic develop-
ments mean that greater efforts are
needed to bring about sustainable
work organisations by optimising the
experience and accumulated knowl-
edge of all, including older workers,
e.g. through career development, a re-
consideration of the parameters for
payment systems taking into account
justified seniority and performance-
related elements, and more possibili-
ties for internal mobility as well as
outplacement and mobility across
firms or sectors. A stronger integra-
tion into collective bargaining of
measures improving competence
management and training is vital, as
are the measures that reduce health
risks and provide realistic alternatives
for early retirement.
Employer-provided training is current-
ly inversely related to age, but posi-
tively related to education levels and
skills. In other words, those that need
additional training most, tend to
receive less of it. The social partners
have a special role to play in abolishing
age stereotypes and developing new
forms of work and training in order
to facilitate the continuous integra-
tion of ageing workers, including equal
access to training opportunities, pro-
viding for flexible working-time
schedules allowing workers to retain
their health and to continue active
participation.
Voluntary guidelines agreed by the
European social partners in the com-
merce sector in March 2002 in sup-
port of age diversity stress the impor-
tance of an age-neutral approach to
employment, recruitment, vocational
training and the distribution of posi-
tions within companies. These guide-
lines may provide useful inspiration to
social partners in other sectors. The
cross-industry European social part-
ners will hold a seminar in 2004 at
which they will discuss various case
studies and explore the possibility of
undertaking further actions (see also
Chapter 3).
In view of demographic trends and in
line with the recommendations of the
report of the Employment Taskforce,
the discussions between the
European social partners exploring
possible joint actions with regard to
the ageing workforce could play an
important role in helping to shift 
policies towards maintaining older
workers in employment. In a large
number of Member States (Finland,
Netherlands, Greece, Belgium,
Austria and Denmark) actions have
already been undertaken to reverse
recourse to early retirement, but
these need to be enhanced and inten-
sified (77).
3.5. Equal opportunities and
integrating people at a
disadvantage in the labour
market
In spite of the law, equal pay and equal
opportunity between men and
women is still elusive.Although social
partners in many Member States
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden,
Spain, Ireland at the cross-industry
level) are seeking ways of addressing
the issue and improving the situation
through collective bargaining, EU-
wide statistics show that the reduc-
tion of the pay and career gap is a
slow and difficult process. Promising
examples include a cross-industry
agreement in France on gender equal-
ity and gender workforce composi-
tion signed in April 2004, covering
matters such as narrowing the gender
pay gap, preventing maternity leave
from adversely affecting women’s
careers and addressing labour market
segregation. In Denmark, a nationwide
agreement has been concluded which
extends fully paid maternity/paternity
benefits from 14 to 20 weeks, as well
as introducing further pregnancy leave
of four weeks for women. Swedish
industry agreements foresee the
establishment of joint funds for, inter
alia, parental leave.
The European social partners are
currently negotiating a framework of
actions in this field, which should
help to move forward in a more
comprehensive and coordinated way
than in the past, helping thereby to
tackle the underlying factors leading
to discriminatory behaviour.An EIRO
comparative study on gender equali-
ty plans at the workplace finds that
so far the issue is rarely dealt with in
collective agreements above the
company level (78).
As emphasised in the employment
guidelines, both governments and
social partners are called upon to
undertake action to improve the situ-
ation of immigrants and ethnic
minorities in the labour market. A
recent EIRO comparative report on
migration and industrial relations (79)
shows that the issue of migrant work-
ers has not yet achieved a significant
place on the social partners’ agenda.
Some positive developments have
taken place at the cross-industry level
in Belgium and, through a national
agreement, in Denmark. In May 2002,
Danish social partners and municipal-
ities signed an agreement with the
government to strengthen measures
to integrate immigrants and refugees
into the labour market. The agree-
ment establishes a three-stage inte-
gration process, involving training and
experience preparing for employ-
ment. A year earlier, the German
Confederation of Trade Unions
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(77) Report of the Employment Taskforce, chaired by Mr. Wim Kok, Jobs, jobs, jobs — Creating employment in Europe, November
2003. On active ageing see also the communication of the Commission, ‘Increasing the employment rate of older workers and
delaying the exit from the labour market’, COM(2004) 146 final.
(78) EIRO (2004), Gender equality plans at the workplace, March.
(79) EIRO (2003), Migration and industrial relations, May.
(DGB) presented a new programme
calling for the introduction of a feder-
al immigration committee and quotas
for certain types of non-EU immigrant
workers.This programme comes at a
time when the federal government as
well as the Confederation of German
Industries (BDI) have highlighted the
need for future large-scale immigra-
tion and are seeking to find ways of
attracting high-skilled foreign labour
to Germany. The debate focuses not
just on the rules governing immigra-
tion, but also seeks to offer foreign
workers support for their integration
into German society. In recent years,
the Dutch Government has been
adopting a tougher approach to the
illegal employment of non-EEA for-
eign nationals.The Dutch Trade Union
Federation (FNV) has focused atten-
tion on the circumstances under
which illegal immigrants are being
employed, and the central employers’
federation, VNO-NCW, wants to
relax regulations that hamper the
arrival of high-skilled staff. In Greece
and Ireland, nationwide non-discrimi-
nation agreements have been signed
and, in Finland, the working conditions
of migrant workers have been
addressed at the central level.
However, at the sectoral and compa-
ny level attention to the migration
issue is rare.
With a view to integrating and mobil-
ising the full labour potential in the
medium term the inclusion of this
issue in the agenda of the social part-
ners can be given more weight. A
recent study for the Commission on
the costs and benefits of diversity
finds that workforce diversity policies
identify important benefits that
strengthen long-term competitive-
ness and, in some conditions, produce
short- and medium-term improve-
ments in performance (80). In this light,
a better integration of all groups into
the labour market is not only a meas-
ure for social cohesion but also of
paramount economic interest for the
EU in general.
3.6. A culture for managing 
change
Change is a wide concept, covering
many issues, including new technolo-
gy, new working methods, the need
for lifelong learning, and, sometimes,
restructuring. In line with many other
reports, and much academic research,
the Employment Taskforce has under-
lined the need for Member States,
social partners and enterprises to
increase their capacity to anticipate,
trigger and absorb change in a mutu-
ally acceptable way.This affects first of
all company industrial relations and
calls for responsible corporate man-
agement as well as provisions for the
information and consultation of
employees in enterprises and estab-
lishments (see Chapter 5).However, it
is also an issue for collective bargain-
ers, at all levels (company, regional,
sectoral) and, as a way of promoting
frameworks for action on particular
issues, at the European level.
In response to the requirements and
challenges of accelerated economic
change and industrial adjustment, the
nature of collective agreements has
also gradually changed. Most agree-
ments have become richer in the
sense of addressing a wide range of
issues. At the same time they have
become more procedural — regulat-
ing how, rather than what must hap-
pen.The thorny issue of ‘opening’ or
‘opt-out’ clauses,discussed in Chapter
1, and the possibility of deviating from
legal provisions by way of collective
agreement are examples of this devel-
opment.As a consequence, the role of
central and sectoral organisations and
wage-bargainers is also changing.Their
role is becoming more one of an
insurer of last resort, providing the
facilities and incentives for local initia-
tives as well as a balance between
management and employees,making it
possible for both to negotiate ade-
quate and sustainable mixes of flexibil-
ity and security. In such a context,
management and employees can be
encouraged to take a longer-term
view, anticipated by appropriate
action and human resource manage-
ment.
Social partners, often together with
governments, are thus called upon to
negotiate the right framework condi-
tions, within which enterprises can be
maximally empowered to create and
maintain competitive jobs for all at fair
working conditions and to be put in a
position to recruit easily from the
external labour market thus balancing
internal company adjustment meas-
ures.There are already some encour-
aging examples, such as the adjust-
ment agreement in the private sector
in Sweden, discussed in Chapter 1.
Built on an adjustment insurance
scheme, workers who are made
redundant can receive financial bene-
fits,education and training,help to find
a new job or to set up an enterprise.
The Severance Act, negotiated in
Austria by the social partners, also has
the potential to increase flexibility and
mobility in the labour market and
increase re-employment possibilities
for unemployed persons. So-called
‘transfer social plans’ are being devel-
oped by some German trade unions
in order to assist works councils in
cases of restructuring. In some Belgian
agreements there are now provisions
for the transition of older workers in
cases of redundancy resulting from
corporate restructuring into other
jobs,with the help of training and per-
sonal coaching and as an alternative to
early retirement. These efforts might
be supported through territorial
agreements, widening the scope for
effective reconversion plans as for
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(80) The costs and benefits of diversity, Brussels, Employment and Social Affairs DG, European Commission, November 2003.
instance initiated in France, and
through a more pro-active use of sev-
erance payments linked to training
and re-employment.
In an exploratory opinion of
September 2003 the European
Economic and Social Committee (81)
emphasised the importance of social
dialogue among all actors involved in
order to cope with the causes and
consequences of industrial change.
The Barcelona European Council of
March 2002 (82) invited the social part-
ners to find ways of managing corpo-
rate restructuring through dialogue
and a preventive approach. In
response, the European social part-
ners have issued some ‘best practice’
orientations on managing company
restructuring, based on case studies
(see Chapter 5).
n 4. Conclusion
There are no quick fixes on how to
handle the various challenges entailed
by the innovative management of
change.What is clear, however, is that
with a view to achieving a competitive
knowledge economy characterised by
sustainable development, a partner-
ship approach can complement the
functioning of markets and reduce
coordination and efficiency failures.
One of the key challenges is of course
to strike a balance that does not stul-
tify, but stimulates change. In other
words, from the procedural point of
view, ‘high quality’ industrial relations
should have low transaction costs
related to contracting, administration,
regulation and conflict resolution of
employment relations. In terms of
outcomes,‘high quality’ industrial rela-
tions should encourage an effective
balance between flexibility for firms
and security for employees, with a
view to supporting the objectives of
competitiveness and employment.
The examples of industrial relations
outcomes provided in this chapter
demonstrate the large diversity of
approaches — both bipartite and tri-
partite — being pursued by the social
partners.This indicates that a variety
of solutions can produce beneficial
results. Social partners in the EU can,
as a consequence, learn a great deal
from each other, and the European
social dialogue can make an important
contribution to this process by pro-
moting the exchange of best practice,
and providing some coordination of
the pursuit of certain shared objec-
tives. Through the social partners’
adoption of agreements and other
joint texts, the European social dia-
logue can also help to stimulate
national bargaining agendas. It will
now be important to ensure effective
interaction between the European
and national levels of industrial rela-
tions players to ensure that these
European level initiatives have a real
impact.
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(82) Presidency conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 24/25 March 2002.

n 1. Introduction
The European social dialogue — the
dialogue between management and
labour at the European level — is a
key feature of the European social
model, and the participation of the
social partners in EU policy-making
through the social dialogue combines
a number of values typical to most
national industrial relations systems in
Europe, namely responsibility, solidari-
ty and participation. The European
social dialogue acts as a complement
to national industrial relations sys-
tems and has developed in tandem
with European integration and the
efforts to build the European internal
market in order to ensure that it
develops in a consensual manner.
The importance of the social dialogue is
such that it is recognised in the Treaties.
Article 138 of the EC Treaty provides
the Commission with the task of pro-
moting the consultation of management
and labour at Community level and tak-
ing any relevant measure to facilitate
their dialogue.
The European social dialogue in its
current form has evolved consider-
ably since its launch in 1985 (83).At that
time there was little bilateral interac-
tion between the social partners at
cross-industry level, whereas now
there is a great deal of active and reg-
ular dialogue between the cross-
industry social partners. In addition,
the sectoral social dialogue has
expanded considerably, with four new
sectoral social dialogue committees
having been set up during the past
two years, bringing the total to 30 (84).
More than 50 % of the economy is
now covered by these committees.
This is a welcome development,as the
sectoral level is often the most appro-
priate level for the discussion of many
labour market issues, which is why it
has traditionally been the predomi-
nant level of collective bargaining in
many Member States. The
Commission’s long-term aim is for all
the main economic sectors to be cov-
ered by social dialogue committees (85).
The work of the various social dia-
logue committees has resulted in the
adoption of over 40 texts by the cross-
industry social partners and over 300
by the sectors since the mid-1980s.
These take a variety of forms ranging
from joint opinions, to guidelines,
codes of conduct, and agreements.
Some of these initiatives, such as three
of the agreements concluded by the
cross-industry social partners and
those in the transport sector, have
been implemented by Council direc-
tives.The topics covered by these texts
are diverse, encompassing employ-
ment, working conditions, training,
health and safety, working-time, social
dialogue, as well as more sector spe-
cific concerns. Some of these texts are
responses to Commission consulta-
tions under Article 138, whereas oth-
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(83) For an overview of the key stages in the evolution of the European social dialogue, see Box 3.3.
(84) For a full list of sectoral social dialogue committees, see Table 3.12.
(85) For an overview of the sectoral social dialogue, see ‘The sectoral social dialogue in Europe’, European Commission, 2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/publications/2003/ke4702397_en.html
Chart 3.1: Number of sectoral texts per year, 1997–2003
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Chart 3.2: Number of sectoral texts per area, 1997–2003
4
5
7
10
11
16
17
18
28
29
30
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Sustainable development
Non-discrimination
Working time
Health and safety
Enlargement
Employment
Social aspects of EU policies
Training
Working conditions
Social dialogue
Economic and/or sectoral policies
Source: European Commission.
ers are purely autonomous initiatives
or responses to Commission policy in
specific sectors (86).
One of the most significant develop-
ments during the last couple of years
has been the decision by the cross-
industry social partners to pursue a
more ‘autonomous’ dialogue. In their
joint contribution to the Laeken
European Council in December 2001,
they indicated their intention to develop a
more independent dialogue and these
efforts culminated, in November 2002,
with the adoption by the ETUC,
UNICE/UEAPME and CEEP (87) of their
first ever joint work programme covering
the period 2003–05. (For further details
on these organisations,see Chapter 1.)
This development is significant as it
marks the first time that the cross-
industry social partners have decided
to take a more proactive approach
to their dialogue rather than simply
responding to Commission consulta-
tions under Article 138. In terms of
agenda-setting, the practical implica-
tions are that it will result in greater
interaction between the social part-
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Chapters Themes Actions Calendar
Employment Employment guidelines Reports on social partner actions in Member States to implement the
employment guidelines (taking into account the cycle of three years)
2003–05 
Lifelong learning Follow-up of ‘framework of actions’ and evaluation report 2003, 2004 and 2005
Stress at work Seminar with a view to negotiating a voluntary agreement 2003
Gender equality Seminar on equal opportunities and gender discrimination aiming at a
framework of actions
2003
Restructuring Identify orientations that could serve as a reference to assist in managing
change and its social consequences on the basis of concrete cases
2003
Disability Update of joint declaration of 1999 as a contribution to the European 
year on disability
2003
Young people Promoting young people’s interest in science and technology to help
address the skills gap through a joint declaration and/or awareness-
raising campaign
2003–05
Racism Updating joint declaration of 1995 (with participation of candidate 
countries)
2004
Ageing workforce Seminar to discuss case studies and explore possible joint actions 2004
Harassment Seminar to explore the possibility of negotiating a voluntary agreement 2004–05
Telework Monitoring of follow-up to framework agreement 2003–05
Undeclared work Seminar aiming at a joint opinion 2005
Enlargement Industrial relations Joint seminars on industrial relations (case studies on different ways of
articulating different levels of negotiations) 
2003–05
Social dialogue Two enlarged social dialogue committees per year 2003–05
Restructuring Study on restructuring in candidate countries 2003–04
Lifelong learning Include candidate countries in follow-up to framework of actions Seminar in 2004,
inclusion in 
reporting 2005
Implementation of 
legal acquis
Joint seminar on European works councils 2004
EU social and employ-
ment policies after
enlargement
Prospective reflection to identify issues that will arise in the EU after
enlargement such as increase in diversity, migrations,
cross-border work, etc.
starting in 2004
Mobility Action plan on skills 
and mobility
Seminar to identify areas where joint actions by the social partners at EU
level could help address obstacles to mobility (notably for managerial
staff), including supplementary pensions
2003–05
TABLE 3.1: EUROPEAN SOCIAL PARTNERS’ JOINT WORK PROGRAMME 2003–05
(86)  For a full list of social partner consultations under Article 138, see Table 3.13.
(87) These abbreviations stand for the following: ETUC — European Trade Union Confederation; UNICE — Union of Industrial and
Employers’ Confederations of Europe; UEAPME — European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises; CEEP —
European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest.
ners’ priorities and those of the
Commission so that when issues fall
within both, the Commission’s and
the social partners’ work pro-
grammes, the Commission will take
account of the social partners’ activi-
ties in deciding how to proceed, as
was the case with the dossiers on
restructuring and stress. The work
programme is not however exhaus-
tive as new priorities may emerge and
the social partners will continue to
respond as before to new
Commission consultations.A growing
number of sectors are also adopting
their own work programmes.
Another significant evolution over
the last few years concerns the
nature of the texts adopted by the
social partners. While the majority
of social partner texts have tended
in the past to be non-binding policy
statements directed at either the
European institutions, national
authorities, or a mixture of both,
more recently the social partners
have begun to adopt an increasing
number of ‘new generation’ texts
(autonomous agreements, guide-
lines, codes of conduct, policy orien-
tations) with commitments or rec-
ommendations directed at their
members and which they undertake
follow-up themselves.This is true of
both the cross-industry and sectoral
social partners.
It is however important to stress
that the activities of the social part-
ners are not confined to the adop-
tion of joint texts. The social part-
ners undertake many transnational
joint projects, often with financial
assistance from the Commission
under its social dialogue, education
and training, and health and safety
budget headings.These projects con-
sist of a large variety of activities,
including the organisation of confer-
ences, round tables, studies and pub-
lications, and the production of prac-
tical tools, such as vocational training
and health and safety manuals, and
guidance on procurement practices.
The transnational nature of these
projects means that they make a
very practical contribution to
increasing the interplay between
industrial relations actors at the
European and national levels, pro-
moting the exchange of experience
and best practice, and improving
understanding of European level pol-
icy at the grass-roots level.
Furthermore, joint projects such as
studies and conferences often culmi-
nate in the adoption of joint texts.
Although the social partners are
increasingly developing proactive ini-
tiatives independently of the
Commission’s agenda, the topics
addressed by the social partners
over the last couple of years contin-
ue naturally to be strongly influ-
enced by the Commission’s priori-
ties and work programme, outlined
in its five-year roadmap, the social
policy agenda (COM(2000) 379
final), and updated by the mid-term
review of the social policy agenda
(COM(2003) 312 final), adopted in
May 2003.
Chart 3.3 provides an indication of
the number of joint texts adopted per
sector during the period 1997 and
2003. It should be stressed that these
figures need to be interpreted with
caution as they only refer to joint
texts rather than joint projects, yet a
sector with relatively few joint texts
might nevertheless be very active
through the work it undertakes in
joint projects. It should also be noted
that this information is purely quanti-
tative and includes all the joint texts
adopted by the social partners, irre-
spective of qualitative considerations,
including whether or not they include
follow-up commitments.
Developments in the European social
dialogue over the last couple of years
can be summarised as a response to
three main concerns: achieving the
objectives of the Lisbon strategy;
preparing for enlargement; and devel-
oping social dialogue as a way 
of improving governance at the
European level.
n 2. A response to three 
main objectives
2.1. Working towards the
Lisbon objectives
Since the year 2000, social dialogue
developments have been taking
place against the backdrop of the
EU’s Lisbon strategy, which has the
objective of making the EU ‘the most
competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world,
capable of sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion’ by the
year 2010.The Lisbon strategy seeks
to regain the conditions for full
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Chart 3.3: Number of documents per sector, 1997–2003
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employment and to strengthen
cohesion through an integrated
approach to EU policy-making which
ensures that the economic, social
and environmental dimensions are
taken into account in all Community
policies. The Lisbon strategy views
social policy as a productive factor,
contributing to both economic com-
petitiveness and a better and fairer
society.
The Commission’s communication
on the social dialogue published in
June 2002 entitled ‘The European
social dialogue, a force for moderni-
sation and change’ (88) stressed the
role of the social partners at all lev-
els in contributing to the attainment
of the strategic objectives set in
Lisbon and the social dialogue as the
driving force behind successful eco-
nomic and social reforms. Social
partners have a key role to play
because they are close to the reali-
ties of the workplace and are there-
fore well-placed to assist the posi-
tive management of change by help-
ing to find the right balance between
the flexibility essential to businesses
which are operating in a highly com-
plex and changing environment, with
the security needed by employees.
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(88) COM(2002) 341 final.
(89) COM(2002) 341 final.
(90) OJ L 70, 14.3.2003, p. 31.
(91) Jobs, jobs, jobs — Creating more employment in Europe, report of the Employment Taskforce, November 2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/task_en.htm.
Tripartite concertation has a long history at European level, dating
back to the 1970s. It refers to the dialogue between the social part-
ners and European public authorities, and is distinct from bipartite
social dialogue.
Tripartite concertation at EU level has been extended in recent
years and there are now four fields in which tripartite concertation
takes place — macroeconomics, employment, social protection and
education and training — each of which comprises both a technical
and political level.
Since 1997 the European Council presidencies have been inviting
the social partners to meet with the troika (the previous, present
and following presidencies) on the eve of European Council meet-
ings in order to discuss issues on the European Council agenda.The
conclusions of the Nice European Council held in December 2000
provided for an annual social summit with the social partners prior
to each spring European Council. Such meetings have been organ-
ised in March 2001 in Stockholm, in December 2001 in Laeken, and
in March 2002 in Barcelona.
The June 2002 communication on social dialogue (89) stressed the
importance of rationalising and improving tripartite concertation
between the social partners and the public authorities.As a result,
some important changes have taken place in the organisation of tri-
partite concertation during 2002–03. Most importantly, a proposal
for a Council decision annexed to the communication takes up the
suggestion of the social partners in their Laeken contribution of
December 2001, and seeks to institutionalise the summits held over
the last few years by setting up a Tripartite Social Summit for
Growth and Employment.The Council decision was adopted on 6
March 2003, enabling the first tripartite social summit to be held on
20 March 2003 (90).The decision indicates that these summits are to
be jointly chaired by the President of the Council and the President
of the Commission.The two social partner delegations comprise 10
representatives each from European cross-industry organisations
either representing general interests or more specific interests of
supervisory and managerial staff and small and medium-sized enter-
prises at European level.The technical coordination is provided for
the employees’ delegation by the ETUC and the employers’ delega-
tion by UNICE. The Council decision states that the ETUC and
UNICE shall ensure that the views expressed by the specific and
sectoral organisations are fully taken into account in their contribu-
tions and shall, where appropriate, include representatives from
some of these organisations in their delegations.
The establishment of the tripartite social summit provides a new
framework for European tripartite concertation.The idea is for all
the different types of concertation to feed into the new tripartite
social summit, with the aim of ensuring greater consistency in tri-
partite concertation and enabling the social partners to make a
more integrated contribution to the various components of the
Lisbon strategy.
The discussions at the first summit centred on the social partners’
contributions towards the implementation of economic and social
reform, and their achievements since the Barcelona Council in 2002,
including the initiatives upon which they have made a start within
the framework of their first joint work programme for 2003–05.
The social partners also presented the first annual follow-up report
on the implementation of the framework of actions on the lifelong
development of competencies and qualifications.
In response to concerns among some Member States about the
current economic and employment situation in Europe, it was
decided at the European Council meeting in October 2003 that an
extraordinary summit would be held on 11 December 2003 in
order to obtain the views of the social partners with regard to
restoring the potential for economic and employment growth.The
summit discussed the Commission’s proposal for a European initia-
tive on growth, designed to stimulate economic recovery within
Europe, and the final report of the Employment Task Force set up in
March 2003.The ‘Kok report’ as it is commonly referred to, takes
stock of the present situation in the EU labour market, analyses the
main reasons why the EU risks not meeting all of its employment
targets and identifies concrete reforms (91).
At the March 2004 tripartite social summit, the social partners
endorsed the idea of a ‘Partnership for Change’, which stresses the
role of partnership as the best way of addressing the challenge of
economic growth and competitiveness, and the importance of
deepening existing practices and traditions of partnership, and max-
imising existing social dialogue processes — both cross-industry
and sectoral — with a view to ensuring the effective implementa-
tion of the necessary reform measures.The parties reaffirmed their
commitment to the Lisbon agenda and the need for Member States
to step up their efforts to achieve the Lisbon objectives. It was
agreed that the theme of partnership for change should be followed
up at subsequent summits.
Box 3.1: Tripartite concertation at the EU level
 
The communication made various
recommendations for enhancing the
social partners’ involvement in the dif-
ferent aspects of the Lisbon strategy,
including the establishment of a new
Tripartite Social Summit for Growth
and Employment, set up in March
2003, to be held on the eve of each
spring European Council.The purpose
of the tripartite social summit is to
ensure greater consistency in the var-
ious concertation processes and to
enable the social partners to make a
more integrated contribution to the
various components of the Lisbon
strategy.
In the 2002 communication, the
Commission encourages the social
partners to put forward points for
action at the European level and to
address the following subjects which
are important for achieving the Lisbon
objectives: preparing for entry into
the knowledge society by recognising
the vital role of lifelong learning and
the acquisition of skills; incorporating
mobility and career pathways into dis-
cussions on working conditions; active
ageing; promoting equal opportuni-
ties; taking into consideration employ-
ment and wider access to the labour
market; promoting sustainable devel-
opment; incorporating quality as a fac-
tor in global performance both in
aspects of work organisation and in
health and safety; and, worker involve-
ment and the negotiated anticipation
of change.
In 2004, the Commission adopted its
most recent communication on social
dialogue, entitled ‘Partnership for
change in an enlarged Europe —
Enhancing the contribution of
European social dialogue’ (92). As the
mid-term point of the Lisbon strategy
approaches and against the backdrop
of the recent enlargement of the EU
to ten new Member States, the com-
munication takes stock of the
European social dialogue, particularly
in view of the recent calls for a part-
nership for change to help deliver the
reforms necessary to enable the
Lisbon objectives to be met on sched-
ule. It complements the earlier com-
munications by focusing on ways of
improving the impact and effectiveness
of the European social dialogue. In
view of the increasing adoption by the
social partners of new generation
texts which the social partners under-
take to implement themselves at the
national level, the communication
stresses the importance of good qual-
ity industrial relations at the national
level and the need to maximise syner-
gies between the European social dia-
logue and other levels of social dia-
logue, in particular national, sector and
company levels and makes proposals
for achieving this, especially with
regard to capacity-building, awareness-
raising, transparency and the follow-up
given to social partner texts.
The themes identified by the cross-
industry social partners in their work
programme and the topics addressed
by the sectoral social partners in their
joint texts and projects during the last
couple of years reflect the priorities
of the Lisbon strategy and seek to
make a contribution to achieving its
objectives.
2.2. Responding to the
challenge of enlargement
Preparation for the enlargement of
the EU on 1 May 2004 also featured
high among the European social dia-
logue activities over the last couple of
years, and was, indeed, one of the
main concerns of the Commission’s
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(92) COM(2004) 557 final. 
Macroeconomic issues Following the European Council of Cologne in June 1999, a macroeconomic dialogue was set up to 
encourage growth and employment, involving the social partners in the discussion of economic,
monetary, budgetary and fiscal policy.Technical meetings take place with the Employment Committee 
(EMCO) and the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), and political-level meetings with the Employment 
and the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers, the Commission and the European Central Bank.
Employment issues The decision setting up the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment abolished the Standing 
Committee on Employment (SCE) and established a tripartite dialogue on employment along the lines of
the macroeconomic dialogue.Technical meetings take place with the EMCO, and political-level meetings 
with the Informal Employment and Social Affairs Council usually held at the beginning of each presidency.
Social protection issues Tripartite concertation in the field of social protection was strengthened in 2002, in particular by the 
closer association of the social partners in the work of the Social Protection Committee, and in the 
preparation and implementation of the national action plans for social inclusion.Technical meetings take 
place with the Social Protection Committee, and political-level meetings with the Informal 
Employment and Social Affairs Councils.
Education and training issues A Council decision taken on 29 November 2002 established a new process of structured dialogue 
between the troika of ministers, the social partners and the Commission.The first political level meeting 
was held on 5 February 2003, at which all parties expressed a desire to promote ongoing concertation 
on the questions of lifelong learning, the development of competencies, and research.
TABLE 3.2: DESCRIPTION OF TRIPARTITE CONCERTATION PRACTICES AT EUROPEAN LEVEL
 
June 2002 communication which
stressed the need to strengthen the
capacities of social partners in the
new Member States.
This enlargement presents a challenge
for European industrial relations
because of the considerable differ-
ences between the industrial relations
systems of most of the new Member
States compared with those of the
majority of EU-15. In particular, EU-15
tend to have strong traditions of bipar-
tite collective bargaining and the pre-
dominant level of bargaining has gener-
ally been the sectoral one.The rates of
workers covered by collective agree-
ments tend to be high, and this is true
even of countries with relatively low
rates of unionisation due to the regu-
lar use of extension procedures (see
Chart 1.5 in Chapter 1 for data on bar-
gaining coverage rates in the EU).
In contrast, the industrial relations pic-
ture in many of the new Member States
is very different.The main form of social
dialogue in these countries is tripartite,
and bipartite dialogue at national and
sectoral level is relatively new and
under-developed.Where collective bar-
gaining occurs, it generally takes place at
company level. The role of collective
bargaining is therefore fairly limited and
the coverage rate is low (estimated to
be 25–30 % on average). Slovenia is an
exception, because of the compulsory
nature of collective bargaining.Although
the possibility for extension procedures
is provided for in the legislation of many
of these countries, they are rarely used.
The situation is compounded by the
weakness of the social partner organi-
sations and their limited financial
resources, a situation which has not
been assisted by the considerable
decline in unionisation during the 1990s
and the difficulties faced by employers’
organisations in recruiting members.
These weaknesses pose a challenge in
terms of the effective participation of
the social partners from the new
Member States in the European social
dialogue, including their ability to
implement and monitor new genera-
tion texts effectively, and their capaci-
ty to make use of the possibility pro-
vided in some EU directives for cer-
tain provisions to be implemented by
collective bargaining.
As a consequence of the challenges
presented by this latest enlargement,
as will be demonstrated later,
enlargement has been a high priority
for both the Commission and the
social partners.
2.3. The contribution of social
dialogue to improving
governance
Over the last few years a parallel, but
related, debate has been taking place
on improving European governance,
with a growing concern to ensure the
application of the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the notion that decisions
should be taken at the lowest appro-
priate level and as close as possible to
the citizen.As part of this debate, the
‘White Paper on European gover-
nance’ (93) adopted in July 2001
stressed the importance of effective
consultation for improving the quality
of legislation and has advocated the
use of co- and self-regulation mecha-
nisms. The White Paper states that
‘the social partners should be further
encouraged to use the powers given
under the Treaty to conclude volun-
tary agreements’.
The social dialogue consultation
mechanisms predated the governance
debate and were in fact pioneering in
this respect. Indeed the social dia-
logue is recognised as constituting a
special form of co- and self-regulation.
This is due to the special nature of the
social partners compared to other
pressure or interest groups which
stems from their ability to take part in
collective bargaining. It is largely for
this reason that the social dialogue
has a specific Treaty basis in Articles
138 and 139.
The Commission’s June 2002 com-
munication on the social dialogue
stresses the important contribution
of the social dialogue to better gover-
nance and makes various recommen-
dations for improving the involve-
ment of the social partners. The
August 2004 communication comple-
ments this by recommending ways of
improving the impact of the results of
the social dialogue.
As the debate on European govern-
ance has evolved, a growing recogni-
tion and advocacy of a larger variety
of governance instruments has also
emerged, including a range of ‘soft’
law measures, such as the open
method of coordination (OMC),
which was strongly recommended
by the High Level Group on
Industrial Relations and Change for
use by the social partners (94).
The OMC is an instrument which was
originally devised with governments in
mind as a tool for helping to imple-
ment the Lisbon objectives, but it can
also be adapted to use by the social
partners. It is a method of peer
review, which entails setting certain
targets or benchmarks (quantitative
where possible) and regularly report-
ing on progress towards them. It is a
useful way of achieving progress in
areas in which legislation may not be
the most appropriate solution, often
because Member States already have
a complex and diverse array of meas-
ures in place, but in which they or the
social partners nevertheless have an
interest in working together at the
European level, either because of the
cross-border implications of certain
policies which require international
cooperation, or because European
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(93) COM(2001) 428 final.
(94) The report of the high level group can be found at the following website: www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-
dial/social/index_en.htm
societies face certain common prob-
lems,such as adapting to technological
change, declining birth rates, and age-
ing populations.
The OMC could be useful for the
social partners because it provides a
pragmatic way of making progress in
areas in which the policy space is
already densely occupied, and
responds effectively to the growing
view that the European level should
serve to facilitate the effective
exchange of best practice between
national, local and enterprise level and
thereby promote mutual learning. For
the OMC to work, however, commit-
ment is necessary among the parties
concerned.
The final section of the chapter discuss-
es the trend among the European social
partners towards the use of a greater
diversity of instruments, including ‘new
generation’ texts which they undertake
to follow up themselves.
n 3. Policy developments:
working towards 
the Lisbon objectives
3.1. Lifelong learning and
mobility
The Lisbon objective of becoming a
dynamic, knowledge-based economy
requires investment in human
resources, in other words the promo-
tion of education and training in order
to ensure that employees possess the
new skills which are required in a
knowledge-based economy. Ensuring
that they remain employable through-
out their working lives is a lifelong
process. Many of the social partners’
activities therefore represent a
response to this challenge.
In March 2002, the cross-industry
social partners, the ETUC, UNICE/
UEAPME and CEEP, adopted the
framework of actions for the lifelong
development of competencies and
qualifications. The text stresses the
importance of the principle of the
shared responsibility of all players for
lifelong learning (e.g. the social part-
ners at national, sectoral and compa-
ny level, public authorities, employers
and individual employees). It empha-
sises that the lifelong development of
competencies depends on the imple-
mentation of the following four pri-
orities:
• identification and anticipation of
competencies and qualification
needs;
• recognition and validation of com-
petencies and qualifications;
• information, support and guidance;
• resources.
This framework of actions is innova-
tive both in terms of the content of
the text and as an instrument. With
regard to the content, it seeks to go
beyond the earlier approach which
prevailed in the social partners’ joint
opinions adopted between 1985 and
1995, which tended to adopt a nar-
rower view of vocational training and
to focus on issues such as the right to
training and equal access. In contrast,
in the framework of actions, the social
partners have adopted a broader
approach by considering the issue of
training from the angle of learning,
both formal and informal; and by
introducing the concept of ‘compe-
tencies’ which have to be validated
and recognised so as to facilitate geo-
graphical mobility; by extending the
scope to all categories (young people,
employees, job-seekers) and all age
groups; and by adopting a multi-level
approach (national, regional, local and
company).
As an instrument, this framework of
actions is also significant as it is the
first time that the cross-industry
social partners have decided to imple-
ment one of their texts via the open
method of coordination (OMC).The
member organisations of UNICE/
UEAPME,CEEP and the ETUC under-
take to promote the framework in
Member States at all appropriate lev-
els taking account of national prac-
tices.At European level, the social part-
ners will continue to contribute to
ongoing discussions on transparency
and recognition of competencies and
qualifications.The social partners have
agreed to monitor progress towards
achieving the four priorities on an
annual basis (reporting in
February–March each year) and will,
after three annual reports, evaluate the
impact on both companies and work-
ers. This evaluation can, if necessary,
lead to an update of the priorities iden-
tified.The social partners’ ad hoc group
on education and training will be
responsible for the evaluation, which
will be presented in March 2006.
In their joint work programme the
social partners indicate that they will
include the new Member States in the
reporting activities from 2005
onwards and a seminar was held in
May 2004 in order to prepare for
their inclusion.
The first and second follow-up
reports were produced in March
2003 and 2004 respectively. National
efforts have been building on previ-
ously existing initiatives, and both
reports reflect the diversity of
Member States’ industrial relations
systems and a variety of priorities as a
result of differing national circum-
stances and needs.
The first report indicated that consid-
erable efforts had been made:
• to disseminate the text (e.g. trans-
late it, hold information meetings,
analyse and discuss the priorities);
• to discuss the text among the social
partners and to integrate the priori-
ties in collective agreements;
• to promote the approach and prior-
ities through tripartite concerta-
tion with public authorities;
• to follow up certain priorities
through more focused projects by
the social partners either jointly
or individually.
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Sector Title of joint text
Agriculture European agreement on vocational training, December 2002
Banking Joint declaration on lifelong learning, November 2002
Civil aviation Joint opinion on the crisis in air transport, October 2001
Joint letter to Commissioner de Palacio supporting the bottom-up approach for functional blocks of 
airspace in the single European sky policy, October 2003
Cleaning industry Joint declaration on employment, February 2001
Common recommendations of the European social partners for the cleaning industry, March 2002
Framework programme of the social dialogue committee in the cleaning industry, March 2004
Commerce European agreement on guidelines on telework in commerce,April 2001
Voluntary guidelines supporting age diversity, March 2002
Joint statement on corporate social responsibility, November 2003
Statement on promoting employment and integration of disabled people in the European commerce and 
distribution sector, May 2004
Construction Recommendations to the national federations regarding implementation of Directive 2001/45/EC on 
‘working at heights’,April 2003
Joint declaration regarding the proposed COM(2001) 386 — 2001/0154/CNS directive of 11 July 2001 
relating to entry and residence conditions for workers who are nationals of other countries, June 2003
Joint statement on the European Commission’s proposal for a directive on services in the internal market,
COM(2004) 002,April 2004
Joint statement on the European Week for Safety and Health at Work — 2004,April 2004
Cross-industry Joint contribution by the social partners to the Laeken European Council, December 2001
Declaration of the social partners for the European year of people with disabilities: promoting equal 
opportunities and access to employment for people with disabilities, January 2003
Framework of actions on the lifelong development of competencies & qualifications, March 2002
Framework agreement on telework, July 2002
Orientations for reference in managing change and its social consequences, October 2003
Framework agreement on work-related stress, October 2004
Electricity Joint declaration on the conference on the social implications of the restructuring of the electricity sector 
in the candidate countries, 2002
Eurelectric-EPSU-EMCEF joint declaration on telework, 2003
Joint statement of Eurelectric, EMCEF and EPSU and final report on the study on lifelong learning in the 
electricity sector, 2003
Joint declaration on equal opportunities and diversity in the electricity sector, June 2003
Joint statement on the future skills needs in the European electricity sector, June 2004
Footwear Existing code of conduct for the footwear sector extended to organisations representing the footwear 
retail sector, February 2002
Horeca Common position on the Commission communication on tourism, 2001
Local & regional government CEMR-EP/EPSU joint statement on telework, January 2004
Mines Joint positions in the context of the draft directives on the management of waste and greenhouse gas 
emissions trading, 2002
Joint position on training and continuing training,April 2003
Personal services Code of conduct — guidelines for European hairdressers, June 2001
Postal services Equal opportunities in the postal sector: good practices, 2001
Private security Joint declaration on the European harmonisation of legislation governing the private security sector,
December 2001
Code of conduct and ethics for the private security sector, July 2003
Railways Agreement on certain aspects of the working conditions of railway mobile workers assigned to 
interoperable cross-border services, January 2004
Agreement on the European licence for drivers carrying out a cross-border interoperability service,
January 2004
Road transport Joint declaration on the road safety action programme, September 2003
Joint declaration on post-enlargement in the road transport sector, September 2003
Joint recommendations of the European social partners to the representatives of management and trade 
unions in local public transport companies in the EU on insecurity in local public transport, November 2003
Sugar Common position on the generalised system of preference for clear and consistent rules of origin 
conceived as an essential counterpart to the opening of borders, 2001
Joint declaration on the impact of enlargement for the sugar industry, 2002
Code of conduct on corporate social responsibility in the European sugar industry, February 2003
Joint position paper on the Commission communication relating to reform of the COM in sugar,
December 2003
Telecommunications Guidelines for telework in Europe, February 2001
Guidelines for customer contact centres, June 2004
Temporary work Joint declaration on the development of the sectoral social dialogue, July 2001
Joint declaration — objectives of the European directive on private agency work, October 2001
TABLE 3.3: SOCIAL PARTNER JOINT TEXTS ADOPTED BETWEEN JANUARY 2001 AND JUNE 2004 (95)
(95) This list is not necessarily exhaustive.
Although it was still early to detect
particular trends resulting directly
from the adoption of the framework
of actions, it appeared to be providing
an impetus for debates between the
social partners at national level on the
development of competencies and
qualifications, and in some cases activ-
ities were being organised around the
four priorities identified at European
level.
The second follow-up report indicated
that activities in the bipartite social dia-
logue had been less geared in the sec-
ond year towards the dissemination of
the framework of actions and focused
more on competence development at
different levels. Different means had
been used to that end, including collec-
tive agreements, joint projects, the
establishment of discussion forums and
the development and promotion of
concrete tools to help companies
develop learning activities. National
social partners had been actively
involved in tripartite activities, including
the design of public policies on educa-
tion and training in several countries.
The second report also included some
information on initiatives taken at the
European sectoral level.
Lifelong learning is of course also a
key issue for the sectors and there-
fore featured in the work of the
majority of the sectoral social dia-
logue committees. The various sec-
tors have undertaken numerous joint
projects, culminating in some cases in
the adoption of joint texts. In some
instances, reference was made to the
cross-industry framework of actions.
In the agriculture sector, the social
partners signed a European agree-
ment on vocational training in
December 2002 which seeks to raise
the level of qualifications of agricultur-
al workers and to facilitate their
mobility within the EU.The agreement
is to be implemented in accordance
with national procedures and prac-
tices and proposes a number of initia-
tives and practical recommendations
to national social partners, national
authorities and the Commission with
regard to skills assessment, the valida-
tion of vocational skills, the trans-
parency of diplomas, and qualifica-
tions.With a view to facilitating mobil-
ity, the agreement proposes a model
for an agricultural worker’s booklet of
vocational qualifications and skills.
Mobility is not only essential for
adapting to structural changes, it is
also important for helping to resolve
the problem of the shortage of skilled
labour in the sector.
Social partners in the banking sector
have prepared an inventory of the leg-
islative framework and practices on
lifelong learning in their sector in 18
countries, and adopted a joint decla-
ration on lifelong learning in this con-
nection in November 2002.This joint
declaration recognises the impor-
tance of training to companies’ com-
petitiveness and aims to promote a
culture of continuing training. It iden-
tifies the same four main themes as
those in the cross-industry social
partners’ framework of actions, but
takes into account the specificities of
this particular sector.
European social partners in the postal
sector have also been inspired by the
framework of actions and the sectoral
social dialogue committee’s new web-
site includes a questionnaire which
seeks to collect examples of best
practices on training and skills devel-
opment in the sector. More than 50
good practices have already been col-
lected.
Social partners in the electricity sec-
tor commissioned a study on lifelong
learning and vocational training needs
in their sector, which resulted in the
adoption of a joint statement in June
2003.The study was drawn up on the
basis of the responses received to
questionnaires sent to electricity
companies in several countries.
Training is an important issue for the
electricity sector as the liberalisation
of energy markets has considerably
changed the context in which elec-
tricity companies now operate, and in
order to remain an attractive employ-
er and to maintain the competitive-
ness of the industry, the electricity
sector must find suitable ways of
ensuring that staff have the skills
which are needed in this new context.
The text identifies the challenges
relating to the needs of older work-
ers, female employees and young
workers entering the industry. The
electricity social partners intend to
use the conclusions of the study to
explore further the question of life-
long learning at a joint workshop
aimed at exchanging examples of best
practice.
Social partners in the mines sector
adopted a joint position on training
and continuing training in April 2003
stressing the importance of training
to economic and social development,
the need for new social skills in addi-
tion to the more traditional technical
occupational skills and the need for
training content to adapt to the needs
of the information society.
In the construction sector, the
European social partners have devel-
oped a brochure on tutorship for
building and public works compa-
nies. The brochure has been devel-
oped because the sector suffers
from image problems which means
that at the same time as many skilled
workers over the age of 50 are leav-
ing the industry, many younger
workers are leaving the sector
either during training or after just a
few years’ of work. This results in
wasted resources for the different
vocational training systems and a
lower return on businesses’ invest-
ments in human resources. The
brochure has therefore been
designed in order to provide the
construction sector’s social partners
and businesses with information and
tools to help them address these
problems through tutorship. It
includes examples of best practice.
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Employers in the construction sector,
represented by FIEC (European
Construction Industry Federation),
have organised a number of ‘thematic
visits’, designed to share and spread
best practices in vocational training.
These visits have also helped to iden-
tify certain problems facing the con-
struction industry, and have included a
large number of participants from
FIEC member federations from the
candidate countries in the run-up to
enlargement.
Furthermore, the texts of other sec-
tors include references to lifelong
learning/training even if it is not nec-
essarily the primary concern of the
text in question, as in the case of the
code of conduct on corporate social
responsibility in the European sugar
industry adopted in February 2003.
Similarly, the code of conduct and
ethics for the private security sector
adopted in July 2003 addresses the
question of vocational training, stress-
ing the need for appropriate training
in order to ensure minimum stan-
dards of professionalism in the sector.
It indicates that in the absence of
national regulations or standards,
companies should, at a minimum, pro-
vide a level of training corresponding
to the training manual developed by
the social partners in the sector in
2001 on basic training requirements
for private security guards.
Finally, the common recommenda-
tions for the cleaning industry
adopted in March 2004 also stress
the importance of vocational train-
ing to promoting professionalism
which is in turn fundamental to
ensuring the sustainable develop-
ment of the sector. In this text, the
sectoral social partners refer explic-
itly to the cross-industry framework
of actions and declare their inten-
tion to actively pursue work in this
area with a view to promoting the
development of vocational training
at all levels.
3.2. Telework: modernising
employment relations
Another important aspect of the
Lisbon agenda concerns the moderni-
sation and improvement of employ-
ment relations, a topic on which the
Commission consulted the social
partners in 2000. During 2001, the
social partners informed the
Commission that they wished to
negotiate their own agreement,which
culminated in the adoption by the
ETUC (along with the
Eurocadres/CEC liaison committee),
UNICE/UEAPME and CEEP of the
framework agreement on telework
signed on 16 July 2002.
In the preamble, the social partners
state that in line with the EU’s
Lisbon strategy, the agreement is a
contribution to preparing the transi-
tion to a knowledge-based economy
and society. The agreement defines
the scope of telework and establish-
es a general European framework
for teleworkers’ conditions of
employment. It covers eight areas:
employment conditions, data pro-
tection, privacy, equipment, health
and safety, organisation of work,
training and collective rights. It aims
to ensure that teleworkers are
afforded a general level of protec-
tion equivalent to workers working
on the employer’s premises.
Like the previous framework agree-
ments on parental leave, part-time
work and fixed-term work, it was
negotiated following a consultation
of the social partners under Article
138 of the EC Treaty on Modernising
and improving employment relations.
However, this agreement departs
from the three other agreements as
it is the first time that the social
partners have decided to implement
an agreement via the first implemen-
tation route in Article 139(2) of the
EC Treaty, namely in accordance with
the ‘procedures and practices specif-
ic to management and labour and
the Member States’.The three previ-
ous agreements have all been imple-
mented via the second route, name-
ly by Council directives.
The main difference between this
implementation method and that
used for the three other agreements
is that it is the social partners them-
selves — more specifically, the nation-
al members of the European signato-
ry organisations — who will imple-
ment the agreement, rather than
Member States. Indeed, in the vast
majority of Member States, the three
previous agreements were imple-
mented either by revising existing leg-
islation or introducing new laws.
The social partners have three years
in which to implement the agreement
— until July 2005 — and they then
have a further year — until July 2006
— to produce a joint report on
implementation.
At the time of writing, the UK,
Sweden and the Netherlands had
adopted non-binding guidelines
agreed jointly by the main peak social
partner organisations. Although the
UK guidelines are non-binding, the
fact that the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI) and the Trades Union
Congress (TUC) have decided to
agree the guidelines together,with the
Department of Trade and Industry’s
(DTI) support for publication, has
been considered to be significant in
the British industrial relations con-
text. The Swedish and Dutch guide-
lines are intended to serve as recom-
mendations for lower levels of bar-
gaining, at either sectoral or company
level, but have no binding force in
themselves. In Ireland, the social part-
ners will update the existing non-
binding code of practice dating from
1999. In mid-2004, cross-industry
negotiations had been initiated in
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece,
Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg and
Norway. In Denmark, Germany and
Sweden the issue is expected to be
taken up in the sectoral collective bar-
gaining rounds during 2004. In
Portugal, the recently amended labour
80
Chapter 3 Industrial Relations in Europe 2004
code includes 10 articles dealing
specifically with telework. In Hungary,
also the labour code has been amend-
ed to include provisions on telework,
and similar steps are under way in the
Czech Republic.
While telework is still a relatively
undeveloped form of work in some
countries, in others, existing collective
agreements already address the issue.
This is the case, for example, with
regard to the electric power-supply,
telecommunications, information tech-
nology services and mineral oil pro-
duction sectors in Austria. Similarly, in
some countries, company level agree-
ments address the issue (96).
Some European sectoral social part-
ners have also addressed the issue of
telework. The commerce and
telecommunications sectors adopted
joint texts in 2001 prior to the cross-
industry agreement as a response to
the Commission consultation. Their
texts highlight similar issues to the
cross-industry agreement, including
the voluntary nature of telework, the
principle of equitable treatment with
other employees, costs involved,
equipment, confidentiality, health and
safety considerations, access to train-
ing and collective rights.
The guidelines on telework in the
telecommunications sector foresaw a
follow-up and the findings produced
in 2003 indicate a high level of imple-
mentation of the guidelines in the 17
large traditional operators in the sec-
tor. The report explains that in all
cases telework is voluntary, the princi-
ple of equitable treatment is respect-
ed, the equipment is always provided
by the company and the costs are
generally borne by it. In each instance,
teleworkers have equal access to
training and career opportunities,
health and safety rules are applied,
measures have been taken to ensure
that teleworkers do not experience
exclusion or isolation, in all companies
teleworkers must respect the confi-
dentiality of all data, and they benefit
from the same collective rights.
More recently, social partners in the
electricity (2003) and local and
regional government sectors (2004)
adopted very similar joint texts wel-
coming the cross-industry agreement
and calling on their members to
implement it in their sectors in accor-
dance with national procedures and
practices specific to management and
labour by the July 2005 implementa-
tion deadline for the cross-industry
agreement. Both sectors also under-
take to monitor the implementation
of the agreement in their sectors in
2005. The similarity of the two sec-
tors’ approaches has been influenced
by the fact that employees  are repre-
sented by the same trade union
organisation, EPSU (European Fede-
ration of Public Service Unions) (97).
3.3. Restructuring:
Anticipating and
managing change
Corporate restructuring is a crucial
issue in the framework of the fulfilment
of the Lisbon objectives with regard to
both its economic and social implica-
tions, and particularly in view of the
likely consequences of EU enlarge-
ment. Restructuring has therefore
been an important discussion topic for
the cross-industry social partners and
was included in their joint work pro-
gramme.The social partners’ delibera-
tions on restructuring were, however,
originally triggered by a Commission
consultation under Article 138 of the
EC Treaty on Anticipating and managing
change: a dynamic approach to the social
aspects of corporate restructuring
launched in January 2002.This consul-
tation paper explains that the Lisbon
strategy is based on a positive
approach to change. Change is viewed
as contributing to innovation, increas-
ing, productivity (by modernising the
organisation of work), and raising prof-
itability, and should therefore be
embraced, anticipated and managed
responsibly.
During 2002–03, the cross-industry
social partners held three seminars
examining case studies of restructur-
ing and, on 29 October 2003, they
presented a joint text to the
Commission entitled ‘Orientations
for reference in managing change and
its social consequences’, which
includes an annex with 10 case stud-
ies on which the orientations were
based (for more information on the
case studies, see Chapter 5).
The orientations stress the need for
explaining the reasons for change in
good time to workers or their repre-
sentatives; the need for good infor-
mation and consultation of workers
throughout the process of change;
and the need to maintain and develop
workers’ competences and qualifica-
tions in order to develop their
employability. It also addresses the
territorial dimension (the economic
and social repercussions of restruc-
turing on the regions in which they
are based) and the specific circum-
stances of SMEs.
These orientations constitute a first
step towards identifying and develop-
ing best practices on anticipating and
managing restructuring throughout
Europe. The cross-industry social
partners’ work programme foresees
two further initiatives relating to this
topic, namely a study on restructuring
in the new Member States, and a joint
seminar on the implementation of the
European works councils directive,
which will also involve further work
on themes relevant to the topic of
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Conditions and the European Commission, 2003.
(97) In the electricity sector trade unions are also represented by EMCEF (European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation).
restructuring. The framework of
actions on the lifelong development of
competencies and qualifications,
adopted prior to the orientations, is
also relevant to this issue in view of
the importance of continuous training
to ensuring the employability of
employees.
At the sectoral level, the electricity
social partners organised a joint
conference on the social implica-
tions of the restructuring of the
electricity sector in the candidate
countries, in Budapest, in Sep-
tember 2002, which resulted in the
adoption of a joint statement. Case
studies were presented on the
effects of liberalisation and privati-
sation on companies, employees
and customers in the EU, and the
preparation of the candidate coun-
tries for EU membership was also
discussed. In 2003, three work-
shops were held in Prague,
Bucharest and Tallinn in order to
discuss the social implications of
the internal electricity market.
In May 2003, the telecommunica-
tions social partners organised a
conference in Cyprus on ‘Social dia-
logue: a key factor for success in
restructuring European telecommu-
nications companies’.
The code of conduct on corporate
social responsibility in the European
sugar industry adopted in February
2003 also includes a section on
restructuring.The code stresses the
need for restructuring to take place
in a socially responsible way, includ-
ing the importance of timely infor-
mation and consultation and the
need to improve the employability
of employees.The code is accompa-
nied by an annex of examples of
good practice, several of which
address cases of socially responsi-
ble restructuring.
Finally, some of the European social
partners have undertaken unilateral
initiatives, such as the conference
held by EMCEF in April 2004 explor-
ing good practices for informing and
consulting workers in cases of
restructuring.
3.4. Corporate social
responsibility (CSR)
Another topic attracting growing
interest among the social partners
and which can make a contribution
to the Lisbon objectives, but also the
European strategy for sustainable
development and better global gov-
ernance, is corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR). This is the concept
whereby companies, often in
response to market pressures,
acknowledge the importance of sus-
tainability issues and their role in
addressing them, by integrating
social and environmental concerns
in their business operations and
their interaction with their stake-
holders on a voluntary basis.
Following the appeal for CSR
launched at the Lisbon Summit in
March 2000, the Commission pub-
lished a Green Paper seeking to
launch a debate on the concept and
to obtain stakeholders’ views on
how it should be taken further at
European level. This was followed 
up in 2002 by the adoption by the
Commission of a communication
outlining its strategy (98).
The social partners began by address-
ing the issue of CSR in the context of
global social governance.The question
of fundamental rights, including in the
context of business relations of EU-
based firms with third countries, had
already been explored by several sec-
tors prior to the launch of the
Commission’s initiatives on CSR and
had resulted in the adoption of char-
ters and codes of conduct in the tex-
tile/clothing, tanning/leather, and
footwear sectors. In the footwear
sector, the original code of conduct
on child labour was extended in
scope in 2000. In the codes of all
three sectors, the European social
partners call on their members to
comply with the core labour stan-
dards as defined in International
Labour Organisation (ILO) Conven-
tions, namely the abolition of forced
labour, the freedom of association and
the right to collective bargaining, the
abolition of child labour and non-dis-
crimination in employment.
The tanning/leather code of conduct
goes beyond these core labour rights
as it includes clauses on reasonable
working hours,decent working condi-
tions and decent remuneration. The
tanning/leather and footwear (2000)
codes foresee the possibility of the
European social partners organising
training and awareness-raising pro-
grammes. They both also call on
member organisations and enter-
prises to integrate the code in their
relations with suppliers or sub-con-
tractors and indicate the need for
independent verification of the
implementation of the code in order
to ensure credibility.
The implementation of these codes
has gradually been gathering pace. For
example, some training and aware-
ness-raising projects (some of which
are ongoing) have recently been
undertaken by the social partners in
the textile/clothing and tanning/
leather sectors to promote the imple-
mentation of these codes in the can-
didate countries, such as Bulgaria and
Turkey.
The commerce sector had also
undertaken various initiatives,
including the adoption of three joint
statements on combating violence,
combating child labour and combat-
ing racism and xenophobia, as well as
an agreement on fundamental rights
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(98) ‘Promoting a European framework for corporate social responsibility: Green Paper’, COM(2001) 366 final and ‘Corporate social
responsibility: A business contribution to sustainable development’, COM(2002) 347 final.
and principles at work. Like some of
the codes of conduct mentioned
above, the latter text urges compa-
nies and workers in the European
commerce sector to comply with
the main ILO conventions, including
the development of their own codes
of conduct for their business rela-
tions with third countries. In March
2002, the woodworking sector
adopted a code of conduct calling on
their members to actively encourage
companies and employees in the
sector to observe the main ILO con-
ventions.
A growing interest in the broader
issue of CSR is now evident among
some of the European sectoral
social partners. Indeed CSR opens
up two new dimensions for the
European social partners. Firstly, it
opens up the possibility of the social
partners’ agreements having an
impact beyond the EU’s borders.
Secondly, it opens up potential new
areas for negotiation, such as the
wider concept of quality and sustain-
able development issues.
The sugar sector has been the first
to undertake a CSR-specific effort
to ensure the voluntary respect of
certain social standards, by adopting
a code of conduct on CSR in
February 2003.The text sets a series
of voluntary minimum standards for
affiliated sugar companies in a num-
ber of areas including human rights,
education and training, health and
safety, pay and working conditions,
restructuring and social dialogue. It
also states that the European sugar
industry expects socially responsible
behaviour from its suppliers and
seeks thereby to contribute to pro-
moting the concept of CSR at the
global level.The preamble states that
the code is intended to serve as a
vehicle for exchanging experience in
order to help develop best practice.
The code foresees regular annual
assessment of its implementation at
European level, and the first follow-up
report was formally approved in
February 2004. The purpose of the
first report was to describe the meas-
ures taken during 2003 to disseminate
knowledge and awareness of the code
prior to its entry into force on 1
January 2004, rather than to assess
the application of the various norms
at this stage. A collection of good
practices, which are intended to pro-
vide a source of inspiration for com-
panies, has been annexed to the code
and will be regularly updated.
The report explains that during
2003, members of the employers’
social working group, which com-
prises company human resource
directors or individuals responsible
for social affairs within federations,
have spent considerable time in
explaining and promoting the con-
cept of CSR to the managements of
different companies and human
resource directors in the sugar
industry with the aim of having the
concept gradually integrated into
the human resource policy of com-
panies. Contacts were also made in
some instances with trade union
organisations, external bodies or
public authorities.The code has been
translated into 14 European lan-
guages, it has been posted on the
websites of the European social
partners — CEFS (employers) and
EFFAT (trade unions) (99)— —and has
received press coverage. The social
partners in the sector have found
that the existing structures at both
the European level (the sectoral
social dialogue committee) as well as
those at national level were ade-
quate for implementing and moni-
toring the code. Furthermore, in
June 2004, the social partners in the
sugar sector opened a website for
their social dialogue to help raise its
visibility and their work on CSR.
The commerce sector has also
begun to explore the wider concept
of CSR, with the organisation in
November 2003 of a conference
devoted to the subject, at the end of
which the commerce social partners
adopted a joint statement which
urges all commerce companies in
Europe to implement CSR policies.
The European social partners under-
take for their part to promote CSR
in business activities, and to raise
awareness, for example, through the
convening of round tables and the
collection and dissemination of good
practices. The success of the state-
ment is dependent on the commit-
ment of the social partners and, it
suggests, that where European
works councils exist, they can play a
positive role.The follow-up given to
the joint statement will be moni-
tored on a regular basis.
Further projects on CSR are under
way in the tanning/leather, banking
and Horeca sectors.The postal serv-
ices sector is seeking to gather
examples of CSR best practices
which are to be published on their
sectoral social dialogue committee’s
new website. In addition, certain
trade union and employers’ organi-
sations have been exploring the
implications of CSR on a unilateral
basis.
Several of the European social part-
ners — UNICE, CEEP, UEAPME,
Eurocommerce, ETUC, CEC/ Euro-
cadres — took part in the EU multi-
stakeholder forum on CSR, the aim of
which was to promote innovation,
transparency and convergence of CSR
practices and instruments. Launched
by the Commission in October 2002,
the forum completed its work in June
2004. The Commission is scheduled
to publish a communication in early
2005 assessing progress in the imple-
mentation of its CSR strategy and
proposing the next steps to be taken.
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These efforts in the field of CSR are
partly a reflection of a new phenome-
non in social regulation emerging at
the transnational company level over
the last 10 years or so towards the
increasing adoption of corporate
codes of conduct intended to serve as
guidelines to companies concerning
labour practices in their supply chains.
Codes of conduct such as these are
attracting considerable analytical
interest as sources of social regula-
tion, however, the question of their
effectiveness and credibility has come
under scrutiny and was part of the
mandate given by the Commission to
the EU CSR forum.
With a view to the future, the promo-
tion of CSR and its integration in daily
business management requires the
development of new CSR-related
professional skills. In addition to a
need for CSR management specialists
in firms and CSR performance asses-
sors, such as social auditors and ana-
lysts, every manager and employee
will need to acquire new skills to be
able to understand and manage CSR
issues in their work. As a conse-
quence,CSR-related training will need
to be included as a new lifelong learn-
ing issue.The emergence of new CSR-
related professions will also have con-
sequences in terms of professional
recognition.These are all issues which
are likely to be addressed by the
social partners in the coming years.
Until now research has tended to
focus essentially on the definition of
CSR and the reasons why it makes
good sense for businesses. The con-
cept of CSR has, however, evolved to
embrace environmental as well as
social issues (sustainable develop-
ment) and the key question concerns
how to integrate these issues as well
as the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders in company manage-
ment. CSR is beginning to be linked to
the global social governance
debate (100). Developments in CSR and
the linkage with other fields such as
corporate governance and industrial
relations are now beginning to be
examined more closely. In the field of
industrial relations, in the coming
years, it will be interesting to examine
questions such as the role of European
social partner texts and international
framework agreements between
multinational enterprises and interna-
tional trade unions in transnational
social regulation, the impact of these
agreements on the various levels of
industrial relations,the relevant actors,
and the cooperation between trade
unions and other stakeholders.
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Footwear Charter on the employment of children
(Extended to cover footwear retailing as well as manufacture in 1998)
1995, updated in 1996 
Commerce Joint statement on combating violence in commerce 1995
Commerce Eurocommerce and Euro-Fiet joint statement on combating child labour 1996
Textile & clothing Code of conduct — a charter by social partners in the European textile/clothing sector 1997
Commerce Eurocommerce and Euro-Fiet agreement on fundamental principles and rights at work 1999
Commerce Joint statement on combating racism and xenophobia 2000
Footwear Code of conduct — a charter by social partners in the footwear sector 2000
Tanning & leather Code of conduct in the leather and tanning sector 2000
Woodworking Code of conduct — a charter for the social partners in the European woodworking
industry
2002
Sugar Code of conduct — corporate social responsibility in the European sugar industry 2003
Commerce Eurocommerce and Uni-Europa Commerce joint statement on corporate social 
responsibility
2003
TABLE 3.4: SOCIAL PARTNER TEXTS ON CSR AND RELATED TOPICS
3.5. The ageing workforce
Long-term demographic trends in
Europe, in particular longer life-
expectancy and declining birth rates,
mean that European populations are
ageing and that an increase in the
employment rates of older workers is
crucial for the economy as a whole in
order to make use of the full potential
of labour supply to sustain economic
growth, tax revenues and social pro-
tection systems. The promotion of
active ageing is reflected in two com-
plementary targets that the EU has
set itself. The 2001 Stockholm
European Council agreed that 50 %
of the EU population in the 55-64 age
group should be in employment by
2010, and the 2002 Barcelona
European Council concluded that the
effective average age at which people
should stop working in the EU should
be raised by five years by this date.
In February 2004, the Commission
adopted a communication entitled
‘Increasing the employment of older
workers and delaying the exit age
from the labour market’ (101), which
urges Member States — in line with
the European employment strategy
— to take urgent action to develop
active ageing policies and stresses,
among other things, the importance
of social partnership. It indicates that
the social partners have an important
role to play through collective agree-
ments on interconnected issues such
as wage-setting, including the weight
given to seniority, work organisation
and improvements in safety and
working conditions, lifelong learning,
the removal of incentives for early
retirement, higher pension entitle-
ments for people to stay in work
longer, as well as flexible retirement
schemes combining gradual retire-
ment with part-time work.The social
partners can also help to promote
best practice in relation to age man-
agement. The communication urges
the European social partners to com-
plement the initiatives taking place at
national level.
The subject of older workers has
begun to attract the attention of
some of the European social part-
ners, with the adoption by the com-
merce sector in March 2002 of vol-
untary guidelines supporting age
diversity. These guidelines seek to
promote and recommend best prac-
tice concerning older workers for
the benefit of both companies and
employees when addressing the age
aspects of human resource manage-
ment. They include the principle of
non-discrimination, an age-neutral
approach to employment, recruit-
ment, and vocational training, and the
need for flexible working-time
arrangements. The commerce social
partners also undertake to continue
exploring measures aimed at giving
older workers the possibility to
remain in active working life.
The social partners have also begun
to address the issue in their work on
lifelong learning. For example, both
the cross-industry framework of
actions on the lifelong development
of competencies and qualifications
and the electricity social partners’
joint statement on lifelong learning
address the need to adapt training
systems to the needs of an ageing
workforce.
The subject of active ageing can
therefore be expected to be devel-
oped further by the European social
partners in the near future. Indeed, it
has been included in the cross-indus-
try social partners’ work programme
as they intend to hold a seminar in
2004 at which they will discuss vari-
ous case studies and explore the
possibility of undertaking further
actions.
3.6. The quality of employment
and services
The notion of quality — of work, of
social policy and of industrial relations
— are important principles in the
Lisbon strategy and the Commission’s
social policy agenda, and are an inte-
gral part of the idea of strengthening
the role of social policy as a produc-
tive factor.
The work of several sectors has
sought to promote the quality of work.
For example, the sugar sector’s above-
mentioned code of conduct on CSR
seeks to improve the quality of work in
the European sugar industry. In the pri-
vate security sector, the code of con-
duct and ethics adopted in July 2003
recommends a series of minimum
standards to companies and employ-
ees in order to ensure a necessary
degree of professionalism and quality.
The code covers a range of issues,
including selection and recruitment,
vocational training, social dialogue,
working conditions, salaries and
income,health and safety, equal oppor-
tunities and non-discrimination, work
organisation and relations with clients,
the police and other security firms.
In March 2004, with similar concerns
regarding the quality of working con-
ditions and the image and profession-
alism of the sector, the European
cleaning industry social partners
agreed on some common recommen-
dations exploring areas for further
development, including the question
of working patterns, health and safety
issues and the need to promote social
integration and combat discrimina-
tion. The recommendations have
served as a basis for the sector’s work
programme, which proposes a more
concrete framework of actions and
initiatives on these topics.
The private security and cleaning
industry sectors share another com-
mon difficulty with regard to the 
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tendency for procurement choices in
these sectors to be based purely on
cost considerations.This has implica-
tions for the quality of working condi-
tions of employees in the sector as
well as the quality of the services pro-
vided. Both sectors have therefore
produced manuals on selecting best
value in public tendering which are
intended to raise awareness among
awarding authorities of the impor-
tance of quality considerations in the
choices made by them. The social
partners are making efforts to ensure
that the manuals are translated into as
many languages as possible and are
distributed widely at the national
level.
In September 2003, the social part-
ners in the local public transport sec-
tor organised a joint conference on
‘Quality at work and quality of servic-
es’ during which best practices were
presented in four fields: vocational
training; equal opportunities and bal-
ance between working life and family
life; work organisation; and health and
safety.The parties involved will further
develop their dialogue on this com-
plex and interdependent topic which
is crucial in a context of growing com-
mercial competition.
3.7. Health and safety
Health and safety standards are part
of the notion of high quality work and
this is a topic which features in the
activities of virtually all the sectors.
This is also an area in which the social
partners have over the years pro-
duced a large number of guides and
practical tools (for example, in the
agriculture, construction and cleaning
industry sectors).
The European social partners in the
construction sector have been, for
example, developing common proj-
ects to improve health and safety at
the workplace and to reduce the eco-
nomic cost of work-related accidents
since the early 1990s. More recently,
in 2002, they produced a guide of best
practices to help companies and
employees involved in the construc-
tion process to implement the direc-
tive on mobile construction sites
(Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June
1992) more effectively and to thereby
reduce the number of occupational
accidents. Another initiative in the
sector consists of the recommenda-
tions adopted by the construction
social partners in April 2003 regarding
the meaning of certain definitions
necessary for the implementation of
Directive 2001/45/EC on ‘working at
heights’.These recommendations pro-
vide practical assistance to national
federations and companies in the sec-
tor clarifying how the European level
legislation should be interpreted,
transposed and implemented in the
Member States.
The personal services sector is cur-
rently preparing a study on the feasi-
bility of a website collecting official
information relating to the sector,
such as legislation in the Member
States concerning occupational dis-
eases, collective agreements negotiat-
ed at national level by the social part-
ners, etc. Another project in the 
sector seeks to develop better
ergonomic tools and furniture in
order to reduce occupational risks
such as repetitive strain injury.
In the railway sector, two significant
Article 139(2) agreements were
adopted by the sectoral social part-
ners in January 2004. The first, con-
cerns certain aspects of working con-
ditions of mobile railway workers
assigned to cross-border interoper-
ability services.This agreement seeks
to establish common minimum health
and safety standards for mobile work-
ers in the European railway freight
market, which was liberalised in
March 2003.With the second agree-
ment, the social partners agreed on
the use of a European licence for driv-
ers carrying out a cross-border inter-
operability service, which is based on
common health and safety conditions
and common competence standards.
The social partners have requested
that the first agreement on working
conditions be implemented in accor-
dance with the second implementa-
tion option in Article 139(2) of the EC
Treaty; it will therefore in principle be
transformed into a Council decision
so that the provisions will apply to all
railway undertakings and thereby cre-
ate a level playing field for all opera-
tors in the European railway market.
In contrast, the second agreement on
the drivers’ licence, going beyond the
scope of Article 137 of the Treaty, will
be implemented in accordance with
the first implementation method
described in Article 139(2), namely
the procedures and practices specific
to management and labour in the
Member States. The agreement has
influenced the legislative proposal
adopted on 3 March 2004 by the
Commission on the certification of
train drivers.
Finally, in October 2004, the cross-
industry social partners adopted an
agreement on work-related stress.
These negotiations were originally
triggered by a Commission Article
138 consultation launched in
December 2002 on stress and its
effects on health and safety at work.
The agreement which has been
reached is the cross-industry social
partners’ second autonomous agree-
ment to be implemented in accor-
dance with the procedures and prac-
tices specific to management and
labour in the Member States. The
objective of the agreement is to pro-
vide employers and workers with a
framework to identify and prevent or
manage problems of work-related
stress.The content of the agreement
is described in greater detail in
Chapter 4. The agreement is to be
implemented within three years of its
signature and, in the fourth year, a full
report on the implementation actions
taken will be prepared by the Social
Dialogue Committee (SDC). In addi-
tion, a yearly table will be prepared by
the SDC summarising the ongoing
implementation of the agreement.
86
Chapter 3 Industrial Relations in Europe 2004
3.8. European employment
strategy
The European employment strategy
(EES) launched at the Luxembourg
Jobs Summit in November 1997 is the
tool for coordinating national employ-
ment policy priorities at European
level. As part of the EES, a set of
employment guidelines are drawn up
each year setting out common priori-
ties for Member States’ employment
plans. Each Member State then draws
up a national action plan (NAP) which
describes how these guidelines will be
put into practice nationally.The NAPs
generally serve as baseline documents
but are rarely the central instrument
for discussing and defining national
employment priorities.
The contribution of the social partners
to the effective governance of the
Strategy (through consultation) and to
the objectives of the Strategy is highly
recognised. The Commission’s joint
employment report 2003/04 indicates
that the involvement of the social part-
ners in developing the NAPs is progress-
ing, and their contributions to imple-
mentation are better presented and
reported, but that their involvement
could nevertheless still be improved.
Participation has either developed with-
in an established institutional set-up, or
has focused on specific action.European
social partner involvement has been
strengthened by the adoption of their
joint work programme 2003–05 and the
institutionalised Tripartite Social Summit
for Growth and Employment,which reg-
ularly meets on the eve of the spring
European Council (see also Box 2.1,
Chapter 2).
In March 2004, the European cross-
industry social partners — ETUC,
UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP — produced
their first report on how the national
social partners were involved in the
preparation of the 2003 NAPs, and
this was presented to the spring sum-
mit of the European Council. The
report indicates that national social
partners from 14 Member States
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the Netherlands and the UK) report-
ed on their involvement in the prepa-
ration of the NAPs for employment
and on key initiatives taken at national,
local, sectoral and company levels,
which contributed to implementation
of the European employment guide-
lines. The report explains that the
social partners were usually consulted
during the preparation of the NAPs. In
most Member States, employers and
trade union organisations submitted
separate comments (Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Netherlands, UK), whereas in
some (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden),
joint contributions were included as
an integral part of the NAP in a sum-
marised version and added as annexes.
In Germany and Greece, the involve-
ment of the social partners improved
compared with previous years, and in
Portugal also to a certain extent. In
some cases the consultation was seen
as too superficial due to the absence
of discussions with government
(Austria), the lack of in-depth discus-
sions on policy content (Denmark), or
insufficient time for consultation
(Finland, Belgium, Netherlands).
n 4. Responding to the 
challenge of 
enlargement
Preparations for enlargement have
been an important feature of the
work of many sectors as well as the
Commission during the last couple of
years.
4.1. Social partner initiatives
with regard to
enlargement
One of the main challenges for the
social partners has been to identify
their counterparts in the new
Member States with whom a dialogue
can be established,which is not always
a simple task as in many of these
countries bipartite national and sec-
toral level social dialogue is virtually
non-existent. Numerous sectors —
including commerce, private security,
cleaning industry, postal services, fish-
eries, textile, footwear, tanning/leather
and banking — have undertaken con-
ferences, forums, and round tables in
order to try to identify their counter-
parts.
While some European sectoral social
partner organisations have members
in virtually all of the new Member
States, others have none at all. In gen-
eral, the trade unions have found it
easier to identify counterparts than
employers, partly as a result of the
fact that following the dismantling of
the former planned economies,
employers’ organisations are a new
phenomenon in many of these coun-
tries. Indeed,historically, the legitimate
actors on the employer side were the
chambers of commerce and industry.
Some sectors have undertaken joint
initiatives seeking to prepare for the
consequences of enlargement on
their particular sector. For example,
the construction social partners have
sought to address the implications for
their sector of the large new pool of
labour which enlargement will entail.
The rail, road and inland waterway
transport sectors have studied ques-
tions linked to the risks of ‘social
dumping’ and suitable methods for
dealing with it. In the rail sector, the
social partners have addressed the
problems of competition and the
opening up of markets, and in the
telecommunications and electricity
sectors, the impact of liberalisation
and privatisation have been discussed.
In some sectors, the social partners
have gone beyond discussions and
undertaken joint measures together.
For example, in the textile and cloth-
ing sector, the code of conduct on
fundamental rights adopted in 1997
by the European social partners has
been extended to the new Member
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TABLE 3.5: SOCIAL PARTNER INITIATIVES TO PREPARE FOR ENLARGEMENT
Sector Initiative
Agriculture Conference on involving the candidate countries and the social partners in the social dialogue, Budapest,
January 2000
Social dialogue in agriculture with a view to EU enlargement, 2002
Banking Bilateral round tables, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, 1999–2002
Civil aviation Conference on the social dialogue in industry, September 2000
Seminar on the social dialogue in the European common aviation area, September 2001
Cleaning industry Joint declaration on enlargement, with the social partners undertaking to cooperate in order to contribute to
structuring the sector in the candidate countries, January 2001
Training sessions on the theme of the social dialogue and enlargement, September and October 2002
Commerce Round tables and seminars: Estonia and Hungary 1998, Czech Republic and Poland 1999, Lithuania and Slovakia
2000, Latvia and Slovenia 2002 
Construction Conference ‘Enlargement: chance or risk’, Berlin, 2002
Round table,Warsaw, 2002
Cross-industry Warsaw Conference, March 1999
Bratislava Conference, March 2001
Five cross-industry employers’ round tables, 1997–2001
ETUC study on the relocation of enterprises, 2001
CEEP seminar on services of general interest, 1999 and 2001
Five national seminars, 2004
Electricity Conference on the social implications of restructuring in the electricity sector in the candidate countries,
Budapest, September 2002
Three regional workshops (Prague, Bucharest,Tallinn) on the social implications of the internal electricity 
market, 2003
Footwear First economic and social forum, Prague, November 2001
Second economic and social forum, 2004
Furniture Seminar on extending the social dialogue to central and eastern Europe, Budapest, July 2002
Fostering the social dialogue in the furniture sector, 2003
Horeca Seminar on the European social dialogue, organised by EFFAT, with representatives of Hungarian trade unions,
Brussels, May 2000
Initial meeting of Horeca associations with their counterparts in the candidate countries with a view to prepa-
ring an enlarged sectoral social dialogue at European level, 2002
Live performing arts Conference on moving towards enlargement of the European social dialogue in the arts, Brussels, 2003
Media Status of workers in the media, arts and entertainment sector in the applicant countries, 2002
The prospects of the European social model in public service broadcasting: a challenge to the enlargement 
process, 2004
Mines Promotion of sustainable development and its social aspects in the mining industry with a view to EU 
enlargement, 2002
Postal services First conference on enlargement and the social dialogue, Bucharest, 2001
Second conference on enlargement and social dialogue, 2003
Private security Training sessions on the social dialogue and enlargement, October 2002
Railways Information seminars in the candidate countries, 2004
Sea fishing Round table on the sectoral social dialogue and enlargement, Malta, 2002 and Riga, 2003
Sea transport Seminar on the social aspects of employment, Brussels, May 2002
Sugar Conference on the impact of enlargement on the sugar industry, Bratislava, November 2002
Impact of EU enlargement on employment, 2002
Tanning/leather First economic and social forum, Hungary, September 2001
Second economic and social forum, Bucharest, October 2002
Third economic and social forum, 2004
Telecommunications Seminar on the implications of the liberalisation of markets, Hungary, October 2001
Textiles/clothing Seminar on the social dialogue and fundamental rights,Turkey, 2000
First economic and social forum, Poland, May 2002
Second economic and social forum, 2004
States. Thematic seminars have also
been organised in Turkey,with the aim
of carrying out a comparative analysis
of working conditions in the sector.
Table 3.5 provides a non-exhaustive
overview of some of the initiatives
undertaken by the social partners in
order to prepare for enlargement.
4.2. Commission initiatives to
prepare for enlargement
The Commission has undertaken var-
ious initiatives to help prepare the
European social dialogue and the
social partners for enlargement.
First of all, it has sent a consistent polit-
ical message to the public authorities
and social partners in the candidate
countries concerning the importance
of social dialogue to the Community
acquis. It has stressed the importance
of the candidate countries developing
stronger bipartite structures, and the
importance of the social dialogue to
the legal acquis, as many Community
directives specify that they may be
implemented in the Member States by
means of legislation or agreements
between the social partners.
The Commission has also stressed
the need for capacity-building among
social partners in these countries in
its 2002 and 2004 communications on
the social dialogue and has undertak-
en various kinds of activities in order
to help the social partners in this
respect. It is, however, important to
note that as the social partners are
autonomous and the social dialogue
in the EU is based on the freedom of
the right to association, capacity-
building is essentially a bottom-up
process depending on the efforts of
the social partners themselves.
The Commission has constantly
endeavoured to promote capacity-
building by insisting on the use of the
Phare programmes to fund projects
on the social dialogue (102). Projects to
promote national, sectoral and/or
regional social dialogue have been
undertaken in the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.As most
of the projects have only been
finalised recently, it is still too early to
know the outcomes.The types of ini-
tiatives undertaken by these projects
include the provision of support for
setting up sectoral dialogue commit-
tees, training the social partners in
consultation, negotiation and language
skills, and strengthening the public
authorities’ administrative capacity for
social dialogue.
Through its social dialogue budget
headings, the Commission has also co-
financed many of the above-mentioned
joint initiatives of the social partners in
EU-15 to help them prepare their
sectors for enlargement (see above).
More recently, the Commission has
co-financed a couple of capacity-build-
ing projects in the new Member
States organised by the International
Training Centre of the International
Labour Organisation. One project is
aimed at trade unions in the com-
merce sector, and the other is aimed
at cross-industry employers’ organisa-
tions. Both projects seek to train
social partner representatives from
the new Member States in negotiating
skills, and to provide them with the
skills to act as trainers themselves
when they return to their respective
countries.
Further to membership, social part-
ners in the new Member States are
now eligible to apply for grants from
these budget headings. These budget
headings are intended to finance spe-
cific projects, and cannot therefore
finance operational expenditure.
Nevertheless, the projects they fund
can be useful for activities such as
training and awareness-raising meas-
ures, which are also an important
aspect of capacity-building.
At the cross-industry social partners’
Bratislava Conference in March 2001,
the social partners called for enlarged
meetings of the cross-industry Social
Dialogue Committee. The Com-
mission responded by organising
enlarged meetings in January 2002
and January 2003. Following the signa-
ture of the accession treaties in April
2003, candidate country social part-
ner representatives have been enti-
tled to participate as observers in the
Social Dialogue Committee, as well as
in the sectoral social dialogue com-
mittees, in the run-up to enlargement.
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TABLE 3.6: TIMETABLE FOR THE PHARE TWINNING PROJECTS ON SOCIAL DIALOGUE
CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
No of projects related to SD 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Project start date 2001 2001 2001
*
2001 2002 2001 2000
2001
2001
Project end date 2002 2003 2004 2003 2003 2002 2001
2003
2002-03
* A new project was submitted in 2003, about which no information is available.
The Commission has also sought to
improve knowledge and awareness of
industrial relations in the new
Member States through various publi-
cations, including a special European
social dialogue newsletter in 2000
devoted to this subject and its
Industrial relations in Europe reports.
The European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions is also undertaking a great
deal of work on increasing knowledge
of industrial relations in these coun-
tries. Finally, the Commission has pro-
vided grants to projects resulting in
publications aimed at improving
knowledge on industrial relations in
the new Member States (e.g. by the
ILO, academic institutions, etc.).
Finally, building on the social partners’
1999 Warsaw Conference and their
2001 Bratislava conference (103), in
January 2004 the Commission organ-
ised a large-scale conference on the
social dialogue in an enlarged Europe,
involving some 250 participants,
including 180 social partner represen-
tatives from the EU and the acceding
countries in Ljubljana.The aim of the
conference was to highlight the
important role of social dialogue as an
instrument of social policy in the run-
up to enlargement.
The conference stressed the follow-
ing elements:
• the importance of strong social
dialogue to achieving the Lisbon
objectives and reconciling eco-
nomic performance and social
progress;
• the need to strike the right bal-
ance between bipartite and tripar-
tite social dialogue;
• the need for autonomous, well-
structured and representative
social partner organisations which
are capable of taking part in the
European social dialogue;
• the need to expand the subjects
discussed in the social dialogue
committees in order to take
account of the specific interests of
the new Member States;
• the need to step up exchanges and
initiatives aimed at strengthening
links between social partners in EU-
15 and new Member States.
A report of the conference proceed-
ings will be published in 2004.
n 5. European social 
dialogue as a form of
better governance: 
the trend towards 
‘new generation’
texts
As explained earlier in the chapter, a
new trend has been emerging in
recent years towards the adoption of
more ambitious texts by the social
partners. This section discusses and
seeks to clarify certain aspects of
these new instruments.
The trend towards the adoption of
more ambitious texts by the social
partners is demonstrated firstly by
their success in negotiating several
framework agreements which have
been implemented by Council direc-
tives, making them binding and appli-
cable to all concerned workers.At the
cross-industry level this includes the
agreements on parental leave (1995),
part-time work (1997) and fixed-term
work (1999) negotiated by UNICE/
UEAPME,CEEP and the ETUC.At the
sectoral level this includes the two
framework agreements on working
time negotiated by the sea transport
(1998) and civil aviation (2000) sec-
tors. In addition, the European social
partners in the railway sector have
jointly requested that their agreement
on certain aspects of the working
conditions of railway mobile workers
assigned to interoperable cross-bor-
der services be implemented by
Council decision (2004).
Another illustration of this new trend
is the increasing adoption by the
social partners of ‘new generation’
texts which make recommendations
to their members and which they
undertake to follow up themselves,
rather than relying on the EU institu-
tions and Member States. At the
cross-industry level this includes the
Framework of actions on the lifelong
development of competencies and quali-
fications, adopted in February 2002,
the Framework agreement on telework,
adopted in July 2002, and the
Framework agreement on work-related
stress, adopted in October 2004.
At the sectoral level, examples
include: the codes of conduct in the
textile/clothing (1997), tanning/leather
(2000) and footwear sectors (1996,
2000); the agreement on the improve-
ment of paid employment in agricul-
ture (1997); the telework guidelines in
the telecommunications sector
(2001); the agreement on vocational
training in agriculture (2002); the
sugar sector’s code of conduct on
CSR (2003); the commerce sector’s
joint statement on CSR (2003); and
the railway sector’s Article 139 agree-
ment on the European licence for
drivers carrying out a cross-border
interoperability service (2004).
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(103 )The Warsaw Conference held in March 1999 was the first conference on the role of the social partners in the enlargement
process. It was organised at the joint request of the social partners with Commission support. It constituted a decisive point of
departure for the social dialogue in the candidate countries, following which the social partners launched numerous initiatives
both jointly and individually. The Bratislava Conference of March 2001 provided a follow-up to the Warsaw Conference and
assembled social partners from the EU and the 13 candidate countries. The aim was to present and discuss the main results of a
joint study, Social dialogue and consultation in the candidate countries, status and prospects, which took stock of the consultation
and social dialogue systems and practices in the candidate countries. The concluding statement which was adopted made sugges-
tions for practical action. For more information, see European social dialogue newsletter — special edition of September 2000 —
‘Preparing for enlargement’, http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/enlargement/socialdialogue_front_en.htm
The adoption of these texts means
that new territory is being entered at
the European level and more can be
expected in the future. Indeed, the
cross-industry social partners’ joint
work programme for 2003–05 refers
to a further voluntary agreement
(harassment), framework of action
(gender equality), and other non-
binding instruments.
The Commission has welcomed this
new willingness among the social
partners to assume greater respon-
sibility for following up their texts,
stating in its June 2002 communica-
tion that,‘as a rule, negotiation is the
most appropriate means for settling
questions related to work organisa-
tion and employment relations at
both multisectoral and sectoral
level’ (104). However, the Commission
has also stressed that special consid-
eration should be given to the ques-
tion of how to implement the texts
adopted by the European social
partners. In its 2004 communication
on the social dialogue, the
Commission stresses the impor-
tance of structured reporting with
regard to all new generation texts,
urging the social partners to system-
atically include detailed follow-up
and reporting provisions in such
texts and proposing support of vari-
ous kinds.
5.1. A large variety of titles and
follow-up provisions
At present the new generation texts
are characterised by considerable
diversity with regard to their titles,
their format and the degree of pre-
cision of the follow-up provisions.
The diversity of titles is a reflection
of the rather loose terminology cur-
rently employed by the social part-
ners, a difficulty identified by the
Commission in its June 2002 and
August 2004 communications.
This diversity is demonstrated by
the different approaches of two sec-
tors — commerce and telecommu-
nications — with regard to the same
topic, namely telework. Both sectors
adopted joint texts on this subject in
2001 addressing similar concerns to
the cross-industry agreement adopt-
ed the following year. Although
broadly similar in terms of content,
the European agreement on guide-
lines on telework in commerce does
not include any specific follow-up
provisions and consists instead of
non-binding guidelines for the indus-
try. In contrast, although the title of
the guidelines for telework in
Europe adopted by the telecommu-
nications social partners suggests
that this is a weaker instrument than
the commerce sector text, the fol-
low-up provisions are in fact more
explicit, recommending implementa-
tion of the guidelines by telecommu-
nications companies by a given date
(end of 2001), albeit on ‘a voluntary
basis and according to each coun-
try’s laws and collective bargaining
practices’, and specifies a date for
monitoring of the adoption of the
guidelines in 2002. Eighteen months
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The question of the representativeness of the organisations con-
sulted under Article 138 is fundamental as it constitutes the basis of
the legitimacy of the social partners for consultation by the
Commission and for their bipartite contractual commitments.As a
consequence, whenever an application to set up a sectoral social
dialogue committee is made, the Commission sends the social part-
ner organisations concerned a questionnaire to enable them to
evaluate the extent to which they meet the criteria for establish-
ment, particularly their capacity to negotiate agreements or their
representativeness which determines the relevance of the social
dialogue. Some 50 European-level organisations are now consulted
in accordance with Article 138 of the EC Treaty, and are listed in the
annex to the communication (COM(2004) 557 final).
In order to define the representativeness of the social partners to
be consulted, the Commission carried out a study in 1993 on the
representativeness of the European cross-industry organisations. In
1997, the Commission decided to update the results of this study
and to examine representativeness at the sectoral level. The
Institute of Labour Sciences at the Catholic University of Louvain-
la-Neuve (UCL) was commissioned to conduct the research and
their network of national experts collect the data on the basis of
questionnaires prepared by the UCL team.The social partners at 
both national and European level are consulted on the validity of the
results.The UCL has conducted studies in more than 20 sectors.
The following sectoral representativeness studies have been carried
out:
1999: construction, commerce, telecommunications, postal services
and textile-clothing sectors.
2000: civil aviation, railways, sea transport, road transport, inland
waterways, banking, insurance.
2001: electricity, hairdressing, local public services, hotel, restau-
rants, cafés, agriculture.
2003: private security, central public services.
2004: cleaning industry, temporary work, culture and media 
(ongoing).
The following monographs have been carried out on social partners
in the candidate countries:
2003: cross-industry social partners, textiles and commerce sectors.
2004: road transport, construction and electricity sectors (ongoing).
The existing studies are available at the webpage of the UCL:
http://www.trav.ucl.ac.be/recherche/dg5-part2.htm.
Box 3.2: Representativeness
 
after adoption of the guidelines, a
questionnaire was sent to all the
companies in the sector, to which the
17 large traditional European opera-
tors responded.The findings indicate a
high level of implementation of the
guidelines.
The range of follow-up provisions
foreseen by the social partners is also
demonstrated by the various sectoral
codes of conduct which have been
adopted.At one end of the spectrum,
the code of conduct on corporate
social responsibility in the European
sugar industry adopted in February
2003 includes very clear follow-up
provisions. It indicates that the social
partners will undertake joint assess-
ments of the implementation of the
code of conduct at European level by
a system of annual reports to be pre-
sented in February of the following
year within the framework of the sec-
toral social dialogue committee at a
meeting specifically devoted to the
subject. It also explains the purpose of
the first report, when it is to be pre-
sented and how the reporting system
will function (February 2004).The first
report has been produced on sched-
ule and fulfils the undertaking made in
the code of conduct.
The three codes of conduct in the
textile/clothing, tanning/leather and
footwear sectors also contain
detailed follow-up provisions. In each
case, the European social partners
indicate the date by which they
undertake to promote and circulate
the codes. The three codes also
explain that the follow-up will take
place within the framework of the
European sectoral social dialogue
committee, that the implementation
of the codes will be evaluated on a
yearly basis, and they indicate the date
by which the first evaluation should
take place. Both the tanning/leather
and footwear codes state that for
credibility, implementation of the
codes has to be controlled in an inde-
pendent fashion.
In contrast, the follow-up and report-
ing provisions in some texts are much
vaguer, with the social partners simply
undertaking to regularly discuss the
follow-up given, or undertaking to fol-
low it up but without giving any indi-
cation as to how often. Some texts
include no follow-up provisions at all.
It should be stressed, however, that
the purpose here is not to suggest
that joint texts with more general
statements concerning follow-up are
necessarily less effective than those
with more precise provisions. Indeed,
it could well be the case that sectors
with relatively vague commitments
end up following up their texts effec-
tively.Equally, experience shows that it
is not because monitoring commit-
ments have been included that they
have necessarily been followed up in
practice. The main intention here is
simply to illustrate the variety of for-
mal implementation and monitoring
provisions which currently exist in the
social partner texts.
5.2. Typology of the results of
European social dialogue
The Commission’s 2004 communi-
cation on social dialogue addresses
the issues outlined above and pro-
poses a typology of European social
dialogue results in order to improve
transparency and assist understand-
ing of the social dialogue outcomes.
This typology identifies four broad
categories of social partner texts,
each of which have sub-categories:
agreements implemented in accor-
dance with Article 139(2); process-
oriented texts; joint opinions and
tools; and procedural texts. It
should, however, be pointed out that
the rather loose use of terminology
by the social partners in the titles of
their texts makes it difficult to 
categorise them and some overlap
categories.
The new generation texts fall within
the categories of ‘autonomous
agreements’ and ‘process-oriented
texts’.
5.2.1. Agreements implemented in
accordance with Article
139(2): minimum standards
The texts in this category establish
minimum standards and entail the
implementation of certain commit-
ments by a given deadline. Article
139(2) makes it clear that two main
types of agreement fall within this cat-
egory, the main difference relating to
the method of implementation fore-
seen.
The first kind of agreements are
implemented at the joint request of
the signatory parties by a Council
decision (in practice so far by Council
directives) on a proposal from the
Commission. This category includes
the three cross-industry framework
agreements on parental leave, part-
time work and fixed-term contracts,
as well as the sea transport and civil
aviation sector agreements on work-
ing time, and the railway sector
agreement on the working conditions
of mobile workers assigned to cross-
border interoperable services. The
three cross-industry framework
agreements were negotiated as a
result of a Commission consultation
under Article 138, whereas the sec-
toral agreements make use of the
space left to the social partners by a
directive (105) to adapt the Community
provisions to the specific needs of the
sector.
In most Member States these agree-
ments have been implemented either
by revising or introducing new legisla-
tion. The responsibility for ensuring
that these agreements are transposed
and implemented lies with the
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(105 ) In this instance Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ L 307, 13.12.1993).
Member States, even in cases where
the provisions are implemented
through collective bargaining by the
social partners. As a legislative act
adopted by the Council is required to
ensure the implementation of agree-
ments in this category, they can only
fall within the areas in which the
Community institutions have compe-
tence to act and which are listed in
Article 137 of the EC Treaty.
Responsibility for monitoring these
agreements lies with the Commission,
although the social partners are sys-
tematically consulted on the imple-
mentation reports.The Commission’s
June 2002 communication states that
‘the Commission believes that the
social partners who triggered the reg-
ulatory text hold special responsibility
for its implementation’ and that
Member States should associate the
social partners in the transposal at
national level of Community texts
that result from negotiated agree-
ments.
The ETUC’s European Trade Union
Institute (ETUI) has already produced
its own monitoring reports on the
parental leave, part-time and fixed-
term work agreements through its
Netlex network of national legal
experts. The agreement on working
time in civil aviation and the agreement
on working conditions in the railway
sector indicate that the social partners
will undertake evaluations of the
implementation of these agreements.
The second category of agreements
(‘autonomous’ agreements (106)) are
implemented via the first implementa-
tion option in Article 139(2), namely
in accordance with ‘the procedures
and practices specific to management
and labour and the Member States’.
This means that it is the social part-
ners themselves who are responsible
for implementing and monitoring
these agreements. The framework
agreement on telework of July 2002 is
the first cross-industry example of
this type of agreement. In October
2004, they adopted their second
agreement of this kind,on work-relat-
ed stress. The question of effective
implementation and monitoring is
particularly important in the case of
agreements of this kind which have
been negotiated subsequent to a
Commission consultation under
Article 138. While respecting the
autonomy of the social partners, the
Commission also has a monitoring
role with regard to this type of agree-
ment to assess the extent to which it
has effectively contributed to the
achievement of the Community’s
objectives.
The agreement on the European
licence for drivers carrying out a
cross-border interoperability service
is a sectoral example of this type of
agreement, but not one triggered by
an Article 138 consultation. This
agreement has provided important
input to the directive proposed by the
Commission.
5.2.2. Process-oriented texts
This category consists of a variety of
joint texts which are implemented in a
more incremental and process-orient-
ed way than agreements. In these texts,
the European social partners make
recommendations of various kinds to
their members for follow-up, and they
should involve regular evaluation of the
progress made towards achieving their
objectives in order to ensure they have
a real impact.
Texts of this kind can be useful in
areas in which legislation at
European level may not be the most
appropriate solution, often because
of the complex and diverse array of
measures already in place in the
Member States, but in which the
social partners may nevertheless
have an interest in working together.
They can also assist the exchange of
good practice and mutual learning.
As the discussion above demon-
strates, there is currently consider-
able variety in the titles employed by
the social partners as well as the
precision of the follow-up provisions
of the texts falling within this second
category.
There are three main types of instru-
ment falling within this category.
Frameworks of action
Frameworks of action consist of the
identification of certain policy priori-
ties towards which the national social
partners undertake to work. These
priorities serve as benchmarks and
the social partners report annually on
the action taken to follow-up these
texts.There is so far one cross-indus-
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Agreements
establishing standards
Article 139(2) of the Treaty
Process-oriented texts
Joint opinions & tools
Agreements implemented by Council decision
Autonomous agreements
Frameworks of action
Joint opinions
Guidelines and codes of conduct
Policy orientations
Declarations
Tools
Procedural texts Rules of procedure
(106 ) The cross-industry social partners have referred to these texts as ‘voluntary agreements’ in their 2003–05 work programme.
try example, namely on lifelong learn-
ing, adopted in February 2002. This
establishes four priorities for imple-
mentation at different levels and annu-
al reports will be drawn up in order
to carry out regular, systematic
assessment of the action taken and
the progress achieved.After the third
annual report, the social partners will
evaluate the impact on both compa-
nies and workers, which can, if neces-
sary, lead to an updating of the prior-
ities identified in March 2006.
Guidelines and codes of conduct
Guidelines and codes of conduct
make recommendations to national
affiliates concerning the establishment
of standards or principles. In some
cases these are intended to serve as
minimum European standards or
principles to be implemented at
national or company level. In other
cases they seek to promote higher
standards than those provided for in
existing legislation.
These texts may be adopted either in
areas where the diversity and com-
plexity of national legal situations and
existing arrangements means that
they may be the most realistic
approach (code of conduct and ethics
for the private security sector), or
alternatively, they may be adopted on
new topics which are relatively unreg-
ulated at national level (guidelines for
telework in telecommunications and
the European agreement on guide-
lines on telework in commerce). Such
texts may in some instances help to
prepare the ground for future
Community legislation.
This category also includes codes of
conduct intended to promote the
implementation in companies’ supply
chains of existing internationally
agreed standards in the area of labour
law established by international con-
ventions (e.g. in the footwear and tan-
ning/leather sectors). The content of
some of these codes of conduct goes
beyond the core ILO conventions.
Policy orientations
This sub-category refers to texts in
which the social partners pursue a
proactive approach to promoting cer-
tain policies among their members.
The texts explain how these will be
promoted (e.g. collection and
exchange of good practice, aware-
ness-raising activities) and how the
social partners undertake to assess
the follow-up given and its impact.
5.2.3. Joint opinions and tools:
Exchange of information
This category consists of social part-
ner texts and tools which contribute
to exchanging information, either
upwards from the social partners to
the European institutions and/or
national public authorities, or down-
wards, by explaining the implications
of EU policies to national members.
The instruments in this category do
not entail any follow-up provisions.
Joint opinions
This category includes the majority of
social partner texts adopted over the
years such as their joint opinions and
joint statements, which are generally
intended to provide input to the
European institutions and/or national
public authorities.These include texts
which respond to a Community con-
sultation (Green and White Papers,
consultation documents, communica-
tions), which adopt a joint position
with regard to a given Community
policy, which explicitly ask the
Commission to adopt a particular
stance, or which ask the Commission
to undertake studies or other actions.
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TABLE 3.7:AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 139(2): MINIMUM STANDARDS
Type of agreement Examples
Agreements implemented by Council decision • framework agreement on parental leave, 1995;
• framework agreement on part-time work, 1997;
Implemented by Council decision, monitored by the Commission • framework agreement on fixed-term work, 1999;
• European agreement on the organisation of working time of
seafarers, 1998.
• European agreement on the organisation of working time of
mobile workers in civil aviation, 2000;
• agreement on certain aspects of the working conditions of
mobile workers assigned to interoperable cross-border servi-
ces (107).
Autonomous agreements implemented by the procedures and • framework agreement on telework, 2002;
practices specific to management and labour and the • agreement on the European licence for drivers carrying 
Member States out a cross-border interoperability service, 2004;
• framework agreement on work-related stress, 2004.
Implementation and monitoring by the social partners
(107 ) Implementation by Council decision requested at the time of writing.
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TABLE 3.8: PROCESS-ORIENTED TEXTS
Type of text Examples (108)
Frameworks of action — working towards common priorities • Framework of actions on the lifelong development of 
competencies and qualifications, 2002.
Follow-up and annual reporting by the social partners
Guidelines, codes of conduct — establishing standards or Establishing new European standards or principles:
principles • recommendation framework agreement on the improvement
of paid employment in agriculture, 1997 (1);
Regular follow-up and reporting by the social partners • agreement on promoting employment in the postal sector in
Europe, 1998;
• guidelines on telework in telecommunications, 2001;
• European agreement on guidelines on telework in commerce,
2001;
• code of conduct — guidelines for European hairdressers, 2001;
• voluntary guidelines supporting age diversity in commerce,
2002;
• joint declaration on lifelong learning in the banking sector,
2002;
• European agreement on vocational training in agriculture, 2002 (1);
• code of conduct on CSR in the European sugar industry, 2003;
• code of conduct and ethics for the private security sector,
2003;
• electricity sector joint declaration on telework, 2003;
• local and regional government joint statement on telework,
2004;
• statement on promoting employment and integration of disa-
bled people in the commerce and distribution sector, 2004;
• guidelines for customer contact centres (telecommunications),
2004.
Promoting and enforcing existing internationally agreed 
standards:
• code of conduct on child labour in the footwear sector, 1996;
• code of conduct for the European textile/clothing sector, 1997;
• agreement on fundamental rights and principles at work, in the
commerce sector, 1999;
• code of conduct in the leather and tanning sector, 2000;
• code of conduct in the footwear sector, 2000;
• code of conduct — a charter for the social partners in the
European woodworking industry, 2002.
Policy orientations — the proactive promotion of policies • joint recommendation on apprenticeship in the sugar sector,
1998;
Regular follow-up and reporting by the social partners • electricity sector joint declaration on equal
opportunities/diversity, 2003;
• orientations for reference in managing change and its social
consequences, 2003 (cross-industry social partners);
• joint statement on CSR in commerce, 2003;
• common recommendations of the European social partners
for the cleaning industry, 2004.
(1) Although these texts are referred to as ‘agreements’, they have been included in this category as their provisions appear to consist 
mainly of recommendations to their members and do not include a date by which implementation of the various objectives must be 
accomplished.
(108 ) Some of these texts do not include detailed provisions on follow-up and reporting, but have been included because they con-
sist of recommendations to their members.
Declarations
This category refers to texts which
are essentially declarations — usually
directed at the social partners them-
selves — outlining future work and
activities which the social partners
intend to undertake (e.g. the organisa-
tion of seminars, round tables, etc.).
Tools
This category refers to the tools
developed by the social partners, such
as guides and manuals, providing prac-
tical advice to employees and compa-
nies on subjects such as vocational
training, health and safety and public
procurement, often with the assis-
tance of Community grants.The social
partners sometimes undertake pro-
motional activities to raise awareness
of their existence. These tools can
make a practical contribution at the
grass-roots level, for example by help-
ing to explain the implications of EU
legislation on certain topics, or help-
ing to exchange knowledge of good
practice.
Procedural texts
This final category consists of texts
which seek to lay down the rules for
the bipartite dialogue between the
parties.This includes the cross-indus-
try social partners’ agreement of 31
October 1991, which made proposals
for the revision of the policy-making
procedures in the EC Treaty in the
social policy field. These proposals
were incorporated virtually verbatim
into the Treaty on EU by the
Intergovernmental Conference of
1991.This category also includes the
social partner texts which determine
the rules of procedure for the sec-
toral social dialogue committees.
5.3. Summing-up
The trend towards the adoption of
more ambitious texts by the social
partners is still a recent phenomenon,
and further developments can be
expected, both in terms of the num-
ber of texts adopted and the clarity of
drafting. In particular, there is a need
for a more consistent use of terminol-
ogy in order to facilitate comprehen-
sion of these texts to those not
directly involved in the social dialogue.
If these texts are to have an optimal
impact, it is also important for them
to include clear and detailed follow-
up provisions, which is not at present
always the case.
The question of the impact of the
European social dialogue is attracting
growing interest, and this is indeed
one of the main issues addressed by
the most recent Commission com-
munication on the social dialogue. It
will be important over the coming
years to examine the follow-up given
in practice by the social partners to
their texts.
n 6.Conclusion: 
The contribution of 
the European social 
dialogue to the 
Europeanisation of 
industrial relations
The European social dialogue is an
important tool for economic and
social modernisation, for anticipating
and managing change, and for achiev-
ing the Lisbon objectives.This chapter
has demonstrated the considerable
activity over the past couple of years
in the European social dialogue, in
particular, the large number of joint
texts adopted by the European social
partners and the large number of
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TABLE 3.9: JOINT OPINIONS AND TOOLS
Type of instrument Examples (109)
Joint opinions • Position on training and continuing training (mines), 2003;
• joint declaration on the European harmonisation of legislation governing the private 
security sector, 2001;
• joint declaration on the objectives of the European directive on private agency work
(temporary work sector), 2001;
• joint opinion of the European social partners in aviation, 2001.
Declarations • Joint declaration on the social partners of the cleaning industry and EU enlargement,
2000;
• joint statement and final report on the study on lifelong learning in the electricity
sector, 2003.
Tools • Selecting best value — a guide for organisations awarding contracts for cleaning ser-
vices (cleaning industry), 2003;
• training kit of basic office cleaning techniques (cleaning industry), 2001;
• European vocational training manual for basic guarding (private security), 2001;
• brochure on tutoring in the construction industry, 2004;
• website of the postal sector social dialogue committee, 2003.
(109) This list is not exhaustive and only provides a few examples.
joint projects undertaken by them
relating to the Lisbon strategy and
preparing for enlargement.The chap-
ter has also explained the qualitative
change in their dialogue: while their
joint texts were previously directed
primarily at the European and nation-
al public authorities, they are increas-
ingly adopting so-called new genera-
tion texts which make recommenda-
tions to their members and which
they seek to follow up themselves.
The European social dialogue is there-
fore now characterised by a greater
variety of instruments. Another
important change is that whereas in
the past, social dialogue at the
European and national levels was
rather disconnected, now there is
greater interaction between the two,
with the European social dialogue
having a greater impact than before
on national social dialogue.This means
that the national social partners now
have a greater need to engage at the
European level, but also that the
impact of the European social dia-
logue will, in the future, largely depend
on the way in which its results are
reintegrated at the national level.
All this activity is contributing to the
Europeanisation of industrial rela-
tions, along the lines identified in
Chapter 1. More specifically, rather
than resulting in convergence — in
other words the vertical or upward
transfer of authority — the European
social dialogue is helping to bring the
European level closer to national or
local discussions and practices, and
national and local actors closer to
each other, while respecting national
and cultural differences. As explained
in Chapter 1, this view of
Europeanisation is a horizontal one,
implying better coordination across
national borders, which can be more
easily reconciled with the overall
trend towards decentralisation in
industrial relations.
In concrete terms, by helping to bring
together social partners from differ-
ent countries, the European social dia-
logue helps to promote mutual learn-
ing among the actors, both with
regard to understanding better the
perspectives of their counterparts on
the other side of industry, but also by
increasing their understanding of dif-
ferent national traditions and cultures
and what happens beyond their bor-
ders. Over time, the social partners at
different levels and on both sides of
industry have come to realise the
benefits of being involved in this
process of Europeanisation, in partic-
ular the benefits of exchanging best
practice and learning from other
national experiences.The new gener-
ation texts, by involving the national
social partners more directly in the
follow-up of their texts, should inten-
sify this process further by implicating
the social partners at different levels
more intensely in joint cooperation.
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Text Implementation and monitoring provisions Implementation
Agreements establishing minimum standards implemented by Council decision
Framework agreement on
parental leave, 14
December 1995
The ETUC, UNICE and CEEP request the Commission to submit this frame-
work agreement to the Council for a decision making these requirements bin-
ding in the Member States of the European Community with the exception
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Council Directive
96/34/EC of 3 June 1996
Commission implementa-
tion report published in
June 2003
Framework agreement on
part-time work, 6 June
1997
The ETUC, UNICE and CEEP request the Commission to submit this frame-
work agreement to the Council for a decision making these requirements bin-
ding in the Member States which are party to the agreement on social policy
annexed to the protocol on social policy annexed to the Treaty establishing the
European Community.
Council Directive
97/81/EC of 15
December 1997
Commission implementa-
tion report published in
February 2003
Framework agreement on
fixed-term work, 18 March
1999
The ETUC, UNICE and CEEP request the Commission to submit this
Framework agreement to the Council for a decision making these require-
ments binding in the Member States which are party to the agreement on
social policy annexed to the Protocol (No 14) on social policy annexed to the
Treaty establishing the European Community.
Council Directive
1999/70/EC of 28 June
1999
Commission implementa-
tion report due in spring
2004
European agreement on
the organisation of wor-
king time of seafarers,
30 September 1998
… Whereas Article 4(2) of the agreement on social policy provides that
agreements concluded at European level may be implemented at the joint
request of the signatory parties by a Council decision on a proposal from the
Commission …
Council Directive
1999/63/EC
21 June 1999
Implementation by
30.6.2002. No monitoring
foreseen so far by the
social partners.
European agreement on
the organisation of wor-
king time of mobile wor-
kers in civil aviation, 22
March 2000
… Having regard to the fact that Article 139(2) of the Treaty provides that
agreements concluded at European level may be implemented at the joint
request of the signatory parties by a Council decision on a proposal from the
Commission,
Having regard to the fact that the signatory parties hereby make such a
request
The parties shall review the above provisions two years after the end of the
implementation period laid down in the Council decision putting this agree-
ment into effect.
Council Directive
2000/79/EC
27 November 2000
Implementation by
1.12.2003. Social partners’
evaluation end 2005/begin-
ning 2006.
European agreement on
certain aspects of the
working conditions of rail-
way mobile workers assi-
gned to interoperable
cross-border services, 27
January 2004
Having regard to:
the fact that Article 139(2) of the Treaty provides that agreements concluded
at European level may be implemented at the joint request of the signatory
parties by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission,
the fact that the signatory parties hereby make such a request.
Follow-up of the agreement:
The signatory parties will follow the implementation and application of the
agreement in the framework of the Sectoral Dialogue Committee set in accor-
dance with Commission Decision 98/500/EC.
Evaluation:
The parties shall evaluate the above provisions two years after the signature
of the present agreement in the light of the first experiences of development
of interoperable cross-border services.
Revision:
The parties shall review the above provisions two years after the end of the
implementation period laid down in the Council decision putting this agree-
ment into effect.
Adoption of a Council
directive foreseen
TABLE 3.10: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 139(2) AGREEMENTS
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Autonomous agreements establishing minimum standards implemented by national procedures and practices
Framework agreement on
telework, 16 July 2002
Implementation and follow-up:
In the context of Article 139 of the Treaty, this European framework agree-
ment shall be implemented by the members of UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP and
ETUC (and the liaison committee Eurocadres/CEC) in accordance with the
procedures and practices specific to management and labour in the Member
States. This implementation will be carried out within three years after the
date of signature of this agreement. Member organisations will report on the
implementation of this agreement to an ad hoc group set up by the signatory
parties, under the responsibility of the social dialogue committee.This ad hoc
group will prepare a joint report on the actions of implementation taken.This
report will be prepared within four years after the date of signature of this
agreement.
National members of
the signatory organisa-
tions
Agreement on the
European licence for dri-
vers carrying out a cross-
border interoperability
service, 27 January 2004
The agreement shall be implemented by the CER-affiliated companies pen-
ding a European directive. For the part covering the scope of this agreement,
both parties want the directive to be written on the basis of this agreement.
The text formalises existing and often comparable practices implemented by
several railway companies and constitutes a framework for the new interope-
rability practices. If a new European directive covers certain points set out in
this agreement, the new directive will be applied.
Follow-up of the agreement:
A committee composed of representatives of all parties having taken part in
drawing up the agreement shall meet every six months, during the first two
years, under the auspices of the Committee on Social Dialogue, to discuss pro-
blems linked to the implementation of this agreement and shall examine the
main experiences of the interoperable services.
CER-affiliated compa-
nies
Framework agreement on
work-related stress,
October 2004
Implementation and follow-up:
In the context of Article 139 of the Treaty, this voluntary European framework
agreement commits the members of UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC (and
the liaison committee Eurocadres/CEC) to implement it in accordance with
the procedures and practices specific to management and labour in the
Member States and in the countries of the European Economic Area.
The signatory parties also invite their member organisations in candidate
countries to implement this agreement.
The implementation of this agreement will be carried out within three years
after the date of signature of this agreement.
Member organisations will report on the implementation of this agreement
to the Social Dialogue Committee. During the first three years after the date
of signature of this agreement, the Social Dialogue Committee will prepare a
yearly table summarising the ongoing implementation of the agreement.A full
report on the implementation actions taken will be prepared by the Social
Dialogue Committee during the fourth year.
National members of
the signatory organisa-
tions
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Text Follow-up provisions
Guidelines, codes of conduct — establishing new European standards or principles
Recommendation frame-
work agreement on the
improvement of paid
employment in agriculture
in the Member States of
the European Union, 24
July 1997
The signatory parties agree to take concerted action to implement measures to improve the employment situa-
tion in the agricultural and rural sector in the European Union.
The signatory parties recommend, having regard to national practices and circumstances, the national and/or
regional and/or provincial professional and trade union organisations representing employers and workers in the
agricultural sector in the Member States of the European Union to develop negotiations of collective agreements
on improving paid employment in agriculture, including its working conditions, on the basis of this text.
In particular, the signatory parties recommend that, at the time of negotiations conducted at national and/or
regional and/or provincial level, they lead to the conclusion of agreements on the adaptation of working time on
the basis of the minimum provisions proposed below.
Provisions relating to the implementation of this recommendation framework agreement:
Given the changing economic background to this recommendation framework agreement, the signatory parties
ask the Joint Committee on Social Problems affecting Agricultural Workers in the European Union to examine the
situation in the Member States in the various areas affected by this text every two years from the standpoint of
both national legislation and applicable collective agreements.
Agreement between the
trade unions and the
employers in the postal
sector in Europe — pro-
moting employment in the
postal sector in Europe,
29 October 1998
The postal employers, management and trade unions represented in the Joint Committee on Postal Services …
conclude a framework agreement for the promotion of employment in the postal sector, in order to implement
at the national level on the basis of the following provisions …
Every year Communications International, Eurofedop and the postal employers, who have signed this agreement,
will review this agreement in order to further develop the progressive nature of the philosophy contained herein.
… The results and conclusion of this process will be published and distributed as a report of the Joint Committee
on Postal Services.
This framework agreement will be effective as of 1 June 1998.
Guidelines for telework in
Europe in telecommunica-
tions, 7 February 2001
The Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee recommends these guidelines for adoption by the end of 2001, on a
voluntary basis and according to each country’s laws and collective bargaining practices.
The SDC agrees to monitor the adoption of these guidelines in 2002.
European framework
agreement on guidelines
on telework in commerce,
26 April 2001
Social partners for commerce in different Member States of the European Union have chosen or may choose to
regulate telework in various ways, through particular agreements on appropriate levels or through integrating tele-
work issues in existing collective agreements or recommendations.Whatever approach is selected, the following
guidelines are recommended when introducing and implementing telework.
Code of conduct — gui-
delines for European hair-
dressers — ‘How to get
along code’, 26 June 2001
The guidelines set out below are recommendations jointly addressed by UNI-Europa and CIC Europe to the
employers and the employees active in the hairdressing sector, as well as to the national organisations that repre-
sent them. These guidelines lay down standards for behaviour for the activities in the hairdressers’ sector.
Consequently, UNI-Europa and CIC Europe strongly recommend that their constituents live up to these guidelines
and implement them in their daily practice.
UNI Europa and CIC Europe will follow up the code in the framework of the European sectoral social dialogue.
Voluntary guidelines sup-
porting age diversity in
commerce, 11 March 2002
… Eurocommerce and Uni-Europa agree that the following guidelines are recommended for the benefit both of
enterprises and employees when approaching the age aspects of human resources management.
… Eurocommerce and Uni-Europa are committed to improving the employment and employability of all workers,
and in this way are helping to support European Community policies in this area.They will continue to explore
measures aimed at giving ageing workers the possibility to remain in active working life.
Joint declaration on life-
long learning in the ban-
king sector, 2002
Bank social partners should consider the following principles, rights and responsibilities …
Frameworks of action — working towards common priorities
Framework of actions for
the lifelong development
of competencies and quali-
fications, March 2002
Actions and follow-up:
The member organisations of UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC will promote this framework in Member States
at all appropriate levels taking account of national practices. Meetings can be organised at national level for pre-
sentation of this document. Given the interest of the matter under consideration, the social partners also decide
to transmit this document to all interested players at European and national levels.The social partners will draw
up an annual report on the national actions carried out on the four priorities identified.After three annual reports,
the social partners will evaluate the impact on both companies and workers. This evaluation can lead to an
update of the priorities identified.The ad hoc group on education and training will be entrusted with this evalua-
tion, which will be presented in March 2006.
TABLE 3.11: THE FOLLOW-UP PROVISIONS OF PROCESS-ORIENTED TEXTS
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European agreement on
vocational training in agri-
culture, 5 December 2002
Subject and field of application:
The present European agreement,concluded in accordance with the provisions of Article 139 of the Treaty, is intended to pro-
pose to national organisations representing agricultural employers and employees, the authorities in the Member States and
the Commission a number of initiatives relating to vocational training for agricultural workers.
Implementation of this agreement:
In accordance with the provisions of the first part of Article 139(2) of the Treaty, implementation of this agree-
ment shall be in accordance with the procedures and practices proper to the social partners at national level and
to the Member States.To ensure this implementation, the signatory organisations propose that the national social
partners work jointly and, if necessary, in cooperation with the competent State authorities.
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the signatory organisations shall set up a follow-up commis-
sion within the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in Agriculture.This commission will circulate to the national
social partners documents relating to the organisation of vocational training in the different Member States and
will be available to advise them about how to achieve practically the objectives set out in this agreement. An
assessment of the implementation of this agreement will be drawn up in three years.
Text Follow-up provisions
Code of conduct on CSR
and the European sugar
industry, 7 February 2003
Monitoring, assessment, updating:
The EFFAT and the CEFS will, within the context of their Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee, ensure the monito-
ring of the progressive implementation of this code of conduct and the regular updating of the examples of good
practice.
To this effect the EFFAT and the CEFS will conduct a joint assessment of the implementation of the code of
conduct at European level, in the form of an annual report covering the calendar year and to be presented in
February of the following year, within the framework of the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee, at a meeting spe-
cifically devoted to this subject.
This annual report will be prepared on the basis of data collected by the European social partners.To this effect,
every year the EFFAT and the CEFS will designate an ad hoc group which will be responsible for the process of
collecting, preparing and presenting these data and including two Sectoral Committee members from each orga-
nisation.
This code of conduct will come into effect on 1 January 2004.The year preceding this date will be devoted to
prepare for its implementation.The first report, to be presented in February 2004, will take stock of the activities
undertaken so far and the monitoring structures jointly arranged at European level to ensure adequate commu-
nication, promotion and training on the CSR code of conduct.The examples of good practice will also be updated
as needed.
CoESS and UNI-Europa
code of conduct and
ethics for the private
security sector, 18 July
2003
Implementation and follow-up of the code of conduct:
CoESS and UNI-Europa believe that the social partners of each company have a particularly important role to
play in the implementation of this code.
CoESS and UNI-Europa wish to place emphasis on the need for companies and employees to incorporate the
principles of this code in their activities.They also emphasise the need for national employer and trade union orga-
nisations to promote this code’s application to the greatest extent possible.
CoESS and UNI-Europa undertake, on a regular basis, to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this code
within their social dialogue.To this end, it is critical that monitoring and preliminary evaluations take place both
at company level and at national level.
Eurelectric-EPSU-EMCEF
joint declaration on tele-
work, 2003
EPSU/EMCEF and Eurelectric call upon their affiliated member organisations to implement the inter-sectoral
agreement in accordance with the national procedures and practices specific to management and labour as refer-
red to in the agreement before 16 July 2005.
EPSU/EMCEF and Eurelectric will monitor the implementation of the agreement in the electricity sector through
the sectoral social dialogue committee.
CEMR-EP / EPSU joint sta-
tement on telework,
13 January 2004
EPSU and CEMR-EP will encourage their members to use the agreement when discussing the introduction or
management of telework, devising policies or concluding agreements on telework in the local and regional govern-
ment sector, in accordance with the national procedures and practices specific to management and labour. CEMR-
EP and EPSU will monitor developments and undertake a first assessment in 2005.
UNI-Europa Commerce
and Eurocommerce state-
ment on promoting
employment and integra-
tion of disabled people in
the European commerce
and distribution sector, 28
May 2004
Implementation:
Promoting employment and integration of disabled people in European commerce and distribution will remain as
a subject for the European social dialogue for commerce.To follow up on this statement, the European social part-
ners call on their affiliated employers’ organisations and trade unions to:
•  convene round table discussions to provide European social partners with feedback on best practice 
approaches;
• collect and disseminate good practices on support for the employment and integration of disabled people in
working life;
•  include the promotion of the integration of disabled people into social dialogue;
•  present this statement to European works councils, where they exist and encourage a discussion;
•  monitor developments related to this statement on a continuous basis.
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Text Follow-up provisions
Guidelines, codes of conduct — promoting and enforcing existing internationally agreed standards
Child labour — a charter
by European social part-
ners in the footwear sec-
tor, 7 March 1995 updated
13 December 1996
The social partners will further see that the present charter be implemented separately as well as jointly through
a social sectoral dialogue at all levels.
The CEC, the ETUC/TCL and their respective national affiliated federations shall circulate this charter in all rele-
vant languages, particularly in companies represented by the above organisations, further recommending that
these companies include this charter in the terms of purchase with their subcontractors and suppliers.
The CEC and the ETUC/TCL agree to carry out an assessment of the charter’s implementation as part of the
social dialogue at European level, at the latest one year following the signing of the agreement …
Code of conduct — a
charter by social partners
in the European
textile/clothing sector (July
1997)
Circulation and promotion:
Euratex and the ETUF/TCL commit to promote and circulate this charter in the relevant languages and at all
levels by 31 December 1997 at the latest.
Euratex and the ETUF/TCL call on their respective member organisations to adopt this charter and to encourage
its progressive implementation at companies’ level.
Follow-up and assessment:
Euratex and the ETUF/TCL agree to follow up, in the framework of the social sectoral dialogue at European level,
the progressive accomplishment of the implementation of this charter.
To that effect Euratex and the ETUF/TCL will conduct a yearly evaluation of the charter’s implementation, the
first evaluation will take place no later than 10 July 1998.The results of such an evaluation will be reported on
in the framework of the social sectoral dialogue.
Eurocommerce and Euro-
Fiet: agreement on funda-
mental rights and princi-
ples at work, 6 August
1999
Eurocommerce and Euro-FIET recommend to their members to actively encourage companies and workers of the
European commerce sector to comply, whenever possible, with the following fundamental rights, embodied in ILO
conventions, including developing their own codes of conduct for their business relations with third countries …
Promotion and dissemination:
Eurocommerce and Euro-FIET shall promote and disseminate this joint statement.
Eurocommerce and Euro-FIET recommend to their respective member organisations to endorse this joint state-
ment and to encourage its implementation.
Implementation and assessment:
Eurocommerce and Euro-FIET will regularly discuss the implementation of this joint statement. On the basis of
the discussion on its implementation, the parties will, in the framework of their European social dialogue, evaluate
the implementation and, if necessary, make recommendations or undertake any relevant actions.’
The Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee recommends these guidelines for adoption by the end of 2001, on a
voluntary basis and according to each country’s laws and collective bargaining practices.
The SDC agrees to monitor the adoption of these guidelines in 2002.
Code of conduct in the
leather and tanning sector,
10 July 2000
Cotance and ETUF/TCL call on their members to actively encourage companies and workers of the European lea-
ther and tanning sector to respect and to include, directly or indirectly (including sub-contracting) in their possi-
ble codes of conduct in all countries, worldwide, in which they operate the following ILO conventions …
Circulation, promotion and implementation:
Cotance and the ETUC/TCL commit themselves to promote and to circulate the code in the relevant languages
at all levels, by 31 December 2000, at the latest.
Cotance and the ETUF/TCL call on their respective members … to adopt this code and to encourage its progres-
sive implementation at company level.
Cotance and the ETUF/TCL will call on their member organisations to integrate the code as a prerequisite in all
contracts with their sub-contractors and their suppliers. Cotance and the ETUF/TCL will thus encourage the com-
panies to make sure that the code is understood by their sub-contractors/suppliers and their respective workers.
Follow-up, assessment and redress mechanisms:
Cotance and the ETUF/TCL agree to follow up, in the framework of the social sectoral dialogue at European level,
the progressive accomplishment of the implementation of the present code of conduct.
To that effect, Cotance and the ETUF/TCL will conduct at least a yearly evaluation of the implementation of the
present code, the first taking place no later than 30 June 2001. …
Cotance and the ETUF/TCL agree that the implementation of the results of the code have to be controlled in an
independent fashion, guaranteeing the credibility of the control to all interested parties.
UNI-Europa and ETNO
guidelines for customer
contact centres, June 2004
These guidelines are a set of broad principles relating to the customer contact business.The aim of the guideli-
nes is to set a high business standard and recognise those customer contact centres that are committed to the
key principles embodied in that standard.We are convinced that those that commit to the guidelines will be the
leaders in the field and as such will be attractive to business partners, potential employees, employment agen-
cies, the community and their customers. Our objective is to encourage all employers operating customer contact
centres to commit to these guidelines.
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Code of conduct — a
charter for the social
partners in the footwear
sector, 17 November 2000
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL call on their members to actively encourage companies and workers of the European
footwear sector to comply with the following ILO conventions ….
Circulation, promotion and implementation:
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL commit to promote and to circulate the code in the relevant languages and at all
levels by … at the latest.
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL shall call on their respective member organisations to adopt this code and to encou-
rage its gradual implementation at company level.
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL shall organise, if needed, training and awareness programmes.
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL shall call on their member organisations and companies to include this code as a
prerequisite into all contracts with suppliers or sub-contractors.The CEC and the ETUF:TCL shall encourage com-
panies to ensure that the code is understood by the said suppliers/sub-contractors and by their respective wor-
kers.’
Follow-up, assessment and appeal mechanisms:
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL agree to follow up, in the framework of the sectoral social dialogue at European
level, the gradual fulfilment of the implementation of this code of conduct. In case of complaints, it is asked for a
communication to be addressed to one of the social partners, specifying the nature of the complaints; a discus-
sion will follow in the framework of the European social dialogue.
To this effect, the CEC and the ETUF/TCL will conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the present code,
at least once a year in the framework of the European social dialogue; the first evaluation will take place no later
than 17 November 2001. …
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL agree that, in case of control, the implementation of the results of the code will have
to be monitored by institutes or organisms that are recognised and active on a worldwide level and that are inde-
pendent of industry and of trade unions, hence guaranteeing the credibility of the control to all interested parties.
The selection of such institutes or organisms will be decided upon in common agreement between the CEC and
the ETUF/TCL.
The CEC and the ETUF/TCL can decide, jointly and freely, to consider, in the framework of the European secto-
ral social dialogue, any new initiative that might be carried out as an extension of the code’s implementation.
Text Follow-up provisions
Code of conduct — a
charter for the social
partners in the European
woodworking industry, 20
March 2002
CEI-BOIS and EFBWW call upon their members actively to encourage the enterprises and workers in the
European woodworking industry to observe the following ILO conventions ….
Dissemination and promotion:
CEI-BOIS and EFBWW have undertaken to disseminate this charter in the appropriate languages at every level
by 30 June 2002.
CEI-BOIS and the EFBWW will call upon their respective member organisations to adopt this charter and encou-
rage its progressive application at enterprise level.
Follow-up and evaluation:
CEI-BOIS and the EFBWW have agreed, under the sectoral social dialogue, to monitor the progress made in
implementing this charter.
To this end, CEI-BOIS and the EFBWW will carry out an annual evaluation of the charter’s implementation, for
the first time on 30 June 2003 at latest.The findings of this evaluation will be reported in the sectoral social dia-
logue.They will be able to request any technical assistance required for this purpose from the Commission and
the Member States.
CEI-BOIS and the EFBWW, in the context of the European sectoral social dialogue, may decide jointly and freely
to take any other initiative in connection with implementation of this charter.
Policy orientations: the proactive promotion of policies
Joint recommendation on
apprenticeship in the sugar
sector, 1998
… the European social partners in the sugar sector recommend to sugar companies:
• to maintain the already considerable effort undertaken by some of them in the field of apprenticeship — or
any other training process for young people — in terms of number and the quality of the training;
• whenever economically and socially feasible, to make a significant effort to offer young people more training
periods and places as apprentices in order to improve their skills on the labour market.
Every year, the European social partners conduct a review of the measures implemented and the results 
achieved.
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Text Follow-up provisions
Electricity sector joint
declaration on equal
opportunities/diversity,
2003
… ESPU/EMCEF and Eurelectric recommend that the social partners at the appropriate level assign a high prio-
rity to the issues raised in this declaration.
… collective agreements and other initiatives could be some of the instruments in this regard. Such considera-
tions include the development of tools and methods necessary to reach equality.
2003 actions
• EPSU/EMCEF and Eurelectric have decided to continue to work on addressing the issues raised in this state-
ment. A study into diversity issues will be undertaken in 2003.
• The social partners will work together to contribute to redress any gender pay gap.
• EPSU/EMCEF and Eurelectric further recommend that the statement is taken as a basis for measures to
address equality, diversity and ageing challenges at national and company level.
Future evaluations are recommended.
Orientations for reference
in managing change and its
social consequences
(cross-industry social
partners), 2003
The orientations drawn up by the social partners are based on the lessons learnt from these 10 case studies and
are intended to be disseminated to all the actors concerned.
Joint statement on corpo-
rate social responsibility in
the commerce sector,
November 2003
Monitoring and assessment:
To follow-up on this joint statement the European social partners will endeavour to:
•  convene round table discussions, exploring concrete measures to promote corporate social responsibility;
•  collect and disseminate good practices;
•  ensure monitoring of the follow-up of the European social dialogue for commerce related to corporate social
responsibility;
To monitor and assess on a regular basis the follow-up to this statement.
Common recommenda-
tions of the European
social partners for the
cleaning industry, March
2004
Why common recommendations?
The EFCI and UNI-Europa … would like to achieve the following aims through this document::
• to formalise a series of fundamental principles which have guided their work for over 10 years of European
social dialogue;
• give a political framework to their future activities;
• address a series of recommendations to cleaning companies, their employees, as well as to their clients (public
and private) and to public authorities (European, national and local).
Implementation and follow up
This document is not an end in itself, but aims to provide a framework for a sustainable and harmonious deve-
lopment of the profession. Its adoption by the EFCI and UNI-Europa is a mark of their goodwill and that of their
respective members, to integrate the objectives and the principles it contains in their future initiatives and to
ensure their promotion amongst all those concerned, including those from outside the profession.
Most of the common recommendations are primarily aimed at cleaning companies, their personnel as well as
the social partners of the sector, at national and European level. However, the realisation of the general objecti-
ves that it sets and the sustainable development of the profession also rely on the development of initiatives aimed
at reinforcing the cooperation with public authorities (national and European) as well as to raise the awareness
of purchasers of services (public as well as private) to the realities of the profession.
The first step of implementing these common recommendations is the adoption of a European Social Dialogue
Committee work programme which proposes a more concrete framework of actions and initiatives which fully
integrates the principles and objectives they set.
Lastly, the EFCI and UNI-Europa consider these common recommendations as a dynamic document and intend
to evaluate, at regular intervals, the appropriateness of the principles and objectives that they pose in light of the
realities of the profession and its developments.
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1985 — The launch of the bipartite dialogue, initiated and supported by the Commission, and traditionally known as the ‘Val Duchesse’
process, after the place where the first meeting was held.The social partners begin to adopt non-binding joint opinions.
1991 — Against the background of the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference, the social partners negotiate the agreement of 31 October
1991, proposing reforms to the Treaty decision-making provisions in the social policy field.The social partners’ proposals are incorporated
virtually verbatim into the protocol on social policy annexed to the Treaty on EU.
1993 — Commission communication concerning the application of the agreement on social policy (COM(1993) 600 final) clarifies cer-
tain aspects of the new social policy provisions.
1994 — The Treaty on EU enters into force.
1995 — Successful negotiation of the parental leave agreement, the first Article 139 framework agreement implemented by Council directive.
1996 — Commission communication concerning the development of the social dialogue at Community level (COM(1996) 448 final).
1997 — Successful negotiation of the second framework agreement implemented by directive — on part-time work.
1997 — The provisions of the protocol on social policy are incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty as Articles 138 and 139.
1998 — Commission communication on adapting and promoting the social dialogue at Community level (COM(1998) 322 final) defines
the criteria for the establishment, composition and operation of sectoral social dialogue committees and constitutes a new departure for
the development of sectoral social dialogue at European level.These new committees replaced the previously existing joint committees
(for example, on sea transport, civil aviation, inland waterways, road transport, railways, telecommunications services, social problems of
agricultural workers, social problems in sea fishing and postal services).
1999 — Successful negotiation of the third framework agreement implemented by directive — on fixed-term work.
2000
March — At the Lisbon Summit of the European Council, Heads of State and Government set out a 10-year strategy for the economic
and social development of the EU.The common vision requires an integrated approach across a range of economic, social and environ-
mental policy areas, in order to achieve sustainable economic growth, more and better jobs, with greater social cohesion.The successful
implementation of the Lisbon strategy requires the active involvement of the social partners.
December — Adoption of the social policy agenda, COM(2000) 379 final, the Commission’s five-year roadmap in the social policy field,
which underlines the importance of social dialogue as a productive factor promoting competitiveness. Promotion of the notions of qual-
ity of work, quality of social policy and the quality of industrial relations.
2001
December — ‘joint contribution’ of the social partners to the Laeken European Council indicating their wish to pursue a more
autonomous dialogue and to draft their own work programme.
2002
February — Presentation by the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the EU of its report to the Commission.
March — Adoption by the cross-industry social partners of the framework of actions on the lifelong development of competencies and
qualifications, the first joint text to be implemented by the open method of coordination.
June — Publication of the Commission communication, ‘The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change’ (COM(2002)
341 final), describing the contribution of the social dialogue to achieving the Lisbon objectives, improving governance and making recom-
mendations for strengthening social dialogue in an enlarged Europe.
July — Adoption of the framework agreement on telework, the first autonomous agreement.
November — Adoption by the European cross-industry social partners of their first joint multi-annual work programme for the period
on 2003–05.
2003
March — First Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment meets.
May — Commission communication, ‘Mid-term review of the social policy agenda’ (COM(2003) 312 final). Promotion of the ‘costs of
non-social policy’ and continuing promotion of the notion of quality, including in industrial relations, stressing the need to develop indica-
tors and increase understanding of different industrial relations practices, particularly in view of enlargement.
2004
August – Adoption of the Commission Communication ‘Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing the contribution of
European social dialogue’ (COM(2004) 557 final). It calls on the social partners to make a concrete contribution to achieving the Lisbon
objectives and proposes ways of enhancing the impact of the results of the European social dialogue.
October – Adoption of the framework agreement on work-related stress, the second autonomous agreement.
Box 3.3: Key stages in the evolution of the European social dialogue
 
106
Chapter 3 Industrial Relations in Europe 2004
Sectors Employees’ organisations Employers’ organisations Date of creation
Agriculture EFFAT GEOPA/COPA 1999
Audiovisual EFJ, EURO-MEI, FIA, FIM ACT,AER, CEPI, EBU, FIAPF 2004
Banking UNI-Europa EACB, ESBG, FBE 1999
Civil aviation ECA, ETF ACI EUROPE,AEA, CANSO, ERA, IACA 2000
Cleaning industry UNI-Europa EFCI 1999
Commerce UNI-Europa Eurocommerce 1999
Construction EFBWW FIEC 1999
Electricity EMCEF, EPSU Eurelectric 2000
Footwear ETUF/TCL CEC 1999
Furniture EFBWW UEA 2001
Horeca EFFAT Hotrec 1999
Inland waterways ETF EBU, ESO 1999
Insurance UNI-Europa ACME, BIPAR, CEA 1999
Live performance EAEA Pearle 1999
Local and regional government EPSU CEMR 2004
Mines EMCEF APEP, Euracoal, Euromines, IMA 2002
Personal services UNI-Europa EU Coiffure 1999
Postal services UNI-Europa PostEurop 1999
Private security UNI-Europa CoESS 1999
Railways ETF CER 1999
Road transport ETF IRU 1999
Sea fishing ETF Europeche/Cogeca 1999
Sea transport ETF ECSA 1999
Shipbuilding EMF CESA 2003
Sugar EFFAT CEFS 1999
Tanning and leather ETUF/TCL Cotance 2001
Telecommunications UNI-Europa ETNO 1999
Temporary work UNI-Europa Euro CIETT 2000
Textile and clothing ETUF/TCL Euratex 1999
Woodworking EFBWW CEI-Bois 2000
TABLE 3.12: THE SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE COMMITTEES
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TABLE 3.13: SOCIAL PARTNER CONSULTATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 138
Date Subject Social partners’ contribution Result
1993 European works councils Opinion following attempt at
negotiations
Council Directive 94/45/EC
Council Directive 97/74/EC of 15 December 1977
extending, to the UK and Northern Ireland, Directive
94/45/EC
1995 Reconciling working life
and family life
Framework agreement on paren-
tal leave (14.12.1995)
Directive 96/34/EC (UK: 97/75/EC)
Implementation deadline: 15.12.1999
1995 Adaptation of the burden
of proof in cases of dis-
crimination based on sex
Separate opinions Directive 97/80/EC (UK: 97/75/EC)
implementation deadline: 1.1.2001
1995 Flexibility in working
time and workers’ secu-
rity
Framework agreement on part-
time work (6.6.1997)
Framework agreement on fixed-
term work (18.3.1999)
Failure of negotiations on tempo-
rary work (May 2001)
Directive 97/81/EC (UK: 98/23/EC)
Implementation deadline: 20.1.2000
Directive 1999/70/EC
Implementation deadline: 10.7.2001
Proposal adopted by the Commission on 20 March
2002. Political agreement yet to be reached in Council
1996 Prevention of sexual
harassment at work
Separate opinions Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation
of the principle of equal treatment for men and women
as regards access to employment, vocational training
and promotion, and working conditions 
1997 Worker information and
consultation
Directive 2002/14/EC
Implementation deadline: 23.3.2005
2000 Protecting workers
against employers’ insol-
vency
Separate opinions Council Directive 2002/74/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council of 23 September 2002
amending Council Directive 80/987/EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States rela-
ting to the protection of employees in the event of the
insolvency of their employer 
2000 Modernising and impro-
ving employment rela-
tions
Framework agreement on tele-
work (July 2002)
Social partners’ agreement to be implemented by
national social partners.
Implementation deadline: 16.7.2005
2000 Protecting workers
against the risks connec-
ted with exposure to
asbestos at work
Separate opinions Common Position (EC) No 53/2002 of 23 September
2002 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with
the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community, with a view to
adopting a directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Council Directive 83/477/EEC
on the protection of workers from the risks related to
exposure to asbestos at work 
2000 Health and safety at
work for the self-
employed
Separate opinions Council recommendation of 18 February 2003 concer-
ning the improvement of the protection of the health
and safety at work of self-employed workers 
2001 Protecting employees’
personal data
On 27 August 2001 the
Commission launched a first
stage consultation of the social
partners
Separate opinions
Second phase of consultation in
progress
2002 Anticipating and mana-
ging change.A dynamic
approach to the social
aspects of corporate
restructuring.
Orientations for reference in
managing change and its social
consequences (October 2003)
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Subject Social partners’ contribution Result
2003 Portability of supple-
mentary pensions
First stage consultation of the
European social partners
(SEC/2002/597 published on
27.5.2002)
Separate opinions
Second stage consultation of the
European social partners adopted
by the Commission on 12.9.2003
No negotiations by the social partners. Commission to
consider whether to propose a directive
2003 Stress and its effects on
health & safety at work
Framework agreement on work-
related stress (October 2004)
Social partners’ agreement to be implemented by
national social partners.
To be implemented within 3 years, plus 1 year for
monitoring.
2004 Extension of the scope
of the directive on carci-
nogenic substances
(90/394/EEC)
First stage of consultation 
April  - July 2004
Second stage of consultation - 2005
In progress
2004 Psychosocial risks,
harassment & violence
at work
First phase of consultation sche-
duled in November 2004
2004 Revision of the working
time directive
First phase of consultation  laun-
ched in December 2003
Second phase of consultation
May-July 2004. Social partners
declined invitation to enter nego-
tiations.
Commission adopted a proposal in September 2004
amending the working time directive.
2004 Revision of the
European works councils
directive
First phase of consultation 
launched in April 2004
In progress
n 1. Introduction
In spite of the growing significance of
other forms of EU intervention in the
social sphere, legislative action at EU
level remains of paramount impor-
tance. This is illustrated by the fact
that, between June 2002 and the time
of publication of this report,25 legisla-
tive dossiers have either been
launched by the Commission,debated
by the EU institutions, or finalised.The
largest number of legislative dossiers
have been adopted in the field of
health and safety (11) and labour law
(11), followed by free movement and
social security for migrant workers
(4), and equal treatment (2 dossiers).
Recent years have witnessed the
emergence of ‘soft’ instruments in the
social policy area, the most innovative
of which is the open method of coor-
dination (OMC), which is used in the
areas of employment, social inclusion,
social security and healthcare. These
non-binding processes can contribute
to achieving convergence in employ-
ment standards within the EU, one of
the primary goals of most legislative
measures. Legislation continues, how-
ever, to be indispensable, primarily to
deal with issues and realities of a
transnational nature (for example, the
European works councils directive,
the European company directive, free
movement issues), as well as to
address basic fundamental rights (for
example, gender equality, protection
of privacy of workers, anti-discrimina-
tion issues, collective rights, etc.).
The role of EU legislation is evolving.
The traditional objective of classical
EU labour law instruments — creat-
ing a level-playing field through setting
minimum standards — remains
important, but European legally bind-
ing provisions increasingly pursue
other European policy goals, such as
modernising the regulatory frame-
work, developing social dialogue at all
levels, finding new balances between
flexibility and security, and increasing
the adaptability of workers, etc.
This interaction between ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ forms of EU intervention is posi-
tive and innovative.The legislative tech-
niques used by the EU are being adapt-
ed to these new roles,especially by giv-
ing leeway to social partners’ interven-
tions at different stages of the legisla-
tive process (from the very start of the
decision-making process, to the imple-
mentation and application phases).
Many of the instruments detailed in this
chapter illustrate this positive evolution
of European labour and social law.
n 2. Labour law
2.1. Information and
consultation of workers
2.1.1. Adoption of the national
information and consultation
directive
On 11 March 2002, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted
Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a gen-
eral framework for informing and con-
sulting employees. The directive lays
down minimum requirements for the
information and consultation of employ-
ees in undertakings and establishments
located in the Community. It includes
arrangements for regular, ongoing infor-
mation and consultation of workers’ rep-
resentatives in undertakings with at least
50 employees, or establishments with at
least 20 employees. It covers the eco-
nomic and financial situation of the com-
pany, the probable development of
employment within the company, any
anticipatory measures envisaged,and any
decision affecting employment contracts.
The adoption of the new directive is a
major landmark in the development of EU
social policy. It brings to an end a protract-
ed and difficult debate over the desirability
of an EU-wide framework for national-level
information and consultation rules. The
directive has finally reached the EU statute
book almost seven years after the idea of
such a measure was first put forward in the
European Commission’s April 1995 medi-
um-term social action programme — and
nearly three and a half years after the
Commission initiated the legislative process
in November 1998 by formally proposing a
draft directive.Throughout this period, the
proposal for the directive provoked sharp
differences of view between employers’
organisations and trade unions, as well as
between EU Member States.
The Community rules in force for more
than 25 years on information and consulta-
tion of employees in the event of collective
redundancies and of transfers of undertak-
ings will thus be supplemented and covered
by general and permanent procedures(110).
The impact of the directive in Member
States will be uneven. For most of EU-15, it
will force an adaptation of existing rules
with a view to developing an anticipative
approach and the strategic information and
consultation provided for in the directive.
The United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as
the new Member States which joined the
EU in 2004, will however have to introduce
considerable changes to their industrial
relations and labour law systems, as they
do not have general and permanent mech-
anisms for informing and consulting
employees, nor a statutory general entitle-
ment for stable employee representation at
the workplace.The directive relies on such
a representation mechanism, the creation
of which constitutes a significant challenge.
It should also help to promote a gradual
change of attitude among employers and
employee representatives towards a more
participatory and constructive relationship.
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(110) See Chapter 5 for further information on these directives.
2.1.2. European cooperative society
Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 and
supplementing Directive 2003/72/EC
concerning the European cooperative
society (SCE) were adopted on 22
July 2003. The regulation lays down
the rules governing the Constitution
and the functioning of the SCE and
the directive deals with employee
involvement.
Impact of the new instruments
These legal instruments will allow cooper-
atives operating on the territory of more
than one Member State to acquire a single
legal identity in accordance with
Community law. Cooperatives will be able
to carry out their activities throughout the
internal market with a single legal identity,
regulation and structure; they will be able
to expand and restructure their cross-bor-
der operations without having to set up a
network of subsidiaries, which takes a great
deal of time and money. Member States
now have three years in which to trans-
pose the provisions of the directive into
national law.The status of the ECS will thus
become operational in 2006.
The EU has 300 000 European coopera-
tives, which play an important part in the
economy as they employ 2.3 million people
and provide services to 83.5 million mem-
bers. The new statute will also constitute
an ideal legal instrument for companies of
any kind, which hope to regroup to ensure
a joint future, and will allow groups of at
least five European citizens from several
Member States to create an ECS. European
cooperatives could be created starting
from zero (but also via a merger or by con-
verting an existing company), either by
physical or legal persons.
With regard to employee involvement, the
texts follow very closely the model of the
European company (SE), adopted on 8
October 2001. The arrangements for
workers’ involvement in the SCE must be
subject to a negotiation between the
boards of the participating entities and
their employees’ transnational representa-
tion.These negotiations shall be carried on
in parallel to the process of establishing the
SCE. If the parties do not reach an agree-
ment, a set of subsidiary rules modelled
after the standard rules in the SE directive
will apply, covering information, consulta-
tion and, in some cases, participation.A few
adaptations have nevertheless been made 
to take into account certain ways of cre-
ating an SCE which have no equivalence in
the SE statute, namely the creation ex
novo of an SCE in which natural persons
participate.
2.1.3. Revision of the European
works councils directive
On 19 April 2004 the Commission
launched the first stage consultation
of the European social partners con-
cerning a possible revision of the 1994
European works councils directive.
The European works councils directive was
adopted in 1994 in order to give employ-
ees access to information and consultation
at the transnational level at which key deci-
sions affecting their enterprises were
increasingly being taken. In spite of some
shortcomings, impressive progress has
been achieved under the directive.
European works councils (EWCs) have
been established in some 650 major
European companies and groups, thereby
laying the foundation for the development
of genuine transnational social dialogue at
the enterprise level. EWCs have demon-
strated their value, not only in securing
information and consultation for employ-
ees, but, equally significantly, in providing a
mechanism through which effective
engagement between management and
employees at the transnational level can
make a significant positive contribution to
company development, particularly to the
successful management of change (111).
The challenge now is to ensure that this
potential of EWCs is fully realised in the
future. In the Commission’s view, companies
can best face the challenges ahead if
employees are fully involved in the life of
the enterprises in which they work. The
proven value of EWCs as a vehicle for
ensuring such involvement must, as a conse-
quence, be developed.
The Commission therefore decided to
launch the formal consultation of the
Community social partners on the review
of the directive.The issue is how social dia-
logue at the enterprise level can best be
provided for in the future.The social part-
ners themselves are best placed to deter-
mine the optimum conditions for fostering
such dialogue, as they are closest to the
realities of the workplace.The Commission 
is convinced that, perhaps more than in any
other area, the social partners have a cru-
cial role to play in securing the future suc-
cessful operation of EWCs. The European
social partners have also been exploring
the closely related issue of managing
restructuring and change, which is dis-
cussed later in this chapter.
2.2. Working time
2.2.1.Codification of existing
directives
A codified version of the directives
concerning certain aspects of the
organisation of working time
(93/104/EC and 2000/34/EC) was
adopted on 4 November 2003
(Directive 2003/88/EC). There were
no amendments in substance to those
directives.
2.2.2. Review of the 1993 directive
On 30 December 2003, the Com-
mission issued a communication on
the re-examination of the 1993 EU
working time directive, in which it invit-
ed comments from national interested
parties and from the European social
partners on the directive’s reference
periods for calculating average working
time, the possibility of allowing individ-
uals to opt out from the maximum 48-
hour week, recent European Court of
Justice (ECJ) case law regarding on-call
working, and measures to improve
work–life balance.
Following the outcome of this consul-
tation, on 19 May 2004, the
Commission adopted a second stage
consultation of the social partners at
Community level. In this document, the
Commission strongly encourages the
European social partners to undertake
negotiations with a view to reaching an
agreement. The document anticipated
the possible content of a Commission
proposal in the event that the social
partners decided not to negotiate.The
social partners were asked to give their
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views or communicate their intention
to negotiate by 6 July 2004.
In response to the Commission's con-
sultation document, the social partners
declined the invitation to enter into
negotiations in this field with a view to
reaching a European agreement, and
asked the Commission to adopt a pro-
posal for a directive.
As a consequence, on 22 September
2004, the Commission adopted a pro-
posal amending the working time
directive.
The 1993 EU Directive 93/104/EC on cer-
tain aspects of the organisation of working
time aims to ensure a better level of health
and safety protection for workers by limit-
ing excessive working hours, providing for
sufficient rest breaks, and regular organisa-
tion of work. Its main provisions include:
• a minimum rest period of 11 consecu-
tive hours for each 24-hour period;
• a rest break where the working day is
longer than six hours;
a minimum rest period of one day per
week;
• maximum weekly working hours of 48
hours on average, including overtime,
over a reference period not exceeding
four months;
• four weeks of paid annual leave;
• an average of no more than 8 hours of
work at night in any 24-hour period.
The text of the directive states that two of
its provisions are to be reviewed before 23
November 2003.These are:
• derogations from the four-month ref-
erence period for the application of
Article 6 of the directive (the maxi-
mum 48-hour working week), whereby
Member States may allow the refer-
ence period to be extended to six
months or, by collective agreement, to
12 months;
• an option for Member States of not
applying Article 6 if the individual work-
er consents to this (i.e. the ‘opt-out’
from the 48-hour maximum working
week).
There have also been important recent ECJ
rulings regarding the definition of working
time with regard to on-call working,
notably the judgments in the Simap case on
3 October 2000 and the Jaeger case on 9
October 2003. These rulings essentially
stated that on-call working should be con-
sidered to be working time, even where
the employee is provided with a bed to
sleep in on the employer’s premises during
periods of non-working. The Commission
therefore believes that in the light of these
cases the time has come to review the
directive.
The proposal adopted by the Commission
on 22 September 2004 therefore covers
three issues: on-call time, reference periods
and the individual opt-out.
Concerning on-call time, the proposal
inserts two new definitions: "on-call time"
and the "inactive part of on-call time", and
a new article defines that the inactive part
of on-call time shall not be regarded as
working time, unless national law or, in
accordance with national law and/or prac-
tice, a collective agreement or an agree-
ment between the two sides of industry
determines otherwise.
With regard to the reference period, the
proposal leaves the current four-month
reference period for the application of
maximum weekly working time, but allows
Member States to extend the reference
period to twelve months.The proposal also
leaves unchanged the possibility of extend-
ing the reference period to twelve months
by collective agreement and specifies that
whenever the duration of the employment
contract is less than one year, the reference
period cannot be longer than the duration
of the employment contract.
Finally, concerning the individual opt-out,
the proposal establishes that the imple-
mentation of the individual opt-out must
be expressly foreseen by a collective agree-
ment or an agreement between the two
sides of industry, in accordance with
national law and/or practice. In cases where
there is no collective agreement in force
and there is no workers' representation
within the undertaking or the business that
is empowered, in accordance with national
law and/or practice, to conclude a collec-
tive agreement or an agreement between
the two sides of industry on the issue, the
individual opt-out remains possible.
The conditions for the application of the
opt-out are, however, tightened: a prohibi-
tion of the consent to be given at the time
of signature of the employment contract or
during any probation period; a maximum
limit of 65-hours of weekly working time in
any one week; and an obligation to keep a
record of the effective number of hours
worked.
2.3. Employee protection in the
event of the employer’s
insolvency
In 23 September 2002 a directive was
adopted amending Directive 80/987/
EEC relating to the protection of
employees in the event of the insol-
vency of their employer (Directive
2002/74/EC).
Directive 80/987/EEC seeks to provide
employees with a minimum degree of pro-
tection under Community law in the event
of their employer becoming insolvent. To
this end, it requires each Member State to
put in place an institution to guarantee
employees, whose employer has become
insolvent, the payment of their outstanding
claims to remuneration for a specific period.
The rules for the organisation, financing
and operation of the guarantee institutions
are decided by each Member State, but
they must comply with certain principles
laid down in the directive.
The directive also contains provisions con-
cerning the protection of certain social
security entitlements.
The amendments introduced in 2002 take
account of changes to insolvency law in the
Member States, the dynamism of the inter-
nal market, the need for consistency with
other Community directives on labour law,
and the case law of the Court of Justice.
The most important amendments are:
• a new concept of insolvency, based on
that used in Council Regulation (EC)
No 1346/2000, henceforth covers all
procedures, whether or not those pro-
cedures have been instituted with a
view to the liquidation of the assets
(the original directive was limited to
liquidation procedures);
• a simplification of several core articles;
• a new provision specifying the compe-
tent guarantee institution in cases with a
cross-border dimension;
• a new provision providing for adminis-
trative collaboration between the
Member States in cross-border situa-
tions.
Directive 80/987/EEC will have to be
transposed by the Member States before
8 October 2005.
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2.4. Temporary work
Following the breakdown of negotia-
tions between the European social
partners in 2001 on the topic of tem-
porary work, the Commission pre-
sented a proposal for a directive
establishing a general principle of non-
discrimination of temporary workers
on 20 March 2002.
Content of the proposal and state-
of-play
According to this principle, a temporary
worker shall not be treated in a less
favourable manner regarding working con-
ditions, than a comparable worker of the
user undertaking. Derogation can be made
if the worker has an open-ended contract
with the temporary work agency as well as
if the social partners conclude a collective
agreement with equivalent protection.
Following the opinion of the European
Parliament at its first reading, the
Commission modified the proposal to take
on board some of the amendments pro-
posed by Parliament. In the modified pro-
posal of 28 November 2002, the
Commission introduced various clarifica-
tions, as well as substantive changes to the
content of some of the provisions. The
main one is as follows: for the purposes of
applying the equality principle, the compar-
ison shall be made with the working condi-
tions which the temporary worker would
have been entitled to had he or she been
recruited directly by the user undertaking,
rather than with a comparable worker in
the user undertaking.
The debates in the Council have proved to
be extremely difficult and progress has
been slow. At the time of publication, the
Council had not yet reached a common
position.
2.5. Restructuring
In January 2002, the European
Commission launched a consultation
with the European social partners
concerning the anticipation and man-
agement of the social effects of cor-
porate restructuring.
Content of the consultation and
state-of-play
For the Commission, developing a positive
approach to corporate restructuring
‘implies combining in an effective and bal-
anced manner the interests of businesses,
faced with changes in the conditions gov-
erning their activity, and those of employ-
ees, threatened with the loss of their jobs’.
The consultation document noted that a
range of existing EU policies are relevant to
restructuring, including:
• EU legislation requiring the information
and consultation of employees;
• EU-level social dialogue;
• the observation and analysis of indus-
trial change, through the establishment
of the new European Monitoring
Centre on Change;
• the EU Structural Funds;
• competition policy;
• the promotion of corporate social
responsibility.
In addition to these policies, the Commission
wanted to examine the scope for establishing
Community-level principles of good practice
during restructuring based on procedures
already developed in the Member States and
experience within companies operating in
the EU.The consultation document identified
four main areas for consideration:
• measures to promote employability
and adaptability, and restructuring on
the basis of ‘lowest social cost’;
• the effectiveness of regulatory
approaches, including the identification
of obstacles to restructuring in a
socially positive way;
• responsibility for the impact on locali-
ties and commercial networks (sub-
contractors etc.);
• the ‘modalities of implementation’,
including the involvement of employ-
ees, fair compensation where job loss-
es cannot be avoided, whether EU-level
dispute resolution machinery would be
useful, and good practice within small
and medium-sized enterprises.
The consultation document sought the
views of the social partners on the useful-
ness of establishing at EU level ‘a number of
principles for action which would support
business good practice in restructuring sit-
uations’, and asked ‘whether they consider
that agreements between the social part-
ners at cross-industry or sectoral level rep-
resent the appropriate way of proceeding’,
as favoured by the Commission.
Following three joint seminars organised in
2003 on good practices in the field of
restructuring, the European-level social
partners agreed on a text in October 2003
entitled ‘Orientations for reference in man-
aging change and its social consequences’.
They also included the issue in their joint
work programme for 2003–05 (112).
2.6. Protection of workers’
personal data
The second stage of the Com-
mission’s consultation of the social
partners on the question of personal
data protection in the employment
context, launched on 30 October
2002,was concluded in January 2003.
The majority of the consulted
employers’ organisations did not see
any need for a Community directive
on this subject. As regards the trade
unions, they were strongly in favour of
a Community directive aiming at
improving the working conditions
within the EU.
Since there was no agreement
between the social partners to engage
in negotiations, the Commission 
services undertook further consulta-
tion with interested stakeholders
(Member States, independent experts,
etc.). As legally prescribed, the
Commission formally requested the
opinion of the Article 29 working
party on the envisaged framework of
principles and rules in this area. The
Article 29 working party’s opinion of
24 September 2003 noted that the
issue of workers’ data protection can
be addressed by a new legal
Community framework, which would
provide the opportunity for the
desirable development of the existing
general principles.
The Commission has still to decide
on what follow-up should be given to
the above-mentioned consultation of
the social partners.
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n 3. Implementation of 
Community 
labour law
3.1. Transposition reports
In accordance with Article 211 of the
Treaty, the Commission monitors the
Member States’ implementation of
Community law and regularly pre-
pares reports for the Parliament and
Council.The social partners are con-
sulted during the preparation of the
reports. During the period 2002–03,
reports have been issued on the
implementation of Directive 97/81/
EC concerning the framework agree-
ment on part-time work and on 
the implementation of Directive
96/71/EC on the posting of workers.
3.2. Coordination of the
implementation of
directives
The work of the Commission is not
restricted to the preparation of
reports. It also provides support for
the Member States in the transposi-
tion of directives. During 2002–03, an
ad hoc group of national experts was
set up in order to coordinate the
implementation of the European
Company statute (SE) of 2001 (113).
Implementation of the SE 
directive
At the request of the Council, the
Commission set up an expert group com-
posed of national experts and social affairs
counsellors in order to provide a forum for
discussing the arrangements for the trans-
position of directive 2001/86/EC into
national legislation. Since the transposition
involves provisions with a transnational
dimension, the expert group has endeav-
oured to seek ways of avoiding any contra-
dictions between the various national sys-
tems by exchanging information and coor-
dinating the transposition work.
The expert group had an informal status,
and the role of the Commission was limit-
ed to providing it with logistical support
and helping to develop its ideas. The
Commission has not sought to interfere
with the transposition of the directive at
national level in any way, nor to intervene
in the right of interpretation of the ECJ, or
other courts concerned. The same applies
to the experts in the expert group who, in
their countries, are responsible, either for
producing draft legislation or monitoring
discussions between the social partners as
part of agreement-based transposition.
The expert group had an extremely produc-
tive exchange of views in a remarkable spirit
of cooperation on the basis of 21 working
documents presented by the Commission
and the delegations. Ten days of meetings
were held, during which the main issues aris-
ing from the implementation of the directive
were extensively discussed. The consensual
approach with the objective of simplifying
what, in any event, will be a complex corpus
of legal provisions allowed the expert group
to draw up a series of conclusions on the
most problematic provisions of the directive.
These conclusions are, in fact, simple
reminders to all who are or will be
involved in the legislative work leading to
the implementation of the directive in all
countries concerned by it. They are by no
means binding and do not in any way exon-
erate Member States from the responsibil-
ity of ensuring its correct transposition and
application, and they do not exempt the
Commission from its obligation to monitor
that work.
Following this exhaustive work, a five-day
seminar was held in Brussels in May and
June 2003 with experts from the new
Member States and candidate countries. A
similar seminar was held in October for
the social partners and experts from these
countries.
3.3. The challenge of
enlargement
The year 2003 was crucial for all
acceding countries in terms of com-
pleting the transposition of the EU
labour law acquis. With the aim of
enforcing the implementation proce-
dure and offering the support of the
Commission’s services, the Director-
General of the Employment and
Social Affairs DG visited all the candi-
date countries. As a follow-up to
these visits, and at the specific request
of the various countries, bilateral
meetings were organised to discuss
and offer assistance on questions aris-
ing during the transposition of the
labour law directives into national law.
The directors-general from the
acceding countries were invited to
the two meetings of directors-gener-
al for industrial relations in May and in
November 2003 to discuss new
developments in the field of industrial
relations with their colleagues from
EU-15.
In December 2002, in cooperation
with the TAIEX office, the Em-
ployment and Social Affairs DG
organised a seminar on information
and consultation with the acceding
countries. The objective of the semi-
nar was to provide a discussion forum
for the exchange of information and
experience between the existing and
future Member States. The seminar
was organised with experts from
acceding countries.
n 4. Health and safety of
workers
4.1. A new Community strategy
on workers’ health and
safety for the period
2002–06
On 11 March 2002 the Commission
adopted a communication entitled
‘Adapting to change in work and soci-
ety: a new Community strategy 
on health and safety at work
2002–06’ (114).
In this new strategy, which seeks to
respond to the EU’s aim, as agreed at the
Lisbon European Council, of improving
both the quantity and quality of employ-
ment, the Commission adopts a broad
approach to well-being in the workplace.
This approach takes into account changes
in the world of work and the emergence of
new, particularly psychosocial, risks aiming
thereby to improve the quality of work,
one of the essential elements of which is a
healthy and safe working environment.
113
Review of legislation 2002–04 Chapter 4
(113) OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 22
(114) COM(2002) 118 final, 11 March 2002.
The Commission is basing this strategy on
a consolidation of the culture of risk-pre-
vention (including psychological and social
risks such as stress, harassment and vio-
lence), on a combination of different policy
tools (such as social dialogue or corporate
social responsibility), and on the creation of
partnerships between all interested parties
in the field of health and safety. The new
strategy thus shows that an ambitious
social policy is a factor contributing to
competitiveness and that, conversely, the
absence of policy (‘non-policy’) gives rise
to costs which weigh heavily on the econ-
omy and society as a whole.
On 3 June 2002, the Council adopted a res-
olution on the new strategy for 2002–06, in
which it welcomed the Commission’s com-
munication and called on the Member
States, the social partners and the
Commission to actively promote health
and safety at work. In a resolution of 23
October 2002, the European Parliament
also welcomed the Commission’s initiative,
but called on it to draw up a detailed action
plan with financial commitments and a
timetable for each major proposal. The
Committee of the Regions and the
European Economic and Social Committee
also endorsed this new strategy on 3 and
17 July respectively.
4.2. Risks from exposure to
physical agents
The Commission’s initial proposal,
which is based on Article 118a (now
Article 137) of the Treaty, takes the
form of an individual directive within
the meaning of Article 16(1) of the
framework Directive 89/391/EEC.
The proposal seeks to protect the
health and safety of workers against
the risks arising from exposure to
physical agents. It applies to four
agents: noise (risks to hearing); vibra-
tions (risks to the hand, arm and
whole body); electromagnetic fields
and optical radiation (risks to health
from induced currents in the body,
shock and burn hazards and from
absorption of thermal energy).
The provisions concerning vibrations,
electromagnetic fields and optical
radiation are new, whereas those
dealing with noise already existed in
Council Directive 86/188/EEC.
In general terms, the Council has cho-
sen to concentrate on one agent at a
time, starting with vibrations. All the
delegations as well as the
Commission accepted this approach,
which consists of negotiating single
components of the Commission’s
proposal on an individual basis, but
without dispensing with the other
elements, which remain on the
Council’s agenda.
4.3. Mechanical vibrations
On 25 June 2002, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted
Directive 2002/44/EC on the mini-
mum health and safety requirements
regarding the exposure of workers to
the risks arising from physical agents
(vibration) (the first element in the
Commission proposal).
The directive aims to protect workers from
risks to their health and safety, particularly
musculoskeletal, neurological and vascular
disorders, resulting or likely to result from
exposure to mechanical vibrations. It
applies to vibrations transmitted to the
hands and arms as well as to the entire
body. Specific prevention measures must be
taken to ensure that the exposure limit val-
ues applying to vibrations cannot be
exceeded.
To take account of the technical difficulties
involved, the directive provides for a transi-
tion period of six years for equipment
made available to workers three years after
the targeted date of transposal in respect
of which the exposure limit values cannot
be observed, taking account of technical
progress and/or the implementation of
organisational measures. This transition
period can be extended to nine years for
equipment in the agricultural and forestry
sectors.
Finally, Member States have the option,
under duly justified conditions, of allowing
for derogations from application of the
exposure limit value for the airline industry
and shipping only.
4.4. Noise
On 6 February 2003, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted
Directive 2003/10/EC on the mini-
mum health and safety requirements
regarding the exposure of workers to
the risks arising from physical agents
(noise) (the second element in the
Commission proposal).
This directive, which reduces the exposure
limit value from 90 to 87 decibels and lays
down two exposure action values, will
replace Directive 86/188/EEC on the pro-
tection of workers from the risks related
to exposure to noise at work.
It imposes certain obligations on employ-
ers, such as risk assessment, reduction of
exposure, training, information and consul-
tation of workers. Some of these obliga-
tions must be met when one of the action
values is reached or exceeded.
All fields of activity are now covered by the
provisions of the directive (the airline
industry and shipping were excluded from
the scope of Directive 86/188/EEC).
However, in order to take account of the
particular features of the music and enter-
tainment sectors, and to enable the direc-
tive’s provisions to be applied correctly and
effectively, a specific code of conduct set-
ting out practical guidelines will have to be
drawn up by the Member States in consul-
tation with the social partners, and in line
with national laws and practices, with a
view to helping workers and employers in
these sectors to achieve the levels of pro-
tection laid down in the directive.
4.5. Electromagnetic fields
On 17 December 2003, the Council
adopted its common position on the
proposal for a directive of the
European Parliament and of the
Council on the minimum health and
safety requirements regarding the
exposure of workers to the risks aris-
ing from physical agents (electromag-
netic fields).
The present proposal constitutes the third
phase of the general approach adopted by
the Council, namely to introduce a separate,
individual directive for each physical agent.
The common position on the proposal for
a directive, which applies to all areas of
activity without exception, lays down limit
values for exposure to electrical, magnetic
and electromagnetic fields which are static
or magnetic or vary in time, with frequen-
cies of up to 300 GHz.
The common position also sets action val-
ues which require employers to take pre-
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ventive measures as provided for in the
directive. Employers are also required to
adequately inform workers likely to be
exposed to these particular risks.
4.6. Asbestos
On 27 March 2003, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted
Directive 2003/18/EC amending
Directive 83/477/EEC.
The directive introduces a single exposure
limit for workers (i.e. 0.1 fibres/cm3 over an
eight-hour period), whereas the initial
directive provided for two limits. The new
directive broadens the scope to cover the
airline industry and shipping.
The directive also provides for the simplifi-
cation of certain administrative procedures
in the event of low-intensity and sporadic
exposure, sets out a reference method for
determining the airborne concentration of
asbestos, and contains more detailed
requirements concerning the training of
workers.
Furthermore, and without prejudice to the
application of other Community provisions
on the marketing and use of asbestos, the
new directive prohibits activities which
expose workers to asbestos fibres during
the extraction of asbestos or the manufac-
ture and processing of asbestos products
(including products containing intentionally
added asbestos), with the exception of the
treatment and disposal of products result-
ing from demolition and asbestos removal.
4.7. Carcinogens
On 20 March 2003, the Commission
adopted a modified proposal
(COM(2003) 127) concerning the
codified version of Directive
90/394/EEC and of its two amend-
ments (Directives 97/42/EC and
1999/38/EC) on the protection of
workers from the risks related to
exposure to carcinogens or mutagens
at work.
This modified proposal takes account of the
work already carried out in the Council,
and the formal or editorial amendments
proposed by the Consultative Working
Party of Legal Services, where justified.
The European Parliament endorsed the
proposal on 2 September 2003.
4.8. Stress and its effects
In December 2002, the Commission
launched, in accordance with Article
138 of the EC Treaty, the first phase of
the Community-level consultation of
the social partners with regard to
stress and its effects on health and
safety at work.
On 17 September 2003, UNICE/
UEAPME, CEEP and the ETUC con-
firmed to the Commission that
negotiations had begun with a view
to reaching an agreement on stress
at work.The negotiations reached a
successful conclusion on 27 May
2004, and the agreement was for-
mally adopted in October 2004.The
agreement is to be implemented via
the first implementation option in
Article 139(2), namely in accordance
with the procedures and practices
specific to management and labour
in the Member States. The agree-
ment is to be implemented within
three years of the signature of the
agreement.A yearly table will be pre-
pared by the Social Dialogue
Committee summarising the ongo-
ing implementation of the agree-
ment. During the fourth year, a full
report on the implementation
actions taken will be prepared (see
also Chapter 3).
The agreement states that its aim is to
increase the awareness and understanding
of employers, workers and their represen-
tatives of work-related stress, and to draw
their attention to signs that could indicate
problems of work-related stress. Its objec-
tive is to provide employers and workers
with a framework to identify and prevent
or manage problems of work-related
stress.
Stress is defined as ‘a state, which is accom-
panied by physical, psychological or social
complaints or dysfunctions and which
results from individuals feeling unable to
bridge a gap with the requirements or
expectations placed on them’. The agree-
ment stresses the complexity of the phe-
nomenon and therefore deliberately does
not provide an exhaustive list of potential
stress indicators. It states, however, that
high absenteeism or staff turnover, frequent
interpersonal conflicts or complaints by
workers are some of the signs that may
indicate a problem of work-related stress.
The agreement refers to the Framework
Directive 89/391/EEC according to which
all employers have a legal obligation to pro-
tect the occupational health and safety of
workers. This duty applies to problems of
work-related stress in so far as they entail
a risk to health and safety.
Measures for preventing, eliminating or
reducing problems of work-related stress
include:
• management and communication
measures such as clarifying the compa-
ny’s objectives and the role of individ-
ual workers, ensuring adequate man-
agement support for individuals and
teams, matching responsibility and con-
trol over work, improving work organ-
isation and processes, working condi-
tions and the environment;
• training managers and workers to raise
awareness and understanding of stress,
its possible causes and how to deal
with it, and/or to adapt to change;
• provision of information to and consul-
tation with workers and/or their repre-
sentatives in accordance with EU and
national legislation, collective agree-
ments and practices.
4.9. Self-employed workers
On 18 February 2003, the Council
adopted Recommendation (EC) No
2003/134 concerning the improve-
ment of the protection of the health
and safety at work of self-employed
workers.
The recommendation calls on the Member
States to promote all measures aimed at
preventing the risks of accidents or occu-
pational diseases to which self-employed
workers are exposed. To the extent that
the essential provisions of current
Community legislation on health and safety,
based on Article 137 of the EC Treaty, apply
only to employed persons and hence
exclude self-employed workers, the
Council calls on the Member States to
encourage prevention and promote meas-
ures aimed at safeguarding the health and
safety of self-employed workers, particular-
ly awareness-raising campaigns, training and
health surveillance.
115
Review of legislation 2002–04 Chapter 4
4.10. Explosive atmospheres
On 25 August 2003, the Commission
issued, in accordance with Directive
1999/92/EC, a non-binding guide of
good practice to assist the Member
States in drawing up their national
policies on the protection of work-
ers at risk from explosive atmos-
pheres (115).
This guide covers explosion prevention and
protection, assessment of explosion risks,
the employer’s duties to safeguard the safe-
ty and health of workers, the duty of the
employer responsible for the workplace to
coordinate all measures where workers of
several undertakings are present at the
same workplace, the zoning of places
where explosive atmospheres may occur,
and the way in which the employer must
produce the explosion protection docu-
ment.
4.11. Schedule of occupational
diseases
On 19 September 2003 (COM(2003)
3297 final), the Commission adopted
a recommendation concerning the
European schedule of occupational
diseases.
In particular, this recommendation calls on
the Member States to introduce the
European schedule set out in Annex I as
soon as possible into their national laws,
regulations or administrative provisions
concerning scientifically recognised occu-
pational diseases liable for compensation
and subject to preventive measures.
This new schedule updates the existing
schedule, dating from 1990, in order to
take account of scientific and technical
progress which has enabled a better
understanding to be gained of how cer-
tain occupational diseases arise. It also
responds to the need to prevent occupa-
tional diseases, as set out in the
Community strategy on health and safety
at work 2002–06.The Member States are
called on to draw up quantified national
objectives, with a view to reducing the
rates of recognised occupational dis-
eases, and promoting an active role for
national healthcare systems, particularly
by improving diagnosis.
4.12. Advisory committee for
safety and health at work
On 22 July 2003, the Council adopted
a decision setting up an advisory com-
mittee for safety and health at work.
The aim of this new advisory committee,
which merges the two existing advisory
committees (namely the Advisory
Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health
Protection at Work (ACSHH) and the
Safety and Health Commission for the
Mining and Other Extractive Industries), is
to assist the Commission in the prepara-
tion and implementation of activities in the
fields of safety and health at work, and to
facilitate cooperation between national
administrations, employers’ organisations
and trade unions. The Committee’s remit
covers all public and private sectors of the
economy.
n 5. Equality for women 
and men
5.1. Revision of the 1976
directive
On 23 September 2002, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted
the directive 2002/73/EC amending
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the
implementation of the principle of
equal treatment for men and women
as regards access to employment,
vocational training and promotion,
and working conditions (116).
The directive incorporates a number of the
developments made in this field by the
jurisprudence of the Court in recent years,
and updates the legislation so that key pro-
visions and definitions are consistent with
those used in the recent anti-discrimina-
tion legislation adopted under Article 13 of
the Treaty (Directives 2000/43/EC and
2000/78/EC).
5.2. Equal treatment in the
access to and supply of
goods and services
On 5 November 2003, the
Commission adopted a proposal for a
directive implementing the principle
of equal treatment for women and
men in the access to and supply of
goods and services (117).
The proposal is made under Article 13 of
the Treaty for adoption by the Council fol-
lowing consultation with the Parliament. It
is the first time that legislation has been
proposed to combat discrimination based
on gender outside the employment field,
and it follows on from Directive
2000/43/EC adopted by the Council in
2000, which prohibits race discrimination
in a number of fields, including employment
and goods and services.At the time of pub-
lication, the Council has reached a com-
mon position.
n 6. Free movement and 
social security for 
migrant workers
6.1. Proposal for a directive of
the European Parliament
and of the Council on the
right of citizens of the Union
and their family members to
move and reside freely
within the territory of the
Member States
The Commission submitted its pro-
posal to the Council on 2 July 2001.
The proposal is based on Articles 12,
18(2), 40, 44 and 52 of the EC
Treaty (118). After reaching political
agreement on 22 September 2003,
the common position was adopted on
5 December 2003.
The aim of this directive is to combine in
one piece of legislation, all the rules con-
cerning the residence rights of EU citizens
wishing to live in another Member State of
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(115) COM(2003) 515 final, 25 August 2003.
(116) OJ L 269, 5.10.2002, p. 15.
(117) COM(2003) 657 final, 5 November 2003.
(118) OJ C 270, 25.9.2001, p. 150.
the EU (workers, self-employed persons,
pensioners, students, the non-active, etc.).
The directive will result in changes to
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 concerning
the free movement of workers, and will
revoke Directive 68/360/EEC on the resi-
dence rights of workers and their family
members.
The new directive will in general incorpo-
rate the acquis concerning the residence
rights of workers and their family mem-
bers; although in some places the adopted
text grants fewer rights to citizens in com-
parison to the original proposal of the
Commission (e.g. in relation to protection
against expulsion on the grounds of public
policy, public security or public health). It
also provides for big steps forward, espe-
cially the granting of a permanent residence
right for all EU citizens after five years of
residence in a Member State.
6.2. The coordination of social
security schemes
On 21 December 1998, the Com-
mission presented a proposal for a
regulation to simplify and modernise
the coordination rules contained in
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. The
Council and the European Parliament
formally adopted the regulation on 29
April 2004 through the co-decision
procedure.
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 provides for
the coordination of national social security
schemes in order to ensure that the applica-
tion of the different national legislations
does not adversely affect persons exercising
their rights to free movement within the EU.
Since its adoption in 1971, the regulation
has undergone a considerable number of
amendments in order to take account of
changes to national legislation, improve
certain provisions, remedy deficiencies or
cover the situation of particular categories
of persons.The goal pursued by coordina-
tion must also be adapted to changes in the
EU as a whole.
The new Regulation (EEC) No 883/2004
on the coordination of social security sys-
tems, contains a fundamental reform and
simplification of the rules for coordination
in the field of social security improving the
protection for the citizen. The regulation
will only be applicable once the necessary
implementing provisions are adopted, i.e.
probably not before the end of 2006.
6.3. Extension of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 to 
third-country nationals
Regulation (EC) No 859/2003 which
extends the provisions of Regulation
(EEC) No 1408/71 to legally resident
third-country nationals was adopted
by the Council on 14 May 2003.
6.4. European health insurance
card
Further to the decision of the
Barcelona European Council to cre-
ate a European health insurance card,
the Commission adopted on 17
February 2003 a communication
which includes a roadmap and
timetable for the gradual introduction
of a European health insurance card.
On 1 June 2004, the European health
insurance card was launched in 13
Member States. It replaces the cur-
rent E-forms needed for healthcare
during a temporary stay in a Member
State other than the one of insurance
(E111, E110, E128 and E119).The 12
other Member States which do not
use national health insurance cards,
have been granted transitional peri-
ods which may not extend beyond 31
December 2005. In order to facilitate
the introduction of the European
health insurance card, a regulation
amending Regulation (EEC) No
1408/71 in respect of the alignment of
rights and the simplification of proce-
dures was adopted on 31 March
2004. A special website on the
European health insurance card has
been created: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/employment_social/healthcard/in
dex_en.htm.
n 7. The European 
Convention and 
Intergovernmental 
Conference on 
the Future of Europe
Following Declaration 23 to the Treaty
of Nice and in accordance with the
arrangements of the Laeken
Declaration on the Future of the EU,
adopted on 15 December 2001 by the
Heads of State or Government, the
Convention on the Future of Europe
submitted a comprehensive draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe in July 2003. This document,
which has been elaborated during the
18 months of work of the
Convention, presided by former
French President Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, has been welcomed by the
European Council of Thessaloniki in
June 2003 as a ‘good basis for starting
the intergovernmental conference’,
which subsequently opened on 4
October 2003.
The intergovernmental conference
made a series of adaptations to the
text of the Convention and took final
decisions on the ultimate version of
the Constitutional Treaty. After tem-
porary suspension following the
December 2003 Brussels European
Council,which failed to bring about an
overall compromise, the intergovern-
mental conference finally reached
agreement on the future Constitution
on 18 June 2004.The Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe was
signed in Rome on 29 October 2004.
The Treaty provides for a series of sig-
nificant changes in the field of employ-
ment and social affairs. It contains a
progressive formulation of the Union’s
values and objectives, including the
principles of justice, solidarity, non-dis-
crimination and equality between
women and men among its basic val-
ues. The important objectives of the
Union comprise the promotion of the
well-being of its peoples, full employ-
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ment and social progress, a social mar-
ket economy, sustainable develop-
ment, the fight against social exclusion
and discrimination, social justice and
protection, equality between women
and men, solidarity between genera-
tions, the protection of children’s
rights and the promotion of econom-
ic, social and territorial cohesion, and
solidarity among Member States.
The Constitution makes it clear that
the social policy competences attrib-
uted by the Constitutional Treaty
belong to the category of shared com-
petences, which empower the Union
to legislate and adopt legally binding
acts in this area. Member States con-
tinue to have the power to act in this
domain to the extent that the Union
has not exercised its competences.
The draft Constitution emphasises the
importance of participative democra-
cy and instructs the Union’s institu-
tions to promote the role of the social
partners at Union level and to facili-
tate their dialogue, while respecting
their autonomy.
The text fully integrates the Charter
of Fundamental Rights — solemnly
proclaimed at the margins of the
European Council of Nice on 7
December 2000 by the presidents of
the European Parliament, the
European Council and of the
Commission — into the future
Constitution. This means that it
becomes a direct source of
Community law, which is another
important reform with considerable
positive implications for the field of
employment and social affairs.
The charter largely does away with
the often arbitrary distinction
between economic, social and cultural
rights on the one hand, and civil and
political rights on the other. By recog-
nising the specific rights of the elderly,
of young people and of persons with
disabilities, as well as rights to educa-
tion, the right to seek work, the right
to information and consultation of
workers, the right of collective bar-
gaining and action, the right of access
to placement services, the right to
protection in the event of unfair dis-
missal, the right to fair and just work-
ing conditions, or the rights to access
to healthcare and to services of gener-
al economic interest, it will reinforce
the social dimension of the integration
process and serve as a driving force
for measures which seek to give prac-
tical effect to these principles.
As far as the more technical Part III of
the draft Constitution is concerned,
the explicit recognition of several prin-
ciples of general application should be
highlighted, some of which are of the
greatest relevance for employment
and social affairs. New ‘mainstreaming’
provisions stipulate that in all its activ-
ities, the Union ‘shall take into account
requirements linked to the promotion
of a high level of employment, the
guarantee of adequate social protec-
tion, the fight against social exclusion,
and a high level of education, training
and protection of human health.’ It
shall also aim ‘to eliminate inequalities,
and to promote equality,between men
and women’ and ‘combat discrimina-
tion based on sex, racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation’.
With regard to services of general eco-
nomic interest,‘to which all in the Union
attribute value as well as their role in
promoting social and territorial cohe-
sion’, the draft Constitution calls upon
the Union and its Member States to
‘take care that such services operate on
the basis of principles and conditions, in
particular economic and financial, which
enable them to fulfil their missions.’ As
another major innovation, it confers
powers upon the Union to define these
principles and conditions on the basis of
which the services of general economic
interest should operate.
The open method of coordination
(OMC) is introduced formally in sev-
eral policy domains, including employ-
ment policy, with the draft
Constitution stipulating that European
laws or framework laws — the con-
vention provided for a completely
new typology of legal acts — ‘may
establish incentive measures designed
to encourage cooperation between
Member States and to support their
action in the field of employment
through initiatives aimed at developing
exchanges of information and best
practices,providing comparative analy-
sis and advice as well as promoting
innovative approaches and evaluating
experiences, in particular by recourse
to pilot projects.’
Finally, it should also be noted that the
legislative procedures have been modi-
fied with regard to the coordination of
social security systems — the scope of
which has been formally extended to
the self-employed, migrant workers
and their dependants — and to non-
discrimination. As far as the latter is
concerned, the European Parliament
will have to give its consent to any
measure the Council intends to adopt
(Parliament is at present only consult-
ed). With regard to the former, the
normal co-decision procedure (which
is simplified and henceforth called the
‘legislative procedure’) will in principle
apply. However, where a member of
the Council considers that a draft
European law or framework law in this
field would affect fundamental aspects
of its social security system or the
financial balance of that system, it may
request that the matter be referred to
the European Council. In that case, the
procedure is suspended. After discus-
sion, the European Council, within four
months of this suspension,either refers
the draft back to the Council, which
terminates the suspension, or requests
the Commission to submit a new draft.
The Treaty establishing the
Constitution will enter into force on 1
November 2006, provided that all the
instruments of ratification have been
deposited, or, failing that, on the first
day of the second month following the
deposit of the instrument of ratifica-
tion by the last signatory State to take
this step.
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n ANNEX (A)
Main social provisions of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, as elaborated by the
European Convention (with the exception of Part II: the Charter of Fundamental Rights)
The Union’s values
Article I-2
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.These values are common to the Member States
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men
prevail.
The Union’s objectives
Article I-3
1.The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.
2.The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal
market where competition is free and undistorted.
3.The Union shall work for sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability,
a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and with a high level of pro-
tection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall
combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women
and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and
territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.The Union shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diver-
sity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.
4. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute
to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair
trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to strict
observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter.
5.The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred
upon it in the Constitution.
Categories of competence
Article I-12
(…)
3.The Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within arrangements as determined by
Part III, which the Union shall have competence to provide.
(…)
Areas of shared competence
Article I-14
(…)
2. Shared competence applies in the following principal areas:
(…)
(b) social policy, for the aspects defined in Part III,
(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion,
(…)
119
Review of legislation 2002–04 Chapter 4
The coordination of economic and employment policies
Article I-15
(…)
2. The Union shall take measures to ensure coordination of the employment policies of the Member States, in particu-
lar by defining guidelines for these policies.
3.The Union may take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States’ social policies.
The social partners and autonomous social dialogue
Article I-48
The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at Union level, taking into account the diversity of
national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy.The Tripartite Social
Summit for Growth and Employment shall contribute to social dialogue.
Equality between women and men
Article III-116
In all the activities referred to in this part, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between
women and men.
Social clause and social dialogue
Article III-117
In defining and implementing the policies and actions referred to in this part, the Union shall take into account require-
ments linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight
against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.
Anti-discrimination
Article III-118
In defining and implementing the policies and activities referred to in this part, the Union shall aim to combat discrimi-
nation based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
Services of general economic interest
Article III-122
Without prejudice to Articles I-5, III-166, III-167 and III-238, and given the place occupied by services of general economic
interest as services to which all in the Union attribute value as well as their role in promoting its social and territorial cohe-
sion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective competences and within the scope of application of
the Constitution, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, in particular econom-
ic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their missions. European laws shall establish these principles and set
these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States, in compliance with the Constitution, to com-
mission and to fund such services.
Non-discrimination
Article III-124
1.Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Constitution and within the limits of the powers assigned by it to
the Union, a European law or framework law of the Council may establish the measures needed to combat discrim-
ination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.The Council shall act
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, European laws or framework laws may establish basic principles for Union
incentive measures and define such measures, to support action taken by Member States in order to contribute to the
achievement of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, excluding any harmonisation of their laws and regulations.
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Free movement of workers
Article III-133
1. Workers shall have the right to move freely within the Union.
2. Any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuner-
ation and other conditions of work and employment shall be prohibited.
3 Workers shall have the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employ-
ment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which
shall be embodied in European regulations adopted by the Commission.
4.This article shall not apply to employment in the public service.
Article III-134
European laws or framework laws shall establish the measures needed to bring about freedom of movement for work-
ers, as defined in Article III-18.They shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee. Such
European laws or framework laws shall aim, in particular, to:
(a) ensure close cooperation between national employment services;
(b) abolish those administrative procedures and practices and those qualifying periods in respect of eligibility for avail-
able employment, whether resulting from national legislation or from agreements previously concluded between
Member States, the maintenance of which would form an obstacle to liberalisation of the movement of workers;
(c) abolish all such qualifying periods and other restrictions provided for either under national legislation or under
agreements previously concluded between Member States as impose on workers of other Member States condi-
tions regarding the free choice of employment other than those imposed on workers of the State concerned;
(d) set up appropriate machinery to bring offers of employment into touch with applications for employment and to
facilitate the achievement of a balance between supply and demand in the employment market in such a way as to
avoid serious threats to the standard of living and level of employment in the various regions and industries.
Article III-135
Member States shall, within the framework of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young workers.
Article III-136
1 In the field of social security, European laws or framework laws shall establish such measures as are necessary to
bring about freedom of movement for workers by making arrangements to secure for employed and self-employed
migrant workers and their dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit,
of all periods taken into account under the laws of the different countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.
2 Where a member of the Council considers that a draft European law or framework law referred to in paragraph 1
would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or
would affect the financial balance of that system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council.
In that case, the procedure referred to in Article III-396 shall be suspended.After discussion, the European Council
shall, within four months of this suspension, either:
(a) refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the procedure referred to in Article 
III-396, or
(b) request the Commission to submit a new proposal; in that case, the act originally proposed shall be deemed not to
have been adopted.
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Employment
Article III-203
The Union and the Member States shall, in accordance with this section, work towards developing a coordinated strat-
egy for employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets
responsive to economic change with a view to achieving the objectives defined in Article I-3.
Article III-204
1. Member States, through their employment policies, shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred
to in Article III-203 in a way consistent with the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States
and of the Union adopted pursuant to Article III-179(2).
2. Member States, having regard to national practices related to the responsibilities of management and labour, shall
regard promoting employment as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate their action in this respect
within the Council, in accordance with Article III-206.
Article III-205
1. The Union shall contribute to a high level of employment by encouraging cooperation between Member States and
by supporting and, if necessary, complementing their action. In doing so, the competences of the Member States shall
be respected.
2. The objective of a high level of employment shall be taken into consideration in the formulation and implementa-
tion of Union policies and activities.
Article III-206
1. The European Council shall each year consider the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions there-
on, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission.
2. On the basis of the conclusions of the European Council, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall
each year adopt guidelines which the Member States shall take into account in their employment policies. It shall
act after consulting the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Employment Committee.These guidelines shall be consistent with the broad guidelines adopted pursuant
to Article III-179(2).
3. Each Member State shall provide the Council and the Commission with an annual report on the principal measures
taken to implement its employment policy in the light of the guidelines for employment as referred to in paragraph 2.
4. The Council,on the basis of the reports referred to in paragraph 3 and having received the views of the Employment
Committee, shall each year carry out an examination of the implementation of the employment policies of the
Member States in the light of the guidelines for employment. The Council, on a recommendation from the
Commission, may adopt recommendations which it shall address to Member States.
5. On the basis of the results of that examination, the Council and the Commission shall make a joint annual report
to the European Council on the employment situation in the Union and on the implementation of the guidelines
for employment.
Article III-207
European laws or framework laws may establish incentive measures designed to encourage cooperation between
Member States and to support their action in the field of employment through initiatives aimed at developing exchanges
of information and best practices, providing comparative analysis and advice as well as promoting innovative approaches
and evaluating experiences, in particular by recourse to pilot projects.They shall be adopted after consultation with the
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. Such European laws or framework laws shall not
include harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
Article III-208
The Council shall, by a simple majority, adopt a European decision establishing an Employment Committee with adviso-
ry status to promote coordination between Member States on employment and labour market policies. It shall act after
consulting the European Parliament.The tasks of the Committee shall be:
(a) to monitor the employment situation and employment policies in the Union and the Member States;
(b) without prejudice to Article III-344, to formulate opinions at the request of either the Council or the Commission
or on its own initiative, and to contribute to the preparation of the Council proceedings referred to in Article
III-206.
In fulfilling its mandate, the Committee shall consult the social partners. Each Member State and the Commission shall
appoint two members of the Committee.
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Social policy
Article III-209
The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social
Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to
make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue
between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the
combating of exclusion.To this end the Union and the Member States shall act taking account of the diverse forms of
national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the
Union economy.
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the internal market, which will favour
the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in the Constitution and from the
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action of the Member States.
Article III-210
1 With a view to achieving the objectives of Article III-209, the Union shall support and complement the activities of
the Member States in the following fields:
(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers’ health and safety;
(b) working conditions;
(c) social security and social protection of workers;
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated;
(e) the information and consultation of workers;
(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-determination, sub-
ject to paragraph 6;
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory;
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article III-283;
(i) equality between women and men with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work;
(j) the combating of social exclusion;
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c).
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) European laws or framework laws may establish measures designed to encourage cooperation between Member
States through initiatives aimed at improving knowledge, developing exchanges of information and best practices,
promoting innovative approaches and evaluating experiences, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regula-
tions of the Member States;
(b) in the fields referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (i), European framework laws may establish minimum requirements for
gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States.
Such European framework laws shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which
would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. In all cases, such European
laws or framework laws shall be adopted after consultation of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic
and Social Committee.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, in the fields referred to in paragraph 1(c), (d), (f) and (g),European laws or frame-
work laws shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, the Committee
of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee.The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, adopt
a European decision making the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to paragraph 1(d), (f) and (g). It shall act unan-
imously after consulting the European Parliament.
4. A Member State may entrust management and labour, at their joint request, with the implementation of European
framework laws adopted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 or, where appropriate, with the implementation of
European regulations or decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-212.
In this case, it shall ensure that, no later than the date on which a European framework law must be transposed, or a
European regulation or decision implemented, management and labour have introduced the necessary measures by
agreement, the Member State concerned being required to take any necessary measure enabling it at any time to be in
a position to guarantee the results imposed by that framework law, regulation or decision.
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5. The European laws and framework laws adopted pursuant to this article:
(a) shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and
must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium of such systems;
(b) shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compat-
ible with the Constitution.
6. This article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.
Article III-211
1. The Commission shall promote the consultation of management and labour at Union level and shall adopt any rel-
evant measure to facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission shall con-
sult management and labour on the possible direction of Union action.
3. If, after the consultation referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission considers Union action desirable, it shall con-
sult management and labour on the content of the envisaged proposal.Management and labour shall forward to the
Commission an opinion or, where appropriate, a recommendation.
4. On the occasion of the consultation referred to in paragraph 2 and 3, management and labour may inform the
Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Article III-212(1).The duration of the procedure
shall not exceed nine months, unless the management and labour concerned and the Commission decide jointly to
extend it.
Article III-212
1. Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Union level may lead to contractual rela-
tions, including agreements.
2. Agreements concluded at Union level shall be implemented either in accordance with the procedures and practices
specific to management and labour and the Member States or, in matters covered by Article III-210, at the joint
request of the signatory parties, by European regulations or decisions adopted by the Council on a proposal from
the Commission.The European Parliament shall be informed.Where the agreement in question contains one or
more provisions relating to one of the areas for which unanimity is required pursuant to Article III-210(3), the
Council shall act unanimously.
Article III-213
With a view to achieving the objectives of Article III-209 and without prejudice to the other provisions of the
Constitution, the Commission shall encourage cooperation between the Member States and facilitate the coordination
of their action in all social policy fields under this section, particularly in matters relating to:
(a) employment;
(b) labour law and working conditions;
(c) basic and advanced vocational training;
(d) social security;
(e) prevention of occupational accidents and diseases;
(f) occupational hygiene;
(g) the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and workers.
To this end, the Commission shall act in close contact with Member States by making studies, delivering opinions and
arranging consultations both on problems arising at national level and on those of concern to international organisations,
in particular initiatives aiming at the establishment of guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best prac-
tice, and the preparation of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation.The European Parliament shall
be kept fully informed. Before delivering the opinions provided for in this article, the Commission shall consult the
Economic and Social Committee.
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Article III-214
1 Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for female and male workers for equal work or work
of equal value is applied.
2. For the purpose of this article,‘pay’ means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consider-
ation,whether in cash or in kind,which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from
his employer. Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
3. European laws or framework laws shall establish measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal oppor-
tunities and equal treatment of women and men in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle
of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.They shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and
Social Committee.
4. With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between women and men in working life, the principle of equal
treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advan-
tages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or com-
pensate for disadvantages in professional careers.
Article III-215
Member States shall endeavour to maintain the existing equivalence between paid holiday schemes.
Article III-216
The Commission shall draw up a report each year on progress in achieving the objectives of Article III-209, including
the demographic situation in the Union. It shall forward the report to the European Parliament, the Council and the
Economic and Social Committee.
Article III-217
The Council shall, by a simple majority, adopt a European decision establishing a Social Protection Committee with advi-
sory status to promote cooperation on social protection policies between Member States and with the Commission.
The Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament.The tasks of the Committee shall be:
(a) to monitor the social situation and the development of social protection policies in the Member States and within
the Union;
(b) to promote exchanges of information, experience and good practice between Member States and with the
Commission;
(c) without prejudice to Article III-344, to prepare reports, formulate opinions or undertake other work within the
scope of its powers, at the request of either the Council or the Commission or on its own initiative.
In fulfilling its mandate, the Committee shall establish appropriate contacts with management and labour.
Each Member State and the Commission shall appoint two members of the Committee.
Article III-218
The Commission shall include a separate chapter on social developments within the Union in its annual report to the
European Parliament.
The European Parliament may invite the Commission to draw up reports on any particular problems concerning social
conditions.
Article III-219
1. In order to improve employment opportunities for workers in the internal market and to contribute thereby to rais-
ing the standard of living, a European Social Fund is hereby established; it shall aim to render the employment of work-
ers easier and to increase their geographical and occupational mobility within the Union, and to facilitate their adap-
tation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in particular through vocational training and retrain-
ing.
2.The Commission shall administer the Fund. It shall be assisted in this task by a Committee presided over by a Member
of the Commission and composed of representatives of Member States, trade unions and employers’ organisations.
3. European laws shall establish implementing measures relating to the Fund. Such laws shall be adopted after consulta-
tion of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee.
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n ANNEX (B)
Main social provisions of Part II of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union)
Protection of personal data
Article II-68
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned
or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.
Right to education
Article II-71
1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training.
(…)
Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work
Article II-75
1. Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation.
2. Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment
and to provide services in any Member State.
3. Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to
working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.
Non-discrimination
Article II-81
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or
sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2. Within the scope of application of the Constitution and without prejudice to any of its specific provisions, any dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.
Equality between women and men
Article II-83
Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.
The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages
in favour of the under-represented sex.
Integration of persons with disabilities
Article II-86
The Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure
their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community.
Workers’ right to information and consultation within their undertaking
Article II-87
Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good
time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.
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Right of collective bargaining and action
Article II-88
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and
practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts
of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.
Right of access to placement services
Article II-89
Everyone has the right of access to a free placement service.
Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal
Article II-90
Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws
and practices.
Fair and just working conditions
Article II-91
1. Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity.
2. Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an
annual period of paid leave.
Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work
Article II-92
The employment of children is prohibited.The minimum age of admission to employment may not be lower than the
minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable to young people and except
for limited derogations.
Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against econom-
ic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to inter-
fere with their education.
Family and professional life
Article II-93
1. The family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection.
2. To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a reason con-
nected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of
a child.
Social security and social assistance
Article II-94
1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protec-
tion in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employ-
ment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.
2. Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advan-
tages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.
3. In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing
assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the
rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.
 
Healthcare
Article II-95
Everyone has the right of access to preventive healthcare and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the
conditions established by national laws and practices.A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the
definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.
Access to services of general economic interest
Article II-96
The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and
practices, in accordance with the constitution, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union.
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DIRECTIVES BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
1. LABOUR LAW
Directives in force:
80/987 – Insolvency employer C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
91/383 – Temporary employment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
91/533 – Written statement C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
93/104 – Working time C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C
94/33 – Protecting young people at work C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
94/45 – European works councils  (97/74 - UK) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C NR C C C C C C C C C C
96/71 – Posting of workers (deadline: 16.12.1999) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C N C C C C
97/74 – Extension 94/45 to UK (deadline: 15.12.1999) C - C - C - - - C - - - C - C - - - - - - - - - -
97/81 – Part-time work (deadline: 20.1.2000)  (98/23-UK) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C NR C C C C C C C C C C
98/23 – Extension 97/81 to UK (deadline: 7.4.2000) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C - - - - - - - - - -
98/50 – Transfers of undertakings 2 (deadline: 17.7.2001) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
98/59 – Collective redundancies – codification – OJ 98.225 16-21 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
99/63 – Working time of seafarers (deadline: 30.6.2002) C C C C C N C N C C N C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
99/70 – Fixed-term work (deadline: 10.7.2001) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
00/34 – Excluded sectors 93/104 (date transposition: 1.8.2003) IC C C N C IC N C N IC C C C C IC C C N C C C C C C C
00/79 – Agreement on working time civil aviation (1.12.2003) C C IC N C IC N N IC N N N C N IC C C C C N C N C C C
01/23 – Transfer of undertakings (codification 77/187 et 98/50)
Directives for which the transposition deadline has not yet expired:
01/86 – Involvement employees - European company statute (8.10.2004)
02/14 – Information and consultation of employees (23.3.2005)
02/74 – Insolvency employer (modif. 80/987) (8.10.2005)
DIRECTIVES BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
2. EQUAL TREATMENT MEN AND WOMEN
Directives in force:
75/117 – Equal pay C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
76/207 – Access to employment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
79/7 – Social security C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
86/378 – Occupational social security schemes C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C N C C C
92/85 – Pregnant workers C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
96/34 – Parental leave   (97/75 - UK) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C NR C C C C C C C C C C
96/97 – Occupational social security schemes (modification 86/378) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C N C N N C C C
97/75 – Extension 96/34 au RU (deadline: 15.12.1999) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C - - - - - - - - -
97/80 – Burden of proof (deadline: 1.1.2001)   (UK: 98/52) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C NR C C C C C C C C C C
98/52 – Extension 97/80 to UK (22.07.2001) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C - - - - - - - - -
Directives for which the transposition deadline has not yet expired:
02/73 – Modification Dir 76/207 (deadline: 5.10.2005)
DIRECTIVES BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
3. NON-DISCRIMINATION/EQUAL TREATMENT ARTICLE 13 EC
Directives in force:
00/43 – Race - (deadline: 19.7.2003) IC C N N C C N C N C N N IC C C N C N C N C C C C C
00/78 – General framework equal treatment in employment & occupation (2.12.2003) IC C N N C C N C N C N C IC C C N C N C C C C C C C
D
DDIRECTIVES BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
4. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
Directives in force:
68/360 – Restrictions on movement and residence C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
98/49 – Supplementary pensions rights (deadline: 25.1.2002) C C C N C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
DIRECTIVES BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
5. HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK
Directives in force:
83/477 – Asbestos C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
86/188 – Noise C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
89/391 – Framework C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
89/654 – Workplaces C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
89/655 – Work equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
89/656 – Personal protective equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
90/269 – Manual handling of loads C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
90/270 – Display screen equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
90/394 – Carcinogens C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C
91/322 – Indicative limit values C C C NR NR NR C C C NR C NR C C C C C C C C C C C C C
91/382 – Asbestos C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/29 – Medical assistance on board of vessels C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/57 – Construction C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
92/58 – Health and safety signs C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/91 – Drilling C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C
92/104 – Mining C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C
93/103 – Fishing vessels C C C C C C C C NR C NR C C C C C N C C C C C N NR C
95/63 – Amendment of work equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
97/42 – Amendment  of carcinogens C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C
98/24 – Chemical agents 5 (deadline: 5.5.2001) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C C C C N C C
99/38 – Amendment of carcinogens (29.4.2003) C N N C C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C C C C N C C
TABLE 4.1: TRANSPOSITION OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES, JULY 2004
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HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK
Directives in force (continued):
99/92 – Explosive atmospheres (deadline 30.6.2003) C C C C C C C C N C N C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
00/39 – First list of indicative occupation exposure limit values chemical agents
Commission directive (deadline: 31.12.2001) C C C C C N C C C C N C C C C C C C C N C C C C C
00/54 – Biological agents (7th - 89.391) [codification] C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C N C C
Directives for which the transposition deadline has not yet expired:
2001/45 Second amendment of work equipment (19.7.2004) C C C C C C C C C
02/44 – Vibration (deadline: 06.7.2005)
03/10 – Noise (15.2.2006) C
2003/18  Second amendment of asbestos (15.04.06)
DIRECTIVES BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
% national legislation communicated (1.1.2004) 91.8 91.8 89.8 89.8 93.9 87.8 91.8 91.8 87.8 91.8 81.6 91.8 93.9 93.9 89.8
% transposition lacking (1.1.2004) 8.2 8.2 10.2 10.2 6.1 12.2 8.2 8.2 12.2 8.2 18.4 8.2 6.1 6.1 10.2
C = Communication of national legislation
D = Derogation
IC = Incomplete/partial communication
NR = Directive not relevant to a particular country
N = No communication of national legislation
n 1. Introduction
Across Europe, companies and their
employees are facing constant pres-
sures to adapt to change and to
restructure their operations. These
pressures stem from the intensifica-
tion of international competition, the
liberalisation of markets, currency
fluctuations, technological progress,
reduced government support, and the
shift from an industrial to a knowl-
edge and information-based economy.
Adaptation to change and restructur-
ing are often essential to the survival
of firms. Restructuring at company
level can take a number of forms:
mergers and acquisitions (M&As);
rationalisations and closures of sites
and divisions in large companies;
moves into new lines of business; an
increase in sub-contracting of non-
core operations; and internal changes,
such as the move towards devolved
business units.
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, as
part of the so-called Lisbon strategy
the EU has set itself the objective of
becoming ‘the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world, capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and bet-
ter jobs and greater social cohesion’
by the year 2010. Economic and social
renewal is fundamental to this strate-
gy and strengthening competitiveness
and cohesion are its dual guiding prin-
ciples. The Commission therefore
advocates a positive approach to
change. Corporate restructuring is a
driving force for change. However the
Commission’s view is that change
needs to be anticipated and managed.
Properly taking into account and
addressing the social impact of
restructuring greatly contributes to
its acceptance, thereby enhancing its
positive potential as well as lowering
its human and societal costs. Fostering
and facilitating structural change,
notably by easing its social conse-
quences, is now explicitly recognised
by EU industrial policy as one of its
key objectives (120).
The form restructuring takes is
diverse and is influenced by national
institutional frameworks among
which there remains a high degree of
distinctiveness even in an era in which
the globalisation of economic activity
has increased.Across the Union there
are marked differences in the way that
firms are financed and owned and also
in the way that managements are
required to inform and consult their
workforces and deal with other
aspects of the industrial relations sys-
tem. In relation to corporate owner-
ship patterns, companies based in sys-
tems in which relations between
owners and managers are generally
distant and where financial perform-
ance is used as the primary indicator
of the health of the firm are those
most likely to undertake rapid and
radical restructuring. In contrast, com-
panies, where owner-management
relations are stable and close, are
more likely to restructure incremen-
tally. In terms of industrial relations
systems, firms in countries that have
deregulated labour markets and
where employees have relatively little
scope to exercise their ‘voice’, tend to
restructure their operations quickly
and dramatically. This contrasts with
the more consensual and gradual
approach required of firms with a
strong tradition of ‘social dialogue’.
Although rooted in diverse institu-
tional frameworks, companies in the
EU are facing similar pressures to
adapt to change. As a consequence,
some common trends can be identi-
fied across countries in the extent
and forms of restructuring at firm
level. However, in spite of these con-
vergent pressures, a high degree of
diversity persists with national indus-
trial relations institutions proving to
be resilient.The process of change is
in fact rather uneven and occurring at
differing paces across countries. In
addition, there is a high degree of
diversity within countries between
international and domestic firms, and
between large and small firms.
This suggests that the ways in which
company restructuring occurs reflects
a complex interaction of factors at
different levels and that national level
systems are not, therefore, the sole
shapers of the way that firms respond
to pressures to restructure their
operations. Firstly, they are supple-
mented by rules agreed at European
level through, for example, European
works councils and transnational
information and consultation proce-
dures, as well as cooperation at sub-
national level, for example, with local
and regional authorities. Other
European influences are felt through
common rules on competition, merg-
ers and acquisitions. Secondly, it is not
only rules — whether national or
European — which matter in deter-
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Corporate ownership and industrial
relations in the EU: national trends and
European policy developments (119)
(119) The first part of this chapter on the interaction between corporate ownership and industrial relations is based on a contribution
by Dr Tony Edwards of King's College, University of London.
(120) Communication from the Commission, 'Fostering structural change: an industrial policy for an enlarged Europe', COM(2004) 274
final, 20 April 2004. 
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mining how firms respond; the role of
individuals — among both manage-
ment in influencing shareholder atti-
tudes and trade unions/employee rep-
resentatives in mediating between
employees and management — is also
important.
This chapter has two main purposes.
Firstly, it examines the interaction
between corporate ownership pat-
terns and industrial relations and
trends in company-level industrial
relations in the EU. In view of the rel-
atively recent transformation of the
economic systems of the new
Member States, this section focuses
mainly on EU-15. Secondly, the chap-
ter seeks to provide an overview of
EU policy developments and
describes the main initiatives taken by
the European institutions and the
European social partners relating to
company level industrial relations and
corporate social responsibility, with a
view to promoting the anticipation
and responsible management of
change. The chapter concludes by
exploring some of the implications of
these policies for company-level
industrial relations in the new
Member States.
n 2. The interaction 
between corporate 
ownership patterns 
and industrial 
relations
Within any national business system,
there is a degree of interdependence
between institutions in various
spheres of the economy, with the
nature of the institutions in one
sphere influencing the nature of those
in others.
Corporate governance is usually
understood as the system by which
companies are directed and con-
trolled. In the light of the recent corpo-
rate scandals, it is now a major global
issue and poor corporate governance
performance by some companies has
greatly undermined confidence in cap-
ital markets. Within the EU, Member
States have different systems of corpo-
rate governance, which, to some
extent, reflect their different cultures.
Furthermore, views differ in Member
States with regard to the roles of cor-
porations and the way in which indus-
try should be financed. In recent years,
corporate governance has been a
growing subject of debate.
In relation to restructuring and
change, of particular importance is
how corporate ownership patterns
inter-relate with industrial relations
and employee and union representa-
tion in particular.With regard to cor-
porate ownership patterns, one dis-
tinction that is often made is between
‘insider’ systems in which there are
close and stable relations between
owners and senior managers, and
‘outsider’ systems in which share-
holders have fluid and distant rela-
tions with managers. The first group
contains a number of variants: the
German system where banks are key
players in owning and controlling
firms; the Swedish system where
investment foundations play a similar
role; and France where the State has
often played a key role in the strate-
gies of large firms, as again became
clear in the recent rescue plan for
Alstom.As argued above, in these sys-
tems, responses to the pressures of
globalisation and intensified competi-
tion tend to be incremental and
evolve over time. Moreover, restruc-
turing is carried out in such a way that
allows a range of ‘voices’ to be heard,
particularly those of employees
through statutory rights to be repre-
sented on company boards or
through meaningful involvement in
decision-making by employees’ repre-
sentatives entitled to be informed and
consulted on major changes, for
example. Thus insider arrangements
tend to be compatible with industrial
relations systems that afford scope
for employee consultation and
involvement.
In outsider systems, on the other
hand, of which the UK and Ireland are
examples,company level restructuring
tends to be more radical and is car-
ried out more quickly. Moreover, the
way that outsider systems are struc-
tured gives shareholders greater influ-
ence over management decisions than
other groups are able to exercise and,
consequently, restructuring is often
geared towards maximising ‘share-
holder value’ without consideration
for other stakeholders’ value. As a
consequence, outsider systems have
tended to coincide with industrial
relations systems that afford employ-
ees fewer and weaker ‘voice’ mecha-
nisms within companies than has been
the case in insider systems.
The corporate ownership patterns in
Europe loosely grouped under the
insider category are evolving in differ-
ent directions and at varying paces.
There are a number of forces for
change: greater foreign ownership,
particularly in the form of financial
institutions from other countries; the
internationalisation of domestic firms,
including the raising of finance in
other countries; privatisation, which
has increased the exposure of for-
merly State-controlled firms to finan-
cial institutions; and reforms to the
rules of corporate governance, which
may be introduced through changes
to merger and takeover codes.These
changes, however uneven, present a
challenge to national systems of
industrial relations that have rested
on stable and close relations between
owners and managers, as changes in
corporate ownership patterns appear
to have some knock-on effects on the
nature of industrial relations prac-
tices.The nature of corporate owner-
ship patterns and industrial relations
systems in the EU, and the extent to
which these are changing are consid-
ered in the next section.
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n 3. The diversity of 
national corporate 
ownership patterns 
and industrial 
relations frameworks
Considerable diversity is evident in
the nature of the national business
systems within the EU. In the follow-
ing section, the distinction between
insider and outsider systems of cor-
porate ownership mentioned above is
used. With regard to industrial rela-
tions, a distinction is made between
those systems that are characterised
by a strong degree of social partner-
ship, those systems in which employ-
ee influence is exerted through
unions that engage in adversarial rela-
tions with employers, and those sys-
tems that allow for relatively little
employee voice. Countries are cate-
gorised according to these distinc-
tions and also by the degree to which
they are changing.
It should, however, be pointed out
that reality is more complex. This
means that countries characterised
as possessing a tradition of social
partnership also have some degree of
adversarial bargaining,while examples
of companies with strong social part-
nership can be found in countries
considered to have weaker traditions
of employee involvement. Although
this distinction simplifies some of the
complexities of national industrial
relations systems, it does never-
theless serve to highlight important
differences.
3.1. Stable insider systems with
strong social partnership
Three countries can clearly be char-
acterised as combining an insider sys-
tem of corporate ownership with a
tradition of social partnership that
shows little signs of change. Austria
is one of these. Ownership is highly
concentrated in Austria, with the gov-
ernment and families featuring as key
shareholders in many firms. As Table
5.1 shows, 86 % of publicly quoted
companies have an owner who con-
trols at least a quarter of the shares,
the threshold that tends to make it
difficult for another firm to launch a
takeover, while 68 % of firms have an
owner controlling more than half of
the shares (Table 5.3). In Luxem-
bourg, too, there is a system of stable
and concentrated ownership, with
‘collective investment funds’ and the
State being the key owners of firms.
Denmark is another illustration; the
high proportion of family owned cor-
porations (see Table 5.4) is a key
aspect of the system of ‘personal
stakeholder capitalism’. Among those
Danish companies that are not family-
owned, the distinction between differ-
ent types of shares — those with spe-
cial voting rights and those without (A
and B shares) — reinforces the con-
centration of control amongst insid-
ers. Takeovers, particularly hostile
ones, are rare in all three countries,
meaning that there is no large ‘market
for corporate control’, nor are there
many signs of significant change
towards the outsider system.
All three countries combine the insid-
er system of corporate ownership
with a well-entrenched system of
social partnership. Rights for a range
of stakeholders, as opposed to simply
shareholders, mean that restructuring
is influenced to some extent by the
concerns of employees. For example,
when a firm in Austria wants to
engage in restructuring that adversely
affects employees, they must first
institute a ‘social plan’ that is arrived
at through a process of consultation
with employee representatives and
sets out how the company intends to
deal with issues such as redundancies
and redeployment. In all three coun-
tries (Austria, Luxembourg and
Denmark) there are formal provisions
allowing employee representatives to
sit on the board of companies and to
therefore exert influence over strate-
gic decisions. The importance of the
stakeholder tradition shows little sign
of being eroded in any of the three
countries, and the systems are all
characterised by a good degree of sta-
bility. Hence, these three countries
can be characterised as stable insider
systems with strong traditions of
social partnership. Accordingly, the
way that restructuring occurs is pri-
marily through gradual and incremen-
tal changes arrived at largely through
consensus.
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TABLE 5.1: LISTED COMPANIES WITH A BLOCKING MINORITY 
OF AT LEAST 25 %
Share (in %)  of all listed companies
Belgium 93.6
Austria 86.0
Germany 82.5
Netherlands 80.4
Spain 67.1
Italy 65.8
Sweden 64.2
UK 15.9
United States – NYSE 7.6
United States – Nasdaq 5.4
Source: M. Becht (2004), ‘Reciprocity in takeovers’, in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter and E.
Wymeersch (eds.),Modern company and takeover law in Europe,Oxford,Oxford University Press.
3.2. Evolving insider systems
with strong social
partnership
A further five countries share many of
the same characteristics as those dis-
cussed in the previous section but dif-
fer in that they are experiencing more
significant changes in the nature of the
corporate ownership patterns and
industrial relations frameworks and
more radical patterns of restructur-
ing. One example is Sweden, a coun-
try that is characterised by a high
degree of concentration. Table 5.1
shows that very nearly two thirds of
companies have one shareholder con-
trolling at least a quarter of the
shares, with family-based foundations
and the State being key owners of
firms (see Table 5.4). The links
between owners and management in
Swedish firms have tended to be close
and stable.The distinction between A
and B shares noted in the case of
Denmark is also very important in
Sweden. There are pressures for
change, particularly through the inter-
nationalisation of large Swedish com-
panies, many of which are listed on
foreign stock markets and have locat-
ed key strategic functions abroad.
Perhaps more significantly, many
Swedish companies have made
sweeping cuts in response to changes
in product market conditions. But
even in these cases, the way that these
processes are handled within Sweden
is still strongly influenced by the
Swedish system of social partnership
and collective bargaining, which
includes worker representation in the
boards of companies and strong con-
sultation rights.
Finland is another example of an
evolving insider system with a strong
tradition of social partnership.
Traditionally, families and the State
have had a key role in many industri-
al groups within Finland (see Table
5.4), forming close and stable linkages
TABLE 5.4: OWNERSHIP OF THE HUNDRED LARGEST COMPANIES 
IN ELEVEN EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES
Dispersed
ownership
Dominant
ownership
Family-
owned
Foreign-
owned Cooperative
Government-
owned
Austria 0 7 25 38 10 20
Belgium 4 20 6 61 3 6
Denmark 10 9 30 23 17 11
Finland 12 25 23 11 10 19
France 16 28 15 16 3 22
Germany 9 30 26 22 3 10
Italy 0 22 20 29 0 29
Netherlands 23 16 7 34 13 7
Spain 6 22 8 45 5 14
Sweden 4 31 18 14 12 21
UK 61 11 6 18 1 3
Source: T. Pedersen and S. Thomsen (1997), ‘European patterns of corporate ownership: A 12-country study’, Journal of
International Business Studies,Vol. 28.
TABLE 5.3: VOTING POWER CONCENTRATION:
% OF COMPANIES FOR WHICH THE LARGEST VOTING POWER
STAKE IS IN GIVEN RANGE
0–25 26–50 51–75 76–100
Austria 14.0 18.0 54.0 14.0
Germany 17.5 18.3 25.5 38.7
Netherlands 35.8 24.8 19.7 19.7
United States – NYSE 94.8 3.5 1.5 0.2
United States – Nasdaq 92.4 3.5 1.5 0.6
Source: Becht and Roell (1999), op. cit.
TABLE 5.2: MEDIAN SIZE OF THE LARGEST ULTIMATE OUTSIDE
VOTING BLOCK FOR LISTED INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
Median size in % of total votes
Italy 54.5
Germany 52.1
Austria 52.0
Belgium 50.6
Netherlands 43.5
Spain 34.2
France (CAC40) 20.0
UK 9.9
NB:The United States (both NYSE and Nasdaq) were below the 5 % disclosure threshold)
Source: M. Becht & A. Roell (1999), ‘Blockholdings in Europe: an international comparison’,
European Economic Review,Vol. 43.
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with management in the firms that
they owned. This has been comple-
mented by the system of co-determi-
nation, which has acted as a brake on
the speed of change and requires
workers to be consulted meaningful-
ly.Also in Finland, employees are rep-
resented in the boards of companies
employing more than 150 employees.
However, the changes in Finland
appear to have been more marked
than in Sweden, driven primarily by
the sharp increase in the sharehold-
ing in Finnish companies by American
pension funds but also by foreign
direct investment. In some foreign-
owned firms there are instances of
restructuring being carried out with
only minimal compliance with the
system of co-determination.
A similar picture of an evolving insid-
er system is evident in Belgium.
Traditionally,one of the key character-
istics of corporate ownership is what
is known as the ‘shareholding cas-
cades’, at the centre of which are
holding companies and family-based
foundations, and to a lesser extent
industrial companies. Within the cas-
cades, ‘stakes are concentrated into
powerful control blocks through busi-
ness group structures and voting
pacts’ (121). One consequence of this
ownership structure is the limited
‘market for corporate control’ since it
is difficult for an outsider to buy into
the ‘cascades’ unless she has the
agreement of firms within these
arrangements. In addition, a number
of features of Belgian law restrict the
ability of companies to launch hostile
takeover attempts for other compa-
nies, and many leading shareholders
acquire legal instruments that enable
them to avoid undesired takeovers. In
the industrial relations sphere, there is
still a strong basis for social partner-
ship. One source of this is that works
councils have to be consulted before
any change affecting the enterprise is
taken. Recently, there have been a
number of instances of very severe
restructuring in Belgium, some of
which has occurred within foreign-
owned firms, particularly the notori-
ous Renault-Vilvoorde case. The
extremely high proportion of foreign
ownership (see Table 5.4) has made
this an emerging trend. Moreover,
among Belgian firms there is some
evidence that share values are more
important drivers of restructuring
than general economic conditions.
While this has caused important
changes in the Belgian business sys-
tem, there is a continuing tradition of
social concertation. In sum, restruc-
turing is evident in Belgium, but the
increased attention to shareholder
value has not removed the key char-
acteristics of the Belgian system of
corporate ownership and social con-
certation continues to shape the way
in which restructuring takes place.
Many observers see Germany as the
classic case of the insider model.The
role of the banks in owning and con-
trolling firms is one distinctive ele-
ment. Traditionally, the big national
banks held a significant stake in many
large German firms, but this has
diminished in recent years. For
instance, between 1992 and 1999, the
share of chairpersons of supervisory
boards of 40 large German compa-
nies who were bank representatives
fell from 44 to 23 % (122). In addition,
under corporate governance guide-
lines adopted in 2002, executives are
encouraged to hold no more than five
supervisory board seats. For the
development of small and medium-
sized firms — the Mittelstand — the
regional banks have remained impor-
tant. In general, the role of the banks
is not confined to their role as share-
holders or lenders, however, since
many small shareholders sign over
their voting rights to the banks who
exercise them by proxy. In addition,
there is a high degree of ownership by
founding families and agencies of the
State (see Table 5.4).Cross-sharehold-
ings between companies are also a
key element of the German system.
While the ‘productionist, long-term,
consensus orientation’ (123) remains a
feature of the German system, there
are some signs of change. One of
these is the beginning of a move
towards hostile takeovers. The
takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone
in February 2000 was a dramatic
change, as it was the first successful
hostile takeover by a foreign firm and
demonstrated that there was no
political defence against such
attempts. Other signs of change
include the emergence of investor
relations departments along Anglo-
Saxon lines in many large companies;
the gradual weakening of the struc-
tures of cross-shareholdings and
interlocking directorates; and the
rhetoric of shareholder value and 
the adoption of international (or
American) accounting standards 
in large, internationalised firms.
However, these changes are quite lim-
ited as there is a very narrow base for
a shareholder value economy in
Germany because of the limited role
of the equity market for company
financing and the central pillars of
German corporate ownership — the
dominating role of banks, the system
of co-determination (with board rep-
resentation for workers in companies
with more than 500 employees and a
strong bargaining position for works
councils on some of the main issues
related to restructuring) and the
company-centred management sys-
tem — are not crumbling. Recent
studies among Germany’s 100 largest
firms have shown that the process of
internationalisation has drawn the
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(121) EIRO (2002) ‘Industrial restructuring: the impact of variations in forms of corporate governance — Belgium’, www.eiro.euro-
found.eu.int/2002/09/word/be0207304s.doc, 2002.
(122) M. Höppner (2003), Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?, Frankfort a/M, Campus Verlag — Reihe Max Planck Institut, 138.
(123) U. Jurgens, K. Naumann and J. Rupp (2000), ‘Shareholder value in an adverse environment: the German case’, Economy and
Society, Vol. 29.
works councils deeper in a process of
social dialogue and negotiation with
management and that most works
councils have been ready to accept
the need for adjustment (124).
While corporate ownership in the
Netherlands is generally quite con-
centrated as is characteristic of insid-
er systems (see Table 5.2), the form
and nature of the ownership of Dutch
companies varies greatly according to
their size. Among large firms, there
has been a very significant rise in the
shareholdings of foreign investors;
recent estimates suggest that over
half of the shares in quoted Dutch
firms lie in foreign hands. However,
among small and medium-sized firms
research shows that the majority
remains family-owned. Even when we
exclude small and medium-sized firms
from the analysis, this holds true:
among firms with more than 100
employees, 50 % are family-
owned (125). Thus the changes in own-
ership have mainly occurred in large
firms. As is the case in Germany,
takeovers have not been a common
feature of the Dutch economy. The
first hostile takeover attempt took
place as recently as 1988, and almost
all stock market listed companies are
protected against hostile takeovers
through statutory measures such as
issuing shares with no voting rights
attached, issuing priority shares to
entrusted officials, and issuing pre-
ferred shares to a friendly third party,
usually a foundation. A contrast with
the British outsider system shows
through in the case of Shell; the 40 %
of the company owned by the British
group Shell Transport and Trading is
traded widely and there is no distinc-
tion between shares, whereas the
60 % accounted for by Royal Dutch
Petroleum has priority shares that
make up only a very small proportion
of the capital but have special voting
rights (126). However, in the past 10
years the positive attitude towards
these protective measures has
changed and some investors like pen-
sion funds have started to press listed
companies to lower their barriers to
hostile takeovers and have had some
success. As in Germany, the network
ties between banks and industry,
based on ‘interlocking positions’ of a
small elite on the supervisory boards
of Dutch firms, have loosened and the
position of the commercial banks
have become less central (127). In 2003,
a voluntary code was adopted in
order to limit the number of board-
room positions any one person can
occupy. One other notable sign of
change is the trend towards managers
of large companies being rewarded
with large packages of share options
and other profit-related bonuses. In
some Dutch companies, active on for-
eign markets, this has become the pri-
mary way in which managerial pay is
constituted and created considerable
tension in the overall policy of wage
moderation.
One check on the influence of share-
holder value in the Netherlands has
been the legal basis for employee rep-
resentation.Works councils have the
right to discuss and give advice on all
major decisions, including investments
and restructuring. In some cases, this
means in fact a temporary veto
power for a period during which the
company and workers’ representa-
tives should seek an agreement. If the
company does not follow this advice,
the works council can challenge the
decision in court. According to law,
the works council is entitled to rec-
ommend or oppose the designation
of all the members of the supervisory
board in large companies, a power
which it exercises on an equal footing
with shareholders. A new merger
code (giving unions the right to be
informed and consulted) was intro-
duced in 2001.While this did not fun-
damentally change the rights of
employees, it provided greater clarifi-
cation on employees’ rights in this
respect.To summarise, there has been
a shift in the balance of power within
corporations in the Netherlands that
has increased the pressure on man-
agement to carry out restructuring in
order to deliver greater shareholder
value, though this does not constitute
radical change. The continuing tradi-
tion of social partnership provides
employees with significant rights to
influence the nature of corporate
restructuring.
3.3. Evolving insider systems
with adversarial
management-union
relations
The third group of countries are sim-
ilar to the second insofar as they pos-
sess insider systems of corporate
ownership that are evolving, but differ
from them in that there is not such a
well-embedded system of social part-
nership. Rather, employee influence
over restructuring tends to be mainly
exercised through trade unions in col-
lective bargaining. Portugal and
Greece are both examples of this
group. In Greece, the State, families
and private foundations are key own-
ers of firms and takeovers are rare. In
Portugal, the State is also a key player
and there is hardly a market for cor-
porate control. In the industrial rela-
tions arena, both countries have
mechanisms designed to promote
consultation, but employee influence
stems primarily from the strength of
unions to exert pressure on employ-
ers through collective bargaining and
through exercising pressure on the
government.These are key influences
on restructuring patterns, which have
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takeover law in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Netherlands 1976–96, University of Amsterdam, research paper, ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=411580.
Country Key features of the system
Austria
The Hausbanken System of investment banking has been a stable source of funds for firms, many of which are pri-
vately owned. Consequently, the stock market is not well developed; the ratio of market capitalisation of publicly
quoted firms to GDP is only 15 %.There is not a well-developed market for corporate control and owners tend
to have close and stable relations with senior managers.
Luxembourg
‘Collective investment funds’ and the State are the two main players in the ownership of firms. Senior manageri-
al positions tend to be very secure and, while there are few formal barriers to hostile takeovers, they are
unknown in Luxembourg.
Denmark
The system has been characterised as ‘personal stakeholder capitalism’ with a high degree of family ownership.
This is particularly the case amongst the SMEs that dominate the industrial structure.Takeovers have increased
slightly but hostile ones are very rare.
Sweden
A distinctive feature of corporate ownership in Sweden has been the role of ‘investment foundations’.While there
is a reasonably high incidence of M&As, particularly cross-border ones, there remain significant barriers to hos-
tile takeovers. Independent shareholder associations have continued to become more active over the last three
decades or so.
Finland
There has been a significant erosion of the role of the State and major banking and finance groups in owning and
controlling Finnish firms. In their place have come pension funds and other financial institutions, particularly for-
eign ones. Related to this has been a growth in M&As (often cross-border in nature), though hostile ones are still
quite rare.An emerging shareholder value orientation is evident.
Belgium
The main forms of corporate ownership are through holding companies and families, with shareholdings being
concentrated and coordinated though networks and pacts.This ‘pyramid’ or ‘cascade’ structure of ownership cre-
ates a strong barrier to hostile takeovers, and there is no real market for corporate control.
Germany
One distinct feature of the corporate governance system is the way it incorporates rights for a range of stake-
holders.This is reliant upon highly concentrated ownership patterns, particularly among banks, while networks of
cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorships are common.There are some modest signs of change, howev-
er, in the direction of the outsider system.
Netherlands
The system is notable for the vast differences between SMEs, which are often controlled by families, and large
firms, which are characterised by very high ownership by foreign institutions and individuals. Among the latter,
there are some moves towards a shareholder value orientation. However, this is normally exercised by ‘voice’
rather than ‘exit’.
Portugal
Among large firms the State is a key player, owning 23 % of shares, and foreign parties now control 13 %. Small
firms are commonly sole proprietorships.There are also numerous small, individual shareholders. A market for
corporate control is not well developed and hostile takeovers are particularly rare.
Greece
The State remains an important owner of Greek firms, as do families. In addition, there are a small number of pri-
vate foundations that control some Greek firms.Takeovers are rare and relations between shareholders and man-
agement are close and stable.There is little to indicate significant change in these respects.
Italy
Family-owned groups are one of the distinguishing features of corporate ownership in Italy while, despite privati-
sation, the State retains an important stake in many firms.The result is a very high degree of concentration of
ownership: six out of 10 stock market-quoted companies have one shareholder with more than 60 % of the
shares.This concentration acts as a barrier to hostile takeovers.
Spain
Recent developments, such as privatisation and increasing investment by financial institutions (particularly foreign
ones), have eroded the influence of the State and holding companies. Now, shareholdings are much more dis-
persed. Greater importance appears to be accorded to these shareholders by management, and the latter’s pay
is increasingly taking the form of stock options.
France
The role of the State in owning and controlling large French firms has been greatly reduced by privatisation.
Managers are increasingly influenced by the demands of institutional investors, paying out a rising proportion of
profits in dividends and having their own pay tied explicitly to share prices.There has also been a growth in M&As,
though in the 1990s only two a year on average were hostile in nature.
Ireland
Industrial groups and families, along with the State, are key features of corporate ownership in Ireland. Foreign
ownership is also very high, largely through foreign direct investment. Relations between managers and sharehold-
ers in publicly limited companies are fluid and arms-length, with a growing incidence of M&As. Senior managerial
pay is often linked explicitly to share prices.
UK
Shareholdings tend to be highly dispersed, with pension funds holding relatively small stakes in a range of firms.
There is a well-developed market for corporate control, with very weak barriers to hostile takeovers.
Shareholding tends to be fluid, exemplified by the rush out of firms undergoing restructuring. Managerial remu-
neration is very strongly tied to measures of shareholder value.
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TABLE 5.5: PATTERNS OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN EU-15
Source: Adapted from EIRO (2002), ‘Corporate governance systems and the nature of industrial restructuring’, Dublin, September 2002,
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2002/09/study/tn0209101s.html.
grown more prevalent in recent
years. One source of change in both
countries but particularly in Portugal
has been the growth of foreign own-
ership, while another has been the
increase in the volume of mergers and
acquisitions.
In Italy, a very highly concentrated
picture of corporate ownership is evi-
dent, with this organised through
‘pyramidal groups’. Only a few years
ago, the largest shareholder in publicly
quoted companies held an average of
48 % of the total voting rights; the
largest three shareholders together
held 62 % of the voting rights (128).The
tradition of family ownership also
shows through very strongly and rela-
tively few companies are quoted on
the stock market. The role of the
State and public ownership has been
significant, though the privatisation
programme during the past decade
has eroded this element. In the indus-
trial relations arena, similarly to
Greece and Portugal, employees can
use the information and consultation
provisions laid down in law in cases of
restructuring, but any significant influ-
ence they exert is generally through
the trade unions.
Interlocking directorates are a key
feature of the Spanish variant of the
insider system. These tend to take
place across industrial sectors, but
especially within capital-intensive
firms, and the system is facilitated by
the controlling influence of holding
companies and by the role of ‘bank-
led economic development and high
State intervention’ (129).This system of
ownership was quite compatible with
employees having the right to be
informed of changes of ownership on
the same terms as shareholders and
to issue a report setting out their
views on proposed restructuring
plans. However, recently, both the sys-
tems of corporate ownership and
industrial relations have changed sig-
nificantly: in relation to the former, a
marked increase in foreign ownership
of Spanish companies and a greater
dispersal of shares is notable (Table
5.4); in relation to the latter, the gov-
ernment has sought to make it much
easier for employers to make collec-
tive redundancies. In addition, some
big Spanish companies have reformed
their governance structures by dis-
mantling control structures that
impeded takeover attempts.
The last decade or so has witnessed
some significant change in the
French business system, particularly
in the area of corporate ownership.A
number of aspects of this changing
picture are evident. One is the signifi-
cant reduction in state ownership of
large French companies; the govern-
ment’s privatisation programme in the
mid-1990s eroded the central role of
the State in the running of large
French firms. A further key indicator
of change relates to the ownership
pattern; until recently, cross-share-
holdings between firms dominated
the pattern of ownership, with the
shareholders of many big industrial
firms being other big industrial firms,
but this has declined from more than
30 % in 1990 to closer to 20 % by
2000. In the place of cross-sharehold-
ings, foreign investors are now the key
owners of large French firms quoted
on the stock market, with American
pension funds particularly influential.
The ownership by foreigners of share
capital on the French stock exchange
has risen sharply during the last ten
years or so to the point where more
than one in every three shares in
French companies is held by foreign-
ers, a higher proportion than in most
comparable countries (130). A third
aspect of the changes has been the
growth in the number of M&As in
France. Traditionally, M&As were
extremely rare, but a number of for-
eign firms have acquired French ones,
and there has also been a significant
growth in takeover bids on the stock
market (although it is difficult to speak
of a genuine market for corporate
control in France comparable to the
prevailing situation in the American
and British stock exchanges). The
rights of employees to be consulted
about restructuring are significant.
Employee representatives must be
informed if restructuring is to take
place as a result of a merger or a
takeover, and consultation with the
comité d’entreprise must occur prior to
shareholders and the public being
informed.However, the opinion of the
comité d’entreprise does not have to be
taken on board by the company and
any substantive influence on how
firms actually restructure tends to
come from unions.Thus in those few
sectors and firms where unions are
strong, employee representatives are
able to shape the way restructuring
takes place, but in the majority they
are not able to do so.
Overall, these changes have meant
that many French firms are undergo-
ing significant change, with greater
pressure to deliver shareholder value
influencing managers. An example of
the mantra of creating shareholder
value being put into practice is the
increase in the percentage of corpo-
rate gross income paid out to share-
holders as dividends.According to fig-
ures from the national statistical
bureau, INSEE, this ratio rose from
22.8 % in 1994 to 41 % in 2000 
for non-financial companies, and
increased in broadly equivalent terms,
but from a higher base, for finance
companies: 33.4 to 61 % (131). Some of
the pressures for change have come
into conflict with the principle under-
lying company law that prioritises the
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concept of the ‘company interest’,
which is supposed to prevent share-
holders’ interests dominating. This
gives managers some protection from
the pressure of shareholders.
However, the indications are that
these changes have had a marked
impact. France has witnessed a rapid
change from a ‘financial network
economy’ to a ‘financial market econ-
omy’ and the shareholding model of
the largest French groups is today
rapidly disintegrating (132).
3.4. Outsider systems with
deregulated labour
markets
The remaining two countries are
quite different from the previous thir-
teen in two key respects; they are
both outsider systems and labour
markets are relatively deregulated
with little formal scope for employee
voice. In Ireland, the key elements of
the outsider system are present, albeit
one with a high degree of family own-
ership among small and medium-sized
firms. It is distinguished by the very
high degree of foreign ownership,
from the UK, and particularly the
United States. Formal channels
through which employees can exer-
cise influence are rare among the for-
eign-owned firms.Within the context
of the social partnership approach fol-
lowed in Ireland in recent decades
(see Chapter 1), attempts have been
made to extend the same cooperative
approach to the level of the enter-
prise on a voluntary basis. In joint
statements, the central organisations
of employers and unions welcomed
the development of ‘employee
involvement’ in firms, including provi-
sions for information and consulta-
tion, but this was not followed to a
great extent in the private sector.
The key feature of corporate owner-
ship in the UK is that shareholdings
tend to be highly dispersed across a
range of financial institutions and indi-
viduals,with it being quite rare for any
one shareholder to own a controlling
stake (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4).
Overall, 70 % of the holdings in UK
listed companies are held by financial
institutions, with each one tending to
hold a very small proportion of the
stock of a particular company (133). Of
all EU Member States, the UK has the
most advanced market for corporate
control.Ownership of shares tends to
be fluid and there is a high incidence
of mergers and acquisitions. In com-
parison with other European coun-
tries, the barriers to takeovers, partic-
ularly hostile ones, are weak. In gener-
al, the relationship between the senior
management team and shareholders
is often characterised as arm’s length.
In other words, the close relation-
ships that exist in some other
European countries, often involving
key shareholders sitting on the board
of the companies, are rare. In part, this
is a consequence of the highly dis-
persed nature of shareholdings, since
no one small shareholder has a strong
incentive to closely monitor manage-
ment. Thus the ‘voice’ of particular
shareholders within the company
tends to be weak. This is not to say
that shareholders’ demands are not
influential over management; indeed,
the weakness of employee rights in
the British system means that share-
holder concerns dominate managerial
actions in general and the nature of
restructuring in particular; the rights
for employees to vote, and potentially
block, restructuring that exist in some
countries — for example through
participation of workers in boards —
are absent in the UK.The influence of
shareholders is generally exercised
through the threat of ‘exit’; that is,
shareholders can sell their stake to a
potential hostile bidder, leading to the
existing management team being
replaced.
It can be argued that the fluidity of
shareholdings in general and the
threat of exit in particular has made it
difficult for British firms to build part-
nership arrangements with their
workforces. While some UK compa-
nies have been able to reconcile
shareholder demands with a partner-
ship approach, in other cases, share-
holder pressure has undermined part-
nership relations of the kind which
have endured under more concen-
trated forms of ownership.
Recently, employee influence in gener-
al, and in influencing the nature of
restructuring in particular, appears to
have grown modestly.The rights that
employees have in cases of insolvency,
stemming partly from European
directives, allow for a ‘voice by non-
shareholder constituencies’ (134), par-
ticularly employee representatives.
Thus this has a particular impact on
major corporate restructuring in rela-
tion to cases of potential or actual liq-
uidation. The future impact of the
‘information and consultation direc-
tive’ in the UK, which will generalise
involvement rights and extend work-
er representation remains to be seen.
Moreover, the role of shareholders is
not always as distant and arms-length
as is often portrayed; some pension
funds have a formal policy of investing
‘in companies that are poorly per-
forming but are fundamentally sound’,
with the aim of improving perform-
ance and delivering long-term share-
holder value through better manage-
ment and corporate governance. In
this process, a team of specialist pro-
fessionals liaise closely with fund man-
agers to monitor company direction
and performance.So there are moves,
albeit limited, towards something of
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(132) F. Morin (2000), op. cit.
(133) J. Armour, S. Deakin and S. Konzelmann (2003) ‘Shareholder primacy and the trajectory of UK corporate governance’, British
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 41.
(134) J. Armour et al. (2003), ‘Shareholder primacy ...’, op. cit.
Country Key features of the system
Austria
Employee rights are quite strong, works councils have the right to be consulted prior to significant restructuring
and in firms of 20+ employees there must be a ‘social plan’ designed to ease the impact on employees.Transfers
of undertakings and collective redundancies must be agreed with the works council (establishments employing
five employees). If there is no agreement, the issue is decided by a conciliation body. Consultation processes often
lead to compromises over management’s plans, while employee representatives on supervisory boards can also
influence restructuring.
Luxembourg
In firms with 1 000+ employees or where the State has a larger than 25 % share, a third of the members of the
board of directors must be elected by employees, who then have formal voting rights on investment and restruc-
turing plans. In all firms with 15+ employees, there must be staff delegates appointed which have consultation pow-
ers.The combined effect of these industrial relations structures and the low level of unemployment have meant
that restructuring tends to be resolved in a consensual manner.
Denmark
In companies with more than 35 employees, employees elect up to a third of members of the company board,
which can vote on all aspects of restructuring. In addition, in enterprises of 35+ employees there must be a works
council established through a ‘cooperation agreement’ and employers must inform the council about any changes
that affect the organisation of work.While employee representatives only have the power to delay and not veto
the changes, in practice employers often use these discussions to seek a compromise agreement.
Sweden
Employees are able to shape restructuring through the process of co-determination, through which consultation
with employee representatives must take place on all ‘important changes’. Unions often manage to secure con-
cessions from management concerning its original plans, for example over the number of employees affected by
restructuring.The very broad coverage of union membership and collective bargaining means that this influence
is widespread across sectors and firms.There is also workers’ representation (2-3 seats) on the board when the
company or the group of companies has more than 25 employees. In the case of a group, the representation is
made at that level.
Finland
‘Personnel representatives’, one quarter or up to four representatives may be nominated onto the ‘administrative
bodies’ that govern the company with 150+ employees. Perhaps more importantly, the system of co-determina-
tion means that in 30+ firms, employers must consult over restructuring, and the strong position of union repre-
sentatives means that in most cases management’s proposals must also be subject to negotiation.This results in a
‘cooperation plan’ that sets out the form and consequences of any restructuring.
Belgium
Works councils must be consulted three months prior to any instance of restructuring and the consequences of
restructuring must be discussed with employee representatives, often leading to a restructuring or social plan.
One aspect of these plans is that they must set out ‘a new approach to organising working time in such a way as
to more effectively distribute work within the enterprise’. Following the closure of the Renault plant at Vilvoorde
in 1997 these rights have been strengthened.
Germany
Employee rights stem partly from the system of plant-based works councils. Employers are obliged to inform
works councils in advance of any restructuring plans that affect employees, and must negotiate an
Interessenausgleich (‘reconcilement of interests’) that sets out the process of change and spells out the implica-
tions for employees. In the absence of an agreement, inter alia, on collective redundancies, the issue is decided by
a conciliation body. Employee rights also stem from their representation on supervisory boards in large firms (usu-
ally one third of the seats but one half in mining and steel sector). However, the practical impact of these formal
rights varies from firm to firm.
Netherlands
Works councils have the right to ‘give advice’ on all major decisions, and if management does not follow this advice,
the council can take the case to a court. In addition, on issues related to restructuring (transfers, closures, invest-
ments, etc.), the works council has the right of suspensive veto (usually one month).Works councils also have a
right of veto over the co-option of members of the supervisory board in companies with 100+ employees.
Portugal
A number of formal mechanisms exist for employees to exert influence over corporate restructuring (mainly
through workers’ commissions), stemming from a number of articles of the constitution and subsequent legisla-
tion.These commissions have the right to ‘submit opinions’ on management’s plans. However, in practice these
commissions cover only a small minority of workplaces and employee influence depends primarily on how well
organised trade unions are at firm level.
Greece
Through the introduction of works councils in the 1980s, employers must consult with their workforces before
undertaking any restructuring that leads to group dismissals. However, employee influence over the consequences
stems largely from collective bargaining.Where unions are well organised, they are able to ameliorate the effects
on employees of restructuring, often using political pressure as a key tactic in the bargaining process, but this influ-
ence varies across firms.
Italy
The principal way in which employees are able to influence restructuring is through collective bargaining, at both
company and sectoral levels. In doing so they can use the information and consultation procedures laid down by
law, such as those relating to collective dismissals. Complementing the role of collective bargaining are the com-
pany level information and consultation procedures.
Spain
Formally, employees have the right to receive the same information as the shareholders. Management must allow
worker representatives to formally set out their views in writing if the changes affect employment, but this report
is not binding on management. Only when restructuring leads to significant changes to the terms of statutory col-
lective agreements is there an obligation on management to reach agreement with employee representatives
before introducing them. Collective dismissals are strongly regulated in Spain, but recent reforms have made it
easier for managers to make redundancies.
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TABLE 5.6: SYSTEMS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN RESTRUCTURING IN THE EU
an insider model. Overall, though, the
UK system is similar in many respects
to that in the United States: share-
holdings are dispersed and fluid; there
is an active market in corporate con-
trol; managerial remuneration is 
in large part tied to shares and 
profit-related bonuses; relationships
between management and sharehold-
ers are arm’s length; and employee
rights are generally weak.
3.5. Summary
One common tendency is that in
many countries which are considered
to possess an insider system of cor-
porate ownership, some of the char-
acteristic features of outsider systems
are becoming more evident. This is
particularly true of France, but there
also clear signs in Sweden, Finland,
Germany and the Netherlands.This is
the key pattern and constitutes a
process of convergence along Anglo-
Saxon lines. However, these develop-
ments are occurring in highly uneven
ways with change being much more
detectable in large, internationalised
companies than in small and medium-
sized ones, and with strong counter-
vailing tendencies based on institu-
tionalised mechanisms for union and
employee representation and consul-
tation within enterprises.Moreover, in
many insider systems, for instance in
Austria, Belgium or Denmark, little
change is observed, and even in an
outsider system such as the UK, there
appear to be some limited moves in
the direction of the insider voice.
Overall, then, change is not occurring
in a tidy, convergent way, and diversity
both across and within EU Member
States remains a key feature.
Generally, the predominant picture
across the EU appears to be that
changing external pressures do not
radically alter the basic nature of
industrial relations frameworks.
Indeed, many firms in insider systems,
and even some in outsider systems,
are willing to use collective bargaining
and other mechanisms that promote
dialogue to facilitate change.
Corporate ownership patterns and
industrial relations frameworks there-
fore appear to be becoming
hybridised as they evolve in response
to both external challenges and also
to the actions of actors and firms
within the system.
This discussion has sought deliberate-
ly to provide an overview of the main
trends and variations in the nature of
corporate ownership patterns and
industrial relations institutions in the
EU Member States. Such an overview
is of necessity simplified, leaving out
many details. The overview showed
significant diversity across the EU and
demonstrated that there is consider-
able change with more emphasis
being put on shareholder value, but
with significant variation in the pres-
ence or even strengthening of mecha-
nisms supporting the ‘voice’ of other
stakeholders. Hence, the direction
and pace of change is not the same
everywhere. The true picture of the
interrelationship between corporate
ownership patterns and industrial
relations is complex and there are
other social and cultural factors that
matter as well. For example, in a study
of corporate governance and employ-
ment relations in seven UK firms, the
findings of Deakin et al. (135) suggest
that although the national institution-
al framework is an important influ-
ence on employment relations, cor-
porate actors nevertheless have a
‘strategic space’ within which to
develop solutions. Their research 
141
Corporate ownership and industrial relations in the EU: national trends and European policy developments Chapter 5
Country Key features of the system
France
Comité d’entreprises have the right to be informed and consulted three months prior to any restructuring. Since
2001, they have the same prerogatives as other minority shareholders and a work’s council delegation has access
(a right of discussion) to the company boards. In public companies, employee representatives hold one third of
the seats on the board. However, employee representatives appear to have only a limited effect on changing man-
agement’s plans in practice. Some instances of unions appealing to politicians for support and works councils have
had some success in the courts in arguing that the process of consultation was not followed fully.
Ireland
There is very little in the way of formal, institutional power to affect corporate restructuring, with a minimalist
legal framework based on the EU directives on transfer of undertakings and collective redundancies. Where
unions are well organised, they have the ability to exert some influence, and this is particularly the case in ‘social
partnership’ deals. Such social partnership arrangements may be strengthened by the EU directive on information
and consultation, but currently these arrangements lack strong institutional foundations. There is a stronger
employee influence in the public sector, with a legal obligation for the employer to consult and inform, and a right
to employee participation on the boards of certain State enterprises.
UK
There is a minimalist legal framework. Such rights as exist stem from EU directives on the transfer of undertakings,
collective redundancies and the forthcoming implementation of the information and consultation directive.
Therefore, the ability of employee representatives to influence restructuring stems from unions’ strength at firm
and plant level, meaning that there is considerable variation in this respect. Recently, the limited growth of ‘partner-
ship’ deals at firm level has afforded employee representatives a modest increase in influence over restructuring.
Source:Adapted from EIRO (2002) ‘Corporate governance systems and the nature of industrial restructuring’, Dublin, September 2002,
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2002/09/study/tn0209101s.html.
(135) S. Deakin R. Hobbs, S. Konzelmann and F. Wilkinson (2001), ‘Partnership, Ownership and Control: The Impact of Corporate
Governance on Employment Relations’, Working Paper No 200, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
indicates that the attitude of manage-
ment, and the managing of sharehold-
ers’ attitudes in particular, is impor-
tant. Similarly, strong trade unions,
with a good understanding of the
industry and company as well as the
ability to manage and mediate
between both employees and man-
agers, are crucial.This finding was also
apparent in the study of the approach
of German works councils to compa-
ny restructuring and adaptation to
international competition (136). Finally,
they also suggest that certain environ-
mental factors, such as the firm’s mar-
ket and regulatory frameworks, may
influence the terms and conditions
for, and the durability of partnership.
3.6. The new Member States
What are the implications of this dis-
cussion for the new Member States?
The change from traditional public
sector management to outsider forms
of corporate ownership is already in
evidence in the new Member States
both through the growing importance
of foreign direct investment by multi-
national corporations (MNCs) and by
portfolio investment by financial insti-
tutions in domestic companies.These
pressures not only have direct effects,
but also serve to inform the choices
of policy-makers as to the desirability
of these distinct models in the contin-
ued creation of institutional frame-
works in the fields of corporate gov-
ernance and industrial relations. One
implication concerns the extent to
which the new Member States are
characterised by systems of social dia-
logue and partnership. Where this is
the case, the evolution of the corpo-
rate ownership system towards out-
sider norms presents a challenge to
the institutions promoting dialogue
and partnership. In other new
Member States where such institu-
tions are absent or extremely weak,
the moves towards outsider systems
of corporate ownership would seem
to create fewer tensions, but other
countervailing tendencies, arising
from politics or union pressure, more
along the model found in southern
Europe, may be found. Perhaps the
most likely outcome of enlargement is
that a further range of hybridised
models will emerge, creating even
more diversity across the EU.
3.7. Policy implications
Although further research into these
issues continues to be necessary in
order to fully understand the links
between corporate ownership pat-
terns and industrial relations as well
as the interplay of other factors, the
variations and trends which have been
identified above have implications for
policy.
Firstly, social partnership appears to
be well-rooted. In most of EU-15, it
has the status of a ‘value’ and is part of
the industrial relations culture. In
addition, by helping to generate trust,
social partnership serves a functional
purpose in helping to bring about
more consensual adaptation to
change. It is therefore something
which needs to be encouraged,partic-
ularly in the new Member States,
most of which have rather weak tra-
ditions of social dialogue (see
Chapters 1, 3 and 6).
Secondly, the diversity and trends
identified demonstrate the impor-
tance of institutional design, as the
rules in place, particularly for employ-
ee information and consultation,
clearly do influence the way in which
restructuring occurs. For national and
European policy matters it is
extremely important to find the right
mix, as there is probably no ‘one-size-
fits-all’ policy or institution.With the
purpose of creating an anticipative
approach to managing change, a
broader base for the acceptance of
change and lowering social and per-
sonal costs, well-designed European
rules on information and consultation
can play a supporting role. In this con-
text the general framework for
informing and consulting employees in
companies situated in the EU estab-
lished by EU Directive 2002/14/EC,
offers not only protection for employ-
ees, but also a business tool for antic-
ipating and managing change. It pro-
vides for minimum standards of infor-
mation and consultation of employ-
ees, while leaving considerable leeway
for Member States and their individ-
ual businesses to apply the rules in a
way best suited to them.
Thirdly, the fact that the responses to
similar pressures are not uniform, in
conjunction with the growing evidence
of a modest growth in employee influ-
ence in the UK — a country with rel-
atively weak employee rights —
demonstrates that other, non-institu-
tional factors also matter.This evidence
indicates that the role and attitude of
individuals is important, suggesting that
education and awareness-raising with
regard to the instrumental role and
benefits of social dialogue and partner-
ship are also important avenues for
encouraging responsible corporate
behaviour, including the responsible
anticipation and management of
change in cases of restructuring.
n 4. EU initiatives in the 
field of company-
level industrial 
relations
The EU has adopted several impor-
tant initiatives over the years in the
field of company-level industrial rela-
tions, relating in particular to worker
information and consultation. In
recent years the EU has adopted a
more anticipative approach.The most
recent EU legislation promotes
upstream worker involvement,
notably on strategic issues and on the
foreseeable evolution of employment
within companies. It seeks to ensure
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(136) W. Streeck et al. (2003), ‘Germany Ltd ...’, op.cit.
the timely development of the
employability and adaptability of the
European workforce to help it suc-
cessfully face the challenges of change.
A distinction is made between legisla-
tive and non-legislative developments.
4.1. Legislative developments
Collective redundancies directive of
1975 (137): The directive provides that
an employer who envisages collective
redundancies must provide employee
representatives with specified informa-
tion concerning the proposed redun-
dancies and must consult with the
workers’ representatives in good time
with a view to reaching an agreement.
These consultations should cover ways
of avoiding or of reducing the redun-
dancies and of mitigating their conse-
quences by recourse to social accom-
panying measures aimed at, in particu-
lar, aid for redeployment and retraining
of the redundant workers.
Transfers of undertakings directive of
1977 (138): The directive provides that
both the transferor and transferee
must provide specified information to
the representatives of employees
affected by the proposed transfer and,
if either party envisages measures in
relation to the employees, their rep-
resentatives must be consulted with a
view to reaching agreement.
The European works councils (EWCs)
directive of 1994 (139): The directive
applies to undertakings or groups with
at least 1 000 employees and at least
150 employees in each of two Member
States. It allows for the establishment
of a European works council — repre-
senting of employees in the Member
States where the group has operations
— which must be informed and con-
sulted on the progress of the business
and any significant changes envisaged.
To date, European works councils have
been established in some 650 transna-
tional groups (see Table 5.7 and Box
5.1. and 5.2).
European company (SE) of 2001 (140):
The directive provides for rules on
information, consultation and possibly
participation in the European compa-
ny (SE).When an SE is to be created,
negotiations between management
and employees’ representatives must
start as regards employees’ involve-
ment in the future SE. If the negotia-
tions fail, standard rules will apply,
according to which a representative
body for the employees shall obtain
information and be consulted on
transnational matters. Board repre-
sentation shall apply according to the
standard rules if employees have pre-
viously had such a right in any of the
participating companies.
Information and consultation directive of
2002 (141): The directive seeks to
strengthen dialogue within enterpris-
es and ensure employee involvement
upstream of decision-making with a
view to better anticipation of prob-
lems and the prevention of crises. It
applies to undertakings with at least
50 employees or establishments with
at least 20, and provides that employ-
ee representatives be informed and
consulted on developments relating
to the economic situation of the
undertaking, the development of
employment and decisions likely to
lead to changes in work organisation
or contractual relations.The deadline
for transposition of the directive by
the Member States is March 2005.
European cooperative society (SCE) of
2003 (142): Directive providing for rules
on information, consultation and 
possibly participation in the European
cooperative society (SCE).The direc-
tive contains a similar model regarding
employees’ involvement to that of 
the SE.
Country Number of EWC agreements
EU
Germany 155
France 78
UK 70
Belgium 70
Netherlands 46
Sweden 35
Italy 31
Ireland 28
Finland 22
Austria 12
Denmark 10
Luxembourg 9
Spain 5
Greece 1
Non-EU
Norway 11
Switzerland 6
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(137) Consolidated by Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20.07.1998, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p. 16.
(138) Consolidated by Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12.3.2001, OJ L 82, 23.3.2001, p. 16.
(139) Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22.9.1994, OJ L 254, 30.9.1994, p. 64.
(140) OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 22.
(141) Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11.3.2002, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29.
(142) OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 25.
TABLE 5.7: NUMBER OF EUROPEAN WORKS’ COUNCIL
AGREEMENTS IN 2002, BY COUNTRY
Source: Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Practical application of the
European Works Council Directive (94/45/EC) and on any aspects of the directive that might need
to be revised’ (exploratory opinion) of 24 September 2003, EESC (EC) No 1164/2003. Some of the
EESC’s figures are derived from the ETUC Infopoint database and the European Trade Union
Institute, European works councils – facts and figures, Brussels, November 2002.
4.2. Non-legislative
Commission initiatives
Corporate social responsibility (CSR): As
a follow-up to the Green Paper on
Corporate Social Responsibility (146),
and the Commission communication
on ‘Corporate social responsibility: A
business contribution to sustainable
development’ (147), the Commission
promotes a concept of CSR which
implies a continuous commitment by
business to behave fairly and respon-
sibly and contribute to economic
development while improving the
quality of life of the workforce as well
as of society at large, including in
times of restructuring and in the
anticipation of change. In 2002 the
Commission created the EU Multi-
Stakeholder Forum on CSR, the aim
of which is to promote innovation,
transparency and convergence of CSR
practices and instruments.The forum
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(143) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Practical application of the European Works Councils Directive
94/45/EC and on any aspects of the directive that might need to be revised’ (exploratory opinion) of 24 September 2003, EESC (EC)
No 1164/2003.
(144) These figures are approximations.
(145) P. Kerkhoffs (2002), European works councils: facts and figures, Brussels, European Trade Union Institute.
(146) COM(2001) 366 final.
(147) COM(2002) 347 final.
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), at the
request of the Commission, prepared an exploratory opinion on
the evolution of European works councils (143). In its opinion, which
was adopted in September 2003, the EESC notes that various stud-
ies analysing the operation of European works councils point to a
dynamic process of development, and a growing recognition of the
positive role played by them in promoting social dialogue within
companies, including in cases of restructuring.This dynamism can be
seen both in the manner in which EWC agreements appear to be
developing as well as in their functioning in practice.
As regards EWC agreements, one of the practical problems regarding
the application of the directive,mentioned in the Commission’s report
of April 2000, was the fact that some of the negotiated agreements
seemed to provide for only a very low level of transnational informa-
tion and consultation.What appears to be happening, however, is that
as agreements expire, their content is being fleshed out more fully
when they are renegotiated. In some cases, this reflects the incorpora-
tion of experience and best practice from outside the EWC in 
question, but in other cases it is a result of the development of greater
trust among the parties as a result of the experience which has been
gained and which has enabled reservations which may have existed at
the outset being overcome.Such renegotiated agreements often result
in the strengthening of the EWCs with regard to the frequency of
meetings and the prerogatives and facilities granted to employee rep-
resentatives.
The developing scope of EWC agreements is also evident from the
extension of the range of issues they deal with. In many agreements
the issues on which employees are to be informed and consulted
has been extended far beyond the core topics referred to in the
annex to the directive. Issues with a strong European dimension
such as health and safety, equal opportunities, training and mobility,
and environmental policy are now also the subject of
employee/management consultation. The range of issues finding
their way on to EWC agendas is also being extended in many cases
through actual practice rather than though formal extension of the
agreement.
This process of dynamic development within EWCs has, perhaps,
reached its fullest expression to date with the emergence, in recent
years, of a negotiating role within some EWCs.This has led to the
conclusion of agreements between management and employee rep-
resentatives on joint texts that go far beyond the basic information
and consultation requirements of the directive. In addition to agree-
ments in the areas mentioned above, the issues addressed in such
joint texts include the consequences of restructuring, trade union
rights and fundamental social rights. With regard to the issue of
restructuring, what has been extremely interesting to observe is
how, in some instances, the EWC has been used as a forum in which
management and employees have reached agreement on how the
restructuring of their European operations should be implemented.
Box 5.1: The evolution of European works councils (EWCs)
• At the end of 2002, out of an estimated total of 1 865 companies
or groups of companies employing 17 million people falling within
the scope of the EWC directive, some 639, with 11 million employ-
ees, had an EWC.
• Some 1 200 companies and groups covered by the directive and
employing roughly 6 million people, have yet to establish an EWC
or a procedure for informing and consulting employees.
• More than half of the agreements were concluded in 1996 alone.
Since then some 40 agreements have been concluded annually.
• 72 % (400) of these agreements were concluded under Article 13
prior to the entry into force of the directive, and 28 % under Article
6, after its entry into force.
• A quarter of the agreements fall under German law, 12–13 % fall
under French, Belgian or UK law, 4 to 7 % under Dutch, Swedish,
Italian, Irish or Finnish law.
• More than 10 000 employee representatives are now directly
involved in the work of EWCs and in implementing intercultural
exchanges and practices.
• In half of the agreements, restructuring issues are included in the
remit of the EWC; 51 % of the agreements mention mergers; 47 %
closures, and 53 % relocations.
• In 2002, 547 companies or groups having a subsidiary in one of the
new Member States came under the scope of the directive. Of
these, 323 had already set up an EWC, 30 % of which included
members or observers from the new Member States.
• The incidence is highest in Poland (50), the Czech Republic (26),
Hungary (23) and Slovakia (16) (145). In March 2004, all acceding coun-
tries except Estonia and Lithuania had transposed Directive
94/45/EC into national legislation.
Box 5.2: European works councils (EWCs) — some facts and figures (144)
presented a report in summer 2004
and the Commission is now sched-
uled to adopt a communication
assessing progress in the implementa-
tion of its CSR strategy and proposing
the next steps to be taken (148).
Follow-up to the Commission’s communi-
cation on the European social dialogue, a
force for innovation and change (149): In
the communication, the Commission
underlines that attainment of the
strategic goals set in Lisbon —
growth, full employment and social
cohesion — depends to a consider-
able extent on the action taken by the
social partners at all levels. The
European social dialogue is therefore
seen as a key tool for ensuring the
positive management of change, in
order to reconcile the flexibility
essential to businesses with the secu-
rity needed by employees, particularly
in the event of major restructuring.
The Commission is therefore encour-
aging and supporting financially and
logistically the initiatives of the social
partners on restructuring in the
framework of their joint work pro-
gramme for 2003–05.This includes a
study on restructuring in the new
Member States.
The European Monitoring Centre on
Change (EMCC) (150): The EMCC was
established in October 2001 with the
purpose of providing accessible, reli-
able data and opportunities to
exchange views, ideas and practice in
order to bring about better under-
standing, anticipation and manage-
ment of change. The EMCC’s objec-
tive is to provide the tools for key
actors in European social policy to
make more informed decisions about
managing the processes of change. It
seeks, through data collection, analy-
sis, investigation and networking, to
identify business strategies and insti-
tutional policies that support the
process of change in socially accept-
able ways, with the aim of providing
users at different levels — regional,
sector, national, company, EU and
global levels — with a single access
point to information on change. Some
1 500 case studies of restructuring
have been recorded so far by the
EMCC.
4.3. Other international
initiatives
International framework agreements:
Over the last decade, in response to
pressure from the media, consumers,
trade unions and civil society organisa-
tions, enterprises have initiated social
responsibility initiatives which aim at
improving their social and environ-
mental performance. In addition to
CSR schemes autonomously promot-
ed by individual companies, multi-
stakeholder initiatives are being pro-
moted by multinational companies and
global trade union federations as well
as by EU level social partners (151).
Since 1995, the European sectoral
social partners have concluded char-
ters and codes of conduct dealing with
CSR issues (see Chapter 3). These
Chemical, Mining (ICEM) Statoil (Norway), 1998
IKEA (Sweden), 1998
Freudenberg (Germany), 2000
Endesa (Spain), 2002
Norske skog (Norway), 2002
AngloGold (South Africa), 2002
ENI (Italy), 2002
Building,Timber (ÏFBWW) Faber-Castell (Germany), 2000
Hochtief (Germany), 2000
Skånska (Sweden), 2001
Ballast-Nedam (Netherlands), 2002
Metal industry (IMF) Merloni Elettodometici (Italy), 2001
Volkswagen (Germany), 2002
DaimlerChrysler (Germany), 2002
Leoni (Germany), 2003
GEA (Germany), 2003
SKF (Sweden), 2003
Rheinmetall (Germany), 2003
Food and Agriculture, ACCOR (France), 1995
Hotels and Tobacco (IUF) Danone (France), 1988
Chiquita (United States), 2001
Fonterra (New Zealand), 2002
Club Méditerranée (France), 2003
Networks (UNI) Telefonica (Spain), 2000
Carrefour (France), 2001
OTE (Greece), 2001
H&M (Sweden), 2003
Transport (ITF) IMEC (professional maritime organisation), 2000
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(148) For a more extensive discussion of CSR and related European social partner initiatives, see Chapter 3.
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TABLE 5.8: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS ON
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
Source: ICFTU website, http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991216332&language=EN
 
texts represent a significant innovation
insofar as they go beyond the tradi-
tional field of the European social 
dialogue, dealing in particular with the
rights of persons living in third coun-
tries. Since 1988, several framework
agreements have been signed between
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and
global trade union federations con-
cerning the international activities of
these companies. To date, framework
agreements have been entered into
between MNEs and global trade union
federations in several major sectors of
operation (see Table 5.8).
As part of these agreements, the com-
pany and global trade union recognise
common minimum standards for the
operations of the MNE around the
world. Nearly all of these agreements
incorporate the ILO fundamental
principles and rights at work. Other
issues such as vocational guidance and
training, however, feature less often in
the agreements. A further challenge
for these agreements relates to han-
dling employment issues, in the event
of restructuring.
These agreements represent an inno-
vative approach towards a new form
of international social dialogue. They
attempt to respond to one of the
challenges of globalisation, namely the
diversity of local situations and
national legislative frameworks. They
indirectly address the credibility chal-
lenge of CSR initiatives by involving
stakeholders in partnerships with
companies.As framework agreements
involve globally active partners, the
methods for implementation can be
particularly effective, provided that
such agreements have a system for
dispute settlement and periodic
review of the terms and implementa-
tion of the agreement based on crite-
ria agreed by both sides.
n 5. Anticipating and 
managing change at 
company level: the 
social partner case 
studies
Since 2002 the cross-industry
European social partners have wanted
to pursue a more ‘autonomous’ social
dialogue (see Chapter 3). The
European social partners have there-
fore recently begun to address the
issue of restructuring, and the topic
was included in their joint work pro-
gramme for 2003–05.The social part-
ners’ deliberations on restructuring
were originally triggered by a
Commission consultation under
Article 138 of the EC Treaty on
‘Anticipating and managing change: a
dynamic approach to the social
aspects of corporate restructuring’
launched in January 2002.This consul-
tation paper explains that the Lisbon
strategy is based on a positive
approach to change.Change is viewed
as contributing to innovation, increas-
ing productivity by modernising the
organisation of work, and improving
profitability. It should therefore be
embraced, anticipated and managed
responsibly.
In response to the Commission con-
sultation, during 2002–03 the cross-
industry social partners held three
seminars examining case studies of
restructuring and on 29 October
2003, they presented a joint text to
the Commission entitled ‘Orien-
tations for reference in managing
change and its social consequences’.
The orientations stress the impor-
tance of the following elements:
• the need to explain and give
the reasons for change in good
time to workers and/or their
representatives and the need
for good information and con-
sultation of workers through-
out the process of change;
• the need to develop the
employability of employees by
maintaining and developing
their competences and 
qualifications;
• the territorial dimension,
namely the importance of
partnership between employ-
ers, trade unions and
local/regional public authori-
ties, when economic and social
changes have serious repercus-
sions for an entire region. Such
cooperation can play a useful
role in fostering new job-cre-
ating economic activities, man-
aging reassignments and
improving the operation of the
local labour market;
• the specific situation of SMEs,
namely their role regarding job
creation, their potential
dependence on one large cus-
tomer, and the particular chal-
lenges facing SMEs when they
themselves restructure;
• the local management of
restructuring, including the
possibility of ‘social plans’ and
the exploration of all possible
alternatives to dismissals.
Ten case studies of restructuring are
annexed to these orientations. Seven
relate to fairly large companies, two
to SMEs, and one to the reconversion
of Asturias, a Spanish region dominat-
ed by traditional, State-owned indus-
tries.These case studies are based on
the reflections of both a manager and
a worker representative from each
firm. Each case study highlights the
range of motives that firms have in
undertaking restructuring.
One motive that drove restructuring
in organisations such as Norsk Hydro,
Danone and Metso was the need to
reduce costs in a context of over-
capacity. Another driver was the
desire to significantly reduce produc-
tion costs by relocating some opera-
tions to lower costs countries, as was
the case in Marzotto and Abeil. In yet
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other cases restructuring was moti-
vated by new pressures associated
with privatisation or changing tech-
nologies, for instance Deutsche
Telekom. In some firms, restructuring
is brought about by a desire to focus
activities more narrowly on certain
core businesses, as was the case at
Siemens or at Barclays, and in others,
it is driven by financial crisis, as in the
case of Auwera (see Table 5.9).
In some of these case studies, there
were adverse consequences for
employees, for example in those
instances of restructuring which
resulted in redundancies, as at Norsk
Hydro, Marzotto, Danone and Metso.
However, the consequences for
employees are not always negative. In
some of the case studies, such as
Barclays, there was no detectable
adverse impact on employment levels;
and the restructuring at Siemens was
followed by a rise in employment at
the Infineon subsidiary.
Even where the consequences for
employees are negative, the case stud-
ies suggest that social dialogue can help
in minimising the adverse conse-
quences for employees.The case stud-
ies provided some evidence of worker
involvement in restructuring in the
new Member States, such as the case
of Danone in Hungary.Even in the case
of Marzotto, where plans to relocate
work to new Member States (the
Czech Republic and Lithuania) were
largely accepted by the unions, amend-
ments to these plans were secured
through negotiations leading to a min-
imisation of the amount of work to be
relocated and agreement on assistance
for job search for redundant workers.
Indeed, across the case studies, assis-
tance to displaced workers in search-
ing for new employment appeared to
be a key mechanism for generating
acceptance to change. One example
of how social dialogue lessened the
consequences for employees is
through the provision of outplace-
ment assistance, for example, at
Norsk Hydro, Danone and Metso.
Another illustration is Deutsche
Telekom’s use of an Internal Human
Resources Services Agency to bring
about internal redeployment.
A further dimension of the case stud-
ies was the institutionalisation of
EWCs as part of regular processes of
consultation. For example, the EWC
was heavily involved in the ‘turn-
around project’ at Norsk Hydro,
complementing the negotiation of
‘social plans’ and involvement of out-
placement services which were decid-
ed locally. Another illustration is in
the case of Danone where the EWC
build on a well-established tradition of
management dealings with the
International Union of Food,
Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant,
Catering,Tobacco and Allied Workers’
Associations (IUF/ UITA).
Negotiations took place at the local
level, but in the framework of a joint
opinion agreed with the international
trade union in the sector. Moreover,
the two instances of restructuring at
Siemens were subject to local negoti-
ations but within procedures agreed
by the EWC.
Cooperation with local and regional
authorities was also helpful in some
cases. For example, there was a terri-
torial pact for employment in the
mining municipality of Asturias, a
regional institutional pact for employ-
ment concluded between trade
unions and the regional government,
as well as a plan for the mining sector
and the reconversion of mining dis-
tricts negotiated by the government
and sectoral trade unions at national
level. Being an objective 1 region,
financial support from the Structural
Funds played an important role. In
Finland, the case study of restructur-
ing in board machines production at
the Valmet Corporation in Tampere,
which is part of the Metso
Corporation, demonstrates the effec-
tive re-employment efforts undertak-
en by the personnel management and
union representatives, Tampere City,
local industry and employment
authorities, the chamber of com-
merce, and the trade unions.
Company/area Country Division / product affected Reasons for restructuring
Norsk Hydro Norway Fertilisers Overcapacity
Danone France Biscuit production Overcapacity
Marzotto Italy Textiles Relocation to lower costs countries
Deutsche Telekom Germany Telecoms Privatisation and adaptation to technological change
Barclays UK Financial services Refocus on core business 
Siemens Germany Micro-electronics and lighting Refocus on core business
Asturias Spain Mining Privatisation
Auwera Germany Industrial cleaning Financial crisis
Abeil France Textiles Relocation to lower costs countries
Metso Finland Board machines for the paper industry Overcapacity
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TABLE 5.9: TEN CASE STUDIES OF RESTRUCTURING
n 6. The implications of 
EU policies on 
company-level 
industrial relations in
the new Member 
States
EU membership will have numerous
implications for company-level indus-
trial relations in the new Member
States. Firstly, the provisions of the EU
labour law directives will have a direct
impact at enterprise level, in particular
though the procedures they provide
for the involvement of employee rep-
resentatives in restructuring.
In the first instance, the main concern
with regard to the new Member
States will be to ensure that these
directives are correctly transposed
into national law. This has obviously
been a major preoccupation of the
monitoring process to date and will
be the subject of more rigorous and
detailed verification and enforcement
after accession.
However, an even greater challenge
will be to ensure that the relevant
implementing legislation in the new
Member States is effectively applied in
practice. In EU-15, failure to follow
prescribed information and consulta-
tion procedures in some restructur-
ing situations has been an issue.
Indeed, it was such failures which pro-
vided at least part of the motivation
for the adoption of the information
and consultation directive and which
also urged the trade unions to call for
a revision of the directive on EWCs.
The emphasis on the development of
administrative and enforcement
capacity which has been a key theme
of the monitoring process will there-
fore have to be continued.
However, beyond the administrative
capacity to enforce legislation, the
ability of the actors themselves at
enterprise level to discharge the role
envisaged for them in the relevant leg-
islation will be an issue. In seeking to
establish effective information and
consultation mechanisms at the
enterprise level, the new Member
States face some considerable chal-
lenges, as there is little tradition 
at company level of either strong
trade union representation or 
elected employee representatives
(see Chapter 1).
The Commission has actively sought
to encourage and support the devel-
opment of the relevant social dialogue
structures at enterprise, sectoral and
cross-industry levels. The social dia-
logue budget headings have sought to
focus support on relevant capacity-
building among social partners in the
candidate countries (see Chapter 3).
At the enterprise level more specifi-
cally, Budget Heading 04-03-03-03
(ex-B3-4003), which deals with infor-
mation, consultation and participation
at the enterprise level, has sought to
prepare representatives from the can-
didate countries for the roles they will
assume under the relevant
Community legislation on employee
involvement. This emphasis on the
needs of the new and future Member
States will be continued in the medi-
um term.
The absence of relevant traditions
and structures in the new Member
States for enterprise-level employee
involvement in restructuring decisions
lends increased importance to the
extension to them of the EWC direc-
tive. Since 1 May 2004, undertakings
and groups falling within the scope of
the directive will be obliged to include
representatives from their operations
in the new Member States within
their EWC. This should assist and
accelerate the development of appro-
priate employee involvement mecha-
nisms in the new Member States
through these representatives being
exposed to and learning from their
colleagues in EU-15. Happily, this
process of including representatives
from the acceding countries has
already commenced in many EWCs in
advance of the legal requirement.The
importance of the issue is reflected by
the fact that the European cross-
industry social partners have included
an examination of the implementation
of the EWC directive after enlarge-
ment in their joint work programme
for 2003–05.
While the effective implementation of
the relevant employee involvement
directives would represent a very sig-
nificant positive factor in managing
restructuring at the enterprise level, it
is worth pointing out that the new
Member States face additional chal-
lenges in terms of the wider industri-
al relations environment. In existing
Member States, the employee involve-
ment directives operate within
national frameworks of industrial rela-
tions which often create a favourable
environment for their effective imple-
mentation in terms of dealing with
restructuring. In addition to employee
involvement rules which often go fur-
ther and take more diversified forms
than those established at Community
level,most Member States have devel-
oped their own responses to the eco-
nomic and social challenges associat-
ed with restructuring.There are sets
of rules, either statutory or agree-
ment-based, with which businesses
engaged in restructuring should com-
ply as well as good practices that they
can follow, addressing issues such as:
• anticipating and measuring the
social consequences of restruc-
turing, including taking into con-
sideration the fact that delaying
limited restructuring may lead
to more drastic restructuring in
the future;
• the principle whereby job losses
and redundancies are only a last
resort (ultima ratio), to be used
in the absence of other, less
drastic solutions;
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• the effective search, by provid-
ing the necessary resources or
by achieving certain expected
results, for alternative solutions,
such as redeployment, training
or retraining of the workers
concerned, the phasing of the
planned measures over time,
the reorganisation of work,
including working time, as a pre-
condition for the use of more
radical measures, help with job-
seeking, occupational guidance,
supporting the development of
self-employment or the creation
of SMEs by the workers affect-
ed, support for workers taking
over certain activities of the
business, etc.;
• the search for someone to take
over the interrupted activities;
• the rehabilitation and realloca-
tion of abandoned industrial
sites both as an environmental
measure and to absorb a pro-
portion of the jobs lost.
The new Member States will be con-
fronted with difficult challenges in
adopting and applying such rules and
practices. In most cases, this will have
to be done almost from scratch. A
pro-active approach from the EU will
therefore be helpful with a view to
helping the new Member States to
create the appropriate legal frame-
works as well as developing the sup-
porting industrial relations systems.
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n 1. Introduction
Following the EU’s enlargement with
10 new Member States joining on 1
May 2004, this chapter seeks to pro-
vide information on employment and
working conditions in the new
Member States, in particular at the
enterprise level in relation to the four
key elements defined by the EU’s
Lisbon strategy:
• Adaptability to change: to what
extent are the new Member
States demonstrating an ability to
adapt to changing conditions?
• Social cohesion: how cohesive are
the new Member States?
• Sustainability: how sustainable are
the systems that have been put in
place (during the transition as
well as a result of EU accession)
with regard to today’s principal
demographic, economic and
social challenges?
• Partnership: to what extent are
these societies based on broad
participation, social dialogue and
participatory mechanisms?
The chapter examines the full range
of employment and working condi-
tions at enterprise level, including
employment contracts, working time,
wages, occupational health and safety,
stress at work, reconciliation of work
and family life, social dialogue and
industrial relations more generally.
The employment and working condi-
tions indicated in this chapter, and the
trends identified, are based on work
done by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) on the basis of the
Eurostat Labour Force Survey,
European Household Panel data, the
2001 survey of the European
Foundation (Dublin) on EU-10 (153)
(the latest available), as well as expert
country case studies as part of an ILO
project on developments at enter-
prise level.
n 2. Adaptability to 
change
The assessment of employment and
working conditions in the new
Member States points to a first major
conclusion: not only is their general
responsiveness to change very strong
but they have also shown initiative in
the adaptation process by developing
innovative policies and practices.This
can be observed in all aspects of
working conditions.
At the same time, reality at enterprise
level points to a second major conclu-
sion: this adaptation to difficult cir-
cumstances has often resulted in poor
and probably unsustainable working
conditions. This is observable in a
number of areas of working condi-
tions, for instance, in employment sta-
tus and contracting, but also in work-
ing time, occupational health and safe-
ty, and remuneration practices.
2.1. Adapting to difficult
circumstances
Work under the previous communist
regime was characterised by very low
wages but also the guarantee of life-
long employment. The shift to a free
market economy has brought radical
changes in patterns of employment,
remuneration and working condi-
tions. The transition years brought
with them restructuring on an
unprecedented scale, resulting in
large-scale redundancies and soaring
unemployment. As the new private
sector emerged and developed, new
enterprises started to leave former
corporate models behind and to
adopt new forms of employment and
working-time arrangements in order
to adapt to the new exposure to
competition.
2.2. Temporary contracts
Although this form of employment did
not exist in the previous communist
regime and early years of transition, as
most workers were employed on per-
manent contracts, fixed-term work has
become a major form of employment
and is being increasingly used (as in EU-
15) as an important source of flexibility.
Currently, the average share of fixed-
term contracts in EU-10 is about 10 %,
slightly below the EU average of 11 %.
However, a few countries, such as
Poland (14 %) and Slovenia (12 %),
have seen employers making more sys-
tematic use of such employment con-
tracts (see Chart 6.1). For employers,
this has the advantage of reducing costs
in the event of termination of employ-
ment. In Poland, the use of such con-
tracts increased by nearly 25 % in 2003
alone. Polish legislation with regard to
this type of contract is particularly per-
missive, providing a strong incentive for
employers to make use of such flexible
forms of employment contract.
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Temporary work can be an important
stepping stone to more permanent
employment. Nevertheless, there is a
strong correlation between the devel-
opment of temporary employment
and the share of employees respond-
ing that this is not their first choice,
but involuntary, suggesting that unem-
ployment is the main factor making
them accept the insecurity of tempo-
rary employment contracts. Besides
the high incidence of involuntary tem-
porary jobs in southern Member
States such as Spain and Portugal (and
to a lesser extent in Greece and Italy)
not counting the ‘underground econ-
omy’, one can observe relatively high
shares of involuntary temporary
employment in Poland, Cyprus, Latvia,
the Czech Republic and Lithuania (see
Chart 6.2).
2.3. The development of
interim agencies
Another new phenomenon is the use
of interim employment agencies.
Although this type of employment is
only in its infancy — all new Member
States being well below the EU aver-
age — a growing proportion of
employment contracts are being con-
cluded through the intervention of
such agencies.
This phenomenon is most widespread
in Latvia, Slovenia and Malta (around
10 % of the labour force).These con-
tracts remain limited in the other new
Member States. In Estonia, only 1.2 %
of employees were employed through
interim agency contracts, although
this figure is rising. In Hungary, only
282 temporary agencies existed in
2002, employing 0.8 % of the total
number of employees, including their
own permanent staff, who represent-
ed half of this figure.The agencies had
contracts with only 1 289 employers,
something that remains insignificant
compared to the total number of
employers (close to 1 million with
more than four employees).
Moreover, this practice does not
seem to be well regulated at present.
Since several agencies were found to
have leased workers to only one
employer, there are reasons to believe
that many of them have been created
by the employers themselves as a way
of reducing their labour costs and
social security contributions.
2.4. Self-employment as a
source of flexibility
The most commonly used form of
flexibility which appears to be emerg-
ing in the new Member States is
recourse to self-employment (see
Chart 6.3).
In 2003,24 % of employees were self-
employed in Poland, 17 % in the
Czech Republic and Lithuania, and
13 % in Hungary, compared to an EU
average of 14 %. In EU-15, the highest
incidence of self-employment is found
in Greece (32 %), Portugal (26 %),
Italy (23 %) and Spain (17 %). In each
of the southern Member States self-
employment is very much associated
with small farmers and retailing, and is
declining. In Ireland and the UK, two
more Member States with a relatively
high incidence of self-employment,
there has been a fall in its share
between 1997 and 2003.The opposite
trend can be observed in many of the
EU-10 countries, with significant rises
in Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania and Estonia,but small reduc-
tions in Poland and Hungary (the data
for Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and Slovenia
does not allow comparison).
The figures indicate a large increase in
the number of self-employed over the
last few years. However, in making
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Chart 6.1: Temporary work (as a % of total employees), 1997-2003
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Source: Eurostat, LFS.NB: SK, LT, LV, EE, CZ: 1998 instead of 1997; 
CY, 1999 instead of 1997.
Chart 6.2: Temporary employment by reason, 2003
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comparisons between countries it is
important to control the size of the
agricultural sector, in particular where
there are many small independent
farmers. Moreover, some ‘self-
employed’ are actually small employ-
ers who employ one or more people
on a perhaps part-time or irregular
basis.This latter category, also existing
in EU-15 and making up some 5 % of
total employment, consists mainly of
managers (42 %) and professionals
(19 %). The self-employed (without
employees) are mainly found in three
sectors: agriculture (49 %), wholesale
and retail trade (21 %) and construc-
tion (23 %) (154). In EU-15, the sectoral
concentration of self-employment is
rather similar, but with a stronger bias
towards agriculture (74 %). The dif-
ference, then,between EU-15 and EU-
10 is that in the new Member States
self-employment is more frequent in
other sectors, such as manufacturing,
financial services and even some pub-
lic services, and it is also rising.
In the same way as temporary con-
tracts, self-employment is providing a
new source of flexibility.This may be
partly because it enables employers
to reduce their social security contri-
butions and employees to have higher
rates of net pay, but with less insur-
ance and higher risks. This develop-
ment is significant in Poland, Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but has
also been reported in the UK, Ireland,
Portugal, the Netherlands and in
some of the other EU-15 countries.
These new forms of self-employment
often involve a form of subcontract-
ing, avoiding social security contribu-
tions and coverage by labour laws.
While there may be short-term flexi-
bility gains for employers and mone-
tary gains for employees, it erodes the
collective basis for social security and
may create a regulatory gap with
regard to pensions and social security
coverage, with exclusionary conse-
quences due to under-insurance in
the future.
2.5. Part-time work for specific
categories of workers
In contrast to other flexible forms of
employment, part-time work is not
very developed in the new Member
States (see Chart 6.4). Moreover, it
tends to be essentially involuntary.For
instance, half of part-time work in
Estonia (51 % in 2002 compared to
42 % in 1993) and in Poland (50 %) is
of an involuntary nature. In addition,
when it is of a voluntary nature, it may
correspond to a second job for those
already working full-time in a main job
(this is the case for 12 % of part-
timers in Estonia).These mechanisms
(lack of alternative full-time employ-
ment, a second job) are also found in
EU-15, but in many Member States,
for instance the Netherlands,
Germany, and in Scandinavia, the
development of part-time work has
also been developed as a way of rec-
onciling work and family life (155).
In EU-10, part-time work is frequently
used to employ retired people, the
disabled, young first entrants and the
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Chart 6.3: Self-employment (as a % of total employment), 1997-2003
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CY, 1999 instead of 1997.
Chart 6.4: Part-time work (as a % of total employment), 1997–2003
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(154) These averages are calculated for EU-10 and the two accession countries Bulgaria and Romania. 
(155) For case studies of Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Ireland and the UK, see J. O’Reilly (ed.) (2003), Regulating
working-time transitions in Europe, Cheltenham, Elgar. On part-time work as a strategy for reconciling work and family life, see J.
Visser (2002), ‘The first part-time economy in the world. A model to be followed?’, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 12. 
unemployed. In Hungary, nearly 20 %
of the 4.8 % of employees working
part-time have disabilities. In Poland,
40 % of part-time workers are either
pensioners or disabled.
In Hungary, part-time work is not
very developed, despite the govern-
ment’s efforts to promote it as a way
of raising the employment rate. The
idea was to make this type of contract
more attractive for both employers
and employees, notably by reducing
the amount of flat-rate healthcare
contributions that are levied on
employees on top of the insurance-
type healthcare contribution. One
possibility offered is to consider a
part-time job (above a certain weekly
limit) as a full-time job when the
length of service is calculated for pen-
sion purposes.
Part-time work is nevertheless on the
increase in EU-10 and may progres-
sively evolve to serve the same func-
tion it normally does in EU-15. In
Estonia the proportion of part-time
workers rose from 5 % in 1993 to
9 % in 2002, mainly in the healthcare
and social services sectors which are
dominated by female employees.
More favourable legislation for part-
time work — especially with regard
to employers’ taxes and contributions
— may encourage greater use of this
form of flexible employment.
2.6. Long working hours
Working time is also an area in which
there are differences between EU-15
and EU-10, with employees appearing
to work longer hours on average in
the latter. On average, some 38 % of
all employed (employees and self-
employed) in EU-10 and Bulgaria and
Romania regularly work more than 45
hours per week, against 21 % in EU-
15. In contrast, short working weeks
of less than 30 hours are much less
frequent in the new Member States.
In 2003 all new Member States — with
the exception of Lithuania and to a less-
er extent Slovakia — were working
above the EU-15 average (41.4 hours a
week), especially Latvia (43.8), Poland
(43.4) and the Czech Republic (43.1). In
EU-15, comparable long working hours
were reported only in Greece, which
registered the highest number of aver-
age working hours (44.4 hours a week)
and in the UK (with 43.8).A breakdown
by status, shows that the longest weekly
and annual working hours are found
among the self-employed (both in EU-
10 and EU-15) and that sectors charac-
terised by long working hours tend to
be agriculture, hotels and restaurants,
and the wholesale and retail trade.
Long working hours appear to have
become a way of coping for both
employers and employees. For
employers, it helps to respond to
periods of peak activity with the same
manpower. For employees, accumulat-
ing the number of hours worked dur-
ing the week has become one of the
main ways of increasing low basic
wages and supplementing family
income.Although it is probably mainly
low hourly wage rates which impel
workers to work long hours, often
long hours are nevertheless the result
of employer pressure rather than the
employee’s wishes. As an example,
30 % of extra working time in Poland
is involuntary and does not therefore
correspond to a free choice on the
part of the employee. Long working
hours probably represent an impor-
tant form of adaptability in a difficult
economic context at enterprise level
and has been an important competi-
tive element in manufacturing, but
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Chart 6.6: Weekly working time (in number of hours) 
of those working full-time, 1997-2003
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Chart 6.5: Long hours and unsocial hours, 2001
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also in sectors such as mining, trans-
port and electricity.
Weekend work or unsocial hours
have also developed rapidly in some
countries. Weekend work in the
retail sector, for instance, is a major
political issue in Slovenia, particularly
the question of whether Sunday
opening should be introduced.
Chart 6.5 tries to map the EU-25 in
terms of both working time and unso-
cial hours. It shows that most new
Member States are located in the
upper right corner, representing a
very extensive use of the labour
force. These figures, well above the
EU-15 average, obviously have direct
implications for employees at work,
especially since working time has
strong correlations with other work-
ing conditions. Longer working weeks
are associated with greater health and
safety risks, and difficulties in reconcil-
ing work and family life.
Although the new Member States
seem to have particularly long work-
ing weeks, there are two positive
developments. Firstly, the number of
hours worked has progressively
decreased in all these countries over
the last few years.When 2003 is com-
pared to 1997, weekly working time
has fallen in most countries, some-
times significantly, as in Slovakia, the
Czech Republic (by nearly two
hours), followed by Slovenia, Estonia
and Cyprus (by one hour). These
countries seem therefore to be
already progressively converging
towards the EU average. This has
been achieved partly through changes
in national legislation — reducing
maximum weekly working time (for
instance, in Poland this was reduced
from 42 to 40 hours between 2001
and 2003) — mainly to fall in line with
the EU working-time directive. Also
in contractual working hours there is
a convergence towards the EU aver-
age. Within EU-15, the movement
towards shorter contractual and
actual working hours which had char-
acterised the 1980s and 1990s, has
come to a standstill after 2001,
though some national and sectoral
changes are observed (156). Working-
time reductions do remain on the
agenda of many unions, especially in
those countries with above-average
weekly hours, for instance in Greece
where the Greek General Con-
federation of Labour (GSEE) included a
significant working-time reduction in
its demands for a renewal of the
national agreement for 2004. In EU-
10, the role of collective bargaining in
setting normal weekly hours is much
less pronounced, given the overall
weaker role of (sectoral) collective
agreements (see Chapter 1).Thus, in
countries such as Estonia, Latvia and
Poland, collective agreements tend
merely to reflect the statutory
norms. In Hungary, negotiations on
the reduction of working time were
held in the tripartite National
Interest Reconciliation Council dur-
ing 2003, but appeared to reach a
deadlock.
Secondly, over the last few years, there
has been a progressive decrease in the
number of workers with a second or
even a third job, the typical way of cop-
ing during the first transition years for
many workers. In Estonia, for instance,
the percentage of workers with a sec-
ond job decreased from 9 % in 1997 to
4.5 % in 2002. It seems that workers
now concentrate on one activity but
accumulate working hours to increase
their wages or their probability of
being retained by their employer.
Second jobs now seem to be common
mainly among more skilled and profes-
sional employees, who can often easily
obtain an additional work contract
with another company.
2.7. The use of ‘civil’ and
‘multiple’ contracts
In the last few years, a new phenome-
non has been emerging at the enter-
prise level, with a growing number of
employees shifting from regular to
self-employed status. This not only
means that the employees get a new
‘self-employed’ job status, but also
that their normal employment con-
tract is replaced with a civil contract.
This has the consequence that they
are no longer covered by the labour
code, but by the civil code, and are no
longer considered to be employees,
but business units. This phenomenon
is not unknown in EU-15 (157), though
its diffusion would seem to be limited
to particular kinds of professionals
and occupations (for instance, lorry
drivers in the road haulage sector or
hairdressers).The problematic conse-
quences for social insurance have
already been mentioned above.
This development seems to reverse a
long historical development in indus-
trial societies in which the ‘employ-
ment relationship’, regulated by labour
law, took the place of the older ‘con-
tracts of work’, regulated by commer-
cial law (158). In a contract of work, the
employer pays a price for a particular
piece of work — a ‘job’ — basically
upon its completion. How the work is
executed is left to the supplier, i.e. the
worker who essentially remains an
independent subcontractor. After the
work is completed, the relationship
between the two sides ceases to exist
and there are no continuing mutual
responsibilities. In contrast, in a con-
tract of employment, it is not a partic-
ular work task that is contracted for,
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(156) see EIRO (2004), Working-time developments — 2003 (http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2004/03/update/tn0403104u.html).
(157) See the study commissioned by the Employment and Social Affairs DG by A. Perulli (2004), Economically dependent/quasi-subordi-
nate employment: legal, social and economic aspects,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/documentation_en.htm#6.
(158) See W. Streeck (2004), ‘The sociology of trade unions and labour markets’, in N. Smelser and R. Swedberg (eds.), Handbook of eco-
nomic sociology, Newbury Peak Ca, Sage.
but the availability of the worker to
perform, within broad limits, any task
assigned by the employer. Wages are
paid, not prices. Instead of a tempo-
rary association for the duration of a
specific project, the employment rela-
tionship constitutes an ongoing organ-
isational relationship with mutual
responsibilities defined by labour law
and, for many workers, the collective
or individual contract. In the case of
employment contracts, trade unions
have a role as agents negotiating the
contractual obligations and protecting
workers from excessive demands, and
as guardians of trust in implicit and
informal mutual commitments. There
is no such role for trade unions in
‘contracts of work’ — in that case
‘unions’ would be more similar to
small business associations that may
protect the quality and price of ‘jobs’.
In spite of the general prevalence of
employment contracts and the status
of wage and salary earners, there has
always existed a minority of jobs exe-
cuted on the basis of contracts of
work, for instance in construction, or
in services where freelancers or con-
sultants tend to operate — for
instance, interpreting, translation,busi-
ness consultancy, hairdressing or
beauty specialists.Usually, contracts of
work were based on some special
‘craft’ or skill that did not require
much teamwork or complex organi-
sational arrangements. The new phe-
nomenon, possibly now more wide-
spread in EU-10 than in EU-15, is
often the result of the restructuring
of jobs based on employment con-
tracts into jobs based on contracts of
work in steady services which are
usually organised in firms with regular
employment, such as in the banking
sector in Hungary.
There seem to be various motivations
for this.With regard to employers, it
helps to reduce their tax burden and
social contributions and to minimise
the likelihood of strikes or the need
for prior authorisation for dismissals.
The advantages for employees are
less clear, although being self-
employed they would probably be
able to claim certain expenses that
may be deducted for the purpose of
income tax. Such advantages would
seem slight if set against the costs of
insurance and protection (for
instance, in the case of female employ-
ees the costs of absence and medical
insurance in case of maternity). It is
also possible that the lack of alterna-
tives and weak bargaining power
under conditions of widespread
unemployment make this an involun-
tary choice on their part.Temporary
agency work would probably be a
functional equivalent, with better
prospects for a gradual increase of
security and the assumption of some
‘employer’ responsibility on the part
of the employing agency, but it may be
that the absence of a clear regulatory
framework has made this an unattrac-
tive option.
Not only does this type of use of self-
employment circumvent the payment
of social security or pension contribu-
tions by the employer, it also affects
working conditions. The self-
employed tend to work longer hours
due to tight deadlines fixed for their
specific assignments, without proper
remuneration, especially since their
working hours are much more diffi-
cult to check and are much harder to
count within official statistics on
working time. In Poland, the self-
employed were found to reach peaks
of 56 hours per week (see Chart 6.7).
The self-employed can also suffer
from non-payment or from long
delays before being paid. In Estonia, for
instance, 13 % of self-employed per-
sons reported having had their wages
delayed by more than a month.
A second type of self-employment is
also occurring, whereby the employer
supplements the employee’s normal
employment contract with an addi-
tional job or ‘self-employment’ con-
tract. The difference in employment
status may be matched by a different
form of activity, with one activity cov-
ered by labour law and the additional
one by commercial law.This practice
seems to be developing rapidly in
some of the EU-10 countries. For
example, the use within the same
enterprise and for the same employ-
ees, a regular labour contract supple-
mented, for extra working time or
additional work assignments, by a
commercial contract of work. This
practice seems to be particularly
widespread in Poland, Hungary and
the three Baltic States. It would seem
a functional equivalent to the flexibili-
ty based on variable overtime hours,
but outside the framework of labour
and working-time legislation.
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Chart 6.7: Self-employment and long hours, 2001
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question 14 on long weekly hours.
In Estonia, a not insignificant propor-
tion of workers — 5 % in 2002
against 11 % in 1998 — continue to
work without any written contract at
all. Their employment and working
conditions are agreed verbally with
the employer, a practice that seems to
be more developed in new enterpris-
es, especially in Tallinn and in some
rural areas (7 % of enterprises in
2002). In the Baltic States, in addition
to an individual labour contract,
employees sometimes sign a supple-
mentary ‘extra agreement’,which is, in
fact, a notice of dismissal that can be
used at any time at the discretion of
the employer. While this practice is
decreasing in Estonia (from 10 to 6 %
between 1999 and 2002), it is becom-
ing more frequent in Latvia and
Lithuania,where it affects nearly 10 %
of the labour force.
2.8. Health and safety risks
Health and safety is an issue to which
enterprises still need to pay more
attention. It has tended to be a rather
neglected area so far because of the
costs entailed without immediate
returns. Although the general situa-
tion seems to be improving, the pic-
ture is still worrying in most of the
new Member States. A health and
safety index developed on the basis of
the Dublin Foundation survey results
of 2001, shows that the health and
safety risks in most of the EU-10
countries are much higher than in EU-
15 (see Chart 6.8).
When legislation exists, many enter-
prises, especially new small and medi-
um-sized enterprises in the private
sector, fail to comply with it. In Estonia,
for instance, according to the labour
inspectorate,only 15 % of enterprises
were in compliance with legal obliga-
tions.The main violations involved the
absence of a contract with an occupa-
tional health service specialist (70 %
were found not to have one), no risk
assessment or plan of activities (60 %
of enterprises are not in compliance),
no internal control (absent in 49 %
of enterprises), no training (not even
discussed in 44 % of cases), and no
elected or appointed representatives
with responsibility for health and
safety (37 %).
Conversely, most of the inspected
enterprises did not have problems
with safety instructions, first aid
equipment and personal protective
equipment. However, the statistics on
occupational accidents and diseases
suggest that there are problems in
this area,as their number increased by
almost 50 % between 1999 and 2002
in Estonia. In other countries, such as
Poland, while the number of accidents
at work is decreasing, they remain at a
high level. Moreover, most victims of
such accidents are found to be on
short-term or temporary contracts.
There is also a direct correlation
between long working hours and the
risk of accidents.
It is possible, however, that the recent
increase in accidents in some of the
new Member States may be due not
only to a real increase in absolute num-
bers, but to better reporting. This
would appear to indicate a move
towards greater transparency and pub-
lic concern in relation to occupational
health and safety issues. EU member-
ship and the need to implement the
EU’s legislative acquis can be expected
to have a further positive impact.
2.9. Unpaid overtime
While contractual and actual working
time is already officially much longer
than in all but a few of the EU-15 coun-
tries (Greece,UK), the true differences
may be greater than suggested by offi-
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Chart 6.8: Long hours and health and safety risks, 2001
R2 = 0.4417
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
Proportion of long hours
ROPL
LT
LV
CYBG
IE
CZ
SK
HU
ES
EL
EE
MT
SI
DK
NL DE
SE
LU
AT
IT
UK
FI
BE
 PT
FR
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
h
ea
lt
h
 a
n
d
 s
af
et
y 
ri
sk
s
Source: Dublin Foundation Survey 2000-01; derived from question 30 on overall health and  
safety risks and question 14 on long weekly hours.
Chart 6.9: Proportion of workers who do not receive extra payment for overtime  
(% of workers who are working more than 48 hours a week; employees only, 2001) 
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%
cial statistics (and the provisions of the
new labour codes), if overtime, second
jobs, multiple contracts and, not least,
the informal economy are taken into
account. It should be pointed out,how-
ever, that these phenomena, in particu-
lar a widespread informal or ‘under-
ground’ economy, in which many prac-
tices are by definition unreported and
hard to gauge statistically, also exist in
EU-15, for instance in Italy or Greece.
Actual hours worked may therefore be
underestimated for all the reasons
mentioned. Finally, official statistics do
not always capture the variation
between periods of intensive activity
with very long working weeks or days.
Average working time remains low
because the reference period taken for
calculation of this average is mainly
defined by employers, due to weak
social dialogue or works councils, and
the absence of collective agreements
in which these matters are defined.
Problems have also been reported
with regard to extra working time in
the public sector in Hungary, Estonia
and the Czech Republic. In Hungary,
due to labour shortages, workers in
the health sector (and particularly
nurses) are legally permitted to work
62 hours per week. In the Estonian
public sector, there is a practice of
adding service contracts to regular
employment contracts.
Beyond long working weeks, the case
studies seem to confirm that a con-
siderable amount of overtime is
unpaid. For example, more than 70 %
of workers in Poland do not receive
any additional remuneration for over-
time. The case of Lithuania is also
striking, as only 6.5 % of workers
who are working more than 48 hours
per week receive extra payment.The
best situation seems to be in Slovakia,
where only 48.5 % of employees
working overtime reported not being
paid (see Chart 6.9). A similar situa-
tion exists for the payment of week-
end work. In Cyprus and Lithuania,
fewer than 10 % of workers are paid
extra for working on Sundays.
While the phenomenon of unpaid
overtime is not unknown in EU-15, it
generally concerns managers and
white-collar employees rather than
manual workers, whereas in many of
the new Member States it tends to
concern all types of workers. Many
reasons induce employees to accept
such conditions. Unemployment is
probably the principal factor.The sec-
ond is the payment of part of the
wages ‘cash-in-hand’, while only the
minimum wage is officially declared.
2.10. Under-reporting of wage
payments
Officially reporting the payment of the
minimum wage and providing employ-
ees with extra payments ‘cash-in-hand’
is a way to save on the payment of
(earnings-related) social contributions
and taxes and, consequently, reduce
labour costs (159). A recent survey (160)
suggests that nearly half of all
Hungarian employers say that this is
general practice in the Hungarian
economy. It is the most quoted
method (by 46 % of respondents) of
saving on labour costs. Next in line
among cost-saving methods is the use
of commercial ‘contracts of work’ (27
%), while around 12 % of all employ-
ers mention temporary employment
‘for a trial period’, and 15 % refer to
part-time employment. In Estonia,
10 % of employees received ‘cash-in-
hand’ payments in 2002 (an improve-
ment on 1999 when this practice was
reported by 19 % of employees). In
Poland this practice was strongly asso-
ciated with employment in micro
firms. In 2003, ‘cash-in-hand’ wages
affected nearly 20 % of employees in
enterprises with fewer than 5 employ-
ees, between 10 and 15 % of employ-
ees in SMEs with 6 to 150 employees,
and fewer than 5 % of employees in
large companies with over 150
employees.
The general practice of under-declar-
ing wages obviously has implications
for social security and tax revenues, as
well as for the social rights and work-
ing conditions of employees. EU
membership should help to improve
the economic and social context.
n 3. Social cohesion
In this section, the position of partic-
ular groups and categories of
employees will be reviewed. How
have women, or those with responsi-
bilities for children, fared? Are there
particular groups with really poor
working conditions and low wages?
What categories of employees are
excluded from the undeniable eco-
nomic and social progress that has
taken place?
These important questions are
reviewed against the background of
the huge differences in economic
development which has characterised
the latest enlargement process.
Representing an increase in the EU’s
population of 28 %, EU-10 added just
over 5 % to total GDP. Chart 6.10
shows the massive differences in GDP
per capita, between EU-15 and EU-10,
but also within EU-10 in particular.
However, considerable economic
progress can also be observed since
1994, continuing in recent years.
There are good reasons to believe
that the new Member States will
‘catch up’, even though this will prob-
ably take some time. Productivity per
hour worked is still much lower in
EU-10, reflecting various factors,
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(159) See the study commissioned by the Employment and Social Affairs DG by P. Renooy, S. Ivarsson, O. van der Wusten-Gritsai and R.
Meijer (2004), Undeclared work in an enlarged union: An analysis of undeclared work: An in-depth study of specific items.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/work_enlarg_en.htm
(160) Economic Trends, 2003
including the structure of capital,
investment, skills, management, work-
ing practices and infrastructure (see
Chart 6.11).
However, in general, growth trends in
hourly productivity and in GDP per
hour worked have been much
stronger in EU-10 than in EU-15 (see
Charts 6.12 and 6.13).
These positive trends have to be set
against some problematic develop-
ments. Firstly, employment rates in
the new Member States tend to be
lower and in most countries remain
far below the targets (70 % for all,
60 % for women) set for 2010 as part
of the Lisbon agenda and the
European employment strategy. More
worrying even is that in some of the
new Member States — Poland,
Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the
Czech Republic — employment rates
have fallen in recent times (see Charts
6.14 and 6.15).
At the same time the unemployment
rates of men and women tend to be
much higher in the new Member
States, ranging from a high 18 % for
men and 20 % for women in Poland
to 5–7 % in Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Slovenia. After initially
soaring unemployment, the decline in
many countries has been slow (see
Charts 6.16 and 6.17).
Finally, Eurostat’s survey of living and
working conditions suggest larger
income differences in many of the EU-
10 countries, although in this case the
indicator based on the Gini-coefficients
calculated after tax household income,
suggest that the spread is very large
and that some of the new Member
States — Slovenia, Hungary and the
Czech Republic (data for Slovakia are
missing) — are as equal as for instance
Germany or the Netherlands, while
others — Poland and the Baltic States,
and also Malta and Cyprus — tend to
be characterised by much higher levels
of income inequality, similar to the UK
and most of the southern Member
States (see Chart 6.18).
These background statistics on GDP,
productivity levels and growth,
employment and unemployment, and
inequality are useful contextual fac-
tors when discussing developments in
working conditions and social cohe-
sion in the new Member States, as
both constraints and opportunities
for development.
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Chart 6.10: GDP per capita, 1994, 2001 and 2003
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Chart 6.11: Hourly labour productivity, 1994, 2001 and 2003 
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Chart 6.12: Growth of productivity per hour worked  
1994–2001 and 2001–03
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3.1. Unemployment and wages
Most recent case studies carried out
in individual enterprises suggest that
the main reason why employees
accept poor employment and work-
ing conditions — without complaining
or going to court — is fear of dis-
missal, against a backdrop of high
unemployment. Another reason why
employees tend to accept long hours,
and at stressful working rhythms, is
the urgent need to raise their living
standards.Table 6.1 shows that mini-
mum wages, as well as actual wages,
are well below the average for EU-15
in terms of purchasing power.
Chart 6.19 shows that compared to
employees on permanent contracts,
those employed on temporary or
fixed-term contracts tend to work
longer hours, have lower hourly
wages, find it more difficult to com-
bine working time and family obliga-
tions, find their working environment
harder to cope with, consider them-
selves more exposed to health and
safety risks and are more dissatisfied
with their work. In contrast, the self-
employed differ from workers on per-
manent contracts mainly in two
respects: much longer working weeks
and a lower probability of low hourly
wages.This seems to suggest that the
self-employed option is mainly open
to skilled (‘craft’) workers or ‘jobbers’
for whom the opportunity costs of
not working and short weekly hours
are relatively high. It is also possible
that the risks associated with self-
employment are compensated by
above-average hourly rates. As a
result, many self-employed were
found to belong to the higher income
category.
Another practice observed at enter-
prise level illustrates the salience of
the wage issue: the widespread prac-
tice of payment of bonuses or premia
as compensation for poor working
conditions — particularly occupation-
al health and safety — a practice
which both workers and trade unions
accept.
The lack of development of part-time
work can also be traced back to low
wages and living standards.Apart from
other disadvantages and the lack of a
regulatory framework granting part-
time workers similar social security
and employment rights as full-time
workers, the low incidence of part-
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Chart 6.13: Growth of GDP  per person employed, 
1994–2001 and 2001–03
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Chart 6.14: Employment rates of men aged 15–64 
1997, 2001 and 2003 
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Chart 6.15: Employment rates of women aged 15–64, 
1997,  2001 and 2003
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% of women aged 15–64
time employment in the southern
Member States (Italy, Greece, Portugal
and Spain) has a similar background of
low hourly wages (and social rights).
Typically, in such cases, part-time
employment, where it exists, is invol-
untary, because of the difficulty of find-
ing full-time work. (Another factor is
that the informal economy may offer
better opportunities nearer home). A
considerable proportion of part-time
employment in EU-10, but also in
some of the EU-15 countries, such as
Greece, Italy, France and even Finland,
is involuntary. There are numerous
examples of high fixed costs (public
transport, childcare, health contribu-
tions) that cannot be met by part-time
wages and therefore make part-time
work an unattractive option.
3.2. The female employment
gap
Under communism, the central and
east European countries tended to
give women a secure place in the
world of work.This is no longer the
case. As shown by Charts 6.14 and
6.15, there is now a widening gap
between male and female employ-
ment rates and female employment
rates in these countries falling behind
those in EU-15. In fact, the highest
female employment rate among the
new Member States is found in
Cyprus, much in contrast to the usu-
ally low employment rates of women
found in the Mediterranean countries.
Next best, in terms of employment
for women, are the Baltic States,
though they have fallen behind the
high levels found among their Nordic
neighbours.
The transition to the market econo-
my has increased the employment 
gap between men and women.
Employment rates have fallen most
dramatically in Poland, to 47 % in
2003, just ahead of the very low rates
of female employment found in Italy,
Greece, Spain and in Malta (see Chart
6.15).
During the transition process, many
‘family-friendly’ workplace arrange-
ments have been abandoned, which
explains to a certain extent the fall in
female employment rates in these
countries. Many women have left the
labour market, either because of diffi-
culties in reconciling work and mater-
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Chart 6.16: Unemployment rates of men, 1997, 2001 and 2003
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Chart 6.17: Unemployment rates of women, 1997, 2001 and 2003
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Chart 6.18: Income inequality indicator, 2000
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Gini coefficient
nity, or because of being more vulner-
able in the restructuring process,
which tends to affect the low-paid and
lower-skilled jobs held by women.
Women have lower prospects of find-
ing work, since they tend to experi-
ence longer spells of unemployment.
Some 67 % of all unemployed women
in Slovakia and 58 % in Poland, com-
pared to an also high percentage of 48
% in EU-15, stay unemployed during
one year or longer.This can have neg-
ative consequences for experience,
skills and motivation to seek new
employment.The prevention of long-
term unemployment has been one of
the central issues in the European
employment strategy since 1997. In
EU-15, the long-term unemployment
rate, though still high,has decreased in
the past six years. A very high inci-
dence of long-term unemployment is
found for men and women in Slovakia,
Poland and Lithuania, for men in Latvia
and Estonia, and for women in
Greece, Italy and Spain, and to a less-
er extent in the Czech Republic (161).
3.3. Other disadvantaged
groups
Efforts have been made in the new
Member States towards the better
social inclusion of pensioners, stu-
dents and the unemployed.The long-
standing political priority of reforming
pension systems since the transition
of these economies, and the more
recent initiatives to extend working
life and postpone retirement (similar
to efforts being made in the Member
States of EU-15), are both attempts to
combat the problem of old-age
poverty, as well as to create more
financially viable systems for the long
run.Measures have also been taken to
facilitate the integration of new
entrants into the labour market, for
instance, through a lower minimum
wage for young people in Estonia.
With regard to older employees
between the ages of 55 and 65, among
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(161) Report by the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok (2003), Jobs, jobs, jobs — Creating more employment in Europe, Chart
11: Long-term unemployment rates, 2002 (based on Eurostat, QLFD), p. 83. 
Chart 6.19: Working conditions of the self-employed (without employees) 
compared to other employees
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Minimum wage level
(in euro) 2003
Minimum wage  
(in PPP) 2003
Austria - -
Belgium 1 163 1 162
Cyprus -
Czech Republic 199 389
Denmark - -
Estonia 138 264
Finland - -
France 1 154 1 150
Germany - -
Greece 605 725
Hungary 212 384
Ireland 1 073 910
Italy - -
Latvia 116 239
Lithuania 125 252
Luxembourg 1 369 1 338
Malta 535 752
Netherlands 1 249 1 225
Poland 201 351
Portugal 416 543
Slovakia 118 265
Slovenia 451 668
Spain 526 617
Sweden - -
UK 1 105 983
EU-15 - -
EU-25 - -
TABLE 6.1: MINIMUM WAGE LEVELS IN EU-25
Source: Eurostat; EC Employment in Europe 2003, p. 80, on 01/01/2003.
 
the new Member States only Estonia
meets the Lisbon criterion of a 50 %
employment rate.The other Member
States are far behind, with employ-
ment rates (in 2002) of 30 % or
lower in Hungary,Poland,Slovenia and
Slovakia, and not many signs of
improvement in recent times.Again, in
this respect there is considerable
similarity with the southern Member
States and with France, Belgium and
Luxembourg, also characterised by
low employment rates among older
workers and only modest improve-
ments in recent years (162).
The situation of people with disabili-
ties deteriorated significantly during
the transition years. Studies point to
the difficult labour market position of
the Roma population. Roma are often
excluded from education and employ-
ment opportunities.A number of pro-
grammes to give them better access
to education and training have been
implemented, leading to some
progress. Nevertheless, their situation
would seem to need a comprehensive
policy, aimed at improving social pro-
tection and social assistance coverage
as well as facilitating their social inte-
gration (schooling, housing, etc.).
3.4. Poverty
Poverty remains a major concern in
most of the new Member States.
Certain groups are more affected
than others, such as the unemployed,
especially the long-term unemployed,
the disabled and those depending on
social assistance. Among the families
most at risk are those with three or
more children as well as single-parent
households, generally single mothers
with dependent children. These
poverty risks, which have a similar
profile in EU-15, have of course direct
implications for family structure, the
main issue addressed in the following
section.
n 4. Social sustainability?
Having examined some of the trends
occurring in employment and working
policies and practices at societal and
enterprise level in the new Member
States, what are the implications for
the sustainability of these societies in
demographic, economic and social
terms?
4.1. Demographic sustainability
Most of the trends in employment,
wages and security found in enterpris-
es have an influence on life outside
the workplace. Where this affects
parents and young people involved in
planning their lives and families, this
can have deep implications for demo-
graphic trends. This has also been
shown for many of the EU-15 coun-
tries (163).
4.1.1. Reconciling work and family
life
The employment and working condi-
tions described above do not seem
conducive for either women or men to
reconcile work and family life. Part-
time work is not very developed and
both women and men tend to work
long hours, not least because of low
wages. In contrast with the EU-15,
where women work fewer hours than
men — 33 as opposed to 41 hours a
week on average in 2000 — there are
hardly any differences between the
length of the working week between
men and women in EU-10. This has
obvious consequences for combining
employment with caring responsibili-
ties, especially for very young children.
Chart 6.20 shows that in some of the
new Member States the female partici-
pation rate of women with children
under school age (taken to be the age
of six) is very low indeed, for example,
in Hungary, Estonia, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia.These rates are
even lower than those found in coun-
tries such as Greece, Italy,Spain and the
UK. However, Slovenia and Lithuania
have high rates, similar to those found
in Denmark and Sweden. Low partici-
pation rates would appear to reflect
difficulty in combining employment
with family duties, the lack of availabili-
ty or low attractiveness of part-time
work (due to low wages and other dis-
advantages), and a shortage of afford-
able public facilities or services.
As in EU-15,where part-time employ-
ment is taken up in EU-10, it is a main-
ly female phenomenon, although in
Slovenia, the Baltic States, Poland and
Hungary the female share in part-time
163
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(162) Report by the Employment Taskforce (2003), Charts 9 and 10: Employment rates of older workers (55–64) (QLFD, comparable
annual estimates based on LFS and ESA 95, Eurostat), p. 82.
(163) For an incisive analysis, see G. Esping-Andersen (1999), Social foundations of post-industrial economies, Oxford, OUP. 
Chart 6.20: Activity rate of persons (aged 20–50) with one  
or more children under 6 years of age, 2003
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employment — usually three quarters
or more — is not as pronounced (see
Chart 6.21).
In these countries, part-time employ-
ment is also taken up by pensioners,
the disabled, young first entrants and
the unemployed and is less associated
with an attempt by women to cope
with work and family responsibilities.
This is confirmed by the pattern
shown in Chart 6.22.Those Member
States in which part-time employ-
ment rates are low tend to be those
in which people think that part-time
work does not help to achieve a bet-
ter balance between work and family
life. Thus, many of the new Member
States are situated in one corner,
together with the southern Member
States, i.e. those with low (volun-
tary) shares of part-time work,
whereas most northern Member
States occupy the opposite corner
with high shares of part-time work
and a more positive evaluation.
Other measures for reconciling work
and family life being discussed by eco-
nomic and social actors in the new
Member States, include childcare cen-
tres, services provided by employers,
opening hours of schools and shops,
housing costs in cities (that involve
longer distances between home,
school and workplace), services for
older children, and also telework and
home-working. It is probable that self-
employment contracts are also being
used as a way of reconciling work and
family life, since they would seem to
leave more freedom to employees to
organise their working hours. In
Estonia, for instance, part-time work
is more widespread among the self-
employed, which may represent a way
of reconciling work and family life.
4.1.2. Impact on maternity
These developments, namely the diffi-
culty of reconciling work and family
life, the absence of decent part-time
employment, employers’ search for
flexibility and unstable employment
prospects are also having an impact
on maternity. In some new Member
States tougher labour markets are
found to be a direct cause of lower
female employment rates, particularly
in a context of high unemployment.
Women are finding it more difficult
than before to reintegrate into the
labour market after maternity leave.
Some Polish labour market specialists
summarise the situation as follows: give
up work if you want to have children or
postpone the first child, sometimes by
10 years. In fact, while 75 % of women
between 25 and 39 years of age are
active, this rate falls to 60 % if they have
one child, to 47 % with two children,
and 51 % for those with three children.
Poland is among those Member States
with the highest participation rate for
women with children under the age of
six, as illustrated by Chart 6.20.
Where the gap in the unemployment
rates of men and women has narrowed,
as is the case in some of the new
Member States, this is also because
women tend to leave the labour mar-
ket. Whatever the cause, fertility rates
have fallen dramatically, emulating the
pattern found in many of the EU-15
countries, but with even greater speed.
Fertility rates are now among the low-
est in the EU (see Table 6.2).
Part of the decline — both in EU-15
and EU-10 — can be attributed to the
decline in families with more than
three children.This is clearly the case
in Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovenia and Slovakia, where people
appear to be increasingly hesitant to
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Chart 6.21: Persons working less than 30 hours per week  
as % of total employment, 2003
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Chart 6.22: Part-time and reconciliation of work and family
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Source: Dublin Foundation Survey 2000-01; derived from question 17 on work and family  
incompatibility and question 14a on part-time employment. 
have more children.This may be relat-
ed to financial difficulties, housing con-
straints, the lack of facilities, etc.
Labour market conditions might lie
behind the tendency to postpone hav-
ing the first child, a tendency which
characterises both EU-15 and EU-10,
but is more recent in the new Member
States. Nevertheless, women in EU-10
on average have their first child at a
younger age than those in EU-15, but
the speed of change between 1989 and
1999 suggests that convergence
towards a common age of 29 or 30 is
just a matter of time (Table 6.3).
4.2. Economic sustainability
The viability of economic systems is,
among other factors, also dependent
upon the working conditions and
social policies in enterprises.As shown
by Charts 6.12 and 6.13, the new
Member States experienced above-
average output and productivity
growth in recent years, which should
be boosted further by accession.
However, developments at the micro-
economic level of enterprises may
become a cause for concern if they are
wasteful with regard to human
resources and undermine productivity
and competitiveness in the long run,
making it more difficult to achieve the
Lisbon targets of growth, more and
better jobs, and social cohesion.
4.2.1. Wasted economic resources
One major feature of most new
Member States is undoubtedly the
existence of a large informal sector,
accounting for approximately 30 % of
GDP in Poland and 25 % in Hungary.
Many employment practices and
working conditions described above,
such as undeclared wages, the under-
payment of wages, the extensive
recourse to self-employment, unpaid
overtime, reduce the tax base for
social security and other revenues
needed for public investment, which
may undermine the long-term eco-
nomic capacity of these countries.
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1980 2000
EU-15 1.82 1.53
Austria 1.65 1.32
Belgium 1.68 1.65
Cyprus 2.46 1.83
Czech Republic 2.10 1.14
Denmark 1.55 1.76
Estonia 2.02 1.39
Finland 1.63 1.73
France 1.95 1.89
Germany 1.56 1.34
Greece 2.21 1.30
Hungary 1.91 1.33
Ireland 3.23 1.89
Italy 1.64 1.25
Latvia 1.90 1.24
Lithuania 2.00 1.33
Luxembourg 1.49 1.78
Malta (1) 1.99 2.05
Netherlands 1.60 1.72
Poland 2.28 1.34
Portugal 2.18 1.54
Slovakia 2.32 1.20
Slovenia 2.11 1.25
Spain 2.20 1.22
Sweden 1.68 1.54
UK 1.90 1.64
TABLE 6.2: FERTILITY RATES IN EU-25, 1980–2000
(1) Figure for 1999.
Source:The social situation in the European Union 2003.
(1) Figure for 1996. (2) Figure for 1995. Source: Eurostat yearbook 2003.
1989 1999
EU-15 (1) 28.07 28.98
Austria 27.09 28.12
Belgium (2) 27.80 28.47
Cyprus 27.10 28.60
Czech Republic 24.75 26.87
Denmark 28.35 29.62
Estonia 25.88 26.57
Finland 28.78 29.58
France 28.19 29.35
Germany 27.57 28.66
Greece 26.98 28.88
Hungary 25.51 27.07
Ireland 29.95 30.48
Italy (1) 28.71 30.00
Latvia 25.60 26.78
Lithuania 25.94 26.50
Luxembourg 28.26 29.36
Malta 28.87 29.00
Netherlands 29.16 30.27
Poland 26.24 27.31
Portugal 27.22 26.60
Slovakia 25.08 26.39
Slovenia 25.75 27.97
Spain 28.72 30.66
Sweden 28.57 29.81
UK 27.57 28.38
TABLE 6.3: MEAN AGE OF WOMEN AT CHILDBEARING, EU-25, 1989–99
4.2.2. The need for more long-term-
oriented activities
A large part of the economic
dynamism in the new Member States
seems to be coming from the myriad
of new private SMEs that emerged
during the transition process.
However, the life expectancy of these
firms is generally less than two years.
This may have direct effects on
employment and working conditions,
which tend to differ sharply according
to the size and form of ownership of
the enterprise.Generally speaking, the
larger the enterprise, the better the
employment and working conditions.
Large corporations tend to regroup
public enterprises or multinational
companies, both of which tend to
provide better working conditions.
4.2.3. Quality of work and
productivity
Although a number of economic stud-
ies and Charts 6.12 and 6.13 show
significant increases in productivity in
EU-10, this is in part the result of
downsizing and rationalisation poli-
cies, leading to a more intensive use of
human resources. Careful studies of
developments in employment and
productivity at the enterprise level,
through specific enterprise surveys
and case studies, are urgently needed
before general conclusions can be
reached. However, surveys of working
conditions and worker satisfaction,
such as the one conducted by the
European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, suggest that the quality of
employment is still low and that
employees may face so many difficul-
ties in terms of income, long hours,
health and safety, the balance between
work and family, and insecurity, that it
may undermine their positive contri-
bution to growth and productivity
(see Chart 6.23).The survey, conduct-
ed in 2000–01, clearly brings out that
worker dissatisfaction, while varying
from country to country, is much
higher in the new Member States.
The survey also helps to identify
some of the major sources of dissat-
isfaction.There appears to be a signif-
icant relationship between dissatisfac-
tion at work and long working hours
(see Chart 6.24).Even stronger corre-
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Chart 6.25: Dissatisfaction at work and occupational health and safety, 2001
R2 = 0,6485
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Source: Dublin Foundation Survey 2000-01; derived from question 34 on dissatisfaction at work
and question 30 on health and safety risks.
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Chart 6.24: Dissatisfaction at work and long working hours, 2001
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Chart 6.23: Dissatisfaction at work in selected Member States  
and candidate countries (proportion of workers who are not satisfied  
with their working conditions), 2000–01
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Source: Dublin Foundation Survey 2000-01; derived from question 34 on dissatisfaction at work.
lations exist between dissatisfaction at
work and occupational health and
safety (see Chart 6.25) and between
dissatisfaction at work and the pro-
portion of workers who say that their
working hours are incompatible with
family and social life (see Chart 6.26).
4.3. Social sustainability
Poor working conditions at enter-
prise level not only influence long-
term enterprise performance but also
have damaging effects on workers’
health and safety, result in stress and
interfere with family life.These human
and social consequences may some-
times only become apparent in the
long run. Too great an imbalance
between flexibility and security may
be detrimental to investment, com-
mitment and productivity, and be
damaging for society as a whole.
4.3.1. Health indicators
Although the situation appears to be
improving, life expectancy in the new
Member States is below EU stan-
dards. In Hungary, life expectancy at
birth is 7.8 years less than the EU-15
average for men and 5.6 years less for
women. Early death is twice the EU
average. Stress at work and stress in
general between the conflicting claims
of work and family are clearly con-
tributing to such worrying mortality
indicators. The death rate of men
between 40 and 60 is significant. In
2000, in Hungary, 40 % of the men
who died were below the age of 65,
the main fatal diseases being of circu-
latory, bone, muscular or digestive 
origin. Poverty and social exclusion —
made more acute by alcoholism —
are also an important factor. In
Hungary, a survey has established a
direct relationship between individual
health conditions, life expectancy, and
socioeconomic status and income.As
an example, there is a 10-year differ-
ence between the life expectancy of
those in the most advantaged group
and the Roma population, which
belong to the most disadvantaged
group. Mortality rates also closely fol-
low regional socioeconomic inequali-
ties and different access to healthcare.
With regard to occupational health
and safety, in most countries labour
inspectorates are clearly under-
resourced. In Hungary, for instance, a
total of 452 000 hours were spent in
2001 on occupational health inspec-
tions, corresponding to the full work-
ing time of 53 physicians and 173 pub-
lic health inspectors.However, accord-
ing to the national Public Health and
Medical Office (ANTSZ), the optimal
coverage would require 123 physicians
and 303 public health inspectors,
working a total of 852 000 hours per
year.This means that the available staff
corresponds to only 53 % of the opti-
mal level. According to the National
Labour Inspectorate (OMMF), in 2001,
there were only 0.4 labour safety
inspectors per 1 000 employees.The
situation is similar in Poland, with only
one inspector for 2 416 enterprises.
4.3.2. Stress
Work-related stress is often due to
the difficulties of reconciling work and
family life, of running from one job to
another, or of having to cope with
employers’ demands of constant avail-
ability. This is no different in EU-10
compared to studies conducted in
EU-15. However, the problem is exac-
erbated when working conditions are
poor, dissatisfaction levels high, and it
is difficult to make a living from one
job. In addition, the lack of awareness
of employers and absence of dialogue
can contribute to increasing stress.
With the move to a monetary econ-
omy and the intensification of work,
work tends to dominate family life in
the new Member States and there are
many indicators showing that work
and family life are not easily recon-
ciled. For example, employers often
demand total availability of their
employees, as indicated by the formu-
lations of many job announcements
seeking workers who are ‘fully avail-
able’ and ‘resistant to stress’.
n 5. Social partnership 
as a governance 
tool
In the EU,social dialogue is recognised
as an important tool for anticipating
and managing change and improving
the governance of labour markets
(see Chapter 3). In view of the poten-
tial role which social dialogue can play
in delivering reforms, this section
examines how social dialogue might
interact with working conditions.
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Chart 6.26: Dissatisfaction at work and work and family reconciliation
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Source: Dublin Foundation Survey 2000-01; derived from question 34 on dissatisfaction at work
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Country Statutory minimum
wages
Level Fixing machinery
Cyprus Yes Sectoral Government — following recommendation of the
Tripartite Labour Advisory Board
Czech Republic Yes National Government —  following consultation with the social
partners
Estonia Yes National Bipartite agreement between the social partners —
followed by government decree
Hungary Yes National Agreement between the social partners at the
National Labour Council —  followed by government
decree
Latvia Yes National Government —  following consultation with the
National Tripartite Cooperation Council
Lithuania Yes National Government —  following recommendation of the
Permanent Labour Remuneration Committee
Malta Yes National Government —  following recommendation of the
Employment Relations Board and automatic indexation
Poland Yes National Tripartite agreement
Slovak Republic Yes National Government —  following recommendation of the
social partners
Slovenia Yes National Tripartite agreement of the social partners —  
followed by government decree
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TABLE 6.4: MINIMUM WAGES IN EU-10
Country Statutory minimum
wages
Level Fixing machinery
Austria No - No statutory minimum —  industry level collective
agreements
Belgium Yes National Agreement between the social partners at the
National Labour Council and automatic indexation
Denmark No - No statutory minimum —  industry level collective
agreements
Finland No - No statutory minimum —  sectoral collective agree-
ments
France Yes National Government —  following either report of the
National Committee on Collective Agreements or
automatic indexation
Germany No - No statutory minimum —  sectoral collective agree-
ments
Greece Yes National Tripartite agreement between the social partners
Ireland Yes National Government —  following either a national tripartite
agreement or the recommendation of the Labour
Court
Italy No - No statutory minimum —  industry level collective
agreements
Luxembourg Yes National Government —  following government review and
automatic indexation
Netherlands Yes National Government
Portugal Yes National Government
Spain Yes National Government
Sweden No - No statutory minimum —  industry level collective
agreements
UK Yes National Government —  following recommendation of the
Low Pay Commission
TABLE 6.5: MINIMUM WAGES IN EU-15
Source: ILO, 2004.
Source: ILO, 2004.
 
5.1. Tripartism
As explained in Chapter 1, social dia-
logue in the new Member States is
characterised by the predominance of
tripartism. All central and east
European countries, but also Cyprus
and Malta, have promoted forms of
tripartism. They have created tripar-
tite national councils — as early as
1960 in Cyprus, 1988 in Malta and
Hungary — to which the government
regularly invites employer and trade
union representatives to deliberate
on a number of economic and social
issues. These structures were instru-
mental in the transition years since
they helped to overcome a difficult
period of economic and social crisis,
avoiding major social upheavals and
serving as an important governance
tool in difficult times.
The report, Industrial relations in
Europe 2002, explained that in many
cases such tripartite bodies have
remained too formal and do not
always produce concrete results.
In Chapter 1, the disconnection
between the national and sectoral
levels, and between tripartite consul-
tation and bipartite dialogue has been
highlighted as one area where institu-
tional change and innovation might be
welcome. In recent years, in some
new Member States such as Hungary,
Slovakia, Slovenia or Estonia, tripar-
tite bodies seem to have extended
the range of areas which they cover
to include wages, social protection
and employment, but also such
diverse topics as immigration, EU
accession and ILO matters.
Moreover, in certain areas, such tri-
partite bodies have acquired more
authority. This is the case in relation
to the minimum wage, an area where
all of EU-10 have implemented a
statutory minimum wage. In compar-
ison, in EU-15, nine Member States
have adopted legislation, whereas six
set minimum wages by (sectoral or
national) agreement (see Chapter 1).
Looking at the procedure and
mechanisms followed, it is usual in
both EU-15 and EU-10 for the gov-
ernment to adjust the statutory min-
imum wage after consultation with
the social partners (see Tables 6.4 and
6.5). In this area, there seems to be a
considerable degree of convergence.
As explained in Chapter 1, such con-
sultations may be conducted in the
framework of social pacts or national
agreements, covering other issues as
well (wage-setting procedures, taxa-
tion, employment policy, unemploy-
ment benefits, etc.). Recent examples
of this approach in the new Member
States are found in Hungary, Slovenia
and Estonia.
5.2. Autonomous bipartite
social dialogue
In contrast to the tripartite struc-
tures, the independent channels of
social dialogue and bilateral negotia-
tions continue to be poorly devel-
oped in most of the EU-10 countries
(see Chapter 1). Employers’ organisa-
tions do not seem to have much influ-
ence on the myriad of small entrepre-
neurs who have emerged in the new
private sector.Trade unions, for their
part, have yet to find the right strate-
gy to achieve representation in small,
private sector companies. Moreover,
they continue to suffer from declining
membership and a low mobilisation
capacity.
In Chapter 1, it was shown that bar-
gaining coverage is much lower in the
new Member States, and declining,
compared with relatively high and sta-
ble coverage rates in all but one or
two of EU-15.As a proximate cause of
this difference, the absence of sectoral
(and regional) bargaining structures,
backed by employers’ associations
representing companies, was identi-
fied. With the exception of Slovenia,
wages and other working conditions
are mostly negotiated at the company
level, if at all. In most small and many
large companies there is no collective
bargaining or representation, and this
situation affects the large majority of
employees (see Chart 1.5 with cover-
age rates).
Not only is the number of collective
agreements low and their coverage
limited,most agreements are also thin
on content.Many simply recite what is
already in the law — a practice which
is not entirely unknown in some of
the EU-15 countries either, for
instance in France. In some cases, as
shown by a recent study of collective
agreements in Estonia, the content of
agreements is even more modest
than what is already provided for by
law, demonstrating the social part-
ners’ lack of knowledge of the existing
legislative provisions on working con-
ditions. In general, collective agree-
ments in the new Member States
cover a very narrow range of issues,
mainly wages and earnings bonuses,
and sometimes, but much less fre-
quently, working time. The other
essential working conditions
described in this chapter, such as
health and safety, working patterns,
working-time flexibility, payment of
overtime, work and family life,
employment contracts, and so on, are
usually not covered by social dialogue.
This void helps to explain some of the
practices occurring in employment
contracting and working conditions
described in the previous sections of
this chapter.
There are, however, positive examples
of social dialogue playing a supportive
role in improving employment and
working conditions.One case in point
is the renewed regional social dia-
logue in Poland, which in recent years
has helped some regions to carry out
restructuring on the basis of partner-
ship, rather than through conflict (see
Box 6.1). Collective bargaining also
seems to be playing an increasingly
active role in regulating working-time
arrangements in Hungary, as shown
by the example in Box 6.2.
Finally, Slovenia offers an example of
best practice in terms of the interplay
between different levels of social dia-
logue, with national tripartite agree-
ments on a number of issues being
complemented by collective agree-
169
Employment and working conditions in the new Member States Chapter 6
170
Chapter 6 Industrial Relations in Europe 2004
Regional social policy is on the Polish agenda again, after the boost
given to regional social dialogue in 2001.The Tripartite Commission
for Social and Economic Issues and the voivodship (regional) com-
missions for social dialogue of July 2001 — that entered into force
in October 2001 — provides for legally based regional tripartite
social dialogue.
Voivodship commissions of tripartite social dialogue (WKDS) start-
ed to operate in March 2002.The law enables these commissions to
be set up at the request of at least one of the representatives of
either a trade union or employers’ organisation, and is composed
of: the voivod representing local authorities; the representatives of
trade unions; the representatives of employers’ organisations; and
the marshall of the voivodship as a representative of the regional
government.
The assessment of these regional commissions is so far mixed. On
the one hand, the social partners have complained about their pure-
ly consultative nature. As they do not have any statutory mission,
this prevents them from moving beyond ‘theoretical’ discussions.
Research conducted in 2003 underlined that such consultative sta-
tus may hinder rather than strengthen the development of regional
social dialogue (1).According to the authors, at the beginning organ-
isations tended to send their senior representatives to the regional
commissions, but this is no longer the case, demonstrating disillu-
sionment with regard to this form of dialogue.The commissions also
seem to be suffering from their excessively narrow scope.
On the other hand, concrete steps could be achieved in the frame-
work of these regional commissions. Cooperation between social
partners could be initiated to implement national and international
programmes aimed at improving employment at the regional level.
This has been the case, for instance, with the commission of the
voivodship of Swietokryskie where social partners worked togeth-
er on the restructuring plan of the coal industry (Huta Ostrowiec).
The social commission played a key role in avoiding social conflicts
and finding concrete solutions. Discussions were also conducted
with a potential Spanish investor who decided to buy the firm in
September 2003 and who signed an agreement with trade unions
on social conditions.The commission also started cooperating with
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in order to define and carry out a
regional restructuring programme that could benefit from European
funds. To sum up, while the functioning of regional social dialogue
still needs to be improved, it nevertheless represents one of the
specific features of Polish industrial relations today.
Box 6.1: Regional social dialogue emerging in Poland
Following the transposition of EC Directive 93/104/EC, the
Hungarian labour code (Act XXII of 1992 modified in 2001) leaves
considerable room for social dialogue over working-time issues. It
allows certain flexibility to be negotiated between social partners,
in particular to increase the maximum annual overtime ceiling (from
the 200 hours legally allowed, to 300 hours) and the daily hours
limit (from 8 to 12 hours).The reference period can also be nego-
tiated and lengthened from two to four months, if there is an enter-
prise collective agreement, and even up to six months if there is an
agreement involving several employers – a ‘multi-employer’ agree-
ment. Finally, collective agreements may also stipulate a reference
period of up to one year for four specified job categories: employ-
ees working in stand-by-shops, employees working in continuous
shifts, those on alternating shifts, and seasonal employees.
Social dialogue on working time thus makes it possible to define a
framework for working time within individual companies, and to take
better account of the specific needs of the various sectors, profes-
sions and types of work organisation. Employers responded positive-
ly to such a call for social dialogue, with two major trends: an
increased interest at enterprise level to negotiate on the reference
period; and the lengthening of the reference period up to the maxi-
mum one-year where conditions allow for this.
As a result, the number of collective agreements with a reference
period of a year increased significantly. In 2002, there were 13 such
agreements out of the 67 registered multi-employer agreements, and
160 out of the registered 1 278 company agreements. In 2003, they
had increased to 20 agreements out of the 73 registered multi-
employer agreements, and to 225 out of the registered 1 275 com-
pany agreements.
The collective agreement in the hotel and catering sector — which
has been extended to the entire sector — includes this kind of pro-
vision. Other sectors where such a one-year reference period is
widely used include agriculture and construction — both dominated
by seasonal work — and the chemical industry — where continuous
shifts prevail.
Social dialogue has thus led to the regulation of extra working hours
and also contributed to fair remuneration of working time, notably
by reducing unpaid overtime — more prevalent where there are no
trade unions.According to the labour inspectorate, those companies
that have no collective agreement — and thus have not lengthened
the reference period beyond two months — are far more likely to
breach the working-time provisions of the labour code (and thus to
face penalties) than companies with collective agreements.
Employees covered by a longer reference period are also better pro-
tected — in line with the joint requirements for flexibility and secu-
rity — since they are automatically entitled to more and longer rest
periods, unless otherwise agreed in the collective agreement, and the
maximum work day can under no circumstances exceed 12 hours.
However, this correlation between social dialogue and working time
has also led to some drawbacks. Firstly, because it means that those
employers who do not have the opportunity to sign such collective
agreements — for instance, either because they employ too few
employees, or the relevant trade union is unwilling to address the
question of reference periods in a collective agreement — end up
being at a competitive disadvantage, as they have to operate with a
2, rather than a 12-month reference period. Such a difference may be
critical in the case of seasonal activities, or those working alternat-
ing shifts. Secondly, the number of employees covered by the exten-
sion of the reference period is in reality low — fewer than half of all
employees — because of the large number of employers with only a
very small number of employees.
This suggests there is a need for more, rather than less social dia-
logue — especially better coverage of collective bargaining — and
for stronger, not weaker social partners.
Box 6.2: Social dialogue on working-time arrangements in Hungary
(1) Sroka Jacek et al. (2003), Rozwoj dialogu spolecznego na poziomie regionalnym — Raport z badan — Memo, Uniwersytet
Wroclawski.
 
ments at sectoral and enterprise level,
and by a strong tradition of workers’
participation in decision-making —
through works councils and participa-
tion on the board — at enterprise
level. These examples suggest that
social dialogue can indeed help to
improve working conditions at enter-
prise level, especially in areas, such as
reconciling work and family life, which
have so far been neglected too often
by the social partners in the new
Member States.
5.3. Employee participation
Direct forms of workers’ participa-
tion — such as participation in boards
of directors or works councils, includ-
ing EWCs — also have a direct
impact on working conditions, espe-
cially where a role is foreseen for
workers’ representatives, such as for
the implementation of all EC direc-
tives on health and safety, which
require health and safety committees.
However, as shown in Chapter 1,
among EU-10 only Slovenia and
Hungary, and more recently Slovakia,
have introduced works councils with
facilities and powers comparable to
some of those found in EU-15. In the
other new Member States, workers’
participation still encounters certain
obstacles. In Poland, the Czech
Republic, and the Baltic States, works
councils and other forms of workers’
involvement in decision-making, con-
sidered to be ‘vestiges’ of socialism,
were dismantled after 1989, together
with other self-management forms,
such as cooperatives, often with the
cooperation of trade unions.
Both in EU-15 and EU-10, worker par-
ticipation and forms of information
and consultation and trade union rep-
resentation and bargaining coverage,
are more likely in larger companies.
Small private enterprises generally do
not have trade unions or works coun-
cils and other participatory mecha-
nisms that could serve as a basis for
social dialogue and partnership. In the
new Member States, the problem is
compounded by the large share of the
small firms sector, the general weak-
ness of trade unions and employers’
organisations, the low coverage of bar-
gaining, and the informal economy.The
result is that social dialogue does not
extend to a relatively large part of the
economy and the workforce.This situ-
ation may change, at least for larger
companies,with the implementation of
EU Directive 2002/14/EC establishing
a general framework for informing and
consulting employees in enterprises.
Employees working in enterprises that
belong to multinational groups have
benefited from the presence of EWCs
that have helped in some cases to
address transnational issues.Chapter 5
explained that of the 547 companies
or groups having a subsidiary in one of
the new Member States falling within
the scope of the directive, 323 had
already set up an EWC,30 % of which
included members or observers from
the new Member States. All acceding
countries have transposed Directive
94/45/EC into national legislation (see
Chapter 4).
The Dublin Foundation survey used
throughout this chapter, indicates a
direct relationship between employ-
ees’ opportunities to discuss their
working conditions with management
and job satisfaction (see Chart 6.27).
However, in spite of this positive
effect on employee satisfaction, such
channels of communication remain
rare. Moreover, even when legal
requirements exist, these are not
always implemented. In Estonia, for
instance, 23 % of enterprises were
found not to apply the obligatory
appointment of a working environ-
ment council. Considering the exces-
sive flexibility of employment con-
tracting emerging in some of the new
Member States, the involvement of
workers’ representatives in employ-
ment decisions — for instance, in col-
lective layoffs and restructuring —
may turn out to be rather marginal.
The development of employees’ finan-
cial participation, especially through
employee ownership, is a particular
feature of EU-10, where such partici-
patory forms have been promoted
more actively than in EU-15. Financial
participation was developed on a
massive scale during the first stage of
privatisation in Slovenia and was also
much used in Hungary, Lithuania and
Latvia.Although this represents a pos-
sible avenue for economic democracy
at work, with potentially positive
effects not only for workers’ motiva-
tion but also for economic perform-
ance and employment, financial partic-
ipation has declined as economic
hardship has often resulted in work-
ers and their families deciding to sell
their shares.
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Chart 6.27: The effects of workers' participation channels on satisfaction 
at work in the new Member States and candidate countries
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n 6. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to assess
trends in employment and working
conditions in the new Member States.
The analysis has shown a mixed pic-
ture, with both achievements and
remaining problems. On the positive
side, employers and employees in the
new Member States have shown a
very strong capacity for adaptation,
with above-average growth and many
institutional innovations and legal
changes. Cyprus and Malta have made
enormous progress to be ready for
accession and the eight new members
from central and eastern Europe have
successfully transformed their collec-
tively planned systems into market
based democracies. They have
removed the central role of the State
to allow individual private operators
to emerge and develop, have redirect-
ed their trade flows from the former
Comecon system towards the EU
and other industrialised countries,
have restructured their economies by
reducing the prevalent manufacturing
activities and the agricultural sector in
favour of service activities, and, finally,
they have introduced new legal and
institutional frameworks making it
possible to operate in a free market
economy and fulfil the social and 
economic requirements of EU mem-
bership.
However, in this adaptation process,
some problematic developments have
been identified, notably the increase
of unemployment. Problems also
remain with regard to working condi-
tions, for example, health and safety,
working hours, unpaid overtime on a
large scale, the under-reporting of
wages, stress at work and difficulties
in reconciling work and family life.
An important challenge for the new
Member States will be the need – in
line with the Lisbon objectives – to
promote more sustainable and
socially cohesive societies at the
same time as continuing their adapta-
tion process. Important progress has
been made and the new Member
States have been involved for some
time now in the open method of
coordination on employment and
social inclusion. Nevertheless,
despite the progress observed, grow-
ing earnings and income differentials,
poverty and the social and economic
exclusion of some groups, continue
to be a problem. No doubt these
features will continue to be the most
important challenges for their indus-
trial relations systems in the coming
years.
EU membership and implementation
of the EU’s legislative acquis in the
social field should help to bring about
improvements in working conditions.
In addition, it will be important to
continue promoting the role of social
dialogue and partnership in these
countries as a way of achieving a more
balanced approach between the need
of employers for flexibility and the
desire of employees for security (see
also Chapter 3). Social dialogue can
also help to include those with disad-
vantages in the labour market, and
thereby contribute to social cohesion.
A cohesive society is better able to
address new challenges. The capacity
of the new Member States for change
and innovation, combined with the
enthusiasm shown in the accession
process and the strong desire to con-
verge with EU standards, give reason
for optimism with regard to the
future.
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Country Abbreviation
Belgium BE
Czech Republic CZ
Denmark DK
Germany DE
Estonia EE
Greece EL
Spain ES
France FR
Ireland IE
Italy IT
Cyprus CY
Latvia LV
Lithuania LT
Luxembourg LU
Hungary HU
Malta MT
Netherlands NL
Austria AT
Poland PL
Portugal PT
Slovenia SI
Slovakia SK
Finland FI
Sweden SE
United Kingdom UK
Bulgaria BG
Romania RO
Turkey TR
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Country abbreviations
 
Useful websites and documents
Employment and Social Affairs DG social dialogue website:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/social/index_en.htm
Employment and Social Affairs DG social dialogue grant website:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/calls/proposal_2004_en.cfm
UNICE — http://www.unice.org
CEEP — http://www.ceep.org
UEAPME — http://www.ueapme.com
ETUC — http://www.etuc.org
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) — http://www.etui.org
Postal Services Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee website: http://www.PostSocialDialog.org
Sugar Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee website: http://www.eurosugar.org
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions — http://www.eurofound.eu.int
European Industrial Relations Observatory — http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int
European Monitoring Centre on Change — http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emcc/emcc.htm
Useful documents
‘Recent developments in the European inter-professional social dialogue 2002–03’
http://esnet.cec/comm/employment_social/social_dialogue/docs/recent_en.pdf
‘The sectoral social dialogue in Europe’
http://esnet.cec/comm/employment_social/social_dialogue/sectoral_en.htm
‘Report of the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the European Union’
www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/social/index_en.htm
‘Industrial relations in Europe 2002 report’
www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/social/index_en.htm
Commission communication,‘Social policy agenda’, COM(2000) 379 final, 28 June 2000
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/general/com00-379/com379_en.pdf
Commission communication,‘Mid-term review of the social policy agenda’, COM(2003) 312 final, 2 June 2003
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2003/jun/com2003312_en.pdf
‘Employment in Europe 2004’
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/employ_2004_en.htm
‘Joint employment report 2003-04’
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/employ_en.htm
‘Jobs, jobs, jobs — Creating more employment in Europe’, report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok,
November 2003
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/task_en.htm
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